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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The establishment of a fully fledged central bank in Greece between May 1927 and May 1928 
was a prerequisite for the country’s stabilisation programme prepared by the Financial 
Committee of the League of Nations.  
Prior to 1928, the National Bank of Greece had acted as a central bank whilst at the same 
time being by far the biggest and most powerful commercial bank in the country. Under 
pressure from the League, its governors faced the challenge of transforming it into a fully 
fledged central bank by shedding all business that was in the province of deposit and 
commercial banking. They chose instead for the Bank to retain its commercial activities and 
instead a new fully fledged central bank was established. 
This thesis explores both the central banking and commercial aspects of the National 
Bank from the enactment of the Law of Control in 1898 until de jure stabilisation in 1928. It 
addresses the following questions: why was the National Bank not in a position to transform 
itself into a fully fledged central bank on its own initiative following a path similar to that 
described by the natural evolution hypothesis? Why were the commercial activities of the 
National Bank so important that in the end it chose to retain that aspect of its business when 
prior to 1927 it had so fiercely guarded its central banking privileges? 
It is argued that it was the way in which the governors of the National Bank combined 
central banking responsibilities with commercial banking that safeguarded and preserved the 
financial strength and consequently the reputation of the Bank throughout its entire history as 
a bank of issue.  
The financial position of the dual-purpose Bank was also protected by the conservative 
and risk-averse way in which it pursued its commercial activities. The National Bank’s 
financial strength was based on its market power and its ability to select high quality assets 
and liabilities which resulted in its enduring profitability and solvency. The quality of its 
assets and liabilities was more important for its governors than maximisation of profits per se. 
The way that central banking reforms were implemented is also studied. The objectives 
and functions of the new central bank are evaluated as well as its financial position when it 
first opened its doors for business. It is maintained that the statutes of the Bank of Greece were 
at the heart of the central banking principles promoted by the Bank of England and were 
focused on the macro function of a central bank and on its role as the bank of the government.  
This thesis also sheds light on the complex relationship that arose between Greek 
governments and foreign supervisors between the enactment of the Law of Control in 1898 
and stabilisation in 1928. Furthermore, it asks questions about the conditionality attached to 
bailout loans in the late nineteenth century and in the 1920s. The impact that international 
financial intervention had on monetary reforms is clearly demonstrated. It is argued that 
monetary developments in Greece between 1898 and 1928 reflect the political economy of the 
time as well as the historical circumstances. Monetary reforms were shaped by the objectives 
of the National Bank and the constraints under which it operated rather than foreign control. 
These findings provide valuable insights into why Greek governments have unsuccessfully 
struggled to implement widespread structural reforms demanded by their lenders since 2010 
and as a consequence the country has experienced a deep and protracted economic recession.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The establishment of a fully fledged central bank in Greece between May 1927 and May 1928 
was a prerequisite of the country’s stabilisation programme prepared by the Financial 
Committee of the League of Nations.  
 
 The Greek authorities resorted to the League of Nations for a second time, in the spring 
of 1927 in order to obtain an international loan under its auspices to stabilise the drachma and to 
continue work with refugees. The reconstruction scheme prepared by the Financial Committee 
was a typical League stabilisation plan, comprising institutional reforms focused mainly on the 
central banking system and the flotation of an international loan. In the Greek example, 
however, there was a domestic variation on the League’s norms in that reorganisation of the 
issuing bank in Greece as recommended by the Financial Committee led to the establishment of 
a fully fledged central bank de novo which opened its doors for business on Monday, 14 May 
1928, two days after the drachma had been de jure stabilised. 
 
 Prior to that date, the National Bank of Greece, a joint stock bank founded in 1841, 
had acted as a central bank whilst at the same time being by far the biggest and most powerful 
commercial bank in the country. In April 1927, League representatives visited Athens to 
investigate economic conditions in the country. The multifaceted character of the National 
Bank attracted severe criticism from the League officials, its activities as a commercial bank 
deemed to be in stark contrast to those of an orthodox central bank. Furthermore, the National 
Bank, being the country’s central bank, was considered to be too close to the government. The 
following June, the Greek government officially requested the assistance of the League of 
Nations to obtain an international loan under its auspices. The Financial Committee asked as a 
prerequisite for the National Bank to be reformed so as to bring it into closer conformity with 
modern central banking practice by shedding all business that would normally be the province 
of deposit and commercial banking. Strong opposition was expressed by the governor of the 
National Bank who was prepared to espouse only marginal reforms of the business that the 
Bank pursued. The negotiations were about to reach a stalemate in late June 1927 when the 
deputy governor of the National Bank suggested an alternative solution which at the time 
appeared innovative: the National Bank would continue its commercial functions and instead 
it would transfer to a new bank its privilege of note issue and those of its other activities that 
would normally be carried on by a central bank. This proposition led to the establishment of a 
fully fledged central bank in Greece, the Bank of Greece.  
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This thesis explores the ‘dual position’2, i.e. both the central banking and commercial 
aspects of the National Bank from the enactment of the Law of Control in 1898 until de jure 
stabilisation in 1928. It addresses the following questions: why was the National Bank not in a 
position to transform itself into a fully fledged central bank on its own initiative following a 
path similar to that described by the natural evolution hypothesis? Why were the commercial 
activities of the National Bank so important that in the end it chose to retain that aspect of its 
business when prior to 1927 it had so fiercely guarded its issuing privilege?  
 
The relationship between the National Bank and the government is scrutinised. The 
way that the government financed wars and reconstruction is also examined. The aim is to 
evaluate the way that public finance between 1912 and 1927 affected the financial position of 
the Old Bank. This naturally leads to the question of the kind of stabilisation programme that 
the governors of the National Bank favoured and how they envisaged it affecting its position. 
What did the National Bank try to achieve with stabilisation? How did its governor envisage 
that stabilisation would affect the status of the Bank? The National Bank pursued the 
implementation of a stabilisation plan accompanied by an international loan in order to 
liquidate part of the government debt tied to its assets. This would improve the financial 
position of the National Bank and enable it to expand its commercial business and take 
advantage of the new opportunities that a stable drachma and capital inflows would create. 
 
The way that central banking reforms were implemented is studied. The objectives 
and the functions of the new central bank are evaluated as well as its financial position when 
it first opened its doors for business. Public debt held by the Old Bank even after having lost 
its central banking functions is also examined.  
 
This thesis also sheds light on the complex relationship that arose between Greek 
governments and foreign supervisors between the enactment of the Law of Control in 1898 
and stabilisation in 1928. Sovereign risk time series have been constructed to establish the 
background of the negotiating power of the Greek government on the international financial 
markets during the period in question. Furthermore, this thesis asks questions about 
government access to capital markets with assistance and support during the first era of 
globalisation and under the auspices of the League of Nations in the 1920s. It also examines 
the conditionality attached to this kind of borrowing operation.  
 
2 Clapham (1944, p. 372). 
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Chapter 1 discusses the historiography on central banking and looks at the different 
theories that have been developed to explain the evolution as well as the spread of the 
institution up to the advent of the Great Depression. Special attention is paid to the role that 
the Bank of England and the League of Nations played in promoting central banking 
orthodoxy in the 1920s. Chapter 2 discusses Greek historiography on the establishment of 
the central bank in Greece and sets the objectives of this thesis. It also presents the sources 
employed. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the predecessor of the Bank of Greece, the National 
Bank, and explore its ‘dual position’ as a central bank and at the same time the most 
important commercial bank in the country. The monetary arrangement of March 1910 that has 
prompted contemporary economists and economic historians to claim that Greece adopted 
either the gold standard or the gold exchange standard during that month is studied in Chapter 
4. The evolution of public debt and the sources of government borrowing from the outbreak 
of the First World War until de jure stabilisation of the drachma are examined in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 6 analyses the different plans proposed for the stabilisation of the drachma and the 
League reconstruction scheme is scrutinised. This chapter also examines the making of the 
Stabilisation Loan. Finally, the parallels and contrasts between the Law of Control of 1898 
and the League Stabilisation Plan of 1928 are explored. Chapter 7 looks at the institutional 
arrangements surrounding the establishment of the Bank of Greece. Its aims and functions are 
presented along with its endowment. Chapter 7 is followed by the overall conclusions of this 
research. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
CENTRAL BANKING IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
 
1.1. Some thoughts on the evolution of central banking  
1.1.1. Origins and evolution of central banking  
1.1.2. Spread of central banking institutions  
1.1.3. In search of a definition of central banking  
1.2. Central banking in the 1920s, the Bank of England and the League of Nations  
1.2.1. Introduction  
1.2.2. Central banking in the 1920s and the Bank of England  
1.2.3. The League of Nations and central banking reforms in the 1920s  
 
 
 
1.1. Some thoughts on the evolution of central banking 
1.1.1. Origins and evolution of central banking 
Walter Bagehot, writing in the nineteenth century, and Vera Smith, in the mid-1930s, despite 
being supporters of free banking, argued in favour of central banking in their influential 
books.3 Today nearly all independent countries have established a central bank whilst the 
influence and the scope of the alternative to central banking, that is to say free banking, has 
remained purely academic.  
 
 The origins of central banking are usually traced to the second half of the nineteenth 
century, with the Bank Charter Act of 1844 being a watershed. The monetary debate in 
London that followed the enactment of Peel’s Act, mainly prompted by Bagehot, led to the 
evolution of central banking as it is known today.4 Some scholars have maintained that central 
banking emerged earlier during the Suspension period between 1797 and 1821 when the 
Bullionist debate took place.5 Both approaches, however, suggest that the ‘home of central 
3 Bagehot ([1873] 1999); Smith (1936). 
4 See, for example, Harvey (1927, p. 10); Goodhart (1988); Capie et al. (1994); Capie (2002). 
5 Flandreau (2008); Bordo (2008, p. 245). 
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banking’ is England.6 In addition, they show that the evolution of the Bank of England from 
being a dual-purpose bank – that is to say, a bank that combined central banking 
responsibilities with commercial activities – to being a non-competitive, non-profit-
maximising banking organisation which focused primarily on public duties provides the 
historical archetype for the development of a central bank. In fact, the dominant view of the 
evolution of central banking has been based on the history of the Bank of England.  
 
Recent research, however, attempts to challenge the ‘British orthodoxy’ and traces 
the origins of modern central banks to the early seventeenth century. It focuses on the history 
of public deposit banks – giro banks – such as the Bank of Amsterdam and the Bank of 
Hamburg and argues that these banks functioned as early precursors of modern central banks 
since they managed to maintain a sound currency.7 Stephen Quinn and William Roberds 
(2005) go as far as to claim that the Bank of Amsterdam was the ‘first true central bank’.  
 
There is a consensus in the literature on central banking, on the reasons that led to the 
establishment of early central banks. Early central banks were founded for political reasons 
connected with the exigencies of state finance.8 Their emergence stemmed from the need of 
‘revenue seeking or power-hungry governments’9 to ‘finance on beneficial, subsidised terms’10 
public expenditure, especially during periods of political turmoil and war. These early central 
banks possibly had a monopoly in note issuing and served as the bank of the government. In 
addition, they pursued commercial activities and enjoyed privileges endorsed by legislation in 
return for financial assistance to the government.  
 
Some nineteenth century central banks were established to unify a chaotic system of 
note issue.11 These central banks were also expected to manage and protect the metallic reserves 
of the country in question and also to facilitate and improve the payment system. These latter 
functions were seen as having widespread beneficial economic consequences. The ability, 
however, to share in the profits of seigniorage and the greater centralised control over the gold 
reserves had obvious political attractions.12  
 
6 Harvey (1927, p. 10). 
7 Quinn and Roberds (2005); Schnabel and Hyun Song Shin (2006); Quinn and Roberds (2007); 
Ugolini (2011). For a brief history of these early public banks, see Roberds and Velde (2014).  
8 Smith (1936, p. 167). 
9 Bordo and Redish (1987, p. 405). 
10 Goodhart (1988, p. 19). 
11 For example, see the reasons that led to the establishment of the Bank of Italy, the Bank of Japan and 
the Reichsbank in Goodhart (1988, pp. 105–160); Capie et al. (1994, pp. 154–172). 
12 Goodhart (1988, p. 4); See Bordo and Schwartz (2003) for a summary of Goodhart’s views on the 
evolution of central banking.  
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Michael Bordo and Angela Redish (1987) examine the possibility that the Bank of 
Canada, founded in 1935, was established as an anchor in the absence of a gold standard 
whilst scholars who have examined the establishment of central banks after the end of the 
Second World War have argued that by then, it had become accepted that any self-respecting 
independent country should have its own central bank.13 In the newly established countries, 
especially those countries which were previously colonies and became independent after the 
Second World War, to have a central bank was synonymous with political and economic 
independence.14 As they achieved political independence, one of their first major acts was 
typically to create a central bank. For the first time, these countries achieved both the political 
sovereignty and the institutional arrangements that would enable them to implement 
independent monetary policies.15  
 
 There has been a debate over whether the evolution of central banking relied entirely 
on market forces or required deliberate state action.16 This debate is focused primarily on the 
role of a central bank as the bank of the banks. Proponents of the free banking school argue, 
usually emphatically, that it was in the monopoly of note issue and other government 
privileges that led early central banks to assume responsibility for the stability of the financial 
sector. For example, Smith (1936, p. 168) argued that ‘[i]t was out of monopolies in the note 
issue that were derived the secondary functions and characteristics of our modern central 
banks’.17 She identified as ‘secondary functions’ of a central bank its role as a bankers’ bank 
and the power to exercise control over the credit market – a form of monetary policy. 
Therefore, according to Smith the monopoly in note issuing – a government granted privilege 
– is the essential attribute that defines a central bank and not any of the ‘secondary functions’. 
In this case then, the emergence of a central bank is a product of ‘government sponsorship’.18  
 
In 1873 Bagehot stated that the government-granted privileges of the Bank of 
England played a crucial part in its gaining the deposits of other banks.19 He concluded that  
with so many advantages over all competitors, it is quite natural that the Bank of England 
should have far outstripped them all. Inevitably, it became the bank in London: all the 
other bankers grouped themselves round it, and lodged their [gold] reserve with it. Thus, 
[the] one-reserve system was not deliberately founded upon definite reasons; it was the 
13 Capie et al. (1994, p. 37). 
14 For example, see Schenk (1993, 1997).   
15 Chandler (1962, p. 3). 
16 White (1999, p. 70). 
17 See also ibid., p. 73. 
18 Ibid., p. 70. 
19 Bagehot ([1873] 1999, pp. 92–100). 
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gradual consequence of many singular events, and of an accumulation of legal privileges 
on a single bank which has not been altered and which no one would now defend.20  
More recently Charles Goodhart (1988), drawing on the historical experiences of 
several nations, demonstrated that early central banks gained their role as a bank of the banks 
in the way Bagehot described. Goodhart argued that  
[o]nce such Central Banks had been established, however, their central position within 
the system, their ‘political’ power as the government’s bank, their command (usually) 
over the bulk of the nation’s metallic reserve, and, most important, their ability to provide 
extra cash, notes by rediscounting made them become the bankers’ bank: commercial 
banks would not only hold a large proportion of their own (cash) reserves as balances 
with the Central Bank, but also rely on it to provide extra liquidity when in difficulties. 21  
Hence, according to Goodhart, market forces are responsible for the evolution of central 
banks as banks of the banks, and for assuming responsibility for the stability of the financial 
sector. He further added that ‘in most cases of central banks founded in the nineteenth century, 
the full ramifications of their role as bankers’ bank were only dimly perceived at the time of 
their founding; these functions developed naturally from the context of relationships within the 
system’.22  
 
Goodhart’s views on the evolution of central banking are known as the natural 
evolution hypothesis. In a nutshell, it is argued that central banking as it is known today 
emerged when private, profit-making commercial banks which also enjoyed government 
sponsored privileges evolved into non-profit, non-competitive public institutions whose main 
concern was the stability of the financial sector. The conflict between the public responsibilities 
of a dual-purpose bank and concerns over satisfying shareholders made the transition from a 
competitive, profit-maximising bank to a modern central bank lengthy and painful.23 Thus, the 
defining characteristic of a central bank according to the natural evolution hypothesis is the 
function of the lender of last resort.24 Monetary policy played a minor role in this evolution.25 
It is beyond doubt that acceptance of the microeconomic responsibility for the stability of the 
financial sector was a defining attribute in the evolution of central banking as it is known 
today. However, as Marc Flandreau (2008, p. 213, n. 2) remarks, Goodhart’s account relied 
heavily on case studies prepared for the US Congress National Commission of 1908, which had 
an explicit mandate to examine whether a central bank was able to reduce the occurrence and 
severity of financial crises.  
20 Ibid., p. 100. 
21 Goodhart (1988, p. 5). 
22 Ibid. 
23 Bordo and Redish (1987, p. 406); Goodhart (1988). 
24 Goodhart (1987, 1988); Capie et al. (1994, pp. 5–6). 
25 Goodhart (1988, pp. 5–6); Flandreau (2008, p. 212). 
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Central banking as it is recognised today is the product of a slow process, trial and 
perhaps historical accident. From the establishment of the Riksbank which is often regarded 
as the oldest surviving central bank, to the outbreak of the Great War is a long period of 
consolidation for the institution. By the turn of the twentieth century, central banking, either 
by market forces as Goodhart argues or according to Smith by government intervention, had 
developed its main characteristics and functions. Central banks were regarded as having a 
monopoly – either partial or complete – in note issuing, and as being banks of the government 
as well as banks of the banks. By that time ideally, central banking institutions had shed 
commercial activities and shareholders’ interests were subordinate to their public duties. 
Otherwise, they ‘were thought of as historical oddities to be brought into line, sooner or later, 
with the English mode’.26  
 
1.1.2. Spread of central banking institutions 
 
Table 1.1: Number of central banks, 1900–1990 
 No. of central banks 
No. of new 
central banks established 
1900 18  
1910 20 2 
1920 23 3 
1930 35 12 
1940 42 7 
1950 59 17 
1960 80 21 
1970 108 28 
1980 137 29 
1990 161 24 
Sources: Pringle (1994, pp. xi–xii); Capie et al. (1994, p. 6). 
 
Table 1.1 above shows the number of central banks in existence at the end of each decade of 
the twentieth century. The Morgan Stanley Central Bank Directory (1994) provided the data 
used to compile this table. Table 1.1 shows that there were 18 central banks by the turn of the 
twentieth century, though they were by no means homogenous. This table also demonstrates 
that the number of central banks being established increased rapidly decade by decade, 
26 Sayers (1976a, p. 2). 
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particularly after the Second World War. Today, almost all independent countries have a 
central bank.  
 
 Capie et al. (1994, pp. 5–6) provided a detailed chronology of the evolution of the 
fully fledged model of the institution such as had been adopted by 14 of the 18 banking 
organisations that Table 1.1 indicates had operated as central banks by the end of the 
nineteenth century. With the exception of the Bank of Japan, each of them was a European 
bank that had evolved into a fully fledged central bank as the term is understood today. Capie 
et al. (1994, p. 5) used a functional definition to identify a banking organisation as being a 
central bank. They recognised a banking organisation as a central bank if it had a note issuing 
monopoly, was the bank of the government and had assumed the role of the lender of last 
resort.27  
 
 A common characteristic of these 18 banking institutions that are thought of as 
having been central banks since the nineteenth century is that they still survive today. With 
the exception of the Sveriges Riksbank, these were privately owned banks engaged in 
commercial activities whilst at the same time enjoying public privileges; they had a note 
issuing monopoly and had been the bank of the government since their foundation. In 
addition, the development of all these banks into central banks in the modern sense of the 
term complied with one of Goodhart’s laws: their public responsibilities were eclipsing their 
commercial activities by the end of the nineteenth century. That is to say, their metamorphosis 
from banks of issue into fully fledged central banks followed a path described by the natural 
evolution hypothesis. By contrast, all organisations that operate as central banks now and 
which were established after the turn of the twentieth century began life as fully fledged 
central banks which had a mandate to be the sole bank of issue, the bank of the government 
and possibly to be responsible for the stability of the banking sector. This demonstrates that 
the development of central banking in most countries differed from that described by the 
natural evolution hypothesis. Nearly all the central banks that operate today were established 
from the beginning as central banks and were endowed with the latest central banking 
principles, powers and techniques, which were frequently in contrast with central banking 
practices in the country in question. 
 
 By the turn of the twentieth century, however, there were other banking organisations 
not recognised in Table 1.1 which, although they had central banking responsibilities, failed 
to evolve into the fully blown version of the institution as it became known after the mid-
27 See Ugolini (2011, pp. 2–8) for a presentation of the functional and institutional approaches to 
central banking. 
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twentieth century. In some cases, these organisations were not encouraged either by market 
forces or further government intervention to evolve into central banks in the modern sense of 
the term, whilst in others historical circumstances did not permit their survival. 
 
 One of the early central banks that did not develop into the fully fledged mode of the 
institution was the National Bank of Greece, which was established in 1842. In 1927, it was 
regarded as ‘one of the oldest banks of issue’,28 and if it had continued to pursue central 
banking activities from then on, then the origins of central banking in Greece would be 
traceable back to the mid-nineteenth century. This would have been possible if in the first 
instance the National Bank had confined its activities to central banking responsibilities and 
had shed the commercial business that was not compatible with orthodox central banking as 
defined by the Financial Committee of the League of Nations in June 1927. The National 
Bank chose to retain its commercial aspect, however, and so instead a new central bank, the 
Bank of Greece, was established. Continuity in central banking in Greece from the mid-
nineteenth century until today might yet have been maintained if in 1928, the newly 
established central bank had taken over the name of the Old Bank becoming the ‘National 
Bank of Greece’ as a member of the League committee responsible for the reform had 
recommended privately. This was never officially proposed, however, as the governors of the 
Old Bank of issue in Greece would never have consented.29  
 
Table 1.1 therefore demonstrates firstly the number of early central banks that had 
evolved into the fully fledged model of the institution by 1900 following a path described by 
the natural evolution hypothesis, and secondly that once the idea of central banking had been 
consolidated then the norm became the establishment of central banks de novo. A question 
occurs, however: why did so many countries establish a central bank de novo even though 
there was already in place some kind of monetary authority that was pursuing central banking 
functions? It is, therefore, important to look at the reasons that prevented early central banks 
from developing into fully fledged models of the institution. In this way, further light will be 
shed on the evolution of central banking as well as the way in which the institution spread. 
This thesis aspires to provide insights into the matter in question by examining the evolution 
of central banking in Greece between the enactment of the Law of Control in 1898 and the 
establishment of the Bank of Greece in 1928. 
 
 
28 Historical Archives of the Bank of Greece – Emmanuel Tsouderos Archive [hereafter HABOG_A3], 
S1Y1F4T1, p. 2. 
29 Bank of England, [hereafter BoE], Archive 0V9/190/93. 
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1.1.3. In search of a definition of central banking 
The natural evolution hypothesis provides a convincing explanation of the development of 
central banking as it is known today. However, it neither explains why the British ‘orthodoxy’ 
became the dominant dogma and was adopted by the rest of the world nor sheds any light on 
the way in which it spread.  
 
 A question asked in the literature is ‘what makes an institution a central bank’.30 This 
question becomes even more pertinent when it is related to historical research on central 
banking. Capie et al. (1994, p. 5) remark that to define ‘central banking is problematic’. 
Whilst Lawrence White (1999, p. 71) notes that there is a ‘surprising lack of consensus on the 
question’ and states that economists identify central banking with at least five major roles, 
adding that it is not necessary for a central bank to have adopted all these roles – it suffices ‘to 
play one or more of these roles without playing all five’. These five roles are as follows: 
serving as a bankers’ bank, having a monopoly of note issue, acting as a lender of last resort, 
regulating commercial banks and conducting monetary policy.31 Goodhart (1988, pp. 5–7) 
identifies an institution as a central bank if it is responsible for monetary policy which is a 
macroeconomic function, is the bank of the banks, acts as a lender of last resort and is 
possibly responsible for banking supervision. The latter are all microeconomic functions. The 
European Central Bank also provides an answer to the question of what a central bank is. On 
its website it is stated that a ‘central bank is a public institution that manages the 
currency of a country or group of countries and controls the money supply – literally, 
the amount of money in circulation’.32 A Goodhart assumption is implied in all these 
definitions of central banking; a central bank is a non-profit-maximising institution which is 
not involved in general commercial banking.  
 
Smith (1936) proposed a definition of central banking which is echoed in the definition 
proposed by the European Central Bank without, however, assuming that a central bank is not 
involved in commercial activities. In her book published in the mid-1930s, she suggested that  
[t]he primary definition of central banking is a banking system in which a single bank has 
either a complete or a residuary monopoly in the note issue. A residuary monopoly 
denotes a case where there are a number of note issuers, but all of these except one are 
working under narrow limitations, and this one authority is responsible for the bulk of the 
circulation, and is the sole bank possessing that measure of elasticity in its note issue 
30 White (1999, p. 71). See also Capie et al. (1994, p. 5); Capie (2009, p. 19). 
31 White (1999, p. 71). 
32 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/explainers/tell-me/html/what-is-a-central-bank.en.html (accessed on 28 
July 2016). 
28 
 
                                                     
which gives it the power to exercise control over the total amount of currency and credit 
available.33 
The question that arises in this thesis is whether the National Bank was a central bank during 
the period that it enjoyed the issuing privilege. The National Bank was a dual-purpose bank 
which combined the public responsibilities of a central bank with commercial activities. Thus, 
if a definition of central banking based on the evolutionary hypothesis is adopted, then the 
National Bank does not qualify as a central bank. The National Bank, however, had either a 
residuary or a complete monopoly in note issuing, was the bank of the government and to a 
limited extent the bank of the banks. Furthermore, it had the financial strength and capacity to 
act as a lender of last resort during a period of crisis. What distinguishes the Old Bank of 
issue in Greece from its European counterparts is that it did not develop into a fully fledged 
central bank as would be recognised today. In this thesis, the National Bank is considered to 
be a central bank which nevertheless failed to adopt the British orthodoxy in central banking, 
and the aim is to examine the forces that shaped the evolution of central banking in Greece, a 
small open economy on the European periphery which had a stable banking system.  
 
 
1.2. Central banking in the 1920s, the Bank of England and the League of 
Nations 
1.2.1. Introduction 
According to R. S. Sayers (1957, p. 21) ‘[t]he interwar period can perhaps be called the heyday 
of central banking. It was certainly the period in which central banking was most widely talked 
about’. Central banking was at the heart of discussions that took place in Brussels in 1920 and 
nearly two years later at the Genoa conference. Furthermore, central banking reforms were at 
the core of all reconstruction schemes prepared by the League of Nations in the 1920s. These 
reconstruction programmes aimed at restoring the pre-war status quo in international financial 
and monetary relations and echoed the resolutions adopted at the Brussels and Genoa 
conferences.  
 
 Both at Brussels and Genoa, resolutions were passed, recommending the 
establishment of central banks where they did not exist. They also called for central banks to 
be insulated from political interference.34 The resolutions passed at both international 
33 Smith (1936, p. 168). 
34 For more on the Brussels and Genoa conferences see, for example: Archives of the League of 
Nations, BOX S123, File No. 6: Monetary Policy, Currency Questions, Genoa Conference Resolutions, 
January 1925; Federal Reserve (1922); Hawtrey (1926, pp.122–129); League of Nations (1945, pp. 10–
13); Clarke (1967, pp. 34–36); Sayers (1976a, pp. 153–163); Flink (1993); Moure (2002, pp. 52–56). 
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financial conferences reflected the ambition of monetary authorities to overcome political 
divisions and problems in the international political arena, a legacy of the war, in order to 
design the institutional basis for the restoration of the international gold standard to its pre-
war status. They also aimed at strengthening the cooperation among central bankers. At 
Genoa it was also proposed that the Bank of England would convene a meeting of central 
bankers to consider how to give effect to the recommendations adopted by the conference.35 
The primary objective of this meeting would be to develop ‘the practice of continuous co-
operation among Central Banks of issue, or banks regulating credit policy in the several 
countries’.36 
 
The resolutions passed at Genoa echoed the principles of central banking that the then 
governor of the Bank of England, Montagu Norman, promoted (more on this later). R. G. 
Hawtrey, who worked at the time for the Treasury, is generally regarded as responsible for 
framing the resolutions of the Genoa conference on monetary policy and central banking.37 
 
Any discussion of central banking during the 1920s is dominated by reference to 
personalities who represented certain ideas and policies that dominated before the outbreak of 
the First World War. These international figures who remained national central bankers 
attempted to establish the pre-war status quo.38 Indeed, their aim was to set out the 
prerequisites and conditions that made the world economy function smoothly during the first 
era of globalisation.  
 
1.2.2. Central banking in the 1920s and the Bank of England 
Considerations of developments in central banking led the governor of the Bank of England, 
Montagu Norman, to draft a paper on ‘Central Banks’ early in 1921. He referred to it as 
‘Epitome’ and it is presented in Table 1.2 below. This paper on the nature of central banking 
went through several versions and expanded as a result of Norman’s correspondence with 
other central bankers and Henry Strakosch who was considered by Norman to be ‘the best 
authority on the subject [of] the principles which should govern the policy of central banks in 
any country’.39 He had been responsible for the founding of the South African Reserve Bank 
and also served as a member of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations from 1920 
35 See Federal Reserve Bulletin (1922, pp. 678–679), resolutions 3 and 12; for more on the meeting, see 
Cottrell (1997). 
36 Hawtrey (1926, p. 123). 
37 Sayers (1976a, p. 156); Eichengreen (1995, p. 72). 
38 Clarke (1967, p. 29.) 
39 Cottrell (1997, p. 29). See also Cottrell (1997, pp. 32–34). 
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until 1937. Furthermore, as a member of the League, he was involved in the preparation of the 
statutes of the Bank of Greece.  
 
Table 1.2: Montagu Norman’s ‘Epitome’ of central banking 
 
CENTRAL BANKS 
 
A Central Bank should not compete with other Banks for general business. 
A Central Bank should not take monies at interest on its own account nor accept Bills of 
Exchange. 
A Central Bank should have no Branch outside its own country. 
A Central Bank should not engage in a general Exchange business on its own account with any 
other country. 
A Central Bank should be independent but should do all its own Government’s business – 
directly or indirectly – including gold and Currency. 
A Central Bank should be the Banker of all other Banks in its own country and should assist 
them to develop its business and economic resources. 
A Central Bank should protect its own Traders from the rapacity of other banks in its own 
country. 
[*] A Central Bank should act as the settling agent for Clearing House balances arising between 
the Banks of its own country, and to the widest extent practicable. 
[*] A Central Bank should handle domestic collections for its members and so regulate the 
domestic exchanges. 
[*] A Central Bank should have power to examine Banks which come to the Central Bank for 
credits and assistance. 
A Central Bank may have an Agency in another country. 
That Agency should either be in its own name or should be the Central Bank of the other 
country: in the former case it should do all its Banking and all Kindred business with the Central 
Bank of the other country. 
And should co-operate in practice and principle with the Central Bank of the other country. 
And should receive the most favoured treatment and information from the Central Bank of the 
other country. 
And should do the Banking and kindred business of its Principal’s Government in the other 
country. 
 
March 1921 
 
Note: Points marked by an asterisk (*) were added by Benjamin Strong to Norman’s original 
compilation of January 1921.  
Sources: Sayers (1976b, pp. 74–75); De Cecco (1994, pp. 4–5; 1997, p. 79); Cottrell (1997, p. 
63).   
 
All the characteristics, primary functions and responsibilities of central banking as it had 
evolved by the 1920s are listed in Montagu Norman’s ‘Epitome’. The governor of the New 
York Federal Reserve Bank, Benjamin Strong, added the three points marked with an asterisk. 
Norman did not refer to the note issuing monopoly of a central bank as he perhaps took it for 
granted. The micro functions of a central bank, that is to say its responsibilities as bank of the 
banks and bank of the government, are very well defined. In his ‘Epitome’, Norman clearly 
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envisages a central bank as a bank of the banks and as a bank of the government. He stressed 
that although a central bank should be responsible for its own government’s business directly 
or indirectly, the central bank should be independent from government interference. He put 
considerable effort into defining the relationship of a central bank with its counterparts 
abroad, so as to encourage central bank cooperation. Norman also aimed at promoting 
exclusive business relations among central banks. 
 
The Comptroller of the Bank of England, Ernest Harvey, was sent to Australia in 
1927 to publicise the Bank of England’s ideas on central banking.40 In an address to the 
Victorian Branch of the Economic Society of Australia, Harvey referred extensively to the 
most important principles of any sound central banking system. He covered the points that 
Norman referred to in his ‘Epitome’, but he also complemented them by stating that the 
central bank should possess the exclusive note issue right. He emphasised the macroeconomic 
function of a central bank and its non-competitive and non-profit-maximising character. 
Harvey too, described a central bank as the bank of other banks in the country and stressed 
that its assets ‘should be of the most liquid character possible’. As he himself acknowledged, 
if the statutes of central banks established in the 1920s are examined, it will be found that 
these principles had been incorporated.41 Table 1.3 below lists the main functions and 
responsibilities of a central bank according to Ernest Harvey and consequently the Bank of 
England. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 Harvey (1927); Sayers (1976a, pp. 206–207). 
41 Harvey (1927, pp. 12, 13, 21). 
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Table 1.3: Harvey’s ‘Functions of a central bank’ 
 
THE FUNCTIONS OF CENTRAL BANKS 
 
1) The central bank should possess the exclusive right of note issue. 
2) A central bank in its management and policy should be free from government control 
and the influence of politics. 
3) A central bank should be entrusted with the entire banking business of its own 
government. 
4) A central bank should be the banker of the trading banks and should act as a settling 
agent for clearing differences between such banks. 
5) A central bank should not ordinarily compete with the trading banks for general 
banking business. 
6) A central bank should ensure to the public the provision of adequate banking facilities 
on reasonable terms. 
7) A central bank should not take moneys at interest on its own account. 
8) A central bank should quote publicly the rate at which it is prepared to discount 
approved bills, and should publish at regular and frequent intervals a clear statement 
of its position. 
9) The assets of the central bank should be of the most liquid character possible. 
10) A central bank should not draw or accept bills payable otherwise than on demand.  
11) A central bank should not engage in a general exchange business on its own account 
for the purpose of earning profits.  
12) A central bank should not engage in trade, nor have any interest in any commercial, 
industrial, or other undertaking.  
13) A central bank should have no branch outside its own country, but may have agencies 
abroad. 
 
Source: Harvey (1927, pp. 16–21).  
 
The main functions and responsibilities of a central bank as they are described in Tables 1.2 
and 1.3 were endorsed by the Financial Committee of the League of Nations, and most of 
them were incorporated in the statutes of the central banks that either were established or 
reformed with the sponsorship of the League during stabilisation in the 1920s. Central banks 
were required to operate at arm’s length from the government and their assets and liabilities to 
‘be of the most liquid character possible’. They were also expected to function as non-
competitive, non-profit-seeking organisations, whose main mandate was the maintenance of 
currency stability. In fact, in the 1920s when the charter of a European central bank was 
revised, even if there had been no radical change in the monetary and banking policy, the 
privileges and profits which had been originally granted to shareholders were reduced.42  
 
 
 
 
42 Conant (1927, p. vi). 
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1.2.3. The League of Nations and central banking reforms in the 1920s 
Table 1.4 shows the central banks that were established during the interwar period. Twelve 
new fully fledged central banks were established in the 1920s and seven during the 1930s, in 
total 19. The Bank of Greece and the Hungarian National Bank are central banks that were 
founded under the auspices of the League of Nations. Their establishment was a prerequisite 
for the involvement of the Financial Committee of the League in de jure currency 
stabilisation.  
 
Table 1.4: Central banks established between 1921 and 1940 
1921–1930  1931–1940  
Bank of Colombia 1922 Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 1931 
Bank of Latvia 1922 Reserve Bank of New Zealand  1933 
Bank of Lithuania 1922 Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador 1934 
Central Reserve Bank of Peru 1922 Bank of Canada 1935 
Hungarian National Bank 1924 Central Bank of Argentina 1935 
Bank of Mongolia 1924 Reserve Bank of India 1935 
Central Bank of Chile 1925 Central Bank of Venezuela 1940 
Bank of Mexico 1925   
Central Bank of Ecuador 1927   
Bank of Greece 1927   
Central Bank of Bolivia 1928   
Central Bank of China (Taiwan) 1928   
Note: After the end of the Great War in 1919, the Estonian central bank (the Bank of Estonia) 
was established under the aegis of the League of Nations but did not survive after the Soviet 
invasion in 1940; the South African Reserve Bank was founded in 1920. 
Sources: Pringle (1994, p. xii); Capie et al. (1994, pp. 182–219). 
 
In the 1920s, the League of Nations intervened in the stabilisation of the currency and carried 
out reconstruction schemes in six European countries. In each case, the Financial Committee 
recommended and indeed insisted that the country should reform its banking system. These 
banking reforms led to the strengthening of the institution of central banking. In addition, 
throughout the interwar period the Bank of England encouraged the strengthening of central 
banking not only in what may loosely be called the Dominions but also in other areas where it 
could exercise its influence. Needless to say, the driving force behind the Financial 
Committee of the League of Nations was the policy of the Bank of England. At the same 
time, one American Professor, E. W. Kemmerer of Princeton University headed missions to 
Latin America and was responsible for setting up central banks in several of the republics 
there. The charter of a number of central banks that were established during the interwar period, 
were drafted abroad by experts at the Bank of England or from the USA. These newly 
established central banks were endowed with the latest central banking principles, powers and 
techniques which were frequently in contrast with central banking practices in the country in 
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question. A representative example of this is the Bank of Greece, a central bank established 
under the auspices of the Financial Committee of the League in the late 1920s. Its statutes 
incorporated an escape clause that allowed the New Bank to act as a lender of last resort in 
case of crisis. More specifically, the Bank of Greece could suspend full reserve requirements 
for a specified period of time, of course with some penalty. However, if use of this provision 
was made during the period that Greece was on the gold exchange standard, would the New 
Bank have been able to maintain the external value of the drachma? Had the New Bank 
established the credibility and authority necessary to resort to this provision without at the 
same time creating further panic in the market? Furthermore, the Bank of Greece received 
statutory independence in its purest form. In spite of this, a few months after it opened its 
doors for business it experienced intervention by the prime minister concerning its discount 
rate policy.43 This incidence demonstrates that neither de jure independence nor the League 
supervision that the Bank of Greece enjoyed at the time could safeguard its autonomy from 
practices embedded in the political circles. 
 
Table 1.4 does not convey a full picture of the spread of central banking in the 1920s. 
All European countries that experienced high inflation or hyperinflation in the 1920s 
reformed their central banking system before de jure currency stabilisation. Central banks 
were also established which did not survive beyond the Second World War because of 
territorial changes or the spread of communism. Central banking was reorganised to respect 
the new boundaries of successor countries to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Austro-
Hungarian Bank was liquidated, as the treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye ordered in 1919. The 
Geneva Protocol of October 1922 provided for the establishment of a new bank of issue, and 
the ‘re-established’ Oesterreichische Nationalbank began to operate on 1 January 1923.44 The 
central banks of Germany, France, Belgium and Bulgaria were reformed when their 
currencies were stabilised. 
 
 The reconstruction schemes that the Financial Committee of the League prepared in the 
1920s incorporated resolutions of the Brussels and Genoa conferences. In addition, these 
League stabilisation programmes recalled the international financial control introduced in 
countries which defaulted during the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century.45 They were 
comprised of two parts: firstly, institutional reforms were implemented which created a 
commitment mechanism that made the stabilisation programme credible, and secondly, an 
43 For more on this see note 158 in this thesis.  
44 Capie et al. (1994, pp. 143–146); Oesterreichische Nationalbank: https://www.oenb.at/en/About-
Us/History/1922-1938.html (accessed on 23 May 2015). 
45 For a comparison between the Law of Control enacted in Greece in 1898 and the League stabilisation 
programme implemented in 1928, see Chapter 6, section 6.7 in this thesis.  
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international loan under the auspices of the League was floated. The focus of the institutional 
reforms was the central bank and accounting or auditing offices.46 A set of guidelines were 
followed when central banking reforms were implemented, which echoed Montagu Norman’s 
‘Epitome’. (See Table 1.2 above.) These guidelines were: (1) central bank independence; (2) 
monopoly of note issue; (3) prudence in lending and discounting operations; (4) limits on new 
advances to the government; (5) centralisation of the monetary transactions of all public sector 
entities in the central bank; and (6) proper cover and reserve backing for the note issue.47 
 
Compulsory balances to be held at the central bank could of course be imposed by law, 
following the example of the Federal Reserve Act, but European practice went against it, and 
the measure had to wait a few decades before becoming widespread on the continent. None of 
the central banking laws of the 1920s mandated compulsory reserve requirements.48 
 
 Thomas Sargent’s (1982) suggestions of sustainable currency stabilisation resonate 
the principles of the League reconstruction schemes. He argued that the essential measures 
that ended hyperinflation in continental countries in the 1920s were firstly the creation of an 
independent central bank ‘committed to refuse the government’s demand for additional 
unsecured credit’, and secondly a simultaneous alteration in fiscal policy.49 Sargent, as Steven 
Webb (1989, p. 74) remarks, developed his views on a successful stabilisation ‘by analysing 
only the final stage of stabilisation’.50 This remark further recalls the Financial Committee’s 
policy when it was approached by countries experiencing difficulties in accessing the 
financial markets independently: a prerequisite was that de facto currency stabilisation should 
have been achieved before they officially offered their assistance.  
 
Reforms of banks of issue and the establishment of new central banks were aimed at 
returning to the pre-war international economic order. Their objective was to facilitate 
monetary stabilisation and adoption of the gold standard or the gold exchange standard, and 
subsequently to secure maintenance of the achieved monetary stability. The objectives and 
functions of central banks were carefully defined in these reforms and special attention was 
46 League of Nations (1945, pp. 19–20); Santaella (1993, pp. 11–12). 
47 League of Nations (1945, pp. 19–20); Santaella (1993, pp. 11–12). 
48 De Cecco (1994, p. 10). 
49 Sargent (1982, p. 89). 
50 Dornbusch (1988a, pp. 410–411) also challenged Sargent’s thesis by arguing that to institute a central 
bank or to pass a budget law is not by itself enough to ensure that these institutions will in fact become 
what they represent on paper, especially when the costs of the implementation of a stabilisation 
programme become apparent. Dornbusch (1988a) instead, argued that exchange rate and interest rate 
policies in the transition have traditionally formed the vehicle for establishing that credibility by a de facto 
stabilisation. Then, the improving budget situation may in turn attract capital flows that reinforce the 
stabilisation. 
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given to the relationship between the government and central banks in what is now referred to 
as the independence of a central bank. In this way, international cooperation and capital 
movements could be promoted. The Great Depression changed the international economic 
environment and also economic thought. In addition it modified the reasons for the 
establishment of a central bank.  
  
 In sum, although ‘the central core and rationale for the existence of a central bank is 
not necessarily to be found in its macroeconomic role in (discretionary) monetary 
management’51 it was on that role that international pressure was mainly focused after the 
First World War. Under the resolutions adopted at the Genoa Conference in the spring of 
1922, central banks were obliged to pursue two objectives: to facilitate currency stability and 
once this was achieved, to support and maintain monetary stability.52 The objective of the 
central banking reforms that were carried out under the supervision of the Financial Committee 
of the League was to create central banks which would operate at arm’s length from 
governments and in this way be able to enforce monetary discipline. Therefore, central banking 
reforms in the 1920s were aimed primarily at making central banks statutorily independent of 
their governments and at restoring monetary policy to the status quo ante.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 51 Goodhart (1988, p. 7). 
52 Federal Reserve (1922, pp. 678–680). 
37 
 
                                                     
  
 
CHAPTER 2: 
CENTRAL BANKING IN GREECE: 
HISTORIOGRAPHY, METHODOLOGY, QUESTIONS AND SOURCES 
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2.1. Central banking in Greece before the establishment of the Bank of Greece 
2.1.1. Central banking and the National Bank 
Before the establishment of a fully fledged central bank in Greece in 1928, the National Bank, 
a joint stock bank established in 1841, carried out the public responsibilities of a central bank 
whilst at the same time being by far the biggest and most powerful commercial bank in 
Greece.53 From its institution in 1841 to 1864 and again from 1920 up to May 1928 the National 
Bank had a complete monopoly in note issue as it was the only issuing bank in Greece. Between 
1864 and 1920 it had a residuary monopoly in note issue as it shared the issuing privilege with 
the Ionian Bank, the Bank of Epirus-Thessaly and the Bank of Crete.54 Nevertheless, the 
National Bank was the most important issuing bank, responsible for the bulk of the banknotes in 
53 Prior to the founding of the National Bank, an attempt to organise a currency and banking system in 
Greece was made by the first governor of the new country, Count Ioannis Kapodistrias, in 1828. In 
1828, upon his arrival in Greece, Kapodistrias introduced the phoenix as the currency of the newborn 
country and founded the National Financial Bank which survived until 1834. The phoenix was replaced 
at par by the drachma in 1832 which remained as legal tender in Greece until January 2002 when the 
euro was introduced. For more information, see Valaorites ([1902] 1988, pp. 1–5); Spiliotopoulos 
(1949, pp. 10–17); Alogoskoufis and Lazaretou (1997, pp. 39–45); Dritsas (1999, pp. 10–13). 
54 The Ionian Bank had a note issue privilege between 1864 and 1920, the Bank of Epirus-Thessaly 
between 1882 and 1899 and the Bank of Crete from 1913 to 1920. 
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circulation during the entire period of its history as an issuing institution. For example in 1914, 
approximately 95 per cent of the banknotes in circulation were banknotes issued by the National 
Bank. The origin of the remaining 5 per cent of banknotes in circulation was either the Ionian 
Bank or the Bank of Crete.55  
 
In the nineteenth century the National Bank was characterised by a conservative 
perspective as well as by a lack of innovative entrepreneurial initiative.56 It can be compared 
with other continental ‘public banks’,57 which combined unique public responsibilities with 
commercial activities. The structure of the assets and liabilities of the Greek bank of issue was 
close to the early North European central banking model, where ‘solidity of collateral’ was 
more important than the liquidity that the classical model of central banking dictated.58 
However, the National Bank is distinguished from those continental banks of issue as it never 
evolved into a fully fledged central bank. A defining moment in the transformation of 
continental banks of issue into fully fledged central banks was when their commercial interest 
started to eclipse. By contrast, the National Bank did not allow the loss of its commercial 
aspect either on its own initiative or through government intervention and consequently did 
not evolve into a fully fledged central bank.   
 
As a bank of issue, the National Bank developed very close links with the government 
and enjoyed a comparative advantage vis-à-vis the other banking institutions. The state 
centralised its payments system and all its deposits at the Bank and the National Bank controlled 
all the government financial accounts. It also negotiated foreign loans for the government and 
played a paramount role in the country’s adoption of a metallic system. This comparative 
advantage was important for the development and prosperity of the National Bank because the 
credit market in the country was small and the banking system underdeveloped. However, this 
privileged position as the issuing bank in the country and as the bank of the government within 
a fairly stable banking system did not encourage the Bank to develop in such manner as would 
pave the way for its transformation from a dual-purpose bank into a fully fledged central bank.  
 
55 The picture remains the same if the issuing privilege of the National Bank in the nineteenth century 
in comparison with that of the other banks of issue is examined. For example in 1869, 79 per cent of 
the banknotes in circulation were banknotes issued by the National Bank whilst the remaining 21 per 
cent were issued by the Ionian Bank. In 1897, 86 per cent of the banknotes in circulation were issued 
by the National Bank. The remaining 14 per cent of the banknotes in circulation were issued in equal 
proportions by the Ionian Bank and the Bank of Epirus-Thessaly. The years were chosen randomly to 
show that the National Bank had a residuary monopoly in the note issue in the nineteenth century. The 
data on banknotes in circulation used are from Kostelenos (1995 pp. 400–401). 
56 Dertilis (1989, p. 10). 
57 In reality they were private institutions. 
58 Tarkka (2009).  
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 On the eve of the outbreak of the Great War, the National Bank combined public 
responsibilities with pure banking activities. It was the bank of issue in the country, the 
guardian of the gold and foreign exchange reserves and the bank of the government. At the 
same time, it was the most important commercial and deposit bank. Its commercial activities 
included short- and long-term credits to the private sectors of the economy, i.e. discounts, 
loans to the agricultural sector, loans on pledged securities and merchandise, mortgage loans 
and loans to public entities. 
 
It has been argued that before the First World War, the National Bank was on the way 
to transforming itself into a central bank, a process that had been adopted deliberately by its 
governors.59 In 1914, however, the National Bank was competing with the other banks for 
general business and its commercial aspect was flourishing. Furthermore, there is evidence 
that in 1913 the National Bank tried to curtail the expansion of other banks in the country.60 
This is a clear indication that the National Bank, despite enjoying the privileges of an issuing 
bank, did not intend to abandon commercial activities and evolve into a fully fledged central 
bank. 
 
When the League representatives visited Athens in April 1927, although the National 
Bank had a monopoly in the issuing privilege and undertook the public responsibilities of a 
central bank it bore little resemblance to an ideal central bank as described by the governor of 
the Bank of England, Montagu Norman, in his ‘Epitome’. The National Bank had a complete 
monopoly of the note issue privilege and was the bank of the government but not the bank of 
the banks. At the same time, it was still the most important commercial and deposit bank in 
Greece, which could influence the conditions of credit directly through its own business. More 
importantly part of its assets were not of the ‘most liquid character possible’ as the model of 
central banking promoted by the Bank of England required. 
 
The National Bank as an issuing bank and as a private institution pursued public 
functions whilst at the same time it had to satisfy its shareholders. The main public duties 
initially of a bank of issue were to maintain a stable currency and to guard the metallic 
reserves whilst at the same time being the bank of the government. As a joint stock bank its 
‘duty to the proprietors’61 was the dividend it paid and its commercial strength.  
 
59 Kostis (2003, pp. 65–66). 
60 Ibid., p. 81. 
61 Clapham (1944, p. 372). 
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 In 1919, Alexandros Diomides, then a sub-governor of the National Bank, stated at an 
annual meeting of its shareholders that the National Bank was a private institution which at 
the same time had a public character.62 This statement as the sub-governor himself admitted, 
described the way that the Bank functioned and its duties to the government. In fact, it was 
the way that the governors of the National Bank had managed ‘the two conceptions of their 
business’,63 i.e. central banking responsibilities with commercial banking that safeguarded 
and preserved the financial strength and consequently the reputation of the Bank during its 
entire history as an issuing institution. A financially sound and strong National Bank created 
the systemic stability that characterised the Greek banking system and made it a respectable 
ambassador for the Greek government abroad.  
 
During periods of well understood emergencies such as wartime and/or periods when 
the Greek government had no access to financial markets, a reluctant private bank financed 
the immediate needs of the government using the printing press and occasionally its own 
reserves. During such emergencies the commercial aspect of the National Bank receded. The 
National Bank curtailed its commercial activities to support the financial requirements of the 
government. Its financial position was weakened as a great part of its balance sheet was tied 
to illiquid government debt. Once the emergency had passed and attempts were made to 
rationalise the monetary system and the economy as a whole then it was ‘duty to the 
proprietors’64 of the National Bank that guided the policies of its governors. When 
stabilisation was pursued the central bank played a paramount role. Stabilisation would 
strengthen its position in the market and give it the opportunity to enhance its commercial 
aspect. This policy acted as self-regulation that helped the National Bank to protect its 
financial strength and reputation throughout its entire history as a bank of issue. A financially 
sound National Bank created the systemic stability that characterised the Greek banking 
system. It was the way that its ‘dual position’65 as a central bank and as a commercial banking 
institution was managed that made the Bank one of the most significant and stable institutions 
in Greek economic history, an organisation that can be classified as a national institution. 
 
 
 
 
62 Kostis (2003, p. 175). 
63 Clapham (1944, p. 372). 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
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2.1.2. International financial intervention and the development of central banking in 
Greece, 1898–1928  
During the period in question the Greek government twice resorted to capital markets to borrow 
with assistance and supervision: in 1898 and once again 30 years later, in 1928. On both 
occasions conditionality was introduced related to central banking practices in Greece. 
 
After the Greek government’s default in 1893 a long period of discussion over the 
settlement of the foreign debt of the country started, initially between Greece and foreign 
bondholders and then between Greece and the Great Powers, that is to say Britain, France, 
Germany, Russia, Italy and Austria. A debt compromise was finally achieved in 1898 after 
Greece had been defeated in the 1897 war with Turkey and was forced to pay a war indemnity. 
The debt compromise led to the enactment of the Law of Control or the ΒΦΙΘ Law as it is 
known in Greek and the flotation of the 2.50 per cent Guaranteed Loan in 1898. The Law of 
Control was a legal document specifying the obligations of the Greek government in order for 
the Great Powers to support it borrowing from the capital markets. It was a detailed plan for the 
reconstruction of the Greek public debt and specified the establishment of the International 
Financial Commission (IFC). The IFC was an international body that assumed responsibility for 
the service of the Greek public debt that was placed under its jurisdiction. Accordingly, the 
Greek government assigned a large part of its public revenues to the IFC and the latter 
administered these in accordance with the terms of the Law of Control.66 The IFC was a debt 
management committee which at the same time supervised monetary policy in Greece, as the 
Law of Control stipulated strict rules governing the issue of banknotes and by doing so 
defined the relation of the central bank to the government. It should be noted that the Law of 
Control did not stipulate that Greece had to adopt the gold standard, as is usually claimed by 
modern scholars.  
 
In 1898, the Greek government partially surrendered its fiscal and monetary 
sovereignty – a fact that was resented in Athens and caused a lot of dispute. Greek 
governments often clashed with the representatives of the Great Powers in Athens over the 
interpretation of certain aspects of the Law of Control. During the negotiations with the 
League, in Geneva in June 1927, Greek representatives were therefore anxious to avoid any 
kind of control or any sort of foreign intervention in Greek public affairs.  
 
The governor of the National Bank moved to the Ministry of Finance as a minister 
and headed the negotiations with the representatives of the mediatory powers. The National 
66 For more see United Kingdom, House of Commons (1898, pp. 11–13); Andreades (1939, pp. 482–
486); Wynne (1951, pp. 320–325). 
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Bank, through its governor, might have not only endorsed but also influenced the 
conditionality incorporated in the Law of Control which related both to monetary policy and 
to the way that internal public debt was reconstructed. As is shown in this thesis, the measures 
stipulated by the Law of Control helped the National Bank to improve its financial strength 
and expand its commercial activities. Furthermore, conditionality incorporated in the Law of 
Control constrained monetary policy and helped the bank of issue to control monetary 
developments in Greece for as long as the conjuncture allowed it. A suggestion by its sub-
governor led to a monetary arrangement in March 1910 which helped the drachma to maintain 
its Latin Monetary Union (LMU) parity up to 1919. This 1910 monetary arrangement, or 
ΓΧΜΒ Law as it is known, has led contemporary economists and economic historians to 
argue that Greece introduced either the gold standard or the gold exchange standard during 
that year. By contrast, before the 1980s it was generally believed that the Greek currency had 
remained inconvertible throughout the period from September 1885 when the gold standard 
was suspended until May 1928 when the gold exchange standard was de jure adopted. 
 
 The influence of the IFC on Greek fiscal and monetary developments is usually 
thought to have been effective. The drachma appreciated and indeed reached its LMU parity 
in 1910, remaining at par until 1919. In addition, the service of the public debt continued 
smoothly until April 1932 when the Greek government defaulted. In fact, the interest rate paid 
to bondholders of external public debt increased and reached its contractual level in the 1920s 
as Table A4.1 in Appendix A4 indicates. Last but not least the Greek government managed to 
return, although very cautiously, to the capital markets in 1902. This thesis, however, departs 
from the view that the presence of the IFC in Athens was the main reason for the successful 
monetary advances and the improvement of the creditworthiness of the Greek government on 
the international capital markets. Here it is argued that the ‘credibility’, in other words the 
successful implementation of the Law of Control, rested on acceptance of conditionality and 
willingness to implement it.67 Firstly, a powerful institution, the National Bank, was 
committed to strict monetary rules introduced by the Law of Control. The Old Bank was also 
able to control and influence monetary developments. Secondly, the appreciation of the 
drachma was in line with the prevailing political economy in Greece. Both the government 
and the National Bank were in favour of a stable drachma close to its LMU parity. It is also 
important to highlight that monetary discipline was followed for as long as the historical 
circumstances allowed it. As is extensively discussed, inflationary policies were used to 
finance Greek participation in the Great War and the Asia Minor campaign in spite of the 
presence of the IFC in Athens. Last but not least, the improvement of the creditworthiness of 
67 For more on ‘credibility’ and a successful stabilisation, see Sargent (1982, 1984).  For criticism of 
Sargent’s idea of ‘credibility’ and stabilisation, see Dornbusch (1988b).  
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the Greek government after the enactment of the Law of Control, as measured by a Greek 
government loan’s spread on the London market relative to the British consols, is a more 
complex and multifaceted issue than is generally assumed in the literature. This question, 
however, is beyond the scope of this thesis. Future research could shed light on this complex 
issue, that is to say to what extent the IFC was responsible for the improvement of the Greek 
sovereign risk, and perhaps more importantly, the way that the Law of Control and Greek 
sovereign risk were intertwined.  
  
 The Greek government resorted to the League of Nations for a second time in the 
spring of 1927, in order to borrow on the international capital markets under its aegis. The 
reconstruction scheme prepared incorporated institutional reforms focused primarily on 
central banking practices in Greece, which led to the establishment of a fully fledged central 
bank, the Bank of Greece, whilst its precursor continued pursuing commercial activities, 
remaining at the same time the most important commercial bank in Greece. 
 
 The National Bank itself would not have implemented such radical reforms of its own 
volition in 1928. By the time the Greek delegation arrived in Geneva in June 1927 to request 
officially the assistance of the League in stabilising de jure the drachma, the National Bank 
had already lost its monopoly on mortgage credit of its own accord to a newly established 
National Mortgage Bank. This was the only monopoly that the bank of issue had enjoyed 
since its foundation in 1842 and one which it willingly conceded to another banking 
institution in the late 1920s. As Table 3.7 in Chapter 3 demonstrates the significance of 
mortgage credit as an asset item of the Old Bank had diminished by 1926 in favour of more 
liquid assets, following a long period of war and high inflation. The newly established 
mortgage bank was after all very close to the National Bank. 
 
 In June 1927 the governors of the National Bank faced the dilemma either of radically 
reforming the bank of issue so as to comply with central banking principles advocated by the 
Bank of England, or retaining its dual-purpose status and letting the Greek authorities ‘seek 
succour elsewhere’.68 As is explained in detail in Chapter 7, in the end a compromise was 
reached after a suggestion from the sub-governor of the bank of issue: the National Bank 
could continue its commercial activities and instead it would transfer to a new bank the 
issuing privilege and all the activities and responsibilities which belonged to a central bank. 
Thus, the governors of the National Bank amended recommendations by the Financial 
Committee of the League and in this way safeguarded the financial strength and consequently 
68 Venezis (1955, p. 35) 
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the market power of the National Bank. Furthermore, the architects of the central banking 
reform protected certain privileges of the Old Bank and thus its unique status in the Greek 
banking market. The League stabilisation programme attracted considerable opposition in 
Athens which threatened the existence of the New Bank in the 1930s. However, the National 
Bank did not participate in this controversy and never attempted to regain the central banking 
privileges that it had lost as a result of the implementation of the League’s stabilisation 
programme.   
 
 By the time that the 1898 Law of Control and the 1928 League stabilisation 
programme were signed, conditionality had been accepted by those that were most affected. 
By contrast, after the outbreak of the current economic recession successive Greek 
governments have been expected to implement widespread structural reforms demanded by 
their lenders which, however, have mustered very little support. Resistance and delays in the 
implementation of structural reforms in a fairly unstable and polarised political environment 
are among the most important reasons that have led to a deep and protracted economic 
recession. A ‘war of attrition’ with distributional implications among different socio-
economic groups has taken place and the burden of a huge and rapid fiscal adjustment has 
been shifted onto those that can bear it least, and to future generations.69 
 
 
2.2. The establishment of the Bank of Greece in the historiography 
Contemporaries regarded the establishment of the Bank of Greece as a symbol of foreign 
intervention in the country and compared its creation with the introduction of the Law of 
Control in 1898. Since then, this observation has been repeated occasionally.  
 
 ‘The founding of the Bank of Greece was accomplished to facilitate the reformation 
of the monetary conditions that had been created by the wars that the country had engaged in, 
as well as the economic repercussions thereof. It was an important step towards the 
modernisation of the economic institutions of the country.’70 Kostas Kostis (1986, p. 115) 
writes that ‘the establishment of the Bank of Greece as the central bank of the country was 
regarded and since then has been regarded as an attempt to rationalise the Greek economy and 
as an indication of state interference in regulating economic activities’. He further argues that 
it is difficult for this interpretation to be challenged, and adds that the establishment of the 
New Bank was not a Greek initiative, restating in this way the argument that the creation of 
69 For a ‘war of attrition’ and stabilisation, see Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Casella and Eichengreen 
(1996). 
70 Bank of Greece (1978, p. 9).  
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the central bank symbolised foreign intervention into Greek political and economic issues. 
Meanwhile, Thanasis Kalaphatis (1999, p. 25) relates the establishment of the Bank of Greece 
to the ΓΧΜΒ Law of 1910 and sees it as a result of government intervention in the banking 
system.71 Christos Hadziiossif (1993, p. 249) goes a bit further by arguing that the splitting of 
the National Bank was aimed both at helping Greece to incorporate itself into the international 
economic system and at facilitating the flow of capital in and out of Greece.  
  
 Previously, G. Vouros (1938, p. 6) had stressed the fact that the banking reforms that 
led to the establishment of the New Bank were a necessary by-product of changes in the 
economy post 1923, i.e. after the Asia Minor debacle and indeed G. Pyrsos (c1935, p. 15) 
suggested that this reform was vital for the economic reconstruction of the country.  
 
 More recently Michalis Psalidopoulos (2011, pp. 74–75; 2014, p. 77) argued that a 
public debate between the governor of the National Bank and Britain’s representative on the 
IFC which was conducted largely in the pages of The Times of London in the autumn of 1925, 
helps to understand why foreign creditors introduced central banking reforms a couple of 
years later.72 This public debate in The Times which created quite a stir in Athens, highlights 
ideological differences between these two men in addition to difficult choices related to 
monetary policy that the governor of the National Bank faced in 1925. In the end, however, as 
is discussed in Chapter 6, the influence of the IFC on central banking reforms was very 
limited.  
 
 Study of the establishment of the central bank in Greece has been approached along 
the following lines. Scholars that treated this issue in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s gave a 
detailed chronological description of the events as well as of the dispute that the creation of 
the Bank of Greece provoked since it was hardly welcomed by Greek banks or politicians. 
Literature concerning the New Bank was intended to examine how it operated after its 
establishment and mainly came to light during a commemoration of an anniversary of the 
Bank of Greece. Present day scholars that have referred to the creation of the Bank of Greece 
have only done so as part of broader research on the interwar period. Hence, the reasons that 
led to the establishment of the central bank in Greece remain to be examined. 
 
 It is hard to dispute the earlier interpretations where the core of the argument has been 
that the establishment of the New Bank was necessary to facilitate the reconstruction of the 
71 The enactment and evolution of ΓΧΜΒ Law of 1910 is extensively examined in Chapter 4 of this 
thesis.  
72 For more on the articles in The Times, see Psalidopoulos (1989, pp. 320–325); Pepelasis Minoglou 
(1993, pp. 128–130). 
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economy after a long period of war and monetary upheaval in the 1920s. It is also implied that 
these banking reforms were beneficial for economic development. However, these 
explanations refer to the consequences of the establishment of the central bank rather than to 
the reasons for banking reforms in the late 1920s.  
 
 Internal forces resulting from macroeconomic policy and the condition of the banking 
system in Greece in the late 1920s, would not have led to the establishment of a fully fledged 
central bank in that period. On its own initiative, the National Bank was prepared to 
implement only minor changes such as the establishment of the Mortgage Bank in 1927, the 
only operation it seems it was willing to concede to another institution. In addition, the 
political climate tended to support the general inertia of the National Bank towards real 
change.  
 
 There is reference in the literature to Eleftherios Venizelos, by far the strongest 
political figure in Greece after 1909, having stated in an interview in Britain’s Morning Post 
in 1917 that ‘the National Bank would be reorganised and would become simply a bank of 
issue’.73 This was actually said not in an interview in the Morning Post but in the Greek 
parliament. (The Morning Post published a report of the occasion when the Prime Minister, 
Venizelos answered a question about a loan that the previous pro–German Greek government 
had contracted with Germany on which the National Bank had acted as an intermediary.74) 
However, his reaction to the banking reforms, when in 1928 he returned to the country and to 
power, indicates that the changes he could have implemented were not much different from 
those that the National Bank had favoured. 
 
 Serious concern about the condition of the banking system in Greece had always been 
expressed by scholars. First, A. Soutsos (1882, vol. I, p. 518) criticised the multifaceted 
character of the National Bank, and expressed doubts as to whether it could fulfil all its 
functions properly. On the same grounds, Ch. Damiris in a book published in 1920 criticised 
the National Bank, stressed the fact that it had too much power over the monetary and 
banking system and argued for change. It is interesting that Damiris was the only one who 
referred to the fact that the National Bank had never been the bank of the banks and had no 
legal obligation to fulfil such a function.75 Finally, N. Bakopoulos (1920) published a book on 
central banks wherein he described the functions and objectives of a full blown version of the 
institution but did not refer to or criticise the National Bank. These objections and criticism 
73 Pyrsos (c1935, p. 16). 
74 The Morning Post, 20 August, 1917. 
75 Pyrsos (c1935, pp. 16–17). 
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over the size, functions and power of the National Bank had very limited impact and could 
not by themselves have led to fundamental changes in the banking system. 
 
 
2.3. Objectives and contribution of the thesis 
The focus of this thesis is twofold: firstly, to examine the evolution of central banking 
institutions in Greece between the enactment of the Law of Control in 1898 and de jure 
stabilisation of the drachma in 1928. Secondly, to explore the impact that foreign supervision 
had on the evolution of central banking in Greece, given the complex relationship that Greece 
had with its foreign creditors. To these ends, the characteristics of central banking in Greece, 
a country on the European periphery, prior to the establishment of the Bank of Greece are 
unravelled and contrasted with the central banking standards that foreign creditors had 
adopted and promoted at the time.  
 
This study looks at the ‘dual position’ of the National Bank; it examines its role both 
as a central bank and as the most important commercial bank in Greece. A crucial question 
that is asked is why the dual-purpose National Bank was not in a position to transform itself 
into a fully fledged central bank on its own initiative following a path similar to that of other 
European central banks and described by the natural evolution hypothesis. Furthermore, it 
asks why the commercial activities of the Old Bank were so important that, in the end, it 
chose to retain that aspect of its business moving forward, when prior to 1927 it had so 
fiercely guarded its central banking privileges. Hence, an important contribution of this thesis 
is a painstaking and in-depth analysis of the tension between the public responsibilities of the 
National Bank as a central bank and its duty to its proprietors.     
 
Time series are constructed using not only quantitative material such as the published 
balance sheet of the National Bank but also a variety of qualitative sources to illustrate the 
evolution of the National Bank as a bank of issue, bank of the government and as the most 
important commercial bank in Greece. The objective is to explore the way in which the 
governors of the Old Bank managed ‘the two conceptions of their business’,76 i.e. central 
banking responsibilities and commercial banking, whilst safeguarding the financial strength 
and consequently the reputation of the National Bank throughout its entire history as a dual-
purpose bank. Furthermore, the time series constructed show changes that a long period of 
war, high inflation and subsequent reconstruction brought to the commercial aspect of the 
National Bank and to its role as an issuing bank and a bank of the government. Highlighting 
76 Clapham (1944, p. 372). 
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changes that occurred in the structure and composition of the assets and liabilities of the dual-
purpose National Bank between the enactment of the Law of Control in 1898 and the spring 
of 1927 when the League of Nations was approached helps to understand what the governors 
of the Old Bank sought to achieve through stabilisation and how they envisaged stabilisation 
would affect its financial status.  
 
The time series constructed demonstrate that the changes brought about by a long 
period of war and monetary upheaval to the structure and composition of the balance sheet of 
the Old Bank determined banking reforms in the late 1920s. It is shown that the National 
Bank used to focus its commercial activities on mortgage credit and time deposits. However, 
the significance of these two items on the balance sheet of the Bank decreased because of a 
long period of war and high inflation. This change on the Old Bank’s balance sheet also 
explains why, of its own volition, it conceded its mortgage credit privilege to a newly 
established mortgage bank in June 1927. Moreover, the newly constructed time series 
graphically indicate that the relationship between credits supplied to the economy and 
bilateral public debt held by the National Bank fundamentally altered after 1918.     
 
A further contribution of this thesis is that the monetary arrangement introduced in 
March 1910, which is known as the ΓΧΜΒ Law or the Valaorites Law, is extensively 
examined; its principles and evolution until 1919, the last time it was used to increase the 
money supply, are scrutinised. This monetary arrangement has prompted contemporary 
economists and economic historians to argue that Greece adopted a clearly defined monetary 
rule during that year, even though there is no agreement amongst them on which standard 
Greece did in fact introduce. However, before the 1980s it was believed that the Greek 
currency had remained inconvertible throughout the period from September 1885, when the 
gold standard was suspended, until May 1928, when the gold exchange standard was de jure 
introduced. An objective here is to draw attention to the discrepancy between the way that 
monetary change in Greece in 1910 is seen in recent economic history literature and the way 
it was considered by scholars and policy makers at the time. Furthermore, it will be 
demonstrated that the way the ΓΧΜΒ Law was employed to increase the banknotes in 
circulation after the outbreak of the Great War, and indeed to finance the active participation 
of Greece in the war, was one of the most important reasons for the high inflation experienced 
at the time. 
 
To a large extent, the long-term impact of war on the financial structure is a result of 
the need for direct and indirect funding of any conflict and its preparation as well as of the 
cost of possible reparations. Therefore, both conventional and unconventional methods used 
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by the Greek government to finance a long period of war and its aftermath are examined in 
detail. The objective is firstly to study the extent to which the National Bank itself financed 
government expenditure during a period when the Greek government had no access to 
international financial markets; secondly, to analyse the impact that government borrowing 
had on the Old Bank; and finally, to acknowledge the origins of the monetary upheaval of the 
1920s. It can be shown that high inflation stemmed from the way that the printing press was 
used to monetise budget deficits. As is evidenced, the Old Bank proved to be the main source 
of financial support for the government and a complex relationship was created between 
them. High inflation in the 1920s wiped out a significant part of the nominal value of bilateral 
public debt denominated in drachmae owned by the National Bank without entirely 
eliminating it. The National Bank aimed at reducing it still further during de jure stabilisation.  
 
The creditworthiness of the Greek government on the London market between the 
enactment of the Law of Control in 1898 and the implementation of a League stabilisation 
programme in 1928 is also examined. The objective is to demonstrate the negotiating power 
that the Greek government had in that market. In addition, research into the press of the 
period shows that market participants were kept well informed, and promptly too, about 
developments in Greece and thus were able to evaluate country risk during a time when a 
system of formal rating had not been developed.  
 
The stabilisation plans proposed by the different participants are explored and 
ideological disparities as well as differences in the way that they envisaged that stabilisation 
would affect institutions with respect to fiscal and monetary policy are exposed. The aim is to 
highlight differences amongst those involved or tempted to become involved in the 
stabilisation of the drachma, that is to say the National Bank of Greece, the Greek Ministry of 
Finance, the IFC, the Bank of England and later the Financial Committee of the League of 
Nations. 
 
A comparison of foreign intervention and financial support between the Law of 
Control of 1898 and the Geneva Stabilisation Plan of 1928 is carried out, as these institutional 
arrangements were harbingers of the establishment of the International Monetary Fund. The 
aim is to reveal both the similarities and differences in institutional reforms sponsored by 
foreign creditors during those two distinctive periods. Differences in the flotation of the 
respective loans are also denoted. 
 
The restructuring of domestic public debt in 1898 is briefly discussed. The aim is to 
demonstrate the way in which the financial position of the Old Bank was affected by this debt 
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readjustment. This thesis also illustrates the way in which government debt held by the 
National Bank before central banking reforms was distributed between the Old Bank of issue 
and the New Bank. The objective is to strengthen the argument made that the National Bank 
during the negotiations with foreign creditors both in the late nineteenth century and in the 
late 1920s sought to achieve a compromise, which at the same time would be favourable to its 
financial position.   
 
The negotiations with the League representatives are discussed in detail and the 
objections raised by the governor of the National Bank to its metamorphosis from a dual-
purpose bank to a modern central bank are presented. The objective is to show that the 
particular domestic variation on the League of Nations’ norms that led to the establishment of 
a fully fledged central bank in Greece in 1928 happened with the consent of the National 
Bank. In fact, it is demonstrated that the ways in which central banking reforms were carried 
out were aimed at strengthening the financial position of the Old Bank of issue. How 
cautiously news of the central banking reform was announced and circulated in Athens is also 
shown. Finally, the thesis closes with an analysis of the institutional arrangements 
surrounding the establishment of the Bank of Greece. The objectives and functions of the new 
central bank are described and its financial position upon commencement of operations is 
evidenced. 
 
This thesis contributes to the understanding of the origins of the central banking 
reforms in Greece in the late 1920s as part of the process of currency stabilisation. It unravels 
the political economy at the root of these reforms and sheds light on the factors that impeded 
the transformation of the National Bank from the bank of issue in Greece and the bank of the 
government into a fully fledged model of a central bank. It places in historical perspective 
issues of political economy that shaped central banking reform in the 1920s and led to a 
domestic variation on the League of Nations’ norms. It is also demonstrated that the evolution 
of the institution of central banking in Greece follows a disparate route from that described by 
the natural evolution hypothesis formed by Goodhart and based on a comparative analysis of the 
experience of several mainly European nations. In this way, this thesis seeks to provide insight 
into the formation of the institution of central banking and its application to small open 
economies. Examination of the establishment of the Bank of Greece can help to draw broader 
conclusions about the evolution of central banking and the establishment of central banks de 
novo. Furthermore, it examines the contribution of the League of Nations and the Bank of 
England to the evolution of central banking in the 1920s and highlights the main principles of 
this institution as they were then.  
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2.4. Overview of the archival sources and data used 
The research in this thesis relies on a variety of sources both qualitative and quantitative that are 
geographically spread between Athens, London and Geneva. In Athens, archival research has 
been carried out at the following archives: the Emmanouil Tsouderos Archive at the Bank of 
Greece, the Historical Archives of the National Bank of Greece, the Alexandros Diomides 
Archive deposited at the Greek Literary and History Archive, which is now part of the National 
Bank of Greece Cultural Centre, and last but not least the Alexandros Diomides Archive at the 
Historical Archives of the National Bank. In addition to the archives in Athens, the Bank of 
England Archive and the Midland Bank Archive in London, as well as the League of Nations 
Archive at the United Nations in Geneva were consulted. The Hambros Bank Archive available 
at the Guildhall Library was also visited. However, the archival material on Greece for the 
period in question at Hambros Bank Archive is insignificant. The documents on Greece there 
primarily refer to the period prior to the outbreak of the First World War.  
 
 The thesis also draws on printed primary material such as the press of the period, both 
Greek and British, parliamentary papers and records of debates, publications of the League of 
Nations and contemporaneous literature. Invaluable information from the British press for the 
purpose of this thesis provides material systematically collected from a wide range of mainly 
daily press and organised in a continuous format of cutting books by the Council of the 
Corporation of Foreign Bondholders. These cutting books are now held at the Guildhall 
Library in London. 
 
 The Emmanouil Tsouderos Archive deposited at the Bank of Greece covers the period 
from the early 1920s until the Second World War and does not bear the hallmark of a personal 
archive to any great extent. By contrast, both archives of Alexandros Diomides consist mainly 
of personal correspondence. The material at the Tsouderos Archive is very rich and includes 
reports written for a variety of purposes, statistical data for his own information, 
correspondence, cables and cuttings from the press of the day. It provides extensive and 
valuable information on the 1920s and in particular on the negotiations for the stabilisation of 
the drachma between Athens, the Bank of England and the League of Nations.  
 
 The Historical Archives of the National Bank are probably the richest and most 
significant archives in Greece for an economic historian writing on the period before the Second 
World War. It is an invaluable repository from which to draw both qualitative and quantitative 
material for the analysis in this study.  
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 The Annual Reports of the National Bank have been used extensively here to construct 
a variety of time series covering the period in question. As a primary source for the 1920s, 
however, it has its limitations. Accountancy practices that were employed during the monetary 
upheaval of the 1920s obscure the real financial position of the Bank during that period. The 
consequent difficulty stems from the way that assets and liabilities denominated in gold and 
foreign exchange were reported on the balance sheet of the Bank. The advisor to the Bank of 
Greece, Horace C. Finlayson described this very vividly in his annual report for 1929. Finlayson 
wrote that the balance sheet published by the National Bank every six months prior to the 
reorganisation of the banking system ‘succeeded in solving the problem of adding four chairs to 
four o’clock to make eight! Gold francs (or drachmae) were added up together with paper 
drachmae so that the statements are bewildering even to the most discerning eye’.77 The 
outcome of this practice is to understate the value of figures denominated in gold drachmae that 
appear on the balance sheet of the National Bank from the point where the drachma began 
depreciating in 1919 until stabilisation. Consequently, what is reported as total assets on the 
balance sheet of the National Bank in the 1920s prior to stabilisation is an understatement of its 
true financial position.  
  
 The material found in the archives in Athens is complemented by primary sources from 
the Bank of England Archive. This primary material comprises a variety of documents ranging 
from reports on Greece to minutes of meetings between Greek officials and representatives of 
the Bank of England. Most of the material used in this thesis is drawn from Sir Otto Niemeyer’s 
Papers.78 Niemeyer joined the Bank of England as an Advisor in 1927 having previously been 
Controller of Finance at HM Treasury. Apart from his general responsibilities on the overseas 
side of the Bank of England, he also was a member of the League of Nations Financial 
Committee from 1922 to 1937 and the chairman of that Committee in 1927 when the 
Reconstruction Plan for Greece was prepared. He also worked feverishly to propagate central 
banking orthodoxy throughout the entire interwar period. 
 
 Last but not least, the League of Nations Archive in Geneva was visited. The most 
important primary sources kept at Geneva can, however, also be found at the Bank of England 
Archive and/or in archives in Athens. Furthermore, the entire collection of the printed material 
of the League kept at its archive is also available at the British Library of Political and 
Economic Science. 
   
77 BoE Archive, OV9/192/2. 
78 Bank of England Archive, Overseas Department, Sir Otto Niemeyer’s Papers (OV9). It covers the 
period from 1922 until 1965 and consists of 592 pieces. His papers whilst he was at the Treasury are 
deposited at the Bank of England Archive. Bank of England (1998, p. 58). 
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 In the 1920s, governments started collecting data and encouraged publications where 
the data amassed were presented. The Greek government was no exception and in the 1920s 
began publishing the Statistical Yearbooks which contain data on all aspects of the economy 
from public finance to literacy.79 The data collected as well as the indices produced in these 
Yearbooks have been widely used both by contemporaneous scholars and contemporary 
economic historians. 
 
 Contemporary economic historians have either collected together data and/or 
constructed time series covering a broad spectrum of the economy.80 The balance sheet of the 
National Bank published twice a year is the principal source of the data for the history of this 
institution. In his research, Kostis has made extensive use of this source to organise data 
covering different aspects of the history of the National Bank and to produce financial ratios 
covering the period between the late nineteenth century and the outbreak of the Second World 
War.81  
 
 A variety of price indices constructed either at the time in question or by contemporary 
economic historians is available. Firstly, the Statistical Yearbooks provide a retail price index 
and a cost of living index. Neither indices are weighted and the method used to construct them 
is apparently that of the arithmetic mean. In addition, all data employed for their construction 
are available in the Statistical Yearbooks. Secondly, during the 1920s Xenophon Zolotas (1928, 
1929) constructed a number of price indices (including a monthly retail price index), which, 
however, do not cover the whole period in question here. In his usual fashion, Zolotas neither 
disclosed his sources for the data used nor the methodology employed. It is, however, highly 
probable that he used the very same data available in the Yearbooks.82 Thirdly, a price index 
based on a Laspeyres formula and on the data in the Statistical Yearbooks was constructed by 
George Kostelenos for the period in question.83 Fourthly, a GDP deflator has been estimated on 
the basis of a selection of ten items and based on the Paasche formula.84 Finally, George 
Mitrofanis has constructed a price index.85 However, no information is available either on the 
method employed or the data used for the construction of this price index.  
 
79 General Statistical Service of Greece (1931–1940).  
80 For example, see Kostelenos (1995); Kostis (2003); Dertilis (2005); Kostelenos et al. (2007); 
Lazaretou (2014). 
81 Kostis (1990, 2003). 
82 Kostelenos (1995, p. 64). 
83 Ibid., pp. 310–316. 
84 Kostelenos (2007, pp. 159–164). 
85 Dertilis (2005, p. 1048). 
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 The most important price indices available are presented in Figure 2.1. A comparison of 
them reveals some differences. In spite of these differences, however, the general picture that 
they produce for the period in question remains the same. In this thesis, all price indices 
mentioned above are treated with caution, a consideration that places constraints on the analysis. 
The main reservation stems from the fact that the items used for their construction are not 
representative of all the sectors of the economy, having been taken mainly if not exclusively 
from the primary sector. Certainly, no items are included from the tertiary sector. The 
Kostelenos et al. (2007) deflator is employed whenever necessary. This deflator is presented in 
Table 2.1 below. In addition, inflation rates for the period between 1915 and 1929 have been 
calculated using the Kostelenos et al. deflator, as well as the general price index included in the 
Statistical Yearbooks. These inflation rates are presented in Table 6.1 in Chapter 6. 
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Figure 2.1.: Price indices, 1914–1929 
Note: GPI stands for General Price Index for the index in the Statistical Yearbooks; K-95 and K-07 is for Kostellenos indices published in 1995 and 2007 
respectively; CoL is for the cost of living and M-02 is the index that George Mitrofanis constructed. 
Sources: See Table A1.1 in Appendix A1.  
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In this thesis, resort to available published data is made selectively and with caution. In general 
the approach that has been adopted is to return to the original sources and construct new time 
series, often of high frequency data when this has been possible. Therefore, a number of new 
time series have been constructed that are related to the fiscal, monetary and exchange rate 
issues studied here. Time series of the creditworthiness of the Greek government on the London 
Stock Exchange between 1896 and 1930 have also been constructed. Furthermore, this thesis 
brings together a wide array of data that demonstrate the financial position of the National Bank, 
its relation with the government and the manner in which the printing press was used as a tool of 
monetary policy during the period in question.  
 
Table 2.1: Kostelenos et al. (2007) deflator  
(Base year 1911=1) 
1898 1.09 1914 1.10 
1899 1.01 1915 1.34 
1900 1.22 1916 1.76 
1901 1.43 1917 2.62 
1902 1.07 1918 3.36 
1903 1.05 1919 3.68 
1904 0.91 1920 4.18 
1905 0.89 1921 5.21 
1906 0.93 1922 8.05 
1907 0.98 1923 13.90 
1908 0.97 1924 15.34 
1909 1.02 1925 16.57 
1910 0.98 1926 18.97 
1911 1.00 1927 21.38 
1912 0.99 1928 21.35 
1913 0.97 1929 19.65 
  1930 17.52 
Notes:  
(1) Rebased from the original deflator where the base year is 1914 (1914=1).  
(2) This is a deflator based on a sample of ten items. 
Source: Kostelenos et al. (2007, Table 7-II, column headed 3, p. 38 of CD). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II:  
THE PRECURSOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK IN GREECE:  
THE NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 3: 
THE NATIONAL BANK AS COMMERCIAL BANK 
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3.1. Structure of the banking system in Greece in 1927 
On the eve of their reform Greek banks could be divided into three categories. In the first 
category the National Bank of Greece, instituted in 1841, stood alone not only because of its 
dual-purpose character as a bank of issue and as a commercial bank but also because of its size 
which enabled it to dominate the country’s banking system. Next came a handful of banks, 
established around the turn of the century and finally a third category of small, mainly local 
banks, most of which were established after the end of the First World War. In addition, there 
were some foreign banks operating in the country and two special institutions, namely the Post 
Office Savings Bank and the Deposit and Loans Fund. Finally, during that same year, on 1 June 
1927, the National Mortgage Bank, a bank specialising in mortgage credit had started to 
operate. Table 3.1 below shows the banks that operated in Greece in 1927, the year of their 
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foundation and the number of branches that each of them had. As Table 3.4 below shows, 17 of 
these banks were listed on the Athens Stock Exchange. 
 
Table 3.1: The banking system in Greece in 1927 
 Year of 
Establishment 
Central  
Offices 
Number of 
Branches1 
    
National Bank of Greece  1841 Athens 83 
    
Bank of Athens 1893 Athens 98 
Bank of the Orient(6) 1904 Athens 7 
Popular Bank(6) 1905 Athens 11 
Commercial Bank of Greece 1907 Athens 34 
    
National Mortgage Bank(2) 1927 Athens  
    
Bank of Piraeus 1916 Piraeus 2 
Bank of Industry(4)(*) 1918 Piraeus 5 
Bank of the National Economy(*) 1918 Piraeus 5 
General Bank of Greece(5) 1918 Athens 3 
Maritime Bank of Piraeus 1918 Piraeus  
Greek Bank of Commerce, Industry and Shipping 1918 Athens  
Central Bank of Greece(*) 1919 Athens  
Bank of Chios 1919 Athens 2 
Amar Bank 1920 Salonika  
Cosmadopoulos Bank(*) 1921 Volos 4 
Greek Securities Bank(5) 1921 Athens  
Bank of Thessaly(*) 1921 Volos  
Bank of Commerce 1922 Athens  
Bank of Property(4)(*) 1923 Athens  
Trapezomesitiki A.E.(*) 1923 Athens  
Anglo-American Bank of Greece(*) 1923 Athens  
Bank of Trikkala 1924 Trikkala  
Bank of Samos(*) 1924 Athens  
Tobacco Industry & Karavasilis Bank 1924 Athens 2 
Bank of Greek Commercial Credit 1924 Athens 11 
Panhellenic Bank of Commerce,  
Industry and Companies(*) 
 
1924 
 
Athens  
Bank of Property of Piraeus(4)(*) 1924 Piraeus  
Nikas’ Brothers, Banking and Commercial 
Company 1924 Piraeus  
Bank of Archipelago(*) 1924 Athens  
Bank of Attikis 1925 Piraeus  
Bank of Commerce and Industry(*) 1925 Volos  
Bank of Messinias(*) 1925 Kalamata  
Bank of Athenian Credit(*)  1925 Athens  
Bank of Larissa 1925 Larissa  
Benveniste Bank(*) 1925 Salonika  
Bank of Crete(3) 1925 Herakleion  
Bank of Greek Merchants(*) 1925 Athens  
Zarifis, Eugenidis & Sia Bank 1925 Athens  
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 Year of 
Establishment 
Central  
Offices 
Number of 
Branches1 
Bank of Commerce and Industry of Volos 1925 Volos  
Bank of Peloponnisos(5)(*) 1925 Gastouni  
Bank of Lakonias 1926 Athens 5 
Union Bank 1926 Salonika  
Servo-Greek Bank 1926 Salonika  
Agrarian Bank of Greece(4) 1926 Athens  
Bank of Agrarian Credit(4)(*) 1926 Almiros  
Pavlos’ Bank(5) 1926 Athens  
Popular Saving A.E. 1927 Athens  
    
Post Office Savings Bank 1914 Athens  
 
    
Foreign Banks in Greece    
Ionian Bank 1839 Athens  
Bank de Salonique 1888 Salonika  
Banque Ottomane  Salonika  
Angloagean Bank of Commerce Ltd  Salonika  
American Express Co. Ltd 1920 Athens  
    
Notes:  
* The banks marked with an asterisk were either liquated or went bankrupt after 1929. 
1 The Number of branches of each bank refers to 1928.  
2 The National Mortgage Bank started operations on 1 June 1927.  
3 The Bank of Property of Crete was renamed Bank of Crete in 1927.  
4 The Bank of Property and the Bank of Property of Piraeus were designed to specialise in 
mortgage credit, the Agrarian Bank of Greece and the Bank of the Agrarian Credit in 
agricultural credit and the Bank of Industry in industrial projects. In practice, however, none 
of these banks pursued aims set out in their respective statutes.  
5 In 1927 the General Bank of Greece was merged with the Popular Bank and the Greek 
Securities Bank with the Bank of Industry; the Bank of Peloponissos and the Pavlos’ Bank 
were both liquated; the Maritime Bank of Piraeus was merged with the Sea Ventures Ltd 
Company.  
6 The Bank of the Orient was acquired by the National Bank in 1932. In that same year the 
Popular Bank was bought by the Ionian Bank.  
Sources: Charitakis et al. (1932, pp. 377–378); Kyrkilitsis (1934, pp. 4–12); Galanis (1946, 
pp. 122–125); Bank of Greece (1978, pp. 50–51); Kostis and Tsokopoulos (1988, pp. 64–67); 
Kostis (1990, pp. 148–153); Dritsa (1990, pp. 235–236); Alogoskoufis and Lazaretou (1997, 
pp. 150–153); Christodoulaki (2002, pp. 253–254). 
 
One of the principal characteristics of the Greek banking system was its considerable stability 
which was mainly due to the ‘great weight and prestige’ of the National Bank, a profit 
maximising dual-purpose bank which at the same time was a conservative and risk-averse 
institution. It was a branch banking system and as Table 3.1 illustrates, in 1928 there were in 
total 272 branches of various banks spread all over the country. Two banks, the Bank of Athens 
and the National Bank, had established by far the most branches: the Bank of Athens had 98 
branches whilst the National Bank had established 83. Then, the Commercial Bank of Greece 
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followed with 34 branches. The majority of the rest of the banks had no branches at all as Table 
3.1 demonstrates whilst those having branches, had established only a few.  
 
 After the end of the Great War the banking system in Greece expanded rapidly with the 
establishment of a great number of small, primarily local banks. This was prompted firstly, by 
the introduction of a law in 1920 relating to limited companies which encouraged bankers to 
turn their offices into small family banks and in this way to benefit from the taxation advantages 
that this law provided.86 As a consequence by the end of the 1920s nearly no bankers’ offices 
remained. Secondly, the increase in the market with the annexation of the New Areas after the 
end of the Balkan Wars and the influx of over a million refugees from Asia Minor created the 
conditions for the expansion of the banking system. Last but not least, the monetary upheaval of 
the 1920s also encouraged the establishment of small local banks.87  
 
The central bank, that is to say the National Bank, had no statutory powers over the 
banking system.88 According to the legal framework as it related to banks before 1926, any 
limited company could undertake banking activities. Only in 1926, a couple of years before the 
banking reforms, was a law introduced that required any new bank being established to have 
capital of at least 15 million drachmae.89 This legal prerequisite checked the establishment of 
new banks after 1926.90 Nevertheless, these banks were small, primarily family banks and the 
main source of their profits seems to have been speculation on the exchange rate. Aggelopoulos 
(1928, p. 53) estimated that in 1924, 52 per cent of the gross profits of the banks came from 
foreign exchange operations, 51 per cent in 1925 but only 39 per cent in 1927.91 When the 
drachma was de facto stabilised in 1927 not only did the more precarious of the new banks stop 
popping up but also those that had been established started experiencing difficulties. During the 
Great Depression many of the small local banks either closed down or were acquired by other 
healthier banks.92  
 
 Another characteristic of the banking system was that it was not competitive and lacked 
diversification and specialisation. The banks in Greece were primarily deposit banks and the 
new banks that appeared in the 1920s followed this tradition. There were, however, exceptions 
86 This was the Law 2190/1920. For more, see Aggelopoulos (1928, pp. 31–32); Kostis (1997, p. 27).  
87 Kyrkilitsis (1934); Bank of Greece (1978, p. 48); Kostis (1987, p. 220); Kostis and Tsokopoulos (1988, 
p. 59); Dritsa (1990, p. 239); Alogoskoufis and Lazaretou (1997, p. 129).  
88 Mazower (1991, p. 71). 
89 Kyrkilitsis (1934); Kostis (1997, p. 179, n. 43). 
90 For the number of new banks that were established each year between 1922 and 1930, see Kyrkilitsis 
(1934, p. 20). 
91 Alogoskoufis and Lazaretou (1997, p. 130); Kostis, (1997, p. 174, n. 14). 
92 About 12 of them closed down in the early 1930s. See Kyrkilitsis (1934, pp. 12–14); Alogoskoufis and 
Lazaretou (1997, p. 130). 
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signalling a need for diversification in the banking system. For example, the Bank of Industry 
established in 1918 by a group of industrialists had as its objective the promotion and support of 
industry.93 The Bank of Property and the Bank of Property of Piraeus aimed at specialising in 
mortgage credit whilst the Agrarian Bank and the Bank of Agrarian Credit at agricultural credit. 
All these new banks, however, remained small and undercapitalised and did not manage to 
encourage competition in the system whilst their professed specialisation remained a mere 
pledge in their statutes.  
 
 All in all, the increase in the number of banks operating in Greece in the 1920s did 
not bring fundamental changes in the banking sector. The real transformation of the banking 
system in Greece happened in a short span of time, namely between 1927 and 1929, when the 
country obtained three specialised banking institutions: firstly in 1927 a mortgage bank, the 
National Mortgage Bank; then in 1928 a central bank, the Bank of Greece; and finally in 1929 
an agricultural bank, the Agricultural Bank of Greece. These sweeping banking reforms led to 
the modernisation and rationalisation of the banking system in Greece and perhaps constitute 
the most important transformation of the banking system in the country in its entire history. 
 
The size of the National Bank was huge and it dominated the market with almost 
monopolistic powers. The representatives of the League that came to Athens in April 1927 to 
investigate the economic situation in the country stressed this characteristic of the National 
Bank in their report.94  
 
Total assets or liabilities are usually used as a measure to compare the size of banks. 
The National Bank, however, was a dual-purpose bank, a bank of issue and at the same time 
the biggest commercial bank in the country. A comparison of total assets or liabilities of the 
National Bank with a sample of other Greek banks is in any event distorted by the fact that the 
total of the banknotes in circulation was reported on the balance sheet of the National Bank. 
Moreover, the 1920s was a period of high inflation and accountancy practices employed by 
banks to record both assets and liabilities denominated in foreign exchange and gold often 
distorted their real financial position. This is particularly the case with the National Bank, as 
has been explained in Chapter 2.  
 
In this thesis, the deposits and market capitalisation of a handful of banks are used as 
measures to assess the size of the National Bank vis-à-vis other banking institutions in 
93 Kyrkilitsis (1934, p. 87); Kostis and Tsokopoulos (1988, p. 60). 
94 See HABOG_A3S1Y1F4T1, pp. 1–100. 
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Greece. Both measures paint the same picture; the National Bank was far bigger than any of 
the other banks. 
 
Table 3.2: Deposits in 1926 
 Deposits 
(in thousands of 
drachmae) As % of Total 
As % of Grand 
Total 
National Bank  
of Greece (1841)2 3,479,103.99 60.91  41.26 
    
Bank of Athens (1893)    1,215,410.70 21.28  14.41 
Popular Bank (1905)      424,984.00 7.44  5.04 
Commercial Bank (1907) 396,316.00 6.94  4.70 
Piraeus Bank (1916) 88,816.00 1.56  1.05 
Bank of Industry (1918) 106,801.00 1.87  1.27 
    
 
Total:1 5,711,431.69 100.00  67.73 
 
Grand Total:3 8,432,900.00  100.00 
Notes:  
1 This is total deposits in thousand of drachmae that the six banks cited above received. Part 
of these deposits was denominated in gold drachmae. For example, 4.05 per cent of the 
deposits of the National Bank in 1926 were deposits in gold drachmae. 
2 Government deposits at the National Bank are not included. In 1926, 12.40 per cent of the 
total deposits of the National Bank were government deposits. 
3 This is the total of deposits that Kyrkilitsis (1934, p. 42) reported. Kyrkilitsis did not cite the 
original source of the data that he reported, nor provided information on the number of banks 
included.  
Sources: Annual Report of the National Bank for 1926; Annual Report of the Bank of Athens 
for 1926; Kyrkilitsis (1934, p. 42); Kostis and Tsokopoulos (1988, pp. 182–196).  
 
Table 3.2 shows the total deposits that the National Bank and a sample of other commercial 
banks received in 1926. These are the Bank of Athens, the Popular Bank and the Commercial 
Bank established before the outbreak of the Great War and the Piraeus Bank and the Bank of 
Industry established in 1916 and 1918 respectively. Deposits reported in Table 3.2 are sight, 
time and savings deposits whilst the government deposits that the National Bank held as a 
consequence of its role as the bank of the government are not included. 1926 was chosen as a 
benchmark for the comparison as it was the last year before any of the banking reforms of the 
late 1920s was carried out. A few months later, in June 1927, the Bank handed over to the 
newly established Mortgage Bank the majority of its time deposits. 
 
 Table 3.2 shows that the National Bank alone attracted approximately 40 per cent of the 
total deposits in the country. In other words, it received 60 per cent of the deposits of the sample 
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of six banks presented in Table 3.2. It is evident that the National Bank was nonetheless the 
predominant deposit bank in Greece. The Bank of Athens follows with 14 per cent of the total 
deposits in spite of having had a widely spread network of branches as Table 3.1 above shows. 
In addition, the deposits of the Bank of Athens represented only one-third of the commercial 
deposits of the National Bank. The Popular and the Commercial Bank held only 10 per cent of 
total deposits between them. Finally, Table 3.2 shows that the banks established after the 
outbreak of the Great War had not managed to capture a significant part of the deposit market 
by 1926. For example in 1926, the deposits of the Piraeus Bank established in 1916 were only 1 
per cent of the total deposits in the country whilst the Bank of Industry’s were 1.27 per cent.  
 
 Another way to compare the size and the power of the National Bank vis-à-vis the 
country’s other banks is to compare the share capital of the National Bank with that of other 
banks. Table 3.3 shows the book value of the share capital and the reserves of the National Bank 
alongside some banks established before the outbreak of the war as well as the Bank of Piraeus 
and the Bank of Industry founded in 1916 and 1918 respectively. However, to compare the 
book value of the capital stock of the banks included in Table 3.3 is misleading. The share 
capital of the National Bank cannot be compared with the book value for example of the capital 
of the Bank of Industry.95 The stock capital of the National Bank had remained the same since 
1884, the last time that it was increased. On the other hand, the Bank of Industry raised its stock 
capital between 1918 and 1925 which was a period of high inflation. The third column of Table 
3.3 shows the reserves of the banks mentioned above. The reserves of the National Bank quoted 
in this table do not include the reserves that it was required by law to maintain after 1923 as the 
central bank in Greece. Half of these reserves that the National Bank was required to hold as the 
bank of issue in Greece in fact belonged to the government. In 1926 these reserves amounted to 
120 million drachmae.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95 For example, see Kyrkilitsis (1934, p. 21); Kostis (1987, p. 233; 1990, p. 166). 
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Table 3.3: Bank capital in 1926 
(in drachmae) 
 Paid Up Capital1 Reserve Funds %2 
National Bank  
of Greece (1841) 20,000,000         220,000,0003 57.73 
    
Bank of Athens (1893) 72,000,000 40,000,000 8.25 
Bank of the Orient (1904)4    
Popular Bank (1905) 15,000,000 2,133,000 0.44 
Commercial Bank (1907) 47,400,000 106,830,000 22.03 
Piraeus Bank (1916) 10,000,000 6,755,000 1.39 
Bank of Industry (1918) 50,000,000 49,280,000 10.16 
    
Total:  424,998,000 100.00 
Notes: 
1 This is the book value of the paid up capital of each bank. Non-comparable. 
2 Percentage of reserve funds of each bank in total reserves of the banks listed above. 
3 The reserve funds of the National Bank according to 2577 law of 1921 are not included in 
the funds cited above. In 1926, these reserves amounted to 120 million drachmae; half of 
these reserves belonged to the government. 
4 The capital and reserves of the Bank of the Orient were reported in francs; 35,000,000 francs 
as capital and 8,163,187.25 francs as reserves. 
Sources: HABOG_A3S1Y1F4T1, p. 97; the data for the National Bank come from its Annual 
Report for 1926; Kostis and Tsokopoulos (1988, pp. 182–196). 
 
Table 3.4 below shows all the banks that were listed on the Athens Stock Exchange. In addition, 
it shows the number of shares and the average price of the share of each bank in 1926 as well as 
its market capitalisation. It is apparent again that the most important bank was the National 
Bank. At the time, 36 per cent of the market capitalisation of the banking sector was vested in 
National Bank. Once again, the Bank of Athens follows with 22 per cent. The Commercial 
Bank holds the third place with 12 per cent of the market. In addition, Table 3.4 demonstrates 
yet again, though in a different way, that the size of the banks established after the outbreak of 
the First World War remained small indeed.  
 
 In sum, in spite of the expansion in the number of banks after the outbreak of the Great 
War, the National Bank still remained the most important bank in Greece in the spring of 1927 
when the representatives of the League visited Athens. Its size, compared to the other banking 
institutions, was huge and its commercial aspect dominated the lending market. Last but not 
least, it continued to be the principal bank of deposit.  
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Table 3.4: Market capitalisation of banks in 19261 
 No of Shares Price of Share2 Market Capitalisation %3 
National Bank of Greece (1841) 20,000 41,503.83 830,076,600.00 36.32 
     
Bank of Athens (1893) 720,000        709.91 511,135,200.00 22.36 
Bank of the Orient (1904) 280,000 606.24 169,747,200.00 7.43 
Popular Bank (1905) 21,429 5,983.49 128,220,207.21 5.61 
Commercial Bank of Greece (1907) 474,000 574.16 272,151,840.00  11.91 
Bank of Piraeus (1916) 100,000 445.83 44,583,000.00 1.95 
Bank of Industry (1918) 200,000 542.49 108,498,000.00 4.75 
Bank of the National Economy (1918) 150,000 257.50 38,625,000.00 1.69 
General Bank of Greece (1918)  n.a.  2,354.41   
Central Bank of Greece (1918) 95,000 347.83 33,043,850.00 1.45 
Cosmadopoulos Bank (1921) 45,000 903.66 40,664,700.00 1.78 
Maritime Bank (1918) n.a. 129.33   
Bank of Chios (1919) 40,000 626.75 25,070,000.00 1.10 
Bank of Thessaly (1921) n.a. 170.16   
Bank of Greek Commercial Credit (1924) 100,000 280.08 28,008,000.00 1.23 
Anglo-American Bank  n.a.  89.50   
Tobacco Industry & Karavasilis' Bank (1924) 15,000 3,716.20 55,743,000.00 2.44 
     
Total:   2,285,566,597.21 100.00 
Notes:  
1 All banks listed on the Athens Stock Exchange in 1926 are cited above. 
2 Average price of the share of each bank at the Athens Stock Exchange in 1926.  
3 Percentage share of each bank in the total market capitalisation of the banking sector. 
Sources: Ministere de l΄Economie Nationale-Statistique Generale de la Grece (1929); Mitzalis (1931, pp. 6–41). 
 
 
3.2. Credits to the Economy 
3.2.1. Introduction 
The National Bank opened its doors for business on 22 January 1842 (Julian calendar) as a 
mortgage bank which at the same time enjoyed issuing privileges. Indeed, according to its 
initial statutes three-quarters of the banknotes it placed in circulation could be covered by 
mortgage loans. This provision was, however, annulled in 1843 as mortgage bonds, being a 
long-term investment, were not considered a suitable asset with which to cover the banknotes 
in circulation.96 
 
 The National Bank developed all kinds of commercial banking activities as time went 
during the ‘long’ nineteenth century. In 1861 agricultural credit was added to its portfolio 
whilst three years later, in 1864, loans and current accounts against securities were permitted. 
In 1871, the Bank was also allowed to participate in limited companies under the condition 
that they operated within the Greek borders. In addition, in 1880 its mortgage activities were 
expanded further to include loans to legal entities. In 1897, loans could be given on pledged 
warrants and in 1900, loans as well as advances against merchandise were authorised.97 
 
 The National Bank continued to pursue all these different activities up to the late 
1920s when banking reforms were implemented. In particular, the evolution of both mortgage 
and agricultural credit in Greece up to the late 1920s was closely correlated with the 
development of the National Bank. The Bank was the only bank in Greece prior to the 
banking reforms of the late 1920s that supplied loans to the agricultural sector, mortgage 
credit and loans to legal entities. In 1926, prior to any banking reform, the National Bank 
added a new activity to those mentioned above that was related to the settlement of refugees 
in urban areas in Greece: it engaged itself in the indemnification of urban refugees in Greece 
for their property left behind in Asia Minor. 
 
 In this section of Chapter 3, credits provided by the National Bank to the economy are 
examined. Credits to the economy include all credit, short- and long-term, granted to the 
productive sectors of the economy. They include discounts, loans against securities and 
merchandise, loans to the agricultural sector, mortgage credit and loans to legal entities. 
Discounts, loans against securities and merchandise were short-term credit as they were 
usually granted for three months. Loans and advances to the agricultural sector stood alone; in 
96 Kyrkilitsis (1934, p. 128). 
97 Valaorites ([1902] 1988, pp. 230–231). 
 
 
                                                     
general, they were furnished for a period between six to nine months. By contrast, mortgage 
credit and loans to legal entities were mainly long-term credit.  
 
 In its entire history as a dual-purpose bank, the National Bank had always pursued 
commercial activities in a conservative and risk-averse manner. Loans were supplied 
cautiously and the solvency of its clients was carefully scrutinised. Principal officials of the 
National Bank assured the representatives of the League of Nations that visited Athens in late 
spring of 1927 that the entirety of the commercial credit provided by the National Bank was 
considered ‘absolutely sound’.98 Certain rules were followed and exceptions were made only 
in rare cases. The same report listed the general rules applied by the Bank to all the 
commercial credit that it provided. No credit was automatically renewed and renewal was 
possible only after the guarantees attached had been thoroughly examined. No prior notice 
was necessary to terminate a credit at the date of its repayment. Current accounts were an 
exception to this and prior notice of termination was required. In addition, a current account 
could be closed whenever it was judged that the guarantees provided had diminished. The 
Bank could make available different types of credit to a customer but the total loaned was 
always aligned with that customer’s solvency.99  
 
 As is repeatedly asserted, the commercial aspect of the National Bank was an 
essential part of the Bank during its entire history as a ‘dual bank’, i.e. whilst it combined 
central banking responsibilities with commercial activities. In this section, the evolution of the 
commercial activities of the National Bank between 1898 and 1930 are examined and the 
changes that occurred during a long period of war and monetary upheaval are highlighted. 
Examination of the commercial credits provided by the National Bank to the productive 
sectors of the economy also sheds some light on credit conditions in Greece. This analysis 
also reveals that the National Bank was not on the way to transforming itself into a fully 
fledged central bank following the evolutionary model of other European central banks. In the 
spring of 1927, when the League of Nations was approached, the National Bank was involved 
in all kinds of commercial activities and had no resemblance at all to the model of a central 
bank pioneered by the governor of the Bank of England.  
 
 The investments of the Bank in other banks and companies, just one of its asset 
classes, are not examined here. The focus is on short- and long-term credit as well as loans to 
the agricultural sector. In addition, the activity related to the indemnification of urban 
refugees in Greece, although an activity close to the commercial interests of the National 
98 HABOG_A3S1Y1F4T1, p. 87. 
99 Ibid., p. 68. 
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Bank, is studied in the section on its relationship with the government. This task was 
intertwined with the dual character of the Bank and was retained when the Bank of Greece 
was established. In fact during the first couple of years of the National Bank as a commercial 
bank that are examined here this activity had an important position amongst its assets. 
 
 Firstly, some general information on the commercial activities of the National Bank is 
provided. Secondly, the size of the commercial activities of the National Bank as a percentage 
of GDP of the country and the total assets of the National Bank is examined. Thirdly, the 
evolution of credits to the economy at constant 1911 values is estimated and the changes that 
occurred during the period in question are pinpointed. Fourthly, a comparison of the 
commercial credit furnished by the National Bank and by the Bank of Athens is attempted. 
Subsequently, the share of each commercial task in total credits is studied. In this way, the 
character of the National Bank as a commercial bank is further examined. Finally, this part 
finishes with some concluding remarks.  
 
This is the first time that time series related to the commercial aspect of the National 
Bank have been constructed and analysed methodically. By this means the evolution of its 
commercial aspect during the period in question has been exposed. It should be stressed, 
however, that no similar analysis on the commercial activities of the National Bank from 
1842 up to 1897 has been carried out so far. Without such research, an examination of the 
evolution of the commercial role of the National Bank during its entire history as a dual-
purpose bank is not possible. 
 
3.2.2. A description of the commercial activities of the National Bank 
Discounts:  
Discounts included bills discounted and current accounts against personal guarantees. The 
Bank discounted bills for a period up to three months. Subsequently, bills could be renewed 
up to three times under the condition that the amount involved was insignificant. In the 1920s, 
they were discounted against personal guarantees and by statute should have borne at least 
two signatures.100  
 
 Discounting took place on the basis of nominal lists, carefully compiled by personnel 
of the National Bank. These lists were revised each year. Both an individual and a business 
had to be included in those lists in order to be able to present a bill for discounting.101  
100 Ibid., p. 69. 
101 Ibid. 
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Loans against Securities: 
Credit against securities was given for a period up to three months. It could be renewed if the 
securities deposited offered sufficient margin. The stocks and bonds eligible for collateral 
varied from government bonds denominated either in gold or drachmae to shares of business 
enterprises such as wine companies or building societies.102  
 
Loans against Merchandise: 
Advances and current accounts against merchandise were also granted for a maximum period 
of three months and could be renewed up to three times if the guarantees provided sufficient 
margin. 
 
 The evaluation of pledged merchandise was carried out by experts from the Bank and 
was repeated each month. In the event that the margin had decreased, the National Bank 
required either a decrease in the debt or additional guarantees.103  
 
 According to the League Report of 1927, the National Bank furnished advances of up 
to 50 per cent of the market value of merchandise. The maximum of 50 per cent of the market 
value was enjoyed by only a few products. For example the equivalent percentage in the case 
of tobacco was 30 per cent. On the other hand, it is noted that the Bank furnished advances of 
up to 75 per cent of the market value of cereals, which was clearly an exception.104  
  
Agricultural Credit:  
Agriculture was the most important economic activity in Greece throughout the period in 
question in this thesis as well as the exclusive source of export goods. The National Bank had 
a monopoly on granting credits to this sector up to 1929 when the Agricultural Bank of 
Greece was established. In the nineteenth century, credit to farmers by the Bank of Epirus-
Thessaly was fairly insignificant. In addition, loans that could be supplied by small local state 
banks that specialised in agrarian credit and operated in the New Areas annexed after the 
Balkan Wars remained negligible.105 Furthermore, the commercial banks that were 
established after the turn of the twentieth century did not include agricultural credit into their 
activities as the business was not regarded as profitable.106 Interest rates for credit to farmers 
were set by law and as a result did not allow sufficient profit.  
102 Ibid., pp. 94–95. 
103 Ibid., p. 78. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Kyrkilitsis (1934, p. 98, n. 1 and 108, n. 1); Kostis (2003, pp. 193–195). 
106 HABOG_A3S1Y1F4T1, p. 74; Kyrkilitsis (1934, pp. 102–103). 
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 When the National Bank was established in 1841, its charter vaguely stated its 
obligation to the agricultural sector.107 Twenty years later in 1861 when the issuing privilege 
of the National Bank was renewed, credit to the agricultural sector was added formally as a 
responsibility. That year, the commercial activities of the Bank were extended by law in such 
a way so as to include loans to farmers. From then on the National Bank was obliged to grant 
farmers up to 2 million drachmae each year.108 Agricultural credit, however, appears on the 
balance sheet of the National Bank as a separate entry only after 1893.109 In 1896 an 
agreement between the National Bank and the government increased the credit that the 
National Bank had to make available to the agricultural sector to at least 10 million drachmae 
each year.110  
 
 Once again when the issuing privilege of the National Bank was renewed in 1914 for 
the last time in its history as an issuing bank, it was agreed to increase credit to agriculture to 
25 million drachmae.111 During that year an institutional development also occurred which is 
regarded as a turning point in the literature on the evolution of agricultural credit in Greece.112 
In 1914, a law was passed that allowed for the establishment of agricultural co-operative 
societies.113 After that year, the National Bank started channelling credit to the agricultural 
sector through those co-operative societies. By the end of 1915 nearly 5 per cent of the credit 
granted by the Bank to the agricultural sector had been given to co-operatives. In 1922, half of 
the credit to agriculture was granted directly to farmers and the other half to co-operatives. By 
1928, however, only 25 per cent of the agricultural credit was supplied as loans directly to 
farmers, whilst the remaining 75 per cent was given to co-operative societies.114 During this 
period the number of co-operative societies in Greece increased very rapidly; from 150 in 
1915 to 4,148 in 1926 the majority of which were engaged in credit activities.115 
 
 Agricultural credit was usually a six- to nine-month credit.116 Loans to farmers were 
rarely renewed other than in the case of destruction of the harvest and under the condition that 
additional guarantees were not required. Credit to farmers was limited and intended to cover 
the needs of basic subsistence from season to season. Only a small portion of the credit 
granted to agriculture was aimed at capital improvements or the improvement of the value of 
107 Kyrkilitsis (1934, p. 97, n. 1). 
108 Ibid.; Valaorites ([1902] 1988, p. 36 and p. 230). 
109 Agriantoni, (1986, p. 383). 
110 Valaorites ([1902] 1988, p. 166). 
111 See Annual Report of the National Bank for 1915 (1916, p. XIV).  
112 Kyrkilitsis, (1934, p. 99); Kostis (1987, p. 157). 
113 Kostis (1987, pp. 185–194; 2003, pp. 193–195). 
114 Kyrkilitsis (1934, p. 103); see also Kostis (1987, p. 187). 
115 Kostis (1987, p. 343, n. 321); See also HABOG_A3S1Y1F4T1, p. 74. 
116 HABOG_A3S1Y1F4T1, p. 74; Kyrkilitsis (1934, p. 98 and 101). 
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the land; for example for the undertaking of drainage projects, the building of warehouses or 
even for the purchase of land and tools. In such cases, the credit was given for a maximum of 
five years.117  
 
 The interest rate charged by the National Bank on agrarian credit was determined by 
law and it was usually lower than its discount rate. In addition, after 1914 the interest rate for 
credit channelled to agricultural co-operative societies was lower by 1 per cent than that 
directed to individual farmers.118 Credit to the agricultural sector, which as already noted was 
monopolised by the National Bank was, however, available only to large farmers who could 
comply with the requirements set for collateral. Small farmers and peasants depended on 
informal chains of credit where punitive interest rates were charged whilst at the same time 
usurious interest rates were banned by law.  
 
 In 1919 the Law of Fictitious Chattel of Tobacco Crop was passed. Before the 
introduction of this law, agricultural loans were regulated only by the Law of Chattel 
Mortgage of 1836, which virtually repeated Roman-Byzantine Law.119 Moreover, in 1920 a 
further legal change occurred: the agricultural warrant was introduced.120 Between 1914 and 
1920, therefore credit conditions for farmers improved considerably with the introduction of 
the law that allowed the establishment of agricultural co-operatives and the two further legal 
changes, the introduction of the Law of Fictitious Chattel of Tobacco Crop and the 
agricultural warrant. Prior to these institutional changes, legislative efforts to facilitate and 
improve agrarian credit concerned themselves solely with devices to prohibit usury rather 
than with the reorganisation of the general legal principles of the chattel mortgage and loan 
contract.121  
 
 A further turning point for agricultural credit conditions during the period in question 
and indeed the most important institutional reform for agriculture up to the end of the interwar 
period was the establishment of an agricultural bank, the Agricultural Bank of Greece, in 
1929. It is generally believed that with the establishment of the Agricultural Bank, credit 
conditions for farmers improved fundamentally and credit became available to the agrarian 
sector at large at an affordable price. These issues, however, are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Further research needs to be carried out to establish the veracity of such claims, as well 
as the timing of the de-escalation of punitive interest rates for the agrarian sector. 
117 Kyrkilitsis (1934, pp. 102–103). 
118 Kyrkilitsis (1934, pp. 106–107); Kostis (1987, p. 344, n. 323). 
119 Pepelasis (1959, p. 189). 
120 Kyrkilitsis (1934, p. 99); Kostis (1987, p. 161; 2003, pp. 196–197). 
121 Pepelasis (1959, p. 189). 
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 When the Greek government was negotiating a stabilisation programme with the 
League of Nations, the minister of agriculture, Alexandros Papanastasiou, was campaigning 
for the establishment of an agrarian bank which would be responsible for agricultural credit in 
Greece.122 In addition, this prospective agrarian bank would undertake compulsory 
expropriation of land and the rehabilitation of all landless peasants, regardless of whether or 
not they were refugees. This proposal, which would have led to the establishment of an 
autonomous agrarian bank operating independently from the National Bank, faced fierce 
opposition both from the National Bank and the political world in Athens.123 Furthermore, 
archival material at the Bank of England shows that the Refugee Settlement Commission 
(RSC) – the committee that was responsible for the settlement of refugees in rural areas in 
Greece – also objected, in fact strongly, to the establishment of an independent agrarian bank. 
In spite of strong opposition to this project, in February 1928 an agreement was signed 
between the National Bank and the government that provided for the establishment of an 
autonomous organisation, known in the literature as the Agrarian Bank, which would aim at 
improving the welfare of the agricultural community at large. This agreement between the 
National Bank and the government, however, was never approved by parliament and as a 
consequence the Agrarian Bank was never founded. The principal argument was that this new 
banking institution would not be adequately capitalised.124  
 
 Nevertheless, two years later in January 1930, the Agricultural Bank of Greece 
opened for business. The statutes of this bank were, however, very different from those of the 
proposed Agrarian Bank and its foundation was directly related to the establishment of the 
Bank of Greece. Upon his return to Greece, after the Bank of Greece began its operations in 
May 1928, Venizelos raised objections to the way that the minister of finance of the all party 
government which had de jure stabilised the drachma, had handled the issue of covers of the 
National Bank.125 In brief, a new agreement between the Old Bank and the government 
provided that part of the surplus value of the covers that under the stabilisation programme 
were maintained by the National Bank as compensation for the early loss of its issuing 
privilege, would be used as capital for the establishment of an Agricultural Bank. As a result, 
part of the surplus value of the covers was given as a ‘dowry’ to the Agricultural Bank which 
started business in January 1930.  
 
122 For more, see Veremis (1987, pp. 255–262); Kostis (1987, pp. 266–275; 2003, pp. 293–299 and 
303–309).  
123 For more, see Veremis (1987, pp. 259–262); Kostis (1987, pp. 258–287). 
124 Veremis (1987, p. 261). 
125 Kostis (1987, pp. 291–293; 2003, pp. 400–405). 
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 The establishment of the Agricultural Bank signalled the end of the banking reforms 
that began with the establishment of the Mortgage Bank in June 1927. In those three years, 
the National Bank lost its privileges and the monopolies that it held: it ceased being the 
issuing bank and the bank of the government as well as conceding its monopoly on mortgage 
and agricultural credit to two newly established specialised banking organisations.  
 
Mortgage Credit:  
The National Bank monopolised mortgage credit in Greece up to 1927 when the National 
Mortgage Bank of Greece was established. Its mortgage credit consisted of two different 
categories of loans: general mortgage loans to the public and loans to legal entities. Credit to 
legal entities included loans to municipality, ports and other legal organisations. A small 
portion of the general mortgage credit could have been medium-term credit given on 
mortgage guarantees. This portion of mortgage credit, which was in fact insignificant, is 
included here with mortgage loans. 
 
 The interest rate charged on mortgage credit was set by law. Furthermore, the interest 
rate paid by legal entities was lower than that charged on mortgage loans to the general 
public. In the 1920s, loans to public entities could have an amortisation period of up to 40 
years but in practice they did not exceed a maximum period of 30 years.126 Credit to legal 
entities was secured by a pledge to the National Bank on the revenues of these organisations. 
In most cases the revenue of legal entities were paid directly to the National Bank and after 
the annuity was deducted the surplus was reimbursed to the organisations concerned.127 
 
 The National Bank could issue bond loans in order to collect capital for mortgage 
credit. Before the 1927 reform, the Bank had provided mortgage credit facilities floating loans 
exclusively for this purpose on five occasions: twice in the middle of the 1920s and three 
times prior to the outbreak of the First World War.128  
 
 The first serious attempt to organise and expand mortgage credit in Greece occurred 
in 1920 with the publication of the 2413 law.129 It has been argued that previous attempts to 
organise mortgage credit had been obstructed by the National Bank.130 The 1920 law 
specified that any joint stock bank with a capital of at least 10 million drachmae could 
exercise mortgage credit. It was, however, never implemented and four years later was 
126 HABOG_A3S1Y1F4T1, p. 80. 
127 Ibid., p. 81. 
128 Kyrkilitsis (1934, pp. 130–131). 
129 For more on this law, see Kostis (2003, pp. 246–247). 
130 Kostis and Tsokopoulos (1988, p. 63). 
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replaced by a new law which indeed regulated mortgage credit in detail. The 1924 mortgage 
law denoted that the paid up capital of a joint stock bank exercising mortgage credit facilities 
should be at least 50 million drachmae and its activity had to be centred exclusively on 
mortgage credit and loans to legal entities.131  
 
 The 3221 law of 1924 laid the foundations for the establishment of the Mortgage 
Bank of Greece by the National Bank itself in 1927. This monopoly on mortgage credit that 
the Bank had enjoyed since its foundation in the nineteenth century was the only one of its 
privileges that it conceded voluntarily during the banking reforms of the late 1920s. It is 
possible that the governors of the National Bank were encouraged by Hambros Bank officials 
to take this initiative.132 Hambros Bank was the official bank of the Greek government in 
London and had at the same time established close links with the National Bank. Both the 
governor and the sub-governor of the National Bank had spent long periods of time in London 
meeting officials at the Bank of England and also visiting Hambros Bank’s headquarters. 
They may have realised that the mortgage credit activities of the National Bank could have 
easily been an impediment to achieving their aim of accessing the London financial market. 
In the City, it was believed that an institution could not be engaged in central banking and at 
the same time pursue mortgage credit activities. Nevertheless, a week after the Mortgage 
Bank opened its doors for business in June 1927, an agreement was signed between the 
Mortgage Bank and the Hambros Bank that provided for the issue of a loan on the London 
market. This loan was guaranteed by the National Bank and was aimed at increasing the 
available capital for mortgage loans supplied by the new bank.133  
 
 The National Bank conceded to the newly established mortgage bank all the assets 
and liabilities that related to its role as a mortgage bank. Indeed, it handed over to the new 
mortgage bank most of its long-term assets and liabilities. That is to say that in terms of assets 
the National Bank ceded all its mortgage loans as well as most of the credit that it had 
extended to legal entities. In addition, it passed on to the new bank real estate that had been 
acquired by confiscation. At the same time, the liabilities that the National Bank passed on to 
the Mortgage Bank consisted of time deposits and the loans that had been issued to fund 
mortgage credit. 
 
 The initial capital of the Mortgage Bank was 80 million drachmae divided in shares 
of 1,000 drachmae each. Three-quarters of this capital, that is 60 million drachmae, was 
131 Kyrkilitsis (1934, pp. 129–130). 
132 Kostis (2003, pp. 247–248). 
133 Kyrkilitsis (1934, p. 133); Kostis (2003, p. 252). 
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covered by reserve funds of the National Bank, which subsequently distributed gratis the 
equivalent amount of shares as compensation to its shareholders: one share of the National 
Bank corresponding to three shares of the Mortgage Bank. The remaining capital of 20 
million drachmae was also contributed by the National Bank, this time using its cash reserves. 
The shares that the Bank obtained were included in its portfolio of investments.134 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
134 Annual Report of the National Bank for 1927 (1928, pp. X–XI). 
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3.2.3. Structure and evolution of credits supplied to the economy by the National 
Bank 
 
Table 3.5: Credits to the economy as a percentage of GDP 
 
 
Sources: Table A1.2 in Appendix A1 and Table A2.2 in Appendix A2. 
 
 % of GDP 
1898 15.98 
1899 20.88 
1900 21.50 
1901 20.65 
1902 23.04 
1903 23.76 
1904 27.22 
1905 27.02 
1906 27.73 
1907 28.81 
1908 30.26 
1909 27.71 
1910 27.81 
1911 24.24 
1912 26.71 
1913 22.71 
1914 18.80 
1915 18.02 
1916 13.78 
1917 9.86 
1918 6.98 
1919 8.89 
1920 10.04 
1921 8.50 
1922 9.86 
1923 6.92 
1924 10.82 
1925 11.79 
1926 9.85 
1927 7.04 
1928 9.36 
1929 13.92 
1930 14.87 
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Table 3.5 above shows total credits to the private economy as a percentage of GDP. Credits to 
the economy include all credit, short- and long-term, furnished to the real economy. In other 
words, they include discounts, loans against securities and merchandise, loans to the agricultural 
sector, mortgage loans and loans to legal entities. The table shows that from 1899 to 1913, total 
credits to the economy by the National Bank fluctuated between 20 per cent and 30 per cent of 
GDP. In 1908, they accounted for over 30 per cent of GDP, the maximum share observed 
during the entire period in question. Credits to the economy as a percentage of GDP in 1898 
were only 16 per cent, the lowest percentage share observed prior to 1913. Since no similar 
research has been conducted, it makes it difficult to know if the level of credits to the economy 
as a percentage of GDP in 1898 is an outlier or if it denotes the dominant trend of a period that 
ended with the enactment of the Law of Control. 
 
  A change in the relationship between the Bank and the economy is noticed after the 
outbreak of the Great War. Between the outbreak of the First World War and the end of the 
period in question, total credits to the economy as a percentage of GDP shrank substantially, 
indicating ‘a loosening of the links’ between the National Bank and the economy.135 In 
particular, between 1917 and 1928 when the National Bank lost its central banking privileges, 
total credit to the economy fluctuated between 7 per cent and nearly 12 per cent. Credits to the 
economy as a percentage of GDP fell to as low as 7 per cent in 1918 and again in 1923. They 
were also 7 per cent of GDP at the end of 1927, the year that the National Bank conceded long-
term assets to the newly established Mortgage Bank. 
 
 After the banking reform, credits to the economy as a percentage of GDP increased, 
pointing to an improvement in the relationship between the National Bank and the economy. 
The same caveat, however, applies again: no similar data exist for the period after the banking 
reforms to examine the relationship of the National Bank with the economy.  
 
 Table 3.6 shows credits to the economy as a percentage of total assets of the National 
Bank between 1898 and 1919 and then again between 1928 and 1930. As has been mentioned 
before, accountancy practices during the monetary upheaval of the 1920s obscure the real 
financial position of the Bank during that period. The value of figures denominated in gold 
drachmae or foreign exchange that appear amongst the assets of the National Bank was 
understated from the time when the drachma began depreciating in 1919 until stabilisation. As 
a result, what was reported as total assets on the balance sheet of the National Bank in the 
1920s prior to stabilisation was an understatement of its true financial position. It should be 
135 Bouvier (1984, p. 37). 
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noted that a small portion of credits to the economy was denominated in gold drachmae. In 
spite of this, however, total credits to the economy have been estimated assuming that they 
paint a fairly accurate picture, since their fraction expressed in gold drachmae was small 
indeed. 
 
Table 3.6: Credits to the economy as a percentage of total assets of the National Bank 
(Data is as at the end of the period) 
 % of Assets 
1898 31.86 
1899 36.46 
1900 39.91 
1901 41.55 
1902 42.01 
1903 44.46 
1904 42.92 
1905 43.45 
1906 43.47 
1907 47.06 
1908 47.31 
1909 47.04 
1910 43.41 
1911 41.61 
1912 37.53 
1913 26.45 
1914 32.02 
1915 28.02 
1916 23.06 
1917 16.67 
1918 11.80 
1919 12.52 
  
1928 42.72 
1929 54.89 
1930 51.39 
Sources: Author’s calculations using the data in Tables A2.1 and A2.2 in Appendix A2. 
 
Table 3.6 shows that between 1898 and 1910, credits to the economy granted by the National 
Bank represented a significant part of its total assets, fluctuating between 31.86 per cent and 
47.31 per cent. Between 1901 and 1911 they remained above 40 per cent, reaching their 
highest percentage of 47.31 in 1908.  
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 Table 3.6 also shows that from 1910 until 1919, credits to the economy as a 
percentage of the assets of the National Bank decreased constantly, in spite of their increase in 
nominal values during that same period. They fell to as low as 11.80 per cent of total assets in 
1918. In March 1910, the ΓΧΜΒ Law was enacted and subsequently the balance sheet of the 
National Bank experienced a period of rapid expansion which was primarily due to this Law. 
(For more on the ΓΧΜΒ Law see Chapter 4.) Banknotes in circulation increased rapidly and 
at the same time the gold and foreign exchange reserves of the Bank were augmented, as the 
ΓΧΜΒ Law dictated, by the same amount as the newly printed banknotes. As Ioannis 
Valaorites, the father of this Law, remarked insightfully in 1913 the ΓΧΜΒ Law ‘did not 
increase at all the resources that the Bank could make available to trade, industry and 
agriculture’.136 To recap, the fall that can be seen in the commercial credits furnished by the 
National Bank as a percentage of its assets between 1910 and 1919 is due not to a decrease of 
their volume but to the rapid expansion of the balance sheet of the National Bank caused 
mainly by the ΓΧΜΒ Law. As Table A2.2 of Appendix A2 shows, credits to the economy 
increased in nominal drachmae between 1911 and 1919. However, that having been said they 
increased more slowly than the rate of the expansion of the total assets of the National Bank. 
 
 In the 1920s prior to the establishment of the Bank of Greece, the share of credits to 
the economy as a percentage of total assets of the National Bank must have remained low. By 
the end of the Asia Minor campaign, the structure of the assets of the National Bank was very 
different from that observed between the introduction of the Law of Control in 1898 and the 
enactment of the ΓΧΜΒ Law in 1910. Illiquid government debt owned by the National Bank 
had increased. Credits to the economy at nominal prices had also swollen but their pace of 
increase was slower than that of total assets. As Table A2.3 of Appendix A2 demonstrates, 
this rise in credits to the economy was below the rate of inflation. 
 
 After the introduction of the ΓΧΜΒ Law the significance of credits to the economy 
supplied by the National Bank as a percentage of its total assets shrank. Credits to the 
economy as a percentage of the total assets of the National Bank remained small until the 
banking reform in 1928. This decrease in the significance of credits to the economy in the 
total assets of the National Bank was due to changes in the structure and composition of its 
assets. During that period the National Bank did not give up any of its commercial activities 
nor did it intend to do so. The decrease in the total credits to the economy as a percentage of 
its assets was caused firstly by the operation of the ΓΧΜΒ Law and secondly by changes in 
136 Kokkinakis (1999, p. 540). 
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the balance sheet of the National Bank produced by a long period of war and monetary 
upheaval. 
 
 The balance sheet that the National Bank published at the end of 1928 followed the 
Bank having lost its issuing privilege and been transformed into a pure commercial bank. As 
expected, the share of credits to the economy as a percentage of its assets surpassed those of 
the immediate period prior the introduction of the ΓΧΜΒ Law. At the end of 1928, credits to 
the economy accounted for nearly 43 per cent of the assets of the National Bank whilst the 
following year they made up over half of its assets; the maximum percentage share observed 
during the entire period in question here.  
 
Credits to the economy by the National Bank at 1911 prices were estimated using the 
data gathered in Table A2.2. The price index produced by Kostelenos et al. (2007) was used 
as a deflator. It was, however, rebased from 1914, the base year of the original time series, to 
1911 – the last year that Greece was not engaged in war prior to the outbreak of the Balkan 
Wars. Every different category of credit to the economy by the National Bank was estimated 
at constant prices in addition to total credits to the economy and the result is presented in 
Table A2.3 of Appendix A2. Subsequently, the time series of credits to the economy at 
constant prices were transformed into ratio form with 1911 again as the base year. In addition, 
total short- and long-term credit expressed as a ratio was also estimated and shown in Table 
A2.4 of Appendix A2.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Credits to the economy at 1911 values (1911=100) 
Source: Table A2.4 in Appendix A2. 
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Figure 3.1 above displays total credits to the economy at 1911 values expressed as a ratio. 
This figure demonstrates that credits to the economy increased until 1912. This increase in 
total credits is also denoted in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 above, where credits to the economy are 
expressed as a percentage of GDP and of total assets of the National Bank. Then, a constant 
decrease is noticed until 1918. Between the end of the Great War and the stabilisation of the 
drachma in 1928 total credits to the economy at 1911 values fluctuated from year to year as 
both Figure 3.1 and Tables A2.3 and A2.4 in Appendix A2 demonstrate. As is mentioned 
above, total credits to the economy at nominal prices increased considerably in the 1920s. 
Credits to the economy by the National Bank at nominal prices dropped only in 1927 – the 
year that the Mortgage Bank was established. Figure 3.1, however, demonstrates vividly that 
this rapid increase in total credits at nominal prices in the 1920s was purely inflationary. In 
the 1920s, prior to the stabilisation of the drachma, total credits to the economy at 1911 prices 
remained low – close in fact to their level at the beginning of the century. Moreover they were 
volatile. It is noticeable that in 1923 total credits to the economy at constant values reached 
the lowest level observed since the outbreak of the Balkan Wars. They surpassed their 1911 
level only in 1929. As is demonstrated below, however, by then the composition of total 
credits to the economy had radically changed because of the banking reforms of the late 
1920s.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Total short-term credit to the economy at 1911 values (1911=100) 
Source: Table A2.4 in Appendix A2. 
 
It should be reminded that the data used for the analysis here have been hand-collected from 
the balance sheet of the National Bank and show its position at the end of each year. Figure 
3.2 displays short term credits to the economy at 1911 prices as a ratio. Short-term credits 
include discounts and credit against securities as well as merchandise. The data employed in 
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Figure 3.2 are presented in Table A2.4 of Appendix A2 and demonstrate that short-term 
credits at 1911 values increased until 1908. Subsequently, between 1909 and 1923 they 
fluctuated around their 1911 level. It should be noted that between 1916 and 1919 short-term 
credits at constant values remained below their 1911 level. By contrast, after 1924 they 
persistently surpassed their 1911 level and after the banking reforms experienced a rapid 
increase until the end of the period in question. 
 
 Table A2.4 in Appendix A2 also presents discounts and credit against securities and 
merchandise. It indicates that both discounts and credit against securities followed the same 
path as total short-term credits. On the other hand, credit against merchandise increased 
abruptly in 1903. This sudden increase was due to credit being furnished by the National 
Bank to the Currant Bank, an organisation established in 1899 to focus on the currant 
problem.137 This loan was guaranteed by currants. It should also be noted that between 1916 
and 1927, credit against merchandise ballooned and that by the end of the period so much so 
that it took up an important position amongst credits to the economy provided by the National 
Bank.  
 
 
Figure 3.3: Agricultural credit at 1911 values, 1898–1930 (1911=100) 
Source: Table A2.4 in Appendix A2. 
 
Figure 3.3 shows credit furnished by the National Bank to the agricultural sector during the 
period in question. Agricultural credit expressed at 1911 prices increased until 1905. 
Subsequently, it remained stable, close to its 1911 level until the outbreak of the First Balkan 
War in 1912. By contrast, between 1913 and 1923 agricultural credit provided by the National 
Bank was constantly below its 1911 value. Figure 3.3 shows that after 1924 the National 
137 Kostis and Tsokopoulos (1988, p. 38). 
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Bank started supplying credit generously to the agrarian sector. Credit to farmers increased 
rapidly until the establishment of the Agricultural Bank in 1930. It is usually argued in the 
literature that the institutional changes described above, i.e. the establishment of co-operative 
societies and the legal changes implemented in 1919 and 1920 fostered this rapid increase in 
credit to the agrarian sector after the end of the Asia Minor debacle. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Total mortgage credit at 1911 values, 1898–1930 (1911=100) 
Source: Table A2.4 in Appendix A2. 
 
Figure 3.4 presents total mortgage credit at 1911 prices during the period in question. Total 
mortgage credit is composed of general mortgage loans and loans to legal entities. Figure 3.4 
indicates that total mortgage credit at constant values increased up to 1911 and then remained 
stable until the outbreak of the First World War. Subsequently, total mortgage credit fell 
considerably and indeed remained below its 1911 level until the end of the period in question. 
After the establishment of the Mortgage Bank in 1927 as Table A2.2 of Appendix A2 
demonstrates, the National Bank stopped supplying general mortgage credit. This table also 
shows that after 1927 the Bank continued granting some mortgage credit though entirely 
made up of loans to legal entities. 
 
Examination of the structure of credits to the economy will shed further light on the 
nature and characteristics of the commercial aspect of the National Bank. This analysis will 
also expose changes that occurred in the commercial aspect of the Bank from the enactment 
of the Law of Control in 1898 until the establishment of the Agricultural Bank in 1930. 
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Table 3.7: Percentage share of each category of credits to the economy by the National Bank 
 
 
Short-Term Credit 
Agricultural 
Credit 
Mortgage Credit 
Discounts Loans against 
Securities 
Loans against 
Merchandise 
Total Short-
Term Credit 
Mortgage 
Loans 
Loans to 
Legal Entities 
Total 
Mortgage 
Credit 
1898 17.32 5.54  22.86 4.89 40.61 31.64 72.25 
1899 17.63 8.43  26.06 8.89 38.03 27.02 65.05 
1900 18.20 7.93 0.10 26.23 10.01 36.18 27.59 63.77 
1901 18.36 7.78 0.45 26.59 8.96 35.42 29.03 64.45 
1902 16.74 8.55 0.38 25.67 9.35 34.26 30.72 64.98 
1903 16.07 8.66 2.86 27.59 9.11 34.50 28.80 63.30 
1904 15.03 9.83 3.33 28.19 8.96 34.92 27.93 62.85 
1905 16.41 8.01 1.64 26.06 9.55 36.70 27.70 64.40 
1906 14.41 7.31 3.42 25.14 10.25 37.20 27.42 64.62 
1907 14.17 8.84 5.39 28.40 9.67 36.86 25.07 61.93 
1908 13.95 12.00 5.68 31.63 8.68 35.92 23.77 59.69 
1909 13.14 13.17 3.80 30.11 8.74 36.40 24.75 61.15 
1910 13.43 9.94 3.65 27.02 9.27 37.26 26.44 63.70 
1911 12.30 11.44 3.70 27.44 8.17 34.53 29.86 64.39 
1912 13.19 16.84 2.27 32.30 7.32 32.95 27.44 60.39 
1913 9.04 13.51 2.40 24.95 7.18 37.41 30.45 67.86 
1914 12.48 16.51 1.10 30.09 6.00 31.31 32.59 63.90 
1915 11.81 21.99 1.77 35.57 5.32 29.67 29.44 59.11 
 
 
 Short-Term Credit 
Agricultural 
Credit 
Mortgage Credit 
Discounts Loans against 
Securities 
Loans against 
Merchandise 
Total Short-
Term Credit 
Mortgage 
Loans 
Loans to 
Legal Entities 
Total 
Mortgage 
Credit 
1916 10.99 20.37 5.85 37.21 5.74 28.90 28.15 57.05 
1917 10.31 16.98 10.94 38.23 5.75 26.73 29.29 56.02 
1918 5.50 7.85 30.93 44.28 6.73 22.72 26.27 48.99 
1919 10.08 8.24 28.02 46.34 9.03 21.17 23.46 44.63 
1920 13.46 11.07 31.69 56.22 11.77 16.84 15.18 32.02 
1921 11.90 12.62 27.39 51.91 11.87 20.06 16.16 36.22 
1922 17.44 19.84 32.01 69.29 7.39 13.68 9.63 23.31 
1923 15.53 12.50 27.21 55.24 15.40 19.25 10.11 29.36 
1924 21.37 10.52 19.64 51.53 20.62 18.16 9.70 27.86 
1925 24.05 12.18 14.74 50.97 19.99 19.12 9.92 29.04 
1926 23.86 11.79 10.90 46.55 17.46 22.95 13.05 36.00 
1927 39.04 13.50 9.41 61.95 34.76 0.00 3.30 3.30 
1928 33.57 13.52 22.06 69.15 27.93 0.00 2.92 2.92 
1929 32.42 15.46 21.45 69.33 27.91 0.00 2.77 2.77 
1930 41.44 17.71 22.15 81.30 11.11 0.00 7.59 7.59 
Source: Author’s calculations using the data collected in Table A2.2 in Appendix A2. 
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As has been mentioned previously, the National Bank had a monopoly on mortgage and 
agricultural credit and at the same time it furnished all kinds of short-term credit, i.e. 
discounts and loans against securities and merchandise. Table 3.7 presents each different 
category of commercial credit as a percentage share of total credits supplied by the National 
Bank. In addition, it shows the share of short-term and mortgage credit in total credits to the 
economy. 
 
 Table 3.7 shows vividly that mortgage credit was the most important commercial 
activity pursued by the National Bank up to end of the Great War. It also demonstrates that at 
the beginning of the century mortgage credit still remained the most important commercial 
activity of the National Bank, despite the fact that it was engaged in central banking 
functions. Between 1898 and 1918 mortgage credit, i.e. both general mortgage loans and 
loans to legal entities had the lion’s share of total credits to the economy. During this period, 
at least 50 per cent of the total credits granted by the National Bank consisted of mortgage 
loans; in 1898 the percentage share of mortgage loans was 72.25 per cent whilst by 1917 it 
had dropped to 56.02 per cent. At the same time, the percentage share of agricultural credit 
granted by the National Bank varied at between 5 per cent and 10 per cent of total credits.  
 
 A long period of war and monetary upheaval altered the structure of credits to the 
economy on the balance sheet of the National Bank. The banking reforms of the late 1920s, 
however, changed fundamentally the nature of the National Bank as a commercial bank. In 
1926, short-term credit represented 47 per cent of total credits supplied by the National Bank 
and agricultural credit 17 per cent whilst mortgage credit had dropped to 36 per cent of total 
credits. By the end of the following year a radical change had occurred in the structure and 
composition of the commercial aspect of the Bank because of the establishment of the 
National Mortgage Bank. In 1927, the National Bank conceded general mortgage credit and 
the majority of the loans that it had provided to legal entities to the newly established 
mortgage bank. As a result, mortgage credit fell to 3.30 per cent of total credits to the 
economy whilst the percentage share of short-term credit rose to 62 per cent and that of 
agricultural credit to 35 per cent. As Table 3.7 shows discounts alone accounted for 
approximately 40 per cent of the total credits furnished by the National Bank in 1927. 
Moreover, in 1930 a further change in the commercial status of the National Bank was 
realised with the establishment of the Agricultural Bank. At the end of that year the 
percentage share of short-term credit increased still further, accounting for 81 per cent of total 
credits to the economy. Thus, in the late 1920s the Bank conceded two monopolies which had 
been important for its commercial status since its foundation; it lost its monopoly on mortgage 
 
 
and agricultural credit. Furthermore, its business mainly concentrated on granting short-term 
credit.  
 
3.2.4. A comparison of the National Bank with the Bank of Athens 
In this section of Chapter 3, credits to the economy furnished by the National Bank are 
compared with credit granted by the Bank of Athens. This comparison helps to illustrate 
further the importance and strength of the National Bank on the Greek market. It also exposes 
the differences between the National Bank as a commercial bank and other banks. The Bank 
of Athens was established in 1893 and until the end of the period in question it remained the 
most important rival of the National Bank for general commercial business. The Bank of 
Athens, upon its foundation, expanded its business beyond the borders of the Greek Kingdom 
to include areas with thriving Greek communities. For example, by 1910 the Bank of Athens 
had created a widespread network of branches in Greece, the then autonomous Crete, Turkey 
and Egypt, as well as in London, Khartoum and Limassol.138 
 
 Geopolitical changes in the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire at the time affected the 
status of the Bank of Athens. Some areas where the Bank of Athens operated were annexed 
by Greece and after the Asia Minor debacle it was forced to abandon completely its business 
in Turkey. In the 1920s, it still pursued business abroad in areas like Egypt and Cyprus and 
expanded successfully its business network in New York and Boston.139 By contrast, the 
National Bank whilst being a dual-purpose bank operated exclusively within Greek borders. 
Having said that, after the end of the Great War the National Bank founded short-lived 
branches in areas later ceded to Greek administration by the Treaty of Serves.140 For example, 
in January 1920 the Greek bank of issue opened a branch in Smyrna, ‘a city with more Greek 
inhabitants than Athens’.141 Beyond any financial objectives, however, the presence of the 
National Bank in Asia Minor aimed at supporting Greek irredentism and facilitating the use of 
the drachma as a medium of exchange in an area that remained under Turkish sovereignty and 
where the lira continued to be the legal tender.142 In 1919, the administration of the Bank also 
explored the possibility of extending their business in the USA. However, it was 1926 before 
they managed to open an agency in New York and an office in Chicago to attract Greek 
diaspora savings.143 Subsequently, after the National Bank lost its issuing privilege the Bank 
138 See ibid., p. 49. 
139 Kostis (2003, pp. 319–320). 
140 Annual Report of the National Bank for 1919, p. Η; Annual Report of the National Bank for 1920, 
p. ΙΒ; Spiliotopoulos (1949, pp. 100–101). 
141 Clogg (1992, p. 93).  
142 For more on the presence of the National Bank in Asia Minor, see Veremis and Kostis (1984).  
143 See Spiliotopoulos (1949, p. 101 and p. 107); National Bank of Greece (2006, p. 110). 
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tried to strengthen its presence in the USA by forming the Hellenic Bank Trust Company in 
New York.144  
 
 A further crucial difference between the commercial aspect of the National Bank and 
the Bank of Athens was that the latter specialised in short-term credit as did most of the other 
banks in Greece. Some mortgage credit was reported on the balance sheet of the Bank of 
Athens after 1901 but it remained insignificant throughout the period in question. On the 
other hand, as it has been mentioned above, the National Bank had a monopoly on mortgage 
credit until 1927. Between 1898 and 1926 mortgage credit fluctuated, as Table 3.7 shows, 
between 72 per cent and 28 per cent of total credits furnished to the economy by the National 
Bank. In addition, the National Bank was the only bank in Greece to provide credit to the 
agrarian sector until the establishment of the Agricultural Bank. 
 
 Table A2.6 in Appendix A2 presents credit supplied by the Bank of Athens as 
compared with that by the National Bank. In the first column, credit supplied by the Bank of 
Athens is juxtaposed with the short-term credit supplied by the National Bank. Mortgage 
credit given by the Bank of Athens is subtracted from the total credit that it furnished. The 
second column of this table compares total credits to the economy granted by the two banks. 
Figure 3.5 illustrates the content of Table A2.6. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Credit supplied by the Bank of Athens as a percentage of 
credit supplied by the National Bank, 1898–1930 
Source: Table A2.6 in Appendix A2. 
 
144 See Annual Report for 1929, p. XII.  
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Between 1898 and 1910, total credit supplied by the Bank of Athens as a percentage of credits 
to the economy by the National Bank fluctuated from 12 per cent to 92 per cent. By contrast, 
from 1911 until 1916 credit provided by the Bank of Athens as a percentage of total credits by 
the National Bank shrank rapidly. The Bank of Athens experienced widespread difficulties 
after 1907, which climaxed with the outbreak of the First World War that led it to the verge of 
bankruptcy. After 1907 total credit to the economy by the Bank of Athens as a percentage of 
total credits granted by the National Bank fluctuated between 21 per cent and 60 per cent 
displaying at the same time considerable volatility from year to year. 
  
 A comparison of short-term credits supplied by the two banks indicates that between 
1904 and 1914, short-term credit provided by the Bank of Athens constantly surpassed short-
term credit provided by the National Bank. During this period short-term credit by the Bank 
of Athens in comparison with that of the National Bank ballooned. Subsequently, short-term 
credit by the Bank of Athens remained persistently below that granted by the National Bank 
until the end of the period in question. Credit by the Bank of Athens as a percentage of short-
term credit supplied by the National Bank in 1919 was an outlier. 
 
 The comparison between credit granted by the Bank of Athens and the National Bank 
carried out above demonstrates that the latter continued to dominate the credit market in 
Greece on the eve of the banking reforms of the late 1920s. It also exposes differences in the 
commercial aspect of the National Bank from that of other banks. Up to the end of the Great 
War, mortgage credit dominated total credits to the economy provided by the National Bank 
whilst by contrast, the handful of other Greek banks concentrated exclusively on short-term 
credit. The Bank of Athens did not manage to undermine the position of the National Bank as 
the most prominent commercial bank in Greece. It experienced initially, a rapid pace of 
expansion of its business as it is shown in Tables A2.5 and A2.6 in Appendix A2 and in 
Figure 3.5 above but it did not, however, manage to challenge successfully the status of the 
National Bank as a commercial bank on the Greek market. 
 
 
3.3. Deposits 
3.3.1. Introduction 
The sub-committee of the League of Nations that was preparing the central banking reforms 
in Greece in late June 1927 recommended that the National Bank should wind up or transfer 
all interest bearing activities including deposits to other banks. As an alternative, a new 
commercial bank could be established to take over all the commercial activities of the 
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National Bank. By then, a principal tenet of central banking was that a central bank ‘should 
not take monies at interest on its own account’.145 The governor of the National Bank, 
Alexandros Diomides, however, centred his objections to the reforms by the League on 
deposits. He was determined that the Bank maintain the right to accept interest bearing 
deposits in any circumstances. He called the National Bank a pure ‘Banque de Depots’ and 
was aware that his resolve not to divest the Bank of its right to receive interest bearing 
deposits would lead to the collapse of a stabilisation plan under the auspices of the League of 
Nations.146 It was inevitable that reform of the National Bank which would have restricted its 
deposits to such non-interest bearing deposits as a central bank can generally accept would 
have curtailed its predominance on the Greek commercial banking market and would in fact 
have brought about its transformation into a fully fledged central bank.  
 
 On the eve of the outbreak of the First World War, the National Bank attracted nearly 
63 per cent of the total commercial deposits gathered by all the banks in Greece as Table 3.8 
below demonstrates. Government deposits that the National Bank held as a consequence of its 
role as the bank of the government are not included. If the total deposits of a sample of the 
four most prominent banks out of the seven joint stock banks that operated in Greece at the 
time is examined, then the percentage share of the National Bank as a percentage of the total 
deposits of these four banks increases to nearly 75 per cent. Nevertheless, Table 3.8 
demonstrates unequivocally the hegemony of the National Bank on the deposit market in 
Greece at the outbreak of the First World War. Furthermore, it indicates how uneven the 
allocation of deposits amongst the big banks in Greece was with the National Bank taking the 
greatest part of them. This was one of the most important characteristics of the banking 
system in Greece that persisted throughout the entire interwar period, notwithstanding the 
banking reforms of the late 1920s. The Bank of Athens managed to attract nearly 15 per cent 
of the total deposits gathered at Greek banks at the time whilst the Popular and the 
Commercial banks enjoyed a mere 5 and 3 per cent respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
145 See Table 1.2 in Chapter 1.  
146 For more, see Chapter 7; See also HABOG_A3S1Y1F40T13, pp. 1–16; Venezis (1955, pp. 27–35). 
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Table 3.8: Deposits in 1914 
 Deposits 
(in thousands of 
drachmae) As % of Total 
As % of Grand 
Total 
National Bank  
of Greece (1841) 300,704.67 74.15  62.82 
    
Bank of Athens (1893) 69,552.96 17.15  14.53 
Popular Bank (1905) 22,607.00 5.57  4.72 
Commercial Bank (1907) 12,685.00 3.13  2.65 
    
 
Total:1 
                        
405,549.63 100.00                  84.72 
 
Grand Total:2 478,700.00  100.00 
Notes:  
1 This is the total deposits in thousands of drachmae of sight, time and savings deposits, that 
the four banks cited above received. Government deposits at the National Bank are not 
included.  
2 This must be the total of deposits of the seven joint stock banks that operated in Greece at 
the time. These were the four banks mentioned in this table, plus the Bank of the Orient, the 
Ionian Bank and the Bank of Thessaloniki. 
3 Figures for deposits other than those at the National Bank and the Bank of Athens may not 
be accurate.  
Sources: Annual Report of the National Bank for 1914; Annual Report of the Bank of Athens 
for 1914; Charitakis (1932, p. 379); Kyrkilitsis (1934, p. 42); Kostis and Tsokopoulos (1988, 
pp. 182–196). 
 
After the outbreak of the First World War the banking sector in Greece expanded rapidly with 
the establishment of numerous, mainly local, undercapitalised banks. (See Table 3.1 above.) 
As a result, the percentage share of the National Bank of the nation’s total deposits shrank. In 
1926, approximately 41 per cent of these deposits were channelled to the National Bank as 
Table 3.2 above indicates. Again government deposits held by the National Bank are not 
included. Although the Bank of Athens had established a widespread network of branches, as 
Table 3.1 shows, it only managed to garner approximately 14.50 per cent of total deposits in 
1926, a percentage similar to that indicated in Table 3.8 for 1914. The Bank of Industry and 
the Piraeus Bank, two of the most prominent of the newly established banks, collected almost 
1.30 and 1 per cent respectively. Table 3.2 also implies that roughly one-quarter of total 
deposits were directed to banks established after the outbreak of the Great War. Thus, Table 
3.2 in conjunction with Table 3.1 suggests that the average percentage share of deposits at 
each one of these primarily local banks, established after 1914, was considerably less than 1 
per cent. These small, undercapitalised banks gathered mainly deposits from the local 
community which took advantage of the high interest rates that they offered.147 
147 Galanis (1946, p. 25). 
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 M. S. Eulambio (1924, p. 178), writing in 1924, asserted that the ‘power of [the 
National Bank] rested upon real wealth – the wealth of the whole nation’. He further added 
that ‘one-half of the Bank’s deposits represent[ed] funds owned by Greeks living outside the 
borders of the Greek Kingdom’. The claimed share of deposits from the Greek diaspora in the 
total deposits of the National Bank that Eulambio suggested should be received with great 
caution. His assertion does, however, show that confidence in the Bank was ‘unlimited’. Indeed 
throughout its history as a bank of issue, the National Bank never experienced a run, despite 
wars as well as turbulent political and economic conditions in Greece. 
 
 Deposits at the National Bank can be divided into two categories: deposits of the 
government and deposits of other agencies as may be loosely called the commercial deposits. 
Deposits of other agencies or commercial deposits or general deposits are terms that will be 
used interchangeably in this thesis and will all refer to the same thing. Deposits of other 
agencies consisted of sight, time and savings deposits.  
 
 The National Bank enjoyed certain privileges as a deposit bank vis-à-vis the other 
banks in the country, which were vigorously protected during the central banking reform. 
These privileges created a comparative advantage for the National Bank over the other banks. 
For example, all legal entities deposited their surplus funds with the National Bank. Banks 
also used to deposit their available funds at the Bank. After central banking reforms, the 
National Bank retained the exclusive right to receive deposits from legal entities. An 
agreement between the government and the National Bank signed in February 1928 allowed 
the latter to gather exclusively all the surplus funds of legal entities right up to the end of 
1950, in violation of the 1927 Geneva Protocol. The Protocol clearly stipulated that the 
surplus funds of legal entities deposited at the National Bank should be transferred to the 
newly established central bank.148 The literature has seen this as an attempt to protect the Old 
Bank.  
 
 In this section of the thesis, deposits at the National Bank between 1898 and 1930 are 
examined. Deposits are distinguished between government deposits and deposits of other 
agencies and each category is examined separately to evaluate their significance for the Bank. 
In this way, the ‘dual position’ of the National Bank as the bank of the government and at the 
same time the most important ‘Banque de Depots’ in Greece is further illuminated.  
 
148 For more, see Pyrsos (c1935, pp. 123–139); Kostis (1986, pp. 80–83); Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, 
pp. 178–179). 
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 The main objective is to analyse the evolution of the National Bank as a ‘Banque de 
Depots’ during the period in question. It will be shown that although the National Bank had 
been the deposit bank of the government throughout its entire history as an issuing bank in 
Greece it remained the predominant deposit bank on the eve of the banking reforms indicating 
that it was not on the way to transforming itself into a fully fledged central bank of its own 
volition. In spite of an increase in the number of commercial banks during the period in 
question, the National Bank maintained its hegemony as a ‘Banque de Depots’ as Table 3.2 
demonstrates and protected its ‘dual position’. The most important change that occurred was a 
slow but continuous shift from time to sight deposits. At the beginning of the period, time 
deposits accounted for the majority of total deposits at the National Bank, but as Table 3.11 
illustrates, by the middle of the 1920s their share of the total deposits had decreased; by then 
sight deposits made up the lion’s share, the outcome of a long period of war and monetary 
upheaval. This change on the liabilities side of the balance sheet of the Bank was in tune with 
changes in mortgage credit; mortgage credit granted by the National Bank was gradually 
reduced after the outbreak of the Great War and as Table 3.7 above demonstrates, its 
significance as an asset item diminished, again a result of a long period of war and high 
inflation. 
 
 Firstly, deposits made by both the government and by other agencies are examined as 
a percentage of the total deposits and liabilities of the Bank. Secondly, deposits at the 
National Bank were estimated at 1911 values and in this way the impact of a long period of 
war and monetary upheaval can be seen. Thirdly, the composition of general deposits into 
sight, time and savings deposits is examined and changes are pinpointed. Finally, deposits of 
other agencies at the National Bank are compared with deposits at the Bank of Athens the 
second biggest bank in Greece. 
 
 As has been noted again and again because of the accountancy practices followed by 
the National Bank in the 1920s, the value of figures denominated in gold drachmae that 
appeared on its balance sheet was understated. A small portion of deposits, both government 
and commercial deposits, were denominated in gold drachmae and were added together with 
deposits in nominal drachmae. Here the same practice is followed in the hope that the 
outcome paints a reasonably accurate picture. The fraction of deposits on the balance sheet of 
the National Bank in gold drachmae was small as Tables A2.10 and A2.11 in Appendix A2 
demonstrate.  
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3.3.2. Structure and evolution of deposits at the National Bank 
The National Bank received deposits from the government and from the public in general 
throughout its history as an issuing bank. Any balances after the service of government loans 
were deposited at the National Bank. The IFC also deposited its funds at the Bank which also 
accepted deposits from the public as if it were an ordinary commercial bank. Furthermore, all 
state undertakings deposited their surplus funds exclusively with the National Bank. Banks 
also deposited their available funds at the National Bank. All these privileges of tradition 
created a comparative advantage to the National Bank in relation to other commercial banks 
that operated in Greece. 
 
 Deposits, however, from legal entities as well as from other banks were not reported 
separately. They were included with the deposits that an ordinary commercial bank accepts. 
Galanis (1960, p. 13) maintained that the deposits of legal entities at the National Bank at the 
point when the Bank of Greece was established were approximately one-tenth of the total 
deposits in general at banks in Greece. Deposits made by other banks at the Athens and 
Piraeus offices of the National Bank in 1926 were very volatile, fluctuating between 6 per 
cent and 18 per cent of the total sight deposits of the National Bank.149 The interest rate paid 
by the National Bank on both deposits by legal entities and by other banks was less than that 
which it paid on the deposits of the general public.150 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
149 HABOG_A3S1Y1F4T1, p. 90. 
150 See Circulars of the National Bank (Various Years).  
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Table 3.9: Government deposits and deposits of other agencies as a percentage of the 
total deposits of the National Bank, 1898–1930 
 
 Government Deposits Deposits of other Agencies 
1898 23.20 76.80 
1899 37.58 62.42 
1900 25.23 74.77 
1901 24.36 75.64 
1902 34.16 65.84 
1903 20.40 79.60 
1904 24.97 75.03 
1905 20.45 79.55 
1906 16.95 83.05 
1907 12.50 87.50 
1908 4.81 95.19 
1909 4.75 95.25 
1910 9.60 90.40 
1911 14.89 85.11 
1912 3.04 96.96 
1913 3.23 96.77 
1914 3.87 96.13 
1915 3.92 96.08 
1916 2.42 97.58 
1917 3.61 96.39 
1918 22.68 77.32 
1919 5.45 94.55 
1920 6.13 93.87 
1921 4.29 95.71 
1922 5.04 94.96 
1923 4.79 95.21 
1924 13.84 86.16 
1925 14.32 85.68 
1926 12.40 87.60 
1927 30.78 69.22 
Notes: On the balance sheet of 1927 government deposits and deposits of other agencies were 
reported together. Government deposits and deposits of other agencies for 1927 was 
calculated using information provided by the governor of the National Bank in the annual 
report for that year. 
Source: Author’s calculations using the data in Table A2.7 in Appendix A2.  
 
Table 3.9 shows deposits made by the government and those of other agencies as a percentage 
of the total deposits of the National Bank between 1898 and 1930. It clearly demonstrates that 
deposits of other agencies dominated throughout the period in question. Furthermore, as 
commercial deposits at the Bank increased, the share of government deposits decreased. 
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Government deposits at the Bank were also very volatile, fluctuating severely from year to 
year as is demonstrated in Table A2.7 in Appendix A2 which presents government deposits, 
deposits of other agencies and total deposits at the National Bank during the period in 
question.  
 
 Some years, namely 1899, 1902, 1911 and 1918 stand out as outliers. During these 
years government deposits were unusually high mainly because of government borrowing. 
Government deposits in 1927 also appear to be an outlier. Table A2.7 shows that government 
deposits increased considerably during that year. In 1927 the National Bank changed the 
format of its balance sheet and government deposits were reported together with deposits of 
other agencies. The governor of the Bank in his annual report presented commercial deposits 
separately without, however, making any reference to government deposits.151 This 
information was used here to separate government deposits and commercial deposits from the 
total deposits of the National Bank. Nevertheless, this abrupt increase in government deposits 
in 1927 cannot be explained and should be received with caution.  
 
 In the early years of the twentieth century, government deposits dropped from 
approximately 25 per cent of the total deposits of the National Bank to 12.50 per cent. 
Between 1908 and 1923, government deposits remained below 10 per cent of the total 
deposits of the National Bank, fluctuating between 2.42 per cent and 9.60 per cent if one 
excludes 1911 and 1918 which, as mentioned above, are both exceptional years. In 1924, the 
share of government deposits increased to approximately 14 per cent whilst at the end of 1926 
they still accounted for nearly 12.50 per cent.  
 
 Thus, the main characteristics of government deposits at the National Bank at this 
time are: firstly, their volatility from year to year and secondly their somewhat insignificant 
share in the total deposits. This is verified by Table 3.10 which presents both government and 
commercial deposits as a percentage of total liabilities of the National Bank. Table 3.10 
further shows total deposits at the Bank as a percentage of its liabilities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
151 Annual Report of the National Bank for 1927 (1928, p. XIV). 
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Table 3.10: Deposits at the National Bank as a percentage of its liabilities, 1898–1930 
 
 
Government 
Deposits 
Deposits of other 
Agencies Total 
1898 5.59 18.52 24.11 
1899 10.40 17.27 27.67 
1900 6.64 19.68 26.32 
1901 7.04 21.88 28.92 
1902 10.92 21.06 31.98 
1903 6.39 24.93 31.32 
1904 8.39 25.21 33.60 
1905 7.26 28.25 35.51 
1906 6.62 32.44 39.06 
1907 4.86 34.06 38.92 
1908 2.06 40.73 42.79 
1909 1.97 39.53 41.50 
1910 4.14 39.03 43.17 
1911 6.70 38.33 45.03 
1912 1.18 37.75 38.93 
1913 1.21 36.17 37.38 
1914 1.67 41.45 43.12 
1915 1.57 38.49 40.06 
1916 0.89 35.81 36.70 
1917 1.15 30.83 31.98 
1918 7.22 24.61 31.83 
1919 1.69 29.29 30.98 
    
1928  71.70 71.70 
1929  75.63 75.63 
1930  76.32 76.32 
Sources: Tables A2.1 and A2.7 in Appendix A2. 
 
Both Tables 3.9 and 3.10 show that deposits of other agencies – that is to say deposits of the 
general public and other deposits that the National Bank attracted as a consequence of its 
privileged position, for example deposits from legal entities and other commercial banks – 
remained important for the Bank throughout the period in question. In 1900, nearly one-fifth 
of the total liabilities consisted of deposits of other agencies. By the outbreak of the First 
World War, general deposits represented approximately 40 per cent of its total liabilities. 
During this period, deposits of other agencies experienced a continuous increase both in 
nominal and at 1911 values as Tables A2.7 and A2.8 show. The year 1909 appears to have 
been an exception. Subsequently, deposits of other agencies as a percentage of the liabilities 
of the National Bank dropped. This decrease in deposits of other agencies as a percentage of 
its liabilities was, however, due for the most part to the expansion of the balance sheet of the 
National Bank following an increase in the banknotes in circulation. 
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 Table 3.10 also illustrates the profound change that the banking reforms brought to 
the National Bank: after the establishment of the Bank of Greece, the National Bank was 
indeed transformed into a pure ‘Banque de Depots’. Following the loss of the issuing privilege, 
deposits accounted for over 70 per cent of the Bank’s liabilities. 
 
Table A2.8 in Appendix A2 shows deposits at the National Bank at 1911 prices. This 
table also presents commercial deposits at 1911 values, expressed as a ratio. Commercial 
deposits expressed as a ratio are illustrated in Figure 3.6.  
 
 
Figure 3.6: Deposits of other agencies at 1911 prices (1911=100) 
Source: Table A2.8 in Appendix A2. 
 
Figure 3.6 and Table A2.8 show that deposits of other agencies at 1911 values increased 
steadily up to the outbreak of the First World War. During this period, deposits were boosted 
in particular by remittances from Greek emigrants to the USA. This rise in the deposits at the 
National Bank is also demonstrated in Tables 3.9 and 3.10 and occurred during a period when 
the Bank experienced constant expansion.  
 
 After the outbreak of the Great War deposits at the National Bank remained high. A 
noticeable decrease in the deposits of other agencies at 1911 prices occurred only during the 
active participation of Greece in the war when inflation rates were soaring. Subsequently, 
during the Asia Minor campaign deposits remained high. They reached even higher levels 
than those on the eve of the outbreak of the First World War. After the Asia Minor debacle, 
however, deposits at constant values decreased to close to their 1911 levels. In 1925, when the 
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National Bank experienced serious liquidity problems, deposits sank to their lowest level 
since 1911. In fact in 1925, deposits at nominal prices even fell by nearly 12 per cent from the 
year before as Table A2.7 demonstrates. Two years later the Mortgage Bank was established 
and the National Bank passed on to this new institution time deposits of a nominal value of 
562 million drachmae which represented two-thirds of the time deposits reported in December 
1926.152  
 
 After the National Bank had lost its issuing privilege it became a pure ‘Banque de 
Depots’. In 1928, as Figure 3.6 and Tables A2.7 and A2.8 show, deposits increased remarkably 
both at nominal drachmae and at 1911 prices whilst inflation remained very low. After the 
stabilisation of the drachma all banks were obliged by law to use the stabilisation rate to update 
all their assets and liabilities denominated in gold drachmae or foreign exchange.153 This 
suggests that deposits reported on the balance sheet of the National Bank in the 1920s were to 
some extent understated. The same can be said of all banks as an abrupt increase in deposits 
reported on their balance sheet after the stabilisation is observed. See, for example, Table A2.12 
where deposits at the Bank of Athens are presented.  
 
 The first signs of distress in the banking sector appeared in 1929. Firstly, a bank 
founded in 1923, the Anglo-American Bank, went bankrupt and a few months later the Bank 
of Thessaly, established in 1921, suspended payments.154 As a result deposits fled mainly 
from medium size banks that were considered weak to large banks and in particular to the 
National Bank.155 In this way the difficulties being experienced by the banking sector because 
of the stabilisation of the Greek currency and/or the Great Depression further enhanced the 
position of the National Bank as the most important ‘Banque de Depots’ in Greece. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
152 Ibid. 
153 See Tables A2.10 and A2.11 in Appendix A2 for deposits denominated in gold drachmae and 
reported on the balance sheet of the National Bank between 1920 and 1927. 
154 Kostis (1986, pp. 65–66). 
155 Galanis (1946, pp. 23–25). 
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Table 3.11: Composition of Deposits at the National Bank, 1898–1930 
 
 Sight Deposits Time Deposits Savings 
1898 30.44 65.66 3.89 
1899 16.31 79.43 4.26 
1900 19.94 75.99 4.07 
1901 26.72 69.54 3.75 
1902 18.80 77.04 4.16 
1903 17.64 78.17 4.19 
1904 19.21 76.68 4.11 
1905 15.15 79.70 5.15 
1906 21.86 72.27 5.87 
1907 13.96 78.78 7.27 
1908 16.15 76.54 7.31 
1909 18.12 73.25 8.63 
1910 17.42 72.11 10.47 
1911 21.02 66.83 12.15 
1912 24.56 63.01 12.42 
1913 26.66 57.84 15.51 
1914 29.58 56.46 13.96 
1915 32.86 52.32 14.83 
1916 37.12 48.36 14.52 
1917 44.57 40.96 14.47 
1918 45.82 38.05 16.12 
1919 43.49 41.36 15.14 
1920 42.35 46.54 11.11 
1921 37.82 51.62 10.56 
1922 44.68 46.10 9.22 
1923 53.15 38.27 8.58 
1924 56.79 35.91 7.30 
1925 52.91 37.54 9.55 
1926 58.38 25.66 15.96 
1927 65.81 9.86 24.33 
1928 66.72 14.45 18.83 
1929 64.55 14.05 21.40 
1930 53.78 21.28 24.94 
Source: Table A2.9 in Appendix A2.  
 
Table A2.9 in Appendix A2 presents commercial deposits of the National Bank at nominal 
prices between 1898 and 1930 divided into sight, time and savings deposits whilst Table 3.11 
shows each category of deposits as a percentage share of the total commercial deposits at the 
National Bank. 
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 Table 3.11 above demonstrates that time deposits had the lion’s share of the total 
deposits of other agencies at the National Bank more or less up to the outbreak of the Great 
War. Between 1898 and 1910 over 70 per cent of total general deposits were time deposits. 
After 1910, time deposits’ share of total deposits began decreasing and in 1916, for the first 
time during the period in question and possibly during the entire history of the National Bank 
as a bank of issue, they accounted for less than 50 per cent of its total deposits. In 1923, time 
deposits shrank even more as a result of new legislation passed to combat exchange rate 
instability and at the same time to provide foreign exchange to the government.156 Table 3.11 
demonstrates that with the establishment of the Mortgage Bank the share of time deposits 
dropped below 10 per cent during that year, whilst on the other hand, the share of sight 
deposits in total deposits of the National Bank experienced a constant increase during the 
entire period in question. By 1927, nearly 66 per cent of the total deposits of the National 
Bank were sight deposits. The share of savings in the total deposits increased steadily until the 
end of the First World War. In the early 1920s, however, that share fell. 
 
 Table 3.11 combined with Table 3.7 which presents the percentage share of each 
category of commercial credits to the economy demonstrates the nature of the National Bank 
as a commercial bank before the central banking reform. At the beginning of the period in 
question and until at least the outbreak of the Great War, the National Bank in spite of the fact 
that it was the issuing bank in Greece, clearly specialised in mortgage credit. Both tables 
show that the National Bank was heavily involved in long-term activities; mortgage loans and 
time deposits. It was the long period of war and monetary upheaval together with the 
establishment of the Mortgage Bank which led the National Bank to focus primarily on short- 
to medium-term activities. This shift in the nature of its commercial activities, however, does 
not indicate that the National Bank was evolving of its own volition into a pure central bank 
following the model of other European banks of issue. It indicates that the commercial 
banking sector in Greece was moving towards specialisation.  
 
3.3.3. A comparison of deposits at the National Bank and the Bank of Athens 
Although Tables 3.2 and 3.8 demonstrate that the National Bank was the most important 
deposit bank in Greece throughout the period, a further attempt is made to establish the status 
of the National Bank as a deposit bank on the Greek market. This time, the deposits at the 
Bank of Athens, the second most important bank in Greece, are compared with deposits of 
other agencies at the National Bank during the entire period in question. The Bank of Athens 
was founded in 1893 as a pure bank of deposits and for this reason it established very rapidly 
156 Annual Report of the National Bank for 1923 (1924, pp. XXIII–XXIV); Tsalikis (1923, pp. 30–32). 
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a widespread network of branches. In addition, it operated beyond the Greek borders, in areas 
with thriving Greek diaspora communities. All deposits, however, irrespective of their origin 
were reported together on the balance sheet published by the Bank of Athens every year. 
 
 By means of comparison, Table A2.13 and Figure 3.7 present deposits of the Bank of 
Athens as a percentage of the National Bank. This comparison aims to evaluate further the 
position as well as the evolution of the National Bank as the principal deposit bank in Greece.  
 
 
Figure 3.7: Deposits at the Bank of Athens  
as a percentage of the National Bank’s general deposits 
Source: Table A2.13 in Appendix A2. 
 
Figure 3.7 demonstrates that deposits at the Bank of Athens increased rapidly up to 1910 
making the Bank of Athens a serious competitor to the National Bank. In fact during this 
period deposits at the Bank of Athens increased more rapidly than commercial deposits at the 
National Bank. The difficulties that the Bank of Athens experienced between 1911 and 1916 
are clearly demonstrated in Figure 3.7, as well as in Tables A2.12 and A2.13.157 In 1915, 
deposits at the Bank of Athens as a percentage of deposits at the National Bank hit their 
lowest level dropping to approximately 16 per cent of the total commercial deposits at the 
National Bank. Subsequently, after the Bank of Athens had been reorganised, its deposits as a 
percentage of commercial deposits at the National Bank increased as is demonstrated above in 
Figure 3.7. This increase was not sustained for long. In the early 1920s, deposits at the Bank 
of Athens as a percentage of total deposits of other agencies at the National Bank dropped and 
157 For the problems that the Bank of Athens faced between 1911 and 1916 as well as the attempts that 
were made at its reorganisation see Kostis and Tsokopoulos (1988, pp. 42–52). 
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then again rose following the end of the Asia Minor debacle. In 1928, after the stabilisation of 
the drachma when these comparisons become more credible because all banks had to revalue 
their assets and liabilities using the stabilisation price of the drachma, deposits at the Bank of 
Athens accounted for nearly 47 per cent of the deposits at the National Bank.  
 
 During the period in question, deposits at the National Bank evolved according to the 
general economic and monetary conditions in Greece. The Bank maintained its hegemony in 
the deposit market in Greece throughout its entire history as a dual-purpose bank. In June 
1927, when the Greek representatives made an official request of the Financial Committee of 
the League of Nations to support the de jure stabilisation of the drachma, the National Bank 
was still a strong commercial institution which at the same time enjoyed note issuing 
privileges. During the period in question the National Bank had shifted its focus from long-
term to short- and medium-term activities, as Tables 3.7 and 3.11 demonstrate. This shift was 
further consolidated with the establishment of the Mortgage Bank in 1927.  
 
 
3.4. Interest rates 
3.4.1. Interest rates on credits to the economy 
Research on interest rates in Greece before the outbreak of the Second World War is limited 
to fleeting references in the literature in spite of their importance for economic growth. In this 
section of the thesis, an overview of interest rates, mainly those of the National Bank both for 
loans to the economy and for deposits is attempted using information from primary as well as 
secondary sources.  
 
 Table 3.12 and Figure 3.8 show changes in the discount rate of the National Bank 
during the period in question. The change in the discount rate in December 1928 was made by 
the newly established central bank, the Bank of Greece.158 
 
 
158 Although autonomy in its purest form was incorporated in the statutes of the Bank of Greece, a few 
months after its establishment the Prime Minister began pressing for a reduction in its discount rate, 
which was hardly justified by economic conditions. This intervention was neither approved by Horace 
C. Finlayson, the foreign advisor to the Bank of Greece, nor Otto Niemeyer who continued to monitor 
closely developments in Greece. On 2 December, the discount rate was, however, reduced from 10 per 
cent to nine per cent – a reduction that remains controversial. For example see Zolotas (1929, pp. 196–
197); Kyrkilitsis (1934, p. 166); and Loberdos (1936, pp. 54–55). As this example indicates, even the 
statutes of the Bank of Greece together with foreign supervision could not safeguard its independence. 
It also needed a political consensus or at least a sufficient degree of political support to be able to 
maintain a position of independence. 
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Table 3.12: The discount rate of the National Bank, 1914–1928 
1903 6.50 
 
19 July 1914 
 
8.00 
11 November, 1914 6.50 
8 March, 1918 6.00 
6 September, 1918 5.50 
1 January, 1920 6.00 
15 May, 1920 6.50 
1 January, 1923 7.50 
23 February, 1925 8.50 
18 August, 1925 10.00 
7 July, 1926 11.00 
6 June, 1927 10.00 
2 December, 19281 9.00 
Note: 1 The change in the discount rate in December 1928 was implemented by the newly 
established central bank, the Bank of Greece and not the National Bank. 
Sources: Annual Report of the National Bank for 1914 (1915, pp. δ’–ε’); Statistical Yearbook 
of Greece for 1930 (1931, p. 269); Statistical Yearbook of Greece for 1939 (1940, p. 494). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8: The discount rate of the National Bank, 1914–1928 (%) 
Source: Table 3.12 above.  
 
Table 3.12 and Figure 3.8 show that initially the discount rate was seldom changed. In the 
1920s, changes became more frequent but still did not reflect the monetary upheaval of the 
time.  
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 Table 3.13 below shows the rate charged by the National Bank for loans to farmers, 
agricultural co-operatives and unions of agricultural co-operatives. These loans were mainly 
for farming and were usually of a period between six and nine months. Interest rates for 
agrarian credit were fixed by law and, as the table below indicates were rarely changed 
despite the turbulent economic and monetary conditions in the country.  
 
Table 3.13: Interest rate paid by farmers, co-operatives and unions of co-operatives (%) 
 Farmers Co-operatives Unions of Co-operatives 
1 January 1905 6.00   
    
1 January 1915 6.00 5.00  
    
27 November 1925 10.00 8.00 7.00 
    
10 April 1928 12.00   
Notes: 
(1) The laws ΒΩΞ΄ of 18 March 1903 and 656 of 20 February 1915 were milestones for credit 
granted for farming by the National Bank during the period in question. The 1903 law 
provided for a decrease in the rate charged to 6 per cent after 1 January 1905. At the same 
time the National Bank agreed to increase credit to agriculture to 21 million drachmae. In 
1915, the Bank undertook to increase loans for farming to 25 million drachmae. In addition, 
preference had to be given to co-operatives and unions of co-operatives where the rate had to 
be 5 per cent or below.  
(2) In November 1925, a decree provided that the rate of the National Bank for farming loans 
could not be higher than the discount rate. The same decree stipulated that the rate for loans to 
co-operatives had to be at least 1 per cent lower than the discount rate and to unions of co-
operatives at least 0.50 per cent lower than the rate charged on farming loans to co-operatives.  
Sources: National Bank of Greece: Circular No. 2, 5 January 1905, pp. 364–365; Circular No. 
71, 31 July 1914; Circular No. 22, 10 April 1928; National Bank (September 1925); National 
Bank (1926, p. 2248); National Bank (1928, pp. 687–688). 
 
Legislation related to agricultural credit that was passed in 1903, 1915 and 1925 determined 
interest rates for agrarian loans during the period in question. The 1903 law allowed for a 
reduction in the interest rate for farming loans to 6 per cent that became effective on 1 
January 1905. Subsequently, in 1915 when the issuing privilege of the National Bank was 
extended to the newly annexed areas after the end of the Balkan Wars, the Bank agreed to 
increase credit to the agricultural sector from the 21 million drachmae provided for by the law 
of 1903 to 25 million drachmae. In addition, preference had to be given to agrarian co-
operatives which enjoyed a lower rate by one hundred basis points than individual farmers 
who continued to pay 6 per cent. In November 1925, the interest for farming loans was linked 
to the discount rate. A decree provided that the interest rate for loans by the National Bank to 
farmers could not be higher than the discount rate. The same decree also stipulated that the 
rate for loans to co-operatives had to be at least 1 per cent lower than the discount rate and to 
107 
 
unions of co-operatives at least 0.50 per cent lower than the rate charged on farming loans to 
co-operatives.159  
 
 The interest rate for mortgage credit was also determined by law. A piece of 1925 
legislation which aimed at regulating mortgage credit, linked the mortgage rate to the yield of 
bonds issued to finance mortgage loans and to the deposit rate. It was stipulated that the 
difference between the mortgage rate and the yield of mortgage bonds or the deposit rate 
could not be more than two percentage points. Previously, the custom was that legislation 
specified a ceiling for the mortgage rate.160 
 
Table 3.14: Interest rate paid on mortgage loans (%) 
1903 7.00 
  
1 October 1910 6.50 
  
1 April 1915 6.00 
  
1 April 1925 8.00 
  
17 December 1925 9.00 
  
24 May 1926 10.00 
Notes:  
(1) The law that was introduced in 1925 to regulate mortgage credit linked the mortgage rate 
to the yield of bonds issued to finance mortgage loans and to the deposit rate. It was stipulated 
that the difference between the mortgage rate and the yield of mortgage bonds or the deposit 
rate could not be more than two percentage points. Previously, the law specified a ceiling for 
the mortgage rate. 
(2) Circular No. 47 of 23 June 1926 referred to mortgage credit granted to legal entities. The 
rate specified for mortgage loans to legal entities was the same as that for mortgage credit to 
the general public. 
Sources: National Bank: Circular No. 105, 10 August 1915; Circular No. 25, 6 April 1925; 
Circular No. 1, 12 January 1926; Circular No. 47, 23 June 1926; Circular No. 22, 10 April 
1928; National Bank (September 1925); National Bank (1928, pp. 687–688).  
 
In addition to discounts, agricultural credit and mortgage loans, the National Bank provided 
loans against merchandise and securities. The rate for loans against merchandise and 
securities usually followed changes in the other interest rates. For example, in May 1920 the 
rate for loans against merchandise and securities increased from 6 per cent to 6.50 per cent.161 
Then, in December 1922 the rate for loans both against merchandise and securities was raised 
159 See National Bank (September 1925). 
160 Ibid., p. 8. 
161 National Bank of Greece, Circular No. 51, 16 May 1920. 
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to 8 per cent.162 In September 1925, the rate for loans against merchandise was increased 
again, this time to 11 per cent.163 There were, however, exceptions to the general rate charged 
against merchandise; for example when tobacco and raisins were used as collateral then the 
interest rate charged was different.164  
 
 The rate charged for credits to the economy was usually increased by 1 per cent when 
loans were renewed. The evidence to hand shows that commission was charged when credit 
was granted against securities and merchandise. Furthermore, available evidence shows that 
lower rates were charged by the headquarters of the National Bank for some loans against 
merchandise and securities, and in other flourishing urban centres, than in the rest of the 
country.165  
  
 Table 3.12 above shows that the discount rate of the National Bank was raised to 11 
per cent in the 1920s whilst the discount rate of other banks was 15 per cent. At the same 
time, interest rates on the unofficial credit market fluctuated between 20 and 25 per cent.166 
This noticeable difference between the rates charged for loans by banks and on the unofficial 
credit market was not a result of the monetary upheaval experienced after the end of the Great 
War. Neither was it a product of the liquidity problems that the credit market faced in the 
mid-1920s. 
 
 As would be expected when the National Bank was established in 1841 an unofficial 
credit market existed.167 Informal credit networks that had already developed by the mid-
nineteenth century continued to operate alongside the formal banking sector for more than a 
century after this. These informal credit networks consisted of merchants, ship-owners, 
insurance companies, landowners, credit offices and local money lenders and operated 
alongside the formal banking institutions. A system of ‘chain finance’ was created whereby 
the National Bank lent ‘to the most creditworthy who in turn, lent to others on a descending 
162 National Bank of Greece, Circular No. 113, 31 December 1922. 
163 National Bank of Greece (September 1925, pp. 5 and 7). 
164 In 1925, the rate charged for loans granted against tobacco was 12 per cent; that is to say it was one 
per cent higher than the general rate for loans against merchandise. For more, see ibid., p. 7. 
165 Circular No. 51 of 16 May 1920 referred to a rate increase for a particular type of loans against 
merchandise and securities from six to six and a half per cent in Athens, Piraeus, Patras, Corfu, Syra, 
Volos, Zakynthos, Salonika and Smyrna. For the rest of the country it was raised from six and a half 
per cent to seven per cent.  
166 Zolotas (1929, pp. 188 and 197); Kyrkilitsis (1934, p. 67). 
167 Zolotas (1926, pp. 93–94); Dritsa (1990, p. 245); Stasinopoulos (2000, pp. 318 and 326, n. 28); 
Petzmezas (2003, pp. 94–95); Dertilis (2005, p. 172). 
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scale of creditworthiness’.168 This ‘chain finance’ system which still survived during the 
period in question kept interest rates at exorbitant levels.169 
 
 A conservative and risk-averse National Bank did not challenge the informal credit 
networks that operated but instead did business with them, as they could provide high quality 
collateral and were low risk and creditworthy customers. Thomadakis (1981, pp. 353–354) 
showed that the clientele of the National Bank between 1873 and 1884 included bankers and 
usurers.170 Research, however, on the relationship between the banking sector and the non-
banking credit system remains limited.171 The literature has not so far tackled crucial 
questions related to the National Bank and the cost of capital in Greece. Could the National 
Bank in fact have challenged effectively informal credit networks in Greece during the ‘long’ 
nineteenth century? This is a question that only future research will answer.  
 
 ‘Chain finance’ on the one hand, and on the other the fact that legislation determined 
the interest rates for agricultural and mortgage credit, indicate that the use of the discount rate 
of the National Bank was not effective as a monetary policy instrument.  
 
3.4.2. Interest rates on deposits 
Table 3.15 shows interest rates paid by the National Bank on deposits in the 1920s. The rate 
for sight deposits at the National Bank fluctuated between 1 per cent and 4 cent in the 1920s. 
At the same time, banks and bankers enjoyed lower interest rates for their sight deposits at the 
National Bank than those cited in Table 3.15. Between July 1909 and December 1919, the 
interest rate for sight deposits at the Bank was 1 per cent and before 1909 it had even been 
zero.  
 
 
168 Thomadakis (1985, p. 66).  
169 For a general description of this ‘chain finance’ system, see Franghiadis (2007, pp. 60–66). For a 
more detailed analysis of the credit lines between export merchants, local money lenders and small 
farmers, mainly related to currant viticulture in southern Greece between 1830 and 1893, see 
Franghiadis (1990, pp. 130–143). See also Petzmezas (2003, pp. 94–105). In a nutshell, export 
merchants lent to local money lenders who in turn were obliged to deliver currant fruit to them. 
Subsequently, local money lenders lent growers who repaid them with currants. Export merchants had 
access to the official credit system in Greece or could easily borrow from abroad. They usually charged 
local money lenders 12 per cent, whilst the money lenders charged small farmers on loans against 
promised deliveries of currant fruit 20 per cent and 24 per cent. The interest rate charged on loans to 
small farmers when other kind of crops were involved could rise to 30 per cent or even 40 per cent. 
However, very little is known about the informal credit networks relating to crops other than currants. 
Research so far has been focused primarily on the way that the production of currant fruit was financed 
as it was the most important export good during the nineteenth century.  
170 See also Franghiadis (1990, pp. 137–139). 
171 See, for example Dertilis, (2005, pp. 172–177). 
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Table 3.15: Interest rates paid by the National Bank on deposits (%) 
 Sight Deposits Time Deposits Savings Account 
Before 19201 1.00 1.25–4.002  
    
1 January 1920 2.003 2.504  
    
18 February 1925 3.00 3.25–7.005 4.006 
    
23 November 1925 4.00 4.25–7.007 5.00 
    
1 August 1927 3.508 4.25–7.00 4.50 
Notes: 
1 Between July 1909 and December 1919, the rate for sight deposits was in general 1 per cent 
whilst previously it had been zero. 
2 The interest rate for time deposits varied between 1.25 and 4 per cent depending on the 
period of maturity. In 1920, a savings account was limited to 3,000 drachmae.  
3 Banks and bankers enjoyed lower sight deposit rates than the general public in the 1920s. 
For example, in 1920 the sight deposit rate for banks and bankers remained at 1 per cent. 
Then, in August 1923 it was further decreased to 0.50 per cent and in May 1924 it became 
0.25 per cent. The rate for sight deposits of banks and bankers was later increased and 
remained at 1 per cent until the end of July 1927. On 1 August 1927 it was again decreased to 
0.50 per cent.  
4 This rate was for a period of up to six months. 
5 The interest rate for time deposits fluctuated between 3.25 per cent and 7 per cent in 
February 1925 depending on the period of maturity. It was 3.25 per cent for time deposits of 
up to six months, 3.5 for up to one year, 4 per cent for up to two years, 5 per cent for up to 
four years, 6 per cent for up to five years and 7 per cent for up ten years and beyond. 
6 In February 1925, savings accounts were limited to 10,000 drachmae or 400 sterling, or 
2,000 dollars or 10,000 French Francs. In November of that same year the interest rate for 
savings increased to 5 per cent and at the same time the limit for a savings account raised to 
50,000 drachmae. 
7 After November 1925, the interest for time deposits varied between 4.25 per cent and 7 per 
cent. It was 4.25 per cent for time deposits for up to six months, 4.50 for up to one year, 5 per 
cent for up to two years, 5.50 per cent for up to 4 years, 6 per cent for up to five years and 7 
per cent for up to ten years and perpetual deposits. 
8 In 1927, the rate for government deposits was set at 1 per cent whilst for legal entities it 
varied between 1 and 3 per cent. The rate for deposits of tobacco companies was 2 per cent.  
Sources: National Bank: Circular No. 151, 30 December 1919; Circular No. 69, 7 August 
1923; Circular No. 12, 18 February 1925; National Bank (September 1925, pp. 7–8); National 
Bank (1928, pp. 689–690); Annual Report of the National Bank for 1927 (1928, p. XIV). 
 
Table 3.16 shows interest rates on deposits advertised by banks in the Athens Economist in 
1921 and 1926. This table indicates that other banks tended to offer higher deposit rates than 
the National Bank. In addition, it demonstrates that the sight deposit rate of the National Bank 
and other big banks converged in the middle of the 1920s, a result of the credit conditions in 
Greece at the time. This table also indicates that small local banks established after the 
outbreak of the Great War tended to pay higher rates to attract customers. The depositors at 
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these small banks were usually locals, acquaintances of their directors who at the same time 
played the role of a creditor to these provincial banks.172  
 
Table 3.16: Interest rate paid on deposits at various banks (%) 
 Sight Deposits Time Deposits Savings Account 
 1921 
Commercial Bank (1907) 3.00 4.50 4.50 
Bank of Industry (1918) 3.50 4.50 5.50 
 January and March 1926 
Ionian Bank (1839) 4.00 4.50  
Bank of Athens (1893) 4.00 4.75 5.00 
Bank of Industry (1918) 4.00 5.00 5.00 
General Bank (1918) 4.50  5.00 
Bank of Thessaly (1921)   6.00 
Pavlos’ Bank (1926) 5.50  7.00 
 December 1926 
Ionian Bank (1839)   5.00 
Bank of the Orient (1904) 4.00 5.00 5.00 
Bank of Piraeus (1916)   6.50 
Bank of the National Economy (1918)   6.00 
Panhellenic Bank (1924)   12.00 8.00 
American Express (1920) 4.00  5.00 
Notes:  
(1) The deposit rates quoted above for 1921 were advertised in the Athens Economist of 11 
January and 3 May 1921. Those for 1926 are from the Athens Economist of 30 March 1926 
and 25 December 1926.  
(2) The rate given in 1921 for time deposits referred to time deposits of a period of maturity 
of one year. 
(3) In January 1921, savings accounts of the Commercial Bank were limited to 4,000 
drachmae and of the Bank of Industry to 5,000 drachmae. 
(4) In January 1926, the rate of time deposits given is for a period of one year. In December 
1926, the rate advertised by the Bank of the Orient was for a maturity period of six months. 
This bank offered a 6 per cent rate for time deposits of a two-year period. The Ionian and the 
Panhellenic banks did not specify any period for the time deposit rate advertised. 
(5) In 1926, the rates advertised for savings applied to a variety of different accounts. For 
example, the Bank of Industry offered a saving account for up to 10,000 drachmae, the 
General Bank for up to 15,000 drachmae, the Bank of Athens for up to 30,000 thousand 
drachmae whilst Pavlos’ Bank, the Bank of the National Economy and the Panhellenic Bank 
offered accounts for up to 75,000 drachmae. The American Express limited its savings 
account to 100,000 drachmae. Neither the Ionian Bank nor the Bank of Piraeus specified the 
size of their savings account.  
Sources: Athens Economist: 11 January 1921; 3 May 1921; 2 January 1926; 9 January 1926; 
30 March 1926; 25 December 1926. 
172 Galanis (1946, p. 25). 
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3.4.3. Concluding remarks 
A comparison between the rates charged for loans and paid for deposits provides striking 
evidence of the lack of competitiveness of the Greek banking system. In addition, the 
persistence of credit facilities other than banking and the charge of shadow interest rates in 
spite of the increase in the number of banks after the end of the Great War indicate the 
backwardness of the credit market in Greece.  
 
 The spread between the discount rate and the rate for sight deposits at the National 
Bank fluctuated between four and a half and 7 per cent. The discount rate of other banks 
moderately varied between 11 and 15 per cent during the period in question which points to a 
considerable spread between the interest rate charged for discounts and the rate paid for sight 
deposits.173 This considerable spread between loan and deposit interest rates is convincing 
evidence indicating the lack of competitiveness of the banking system in Greece. 
 
 Greek banks were regarded as profitable.174 An indication of their profitability is the 
spread between the rates of their loans and deposits. The tables presented in this section 
indicate a comfortable difference between the loan and deposit interest rates of the National 
Bank. This difference was increased when credit was renewed or when commission was 
added. The next section of this chapter deals with the financial position and strength of the 
National Bank during the period in question. 
 
 
3.5. Profit and loss statements  
3.5.1. Some thoughts on the profitability of the National Bank 
The National Bank published an income statement twice a year, in June and December 
throughout its entire history as a bank of issue. After the central banking reforms it published 
an income statement only once a year, in December. These income statements provide ample 
information on revenue, expenses, net profits as well as data on dividend paid to shareholders 
each semester. On occasions, its governors acknowledged that the Bank retained unpublished 
profits, a practice that was not uncommon in banking institutions at the time.175 Nevertheless, 
173 The Scottish banking system of the nineteenth century is regarded as highly competitive. The spread 
between loan and deposit interest rates was typically only one to two percentage points. See White 
(1999, p. 83).  
174 Kyrkilitsis (1934, pp. 47–53).  
175 Annual Report of the National Bank for 1921 (1922, p. XXI); Annual Report of the National Bank 
for 1922 (1923, p. XXVII); See, for example, Cassis (1994) Chapter 5 for a general discussion on the 
unpublished profits of various banks at the time.  
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these profit and loss statements still provide a wide range of information that can be used to 
assess the financial position of the National Bank.  
 
 Kostis and Kostelenos (2003) used these profit and loss statements to estimate risk 
indicators and performance ratios for the National Bank between 1897 and 1940.176 An 
examination of these financial ratios leads to the following observations. Firstly, the financial 
ratios estimated indicate that the National Bank, a privately owned institution, had adopted a 
conservative attitude towards risk. Secondly, the results that the financial ratios yield for the 
period between 1928 and 1940 when the National Bank operated as a purely commercial 
bank, are much as theory would lead to expect. By contrast, both the risk indicators and 
performance ratios that refer to the period that the National Bank acted as a dual-purpose 
bank, did not always provide the results that theory would suggest. Finally, the financial ratios 
estimated imply that the late 1920s may have marked a watershed in the evolution of the 
National Bank. 
 
 When total assets is used to calculate a financial ratio for the period that the National 
Bank served as a dual-purpose bank then the result may not be what theory suggests. For 
example, both return on assets and the liquidity multiplier estimated by Kostis and Kostelenos 
(2003) indicate that the performance of the National Bank between 1910 and 1919 was not 
the one expected by theory. In addition, the liquidity multiplier shows that risk for the 
National Bank increased during this period. The authors argue that this deterioration in the 
performance of the Bank was due to an increase in the price level between 1910 and 1919. 
For the estimation of both ratios total assets are needed: total assets are used in the 
denominator to calculate return on assets and in the nominator when the liquidity multiplier is 
calculated. Between 1910 and 1919, however, the National Bank experienced a rapid increase 
in total assets and consequently total liabilities, primarily because of the operation of the 
ΓΧΜΒ Law. This expansion of the balance sheet of the National Bank was entirely a result of 
its role as an issuing bank.  
 
 Profitability measures and other financial ratios such as those estimated by Kostis and 
Kostelenos (2003) are simple measures that are used to examine the economic performance of 
banks and companies. The National Bank was a complex private institution that combined 
public responsibilities with commercial activities. It is difficult for these financial ratios to 
176 See the CD included in Kostis in collaboration with Kostelenos (2003). They estimated the 
following risk indicators: liquidity risk, interest rate risk, credit risk, capital risk and solvency risk. 
Whilst the performance ratios estimated are return on equity and assets, liquidity multiplier, profit 
margin and asset utilisation. 
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reflect the fact that the National Bank was a dual-purpose bank that operated during complex 
historical conditions. 
 
 As the authors themselves noted, the financial ratios that they estimated indicate that 
the performance of the National Bank, a privately owned institution, which for most of the 
period that they examined combined public responsibilities with commercial activities was 
rational. The question that they pose is if indeed maximisation of profits was a priority of its 
governors given the historical conditions during the period that they examine. They add that if 
the priority of the administration of the National Bank was not to maximise its profitability 
then tools such as those used to evaluate the performance of commercial banks may not be 
appropriate to the case.  
 
 A rational question that is posed is to what extent the public responsibilities of the 
National Bank curbed its profitability as a commercial bank. At the same time, however, it 
could be argued that its privileges as the central bank in Greece enhanced its profitability. The 
National Bank remained a financially strong institution throughout its entire history as a dual-
purpose bank. Its financial strength was a result of the way that its governors balanced the two 
conceptions of their business: ‘duty to the proprietors’ as a commercial bank and on the other 
hand ‘duty to the public’ as a bank of issue – two responsibilities that could at times conflict. 
 
 The National Bank’s financial strength was based on its market power and its ability 
to select high quality assets and liabilities which resulted in its enduring profitability and 
solvency. In this thesis, the term profitability does not necessarily mean that the aim of its 
management was the maximisation of profits, despite the fact that the National Bank was a 
private institution. The good quality of its assets and liabilities given the constraints under 
which it operated was more important for its conservative and risk-averse governors than 
maximisation of profits per se in the conventional sense of the term. A great number of the 
assets and liabilities of the National Bank were related to the monopolies and privileges that it 
enjoyed. Furthermore, its policy as a commercial bank was to lend against a variety of good 
collateral, to low risk, creditworthy customers from its establishment in 1842 to the end of the 
period in question. 
 
3.5.2. Composition of the revenue of the National Bank 
The National Bank’s revenue came from interest charged on credits granted to the economy; 
from holding public debt and foreign exchange reserves deposited abroad; from owning 
property and shares of other banks and companies; from renting safe deposits and keeping 
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securities and bonds for its customers. Income statements also included an entry entitled 
revenue resulting ‘From different profits’. The source of revenue included in this entry was 
specified only in 1920. The profit and loss statement of December 1920 stated that revenue 
‘From different profits’ was comprised of revenue from foreign exchange differences, 
commission on capital movements and other profits in general. 
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Table 3.17: 
Composition of income of the National Bank, 1898–1930 
(as a percentage of total income) 
 
 
Credits to 
the 
Economy Public Debt 
Bilateral 
Government 
Debt 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Reserves 
Different 
Profits 
 
 
 
Sundry 
1898 56.90 24.15 12.39 3.62 1.12 1.82 
1899 58.43 25.67 7.40 3.32 2.24 2.95 
1900 64.99 19.77 7.47 1.92 3.29 2.56 
1901 65.31 19.34 7.14 2.77 2.32 3.13 
1902 65.84 18.56 6.92 2.53 3.50 2.66 
1903 68.76 16.68 6.64 2.59 2.37 2.97 
1904 66.86 15.54 6.17 4.32 2.77 4.35 
1905 65.31 15.21 6.51 5.72 4.13 3.11 
1906 65.90 14.27 5.62 7.06 3.82 3.33 
1907 64.91 13.06 5.45 9.95 2.53 4.10 
1908 63.36 13.74 5.04 10.47 2.85 4.54 
1909 62.88 14.15 5.39 10.50 2.33 4.74 
1910 62.09 15.21 5.32 11.40 1.60 4.38 
1911 59.83 14.86 3.64 16.37 1.60 3.71 
1912 57.37 13.76 3.22 17.80 4.79 3.07 
1913 45.61 20.63 2.66 24.63 4.14 2.33 
1914 43.84 22.59 2.16 22.58 6.88 1.95 
1915 41.82 30.29  16.12 10.23 1.54 
1916 33.90 28.82  26.61 9.24 1.43 
1917 28.74 27.90  34.98 7.09 1.28 
1918 25.64 23.26  43.44 6.50 1.15 
1919 28.32 21.42  42.25 6.99 1.02 
1920 24.25 34.00  23.48 17.28 0.99 
1921 23.92 8.08 23.09 13.67 21.59 9.65 
1922 28.95 7.84 15.69 8.06 28.40 11.07 
1923 36.97 6.57 19.54 7.67 27.86 1.39 
1924 46.70 7.09 13.71 7.12 23.91 1.48 
1925 50.65 15.90 8.96 13.79 9.55 1.14 
1926 44.80 16.39 2.79 16.31 18.25 1.46 
1927 52.83 14.42 6.05 9.75 14.89 2.07 
1928 60.12 14.28 3.02 7.59 12.44 2.54 
1929 71.02 9.86 1.66 5.87 8.09 3.49 
1930 69.63 14.30  4.19 6.82 5.06 
Sources: Author’s calculations using the Profit and Loss Statements of the National Bank, 
1898–1930. 
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In Table 3.17 above, the revenue of the National Bank has been grouped into six categories. 
The percentage share of each category in the total income of the National Bank has then been 
estimated. All earnings from interest charged on credits granted to the economy were gathered 
together and their percentage share of the total earnings is given in the first column of Table 
3.17. Revenue from public debt owned by the National Bank was grouped into two categories 
whenever possible, depending on the information provided by the income statements: income 
from public debt traded on stock exchanges and income from illiquid public debt held by the 
National Bank as a consequence of its role as a central bank. The fourth column of Table 3.17 
presents the percentage share of the revenue of the National Bank which is related to foreign 
exchange reserves deposited abroad. The fifth column refers to earnings from what was called 
‘Different profits’. Finally, the last column, entitled ‘Sundry’, includes earnings from 
property, shares of banks and companies that the National Bank owned and other income 
derived from miscellaneous sources.  
 
 It should be noted that Table 3.17 does not demonstrate if income from a particular 
category increased or decreased during the period in question. If this table is compared with 
tables in chapters three and four that present the evolution of commercial credits and public 
debt then it could be inferred implicitly if revenue from credits granted to the economy or 
public debt held by the National Bank increased or decreased.  
 
 Between the enactment of the Law of Control and the outbreak of the First Balkan 
War the main bulk of the revenue of the National Bank came from credits supplied to 
different sectors of the economy. During this period revenue from interest rates charged on 
credits supplied to the economy fluctuated between 56 per cent and 69 per cent of total 
income of the National Bank. Revenues from public debt take second place. Earnings from 
public debt traded on stock exchanges, as Table 3.17 demonstrates, constituted the majority of 
the income from public debt; between 13 per cent and 25 per cent of total income stemmed 
from public debt traded on stock exchanges. On the other hand, between 4 per cent and 12 per 
cent of total income resulted from bilateral government debt in spite of the fact that it 
composed a significant item in the total assets of the National Bank as Table 4.6 in Chapter 4 
demonstrates.  
 
 The percentage share of income derived from foreign exchange reserves deposited 
abroad was increasing between 1898 and 1911. Revenue from foreign exchange reserves 
increased from 2 per cent in 1900 to 16 per cent of total revenue in 1911. In fact, in 1911 
revenue from foreign exchange reserves surpassed those from public debt traded on stock 
exchanges for the first time during the period in question. The share of revenue from foreign 
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exchange reserves as a percentage of total revenue indicates that the National Bank was 
increasing its foreign exchange reserves during this period. In addition, the introduction of the 
ΓΧΜΒ Law in 1910 helped the Bank to further augment its reserves in foreign exchange; 
indeed in 1912, earnings from foreign exchange reserves became the second most important 
source of income with revenue from total public debt in third place. 
 
 Between the Balkan Wars and the Asia Minor debacle the importance of the different 
sources of income of the National Bank altered, mirroring changes in its balance sheet. The 
picture drawn during this period is not consistent. Up to the point of the active participation of 
Greece in the Great War, earnings from credits to the economy continued to be the most 
important source of income. Subsequently, between 1917 and 1922 revenue from either 
foreign exchange or total public debt became the most important source of income for the 
National Bank.  
 
 In 1920, the percentage share of income from ‘different profits’ swelled noticeably. 
As Table 6.2 in Chapter 6 indicates, 1920 was the first year of considerable foreign exchange 
instability in Greece. This, coupled with the information provided by profit and loss 
statements, that is to say that ‘Different profits’ also includes earnings from foreign exchange 
dealings indicating that the National Bank most likely speculated on the foreign exchange 
market at the time.177 
 
 After the end of the Asia Minor campaign, credits to the economy were once more the 
most important source of income for the National Bank. Revenue from ‘different profits’ 
continued to be considerable before stabilisation, competing with earnings from total public 
debt for second place.  
 
 After de jure stabilisation, when the National Bank operated as a purely commercial 
bank, nearly 70 per cent of its income, as Table 3.17 shows, derived from credits supplied to 
the economy. Public debt remained the second most important source of income but this time 
it represented only a small fraction of its total earnings.  
 
 Thus, credits to the economy provided the lion’s share of the income of the National 
Bank. During the long period of war and monetary upheaval, however, credits to the economy 
did not always constitute the most important source of revenue. This change was a product of 
177 See statements of profits and losses between 1920 and 1930. See also Kostis (2003, p. 172).  
119 
 
                                                     
exceptional historical conditions and not the result of a deliberate policy on the part of the 
National Bank.  
 
3.5.3. Evolution of revenue, expenses and dividend of the National Bank 
Figure 3.9 demonstrates the way in which the total revenue of the National Bank at constant 
1911 prices evolved between 1898 and 1930. This figure indicates that revenue of the 
National Bank at constant prices increased until the outbreak of the Great War. (See also 
Table A2.18 in Appendix A2.) Subsequently, revenue fell until the Armistice. Figure 3.9 also 
shows that during the Asia Minor campaign, revenue increased spectacularly. Indeed income 
at constant prices in 1921 and 1922 reached unusually high levels that had not been reached 
before, during the period in question, and were surpassed only in 1930. After 1923, the 
National Bank’s earnings fluctuated. They remained, however, above their 1911 level and in 
fact after 1925 income at constant prices exceeded its 1914 level.  
 
 
Figure 3.9: Revenue of the National Bank at 1911 prices, 1898–1930 (1911=100) 
Source: Table A2.18 in Appendix A2.  
 
An examination of revenue alone reveals very little about the financial position of the 
National Bank. Therefore, the evolution of expenses is also examined and compared with the 
development of revenue. Figure 3.10 shows the expenses of the National Bank at constant 
prices. It demonstrates that expenses increased until the outbreak of the First World War. 
Then, they decreased until the Armistice, following the same pattern as revenue. In the 1920s, 
expenses fluctuated considerably but remained above their 1911 level.  
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Figure 3.10: Expenses of the National Bank at 1911 prices, 1898–1930 (1911=100) 
Source: Table A2.18 in Appendix A2.  
 
It should be noted that revenue increased faster than expenses before the outbreak of the 
Balkan Wars and between 1921 and 1922. However, during the rest of the period the rate of 
increase in expenses was faster than the rate of increase in revenue. In the 1920s, the rise in 
expenses was mainly due to an increase in personnel cost as the number of staff increased as 
well as the number of branches that the Bank operated. 
 
Figure 3.11 and Table A2.19 in Appendix A2 compares expenses with the revenue of 
the National Bank. It shows expenses as a percentage of revenue during the period in 
question. Expenses of the National Bank as a percentage of revenue increased considerably 
between 1905 and 1919. In addition, between 1923 and the end of the period in question, 
expenses as a percentage of revenue fluctuated between 80 and 85 per cent, a percentage 
share higher than that observed before the Balkan Wars.  
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Figure 3.11: Expenses as a percentage of revenue, 1898–1930 
Source: See Table A2.19 in Appendix A2. 
 
Figure 3.12 shows the evolution of net profits of the National Bank at constant 1911 prices 
between the enactment of the Law of Control and stabilisation. It demonstrates that net profits 
increased until 1904. Subsequently, they remained stable until the end of the Balkan Wars, a 
fact that points to the conservative character of the National Bank. During the Great War net 
profits decreased. By contrast, between 1920 and 1923 the National Bank’s profits were 
generally high. This short time-span also appears to be an outlier in figures related to revenue. 
During those three years the National Bank enjoyed extraordinarily high earnings which, to a 
great extent, stemmed from unpublished profits. Legislation related to the National Bank and 
passed in 1920, encouraged the publication of unpublished profits from previous years.178 
Subsequently, net profits remained close to their 1911 level and after the banking reforms the 
trend seems to be upward.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
178 Annual Report of the National Bank for 1921 (1922, p. XXI); Annual Report of the National Bank 
for 1922 (1923, p. XXVII). 
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Figure 3.12: Net profits of the National Bank at 1911 prices, 1898–1930  
(1911=100) 
Source: Table A2.21 in Appendix A2.  
 
Net profit margin or ratio, that is to say net profits as a percentage of revenue, has been 
calculated and presented in Figure 3.13 and Table A2.22. The percentage share of net profits 
in the National Bank’s revenue decreased to below 20 per cent after 1912 reaching a very low 
level in 1918 and 1919. As expected, in 1921 and 1922, the net profit margin was unusually 
high. After 1924, it dropped again and remained below 20 per cent until the end of the decade.  
 
 
Figure 3.13: Net Profit Margin, 1898–1930 
Source: Table A2.22 in Appendix A2. 
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Figure 3.13 indicates that there was a higher margin of safety for the National Bank until the 
outbreak of the Balkan Wars. This is in tune with the observation that revenue increased at a 
greater rate than expenses up to 1911, leading to higher profit margins. By contrast, during the 
rest of the period, with the exception of the period from 1919 to 1922, expenses grew at a 
greater rate than revenue leading to lower profit margins.  
 
 Figure 3.14 indicates the percentage of net profits of the National Bank distributed as 
a dividend. The percentage share of net profits distributed fluctuated between 80 per cent and 
95 per cent between 1898 and 1919. By contrast in 1920, a mere 30 per cent of net profits of 
the bank of issue was distributed as a dividend. The following year this share dropped further 
to 11 per cent. This change in the dividend policy of the National Bank in 1920 is explained 
by changes related to its role as a bank of issue and the way that it was taxed.  
 
 
Figure 3.14: Percentage of net profits of the National Bank paid as dividend, 1898–1930 
Source: Table A2.24 in Appendix A2. 
 
Figure 3.15 shows the annual dividend paid per share at 1911 prices each year during the 
period in question. It indicates that dividend paid at 1911 prices increased until 1905 and then 
fluctuated at around the same price until 1913. After the outbreak of the Great War the 
dividend fell. In the 1920s, the annual dividend distributed per share was smaller than that 
paid between 1910 and 1913. The governors of the Bank, however, emphasised to 
shareholders that dividend had increased to unprecedented levels, referring of course to 
nominal rises. 
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Figure 3.15: Annual dividend paid per share 
by the National Bank at 1911 prices, 1898–1930 (1911=100) 
Source: Table A2.25 in Appendix A2. 
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4.1. The National Bank as an issuing bank 
Between the outbreak of the First World War and the stabilisation of the drachma the issuing 
privilege of the National Bank was extended three times and the government resorted to the 
printing press over and over again to finance war. As a consequence the money stock 
increased by more than seventeen-fold between 1914 and 1928.179 Figure 4.1 illustrates this 
increase very vividly. 
 
 During the entire period in question the money supply did not consist of one simple 
issue, but of several issues added together with different legal bases. Tables 4.1 and 4.4 
summarise the different categories of banknotes that were in circulation in 1914 and in 1928 
when the National Bank finally lost its issuing privilege. In both tables, banknotes in 
circulation were organised in categories according to the legal provisions related to their issue 
and at the same time in the way that were reported on the balance sheet of the National Bank. 
These different issues of banknotes also illustrate the complex relationship between the 
National Bank and the government.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
179 Money stock here is M0 which means that only banknotes in circulation are included. Throughout 
the thesis money stock is used interchangeably with banknotes in circulation and money supply. 
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Figure 4.1: Banknotes in circulation, 1910–1928 
(January 1914=100) 
Source: Author’s calculations using data in Table A3.1 in Appendix A3. 
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All banknotes in circulation were exchanged according to their nominal value and the public 
was not aware of the different laws that led to their printing. Nor did the banknotes 
themselves indicate their origin. During discussions over the stabilisation of the drachma in 
Geneva in June 1927, the Financial Committee of the League recommended the 
amalgamation of all the different banknote issues into one that would be regulated by the 
same legal arrangements.180  
 
In this section of Chapter 4 the role of the National Bank as a bank of issue is 
examined. Firstly, therefore, the monetary arrangements that prevailed on the eve of the 
outbreak of the First World War will be examined so as to assist with understanding the 
methods employed to increase the banknotes in circulation between 1914 and 1927. Secondly, 
a question is posed regarding the kind of monetary rule that Greece introduced in 1910. This 
year is usually cited by contemporary economic historians and economists as the year that 
Greece adopted either the gold standard or the gold exchange standard, depending on their 
view. By contrast, before the early 1980s it was generally believed that the Greek currency 
had remained inconvertible throughout the period from September 1885, when the gold 
standard was suspended, until May 1928 when the gold exchange standard was de jure 
introduced. What was the monetary arrangement in Greece in 1910 that has prompted 
scholars to argue more recently that Greece adopted a clearly defined monetary rule during 
that year, even though there is no agreement amongst them on which rule Greece in fact 
introduced? Thirdly, the methods employed for the increase in the banknotes in circulation 
between the outbreak of the First World War and the stabilisation of the drachma will be 
presented. In this way, the position of the National Bank as a bank of issue will be further 
exposed. In addition, the origins of the monetary upheaval of the 1920s will be pinpointed.  
 
4.1.1. Money supply in 1914 
After the end of the Balkan Wars the land area of Greece and its population was doubled as a 
result of the annexation of Epirus and Macedonia. In those newly annexed areas the Greek 
currency was not the only currency that was used as a medium of exchange in 1914; the 
Turkish lira and gold coins were also used in everyday transactions. Payments to the Greek 
army still stationed in those areas, however, facilitated the substitution of the drachma in 
place of the other currencies in circulation. It is believed that only in 1916 did the drachma 
begin to be the dominant currency in those areas.181 Consequently, any attempt to estimate the 
money supply in Greece in 1914 should take this fact into account. 
180 Pyrsos (c1935, p. 46). 
181 NBGHA_Α1Σ18Υ1Φ164Ε1. 
 
 
                                                     
As Table 4.1 below illustrates, the system of banknote issue in 1914 can be divided 
into three categories: firstly, banknotes that were in circulation because of the note issue 
privilege; secondly, banknotes issued for the account of the government and finally, those in 
issue because of the ΓΧΜΒ Law of 1910.  
 
Table 4.1: Summary of banknotes in issue in 1914 
(in Drachmae)  
 
A) Banknotes issued because of the privilege of note issue  
1) Note issue right of the National Bank under Law ΑΣΟΓ/1885                              60,000,000 
2) Transfer of the issue right of the Bank of Epirus-Thessaly                                       
     to the National Bank, Law BXMA/1899                                                         6,000,000 
3) Note issue right of the Ionian Bank                                                                               7,000,000 
4) Note issue right of the Bank of Crete                                                       10,405,000 
 
                                                                                 TOTAL:                     83,405,000 
 
 
B) Banknotes issued for the account of the government  
                       Initial Amount        Balance on 31 December 19141 
Law ΒΦΙΘ/1898           94,000,0002                  60,951,000     
               
 
C) Banknotes issued under the ΓΧΜΒ Law of 19 March 1910                      
                                                   Balance on 31 December 1914             Legal Maximum 
                                                                  153,513,0003                                200,000,000 
 
 
                                                                GRAND TOTAL:                                          344,356,0004                                                    
 
Notes:  
1 Balance of banknotes in circulation under the Law of Control at the end of December 1914.  
2 Total forced circulation of banknotes and coins in 1898 when the Law of Control was 
introduced. 
3 Banknotes in circulation under the ΓΧΜΒ Law at the end of December 1914. The National 
Bank was permitted to circulate up to 200 million drachmae using this Law.  
4 On 31 December 1914, the legal maximum of note issue laid down by the above laws was 
344,356,000 drachmae. The actual number of banknotes in circulation on that date was 
252,206,000 drachmae. This number does not include banknotes that were in circulation 
because of the issuing privilege of the Ionian Bank and the Bank of Crete.  
Sources: Table A3.1 in Appendix A3; NBGHA_Α1Σ22Υ6Φ1Ε32; HABOG_A3S1Y1F4T1, 
p.7; United Kingdom House of Commons (1898, p. 14); Annual Report of the National Bank 
for 1914 (1915). 
 
4.1.1.1. Issuing privilege 
As has been discussed before, in 1914 there were three banks in the country that enjoyed the 
note issuing privilege: the National Bank, the Ionian Bank and the Bank of Crete. By this 
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time, however, one of them, the Ionian Bank had already agreed that it would transfer its 
issuing privilege to the National Bank in 1920.182 
 
The National Bank had the legal right to circulate banknotes to the value of 66 
million drachmae: 60 million drachmae in its own right and a further 6 million drachmae 
following the acquisition of a minor issuing bank, the Bank of Epirus-Thessaly in 1898.183  
 
The Ionian Bank, established in 1839, had the issuing privilege for the Ionian Islands 
and could circulate up to 7 million drachmae in banknotes. The third bank of issue in Greece, 
the Bank of Crete, founded in 1899, was granted the issuing right for Crete which at the time 
was an autonomous area. The Bank of Crete could issue up to approximately 10.5 million 
drachmae in banknotes. The National Bank contributed to the share capital of the Bank of 
Crete and owned 8 thousand shares out of a total of 40 thousand. Crete was annexed by 
Greece in 1913 and in 1920 the Bank of Crete’s issuing privilege was transferred to the 
National Bank. Hence, in 1920 with both minor banks of issue, the Ionian Bank and the Bank 
of Crete, handing over their issuing rights, the National Bank then had a complete monopoly 
of note issue until 1928 when the Bank of Greece was established.  
 
4.1.1.2. Law of Control 
Article 30 of the Law of Control of 1898 set a precise timetable for the retirement of 
government debt in banknotes.184 The Law of Control stipulated that from 1900 onwards the 
government had to cancel banknotes of at least 2 million drachmae every year until debt in 
banknotes of forced circulation had been gradually reduced to 40 million drachmae. At the 
time of the enactment of this law, government debt in forced currency was 74 million 
drachmae and small notes of one and two drachmae guaranteed by the banks of issue 
amounted to 20 million drachmae.185 In addition, the Law of Control specified that no new 
forced currency loan could be made to the Greek government without the assent of the IFC 
until its debt in banknotes of forced currency had been fully paid off.  
 
182 Annual Report of the National Bank for 1903 (1904); Eulambio (1924, p. 21); Spiliotopoulos (1949, 
pp. 80–81). 
183 Valaorites ([1902] 1988, pp. 207–209). 
184 See United Kingdom, House of Commons (1898, pp. 14–15); Valaorites ([1902] 1988, pp. 187–
188). 
185 Of the 74 million drachmae 71 million had been granted by the National Bank, 2 million by the 
Ionian Bank and 1 million by the Bank of Epirus-Thessaly. Whilst of the 20 million in small notes, 10 
million drachmae had been granted by the National Bank and the remaining ten had been granted by 
the Ionian Bank and the Bank of Epirus-Thessaly in equal shares. For the origin of this government 
debt to the banks of issue see Katselidis (1996, pp. 295–297 and 305). 
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 This measure introduced by the Law of Control was characteristic of the deflationary 
measures implemented in countries that experienced a debt crisis in the late nineteenth 
century.186 The Law of Control provided for a slow but substantial withdrawal of forced 
currency from circulation. The retirement of 2 million drachmae in 1900, when this measure 
was implemented for the first time, was the equivalent of 1.43 per cent of the total banknotes 
that could be circulated during that year. In total, however, the Law of Control required a 
substantial cumulative retirement of approximately one-fourth of the total monetary base of 
1900 ceteris paribus. 
 
The Greek government abided by this provision of the Law of Control even in the 
early 1920s when the printing press was liberally used, and finally the target stipulated was 
achieved in 1925.187  
 
4.1.1.3. ΓΧΜΒ Law 
Article 30 of the Law of Control which was introduced in 1898, encouraged monetary 
discipline in Greece; it strictly prohibited the National Bank from using the printing press to 
support lending to the government without the consent of the IFC, until the debt in banknotes 
from the forced circulation had been fully paid off. Article 30, however, incorporated an 
escape clause which allowed for an increase in the number of banknotes in circulation on 
condition that this was for the ‘needs of trade’.188  
  
This article of the Law of Control defined the obligations of the Greek authorities 
relating to monetary issues. It was the only article in the entire Law of Control, or ΒΦΙΘ Law 
as it is otherwise known, that dealt with monetary matters. Article 30 also set out the 
supervisory duties of the IFC regarding monetary policy in Greece.  
 
186 For Argentina see Della Paolera and Taylor (2001, pp. 72–74 and 106).  
187 See data in Appendix A3, Table A3.1. 
188 United Kingdom, House of Commons, Greece No. 1: Greek Law of Control (1898, pp. 14–15). 
More precisely Article 30 of the Law of Control read as follows: ‘The debt in bank notes of forced 
currency, amounting to 74,000,000 drachmas as well as the debt in small notes of 1 or 2 drachmas, 
guaranteed by the banks of issue amounting to 20,000,000 drachmas, shall be withdrawn, from the year 
1900 onwards, annual payments of which the minimum is fixed at 2,000,000 drachmas. 
This withdrawal may cease with the assent of the International Commission, when the debt in 
bank notes has been reduced to 40,000,000, drachmas. 
No new forced currency loan may be concluded by the Government without the assent of the 
International Commission, before the debt in bank notes of forced currency has been fully paid off. 
No other fiduciary issue may be ordered or authorised by the Government beyond such as may 
take place to meet the needs of trade within the limits fixed or to be fixed by the Statutes of the present 
and future banks of issue.’ 
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 It should be noted that the Law of Control did not stipulate that Greece had to 
introduce the gold standard as is asserted in the literature dealing with the period in question. 
However, it could be argued that adhering to the monetary policies defined by article 30 
might have led to the adoption of the gold standard which was the prevailing monetary 
standard at the time.  
 
The escape clause incorporated in article 30 of the Law of Control was used in 1910 
to introduce article eight of the ΓΧΜΒ Law which outlined the prerequisites for an increase in 
the money supply without the Law of Control being violated.  
 
On 19 March 1910 (Julian calendar), two laws were enacted by the Greek 
government: the ΓΧΜΑ Law which dealt with coinage and the ΓΧΜΒ Law or the Law 
hereafter, the primary purpose of which was to authorise the flotation of a loan on the 
international financial markets.189 Articles one to seven of this law dealt specifically with the 
flotation of a loan of up to 150 million gold drachmae, whilst article ten proposed the 
restructuring of the government loans denominated in gold and placed under the jurisdiction 
of the IFC.  
 
The ΓΧΜΒ Law, however, is still remembered and discussed for its eighth article 
which introduced the most important monetary reform in Greece between the suspension of 
convertibility in 1885 and the adoption of the gold exchange standard in 1928. It provided an 
innovative way to increase the money supply and at the same time to safeguard the external 
value of the drachma.  
 
Article eight of the ΓΧΜΒ Law is also often called the Valaorites Law as it was the 
brainchild of Ioannis Valaorites, the sub-governor of the National Bank.190 Valaorites drafted 
the article and the minister of finance agreed to add it to the ΓΧΜΒ Law. The IFC did not 
raise any objections.  
 
Article eight of the ΓΧΜΒ Law authorised the National Bank to increase for its own 
account, the banknotes in circulation beyond the limit that its issuing privilege allowed on 
condition that these freshly printed notes were used to buy gold and foreign exchange at a 
189 See National Bank of Greece (1913, pp. 233–240). In fact, the ΓΧΜΒ Law was entitled ‘About a 
loan up to 240,000,000 gold drachmae, about ending forced circulation and about changing the terms 
validated by the ΒΦΙΘ Law of 26 February 1898 of the International Control, relating to gold loans 
under their jurisdiction’. 
190 It has been argued that a similar scheme had been proposed by the director of the Bank of Athens, 
Ioannis Pesmazoglou in 1903. For example, see Kostis (2003, p. 83); Lazaretou (2007, pp. 181–193). 
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price that was not above par. The National Bank was then obliged to sell the gold at par plus 1 
per thousand as a commission. Foreign exchange was to be sold at the equivalent of the parity 
of the drachma with the French franc, this time with half a per cent added as profit.191 When 
gold or foreign exchange was sold then the equivalent value in banknotes had to be 
withdrawn from circulation. The Law also provided that an agreement between the National 
Bank and the government, validated by a royal decree, was necessary to determine the limit 
up to which banknotes could be issued by the National Bank whilst still abiding by the 
principles of this Law. Subsequent agreements could authorise a further increase in the upper 
limit of the banknotes issued under the principles stated in article eight. In addition, this 
article allowed the use of gold coins as a medium of exchange. 
 
The parity that the ΓΧΜΒ Law refers to was the parity of the drachma set in 1868 
when Greece joined the Latin Monetary Union (LMU), that is to say that one paper drachma 
equalled one gold drachma, which in turn was equal to one French franc. This parity had been 
reached towards the end of 1909 after a long period where the Greek currency had at first 
depreciated severely between 1886 and 1902 and then appreciated again. 
 
It should be noted that the ΓΧΜΒ Law did not restrict the buying and selling of 
foreign exchange to the foreign exchange of countries on the gold standard, as has been 
argued.192 The Law refers only to foreign exchange in general a practice followed in all the 
subsequent agreements between the government and the National Bank authorising the latter 
to increase the banknotes in circulation under the principles of article eight of the ΓΧΜΒ 
Law. 
 
Article nine of the ΓΧΜΒ Law allowed for an increase in the nominal capital of any 
loan to be authorised under this law from 150 million gold drachmae to 240 million gold 
drachmae on the same terms. The proceeds of this additional part of the loan would be 
assigned exclusively to the repayment of the debt on forced banknotes to the bank of issue. 
This article of the ΓΧΜΒ Law also stated that the date of the suspension of inconvertibility 
would be determined by a royal decree after the National Bank had been consulted. Needless 
to say, this part of the loan was never issued and inconvertibility remained by law. Ultimately, 
the nominal capital of the loan that was floated, the Bonds Loan of 1910 as it is known, did 
not exceed 110 million gold drachmae.193 
 
191 For the way that the Law was altered in the following year see Annual Report of the National Bank 
for 1911 (1912, p. ια). 
192 Kostis (2003, p. 88); Tuncer (2011, p. 151). 
193 For more on the Bonds Loan, see Christodoulaki et al. (2011, pp. 10–11); (2012, pp. 552–553). 
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The literature argues that the ΓΧΜΒ Law was introduced to boost the economy.194 It 
is possible, however, that the main reason for its introduction was to curb the appreciation of 
the drachma at a time that it was fluctuating close to the Latin Monetary Union parity and 
with the Greek government about to float a loan on the international financial markets. Under 
the ΓΧΜΒ Law, the National Bank acquired the means to intervene in the foreign exchange 
market to maintain a stable drachma and prevent any seasonal fluctuations of the external 
value of the Greek currency. In addition, its objective was to increase liquidity, in particular 
during the period of the harvest. Last but not least, article eight of the ΓΧΜΒ Law was aimed 
at paving the way for the introduction of the gold standard at some time in the future when 
conditions were favourable. This Law proved to be an inexpensive way for the National Bank 
to increase its reserves both in gold and foreign exchange. As it is demonstrated in Chapter 3, 
these foreign exchange reserves became a significant source of profit for the Bank.  
 
By the end of 1912, Greece was embroiled in the First Balkan War and policy makers 
had become complacent over the monetary arrangement in Greece. There was no talk of 
introducing de jure convertibility which would most probably have entailed a settlement of 
the government debt in forced circulation to the bank of issue.195 For its part the National 
Bank, a private institution, enjoyed the benefits of the ΓΧΜΒ Law without the ‘golden 
fetters’. 
 
The Valaorites Law operated as it was designed to do until 1915, though gold parity 
of the drachma was maintained until 1919. In 1915 for the first time, the National Bank used 
Book Credits to issue banknotes under the ΓΧΜΒ Law, a practice that was repeated again and 
again during the Great War and which became one of the main reasons for the monetary 
upheaval of the 1920s. This use of the ΓΧΜΒ Law will be discussed extensively in other parts 
of the thesis as it developed into a controversial issue.  
 
 Article eight of the ΓΧΜΒ Law set out the prerequisites for an increase in the money 
supply. Subsequently, an agreement between the National Bank and the government validated 
by a royal decree determined the limit of banknotes which could be issued by the National 
Bank whilst still abiding by the principles of this Law. In September 1910 for the first time, 
the National Bank was authorised to issue up to 10 million drachmae. As Table 4.2 below 
194 For the reasons that led to the introduction of the ΓΧΜΒ Law see: Annual Report of the National 
Bank for 1910 (1911); Zolotas (1928, pp. 7–8 and 77–81); Psalidopoulos (1989, pp. 53–54); 
Alogoskoufis and Lazaretou (1997, pp. 83–85); Kokkinakis (1999, pp. 497–557); Kostis (2003, pp. 78–
90). 
195 Valaorites even hinted in one of his reports when he served as the governor of the National Bank 
that convertibility could be endorsed by law without the government having repaid its debt in forced 
circulation to the bank of issue. See the Annual Report of the National Bank for 1910 (1911, p. ιβ΄). 
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shows, two more agreements between the National Bank and the government followed in a 
short span of time. Figure 4.2 illustrates that by the end of 1910, 17 per cent of the total 
banknotes in circulation were banknotes in circulation because of the ΓΧΜΒ Law and by the 
end of 1914 this amount had risen to 61 per cent. 
 
Table 4.2: Evolution of the ΓΧΜΒ Law, 1910–1914 
 1 2 3 4 
1910     
14 September 1910 10,000,000 10,000,000   7,500,000 5.86 % 
14 October 1910   5,000,000 15,000,000 14,209,000 11.26 % 
18 November 1910 10,000,000 25,000,000 14,984,000 11.99 % 
1911     
1 August 1911 10,000,000 35,000,000 25,000,000 20.13 % 
1912     
3 July 1912 20,000,000  55,000,000 35,000,000 27.54 % 
21 September 1912 20,000,000 75,000,000 56,500,000 32.37 % 
24 October 1912 25,000,000 100,000,000 75,000,000 40.57 % 
10 November 1912 25,000,000  125,000,000 90,000,000 40.10 % 
1913     
 6 May 1913 25,000,000 150,000,000 128,234,000 63.16 % 
30 September 1913 25,000,000 175,000,000 149,804,000 63.70 % 
1914     
30 January 1914 25,000,000  200,000,000 168,540,000 73.18 % 
Notes: 
(1) The first column of the table above shows the date when a royal decree authorised an 
increase in the banknotes issued under the ΓΧΜΒ Law. 
(2) The second column, (headed 1) shows the number of banknotes that could be issued 
according to the royal decree. 
(3) The third column, (headed 2) indicates the upper legal limit of banknotes that the National 
Bank was permitted to circulate under the ΓΧΜΒ Law. 
(4) The fourth column, (headed 3) shows the number of banknotes issued under the ΓΧΜΒ 
Law that were in circulation at the end of the month given in the first column. 
(5) The fifth column (headed 4) shows banknotes issued under the ΓΧΜΒ Law as a 
percentage of the total of banknotes in circulation at the end of the month given in the first 
column. 
Sources: NBGHA: Α1Σ18Υ1Φ34Ε1; Α1Σ18Υ1Φ34Ε2; Α1Σ18Υ1Φ34Ε3; Α1Σ18Υ1Φ34Ε5; 
Α1Σ18Υ1Φ34Ε6; Α1Σ18Υ1Φ34Ε7; Α1Σ18Υ1Φ34Ε8; Α1Σ18Υ1Φ34Ε9; Α1Σ18Υ1Φ34Ε13; 
Α1Σ18Υ1Φ161Ε3; Α1Σ18Υ1Φ161Ε4; Α1Σ18Υ1Φ161Ε5; National Bank of Greece: Annual 
Report for 1910, p. ια΄ and p. η΄; Annual Report for 1911, p. ια΄; Annual Report for 1912, p. 
ιδ΄; Annual Report for 1913, p. ιε΄; Annual Report for 1914, p. η΄.  
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Figure 4.2: Percentage of banknotes of the ΓΧΜΒ Law in total banknotes in circulation 
Source: Author’s calculations using the Annual Reports of the National Bank, 1910–1914 
 
4.1.2. Did Greece genuinely introduce either of the Gold, or Gold Exchange, 
Standards in 1910? 
4.1.2.1. Approaches to the 1910 monetary arrangement in historical perspective 
The year 1910 is usually cited by contemporary economists and economic historians as the 
year that Greece adopted either the gold standard or the gold exchange standard. In some 
literature it is stated that Greece successfully adopted the gold standard in 1910. On the other 
hand, there is literature in which it is argued that Greece in fact introduced the gold exchange 
standard that year. Furthermore, in a recent thesis it is maintained that Greece was a gold 
standard country in the ‘conventional sense’ from 1885 until 1909 or even 1910 when the 
country is said to have ‘switched’ to the gold exchange standard.196 Previously, or at least 
until the 1980s it was generally believed that Greece had been on forced circulation and that 
its currency had remained inconvertible throughout the period from September 1885 when the 
gold standard was suspended until May 1928 when the gold exchange standard was de jure 
introduced. In this section of the thesis, an attempt is made to examine claims made in recent 
economic history literature about the type of monetary system that Greece utilised before the 
outbreak of the Great War and at the same time to present the dominant view amongst 
scholars, policy makers and consequently investors in Greek government bonds at the time.  
 
 
196 Tuncer (2011, pp. 153, Table 2.10, 155, 156, 218, 242, 305 and 308). 
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Table: 4.3: 
Table of dates of convertible and inconvertible banknote circulation 
from Emmanuel Tsouderos Archive 
1 January 1842 3 April 1848 Convertible 
4 April 1848 15 December 1848 Inconvertible 
16 December 1848 29 December 1868 Convertible 
30 December 1868 14 July 1870 Inconvertible 
15 July 1870 18 June 1877 Convertible 
19 June 1877 31 December 1884 Inconvertible 
1 January 1885 19 September 1885 Convertible 
20 September 1885 Until today1 Inconvertible 
Notes:  
1 ‘Until today’ is the exact phrasing in the document and refers to the date that this table was 
compiled, possibly 31 December 1926. 
2 Greece was following the Julian calendar until February 1923. 
Source: HABOG_A3S1Y2F138T8, p.1. 
 
Table 4.3 above illustrates the periods that the drachma was convertible into gold, as well as 
the periods of inconvertibility from the establishment of the National Bank in 1842 until the 
point when it conceded its issuing privilege to the Bank of Greece in the late 1920s. This table 
was compiled by officials at the National Bank possibly in December 1926, at a time when 
they were working on the stabilisation of the drachma after a long period of monetary 
instability.197 At about this time, Zolotas (1928, pp. 6–8) also wrote that there were four 
periods during which the drachma was inconvertible between 1848 and 1928. A discrepancy 
may be noticed between Table 4.3 and the information Zolotas provided regarding the day or 
the month that inconvertibility was enacted or suspended. If the information, however, 
provided in Table 4.3 above and that provided by Zolotas is compared, it is obvious that the 
periods that the drachma was inconvertible and therefore also those when it was convertible 
coincide. In general therefore, there is a consensus in the archival material as well as in the 
literature published before the early 1980s, about the monetary system in Greece before the 
outbreak of the First World War. The gold standard was adopted on 1 January 1885 (Julian 
calendar) and convertibility was sustained until 19 September 1885 (Julian calendar). 
Subsequently, the drachma was inconvertible until 12 May 1928 when the gold exchange 
standard was adopted by law.  
 
There is, however, a noticeable difference if Table 4.3, prepared by policy makers at 
the time, is compared with tables produced by contemporary economic historians: these days 
197 See HABOG_A3S1Y2F138T8, p. 1. 
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it is widely argued that Greece introduced ether the gold standard or the gold exchange 
standard in 1910. It is also claimed that Greece remained on a monetary standard either until 
1914 or until 1919. A notable exception remains Coskun Tuncer (2011) who argues that the 
monetary standard in Greece between 1885 and 1910 was ‘conventionally’ characterised as 
the gold standard, and this in spite of the fact that the drachma remained irredeemable. In this 
way, Tuncer endorses the idea that Greece was on the gold standard from 1885 until 1910.198 
This idea, however, is unsubstantiated; no evidence is provided to support the claim that 
Greece was ‘conventionally’ regarded as a gold standard country throughout the period from 
1885 until 1909. In fact, an attempt was made and convertibility was introduced on 1 January 
(Julian calendar) 1885 and for nearly nine months until 19 September (Julian calendar) 1885 
the country did operate the gold standard. Subsequently, the drachma firstly depreciated 
severely and then appreciated until the end of 1909 when the LMU parity was reached; that is 
to say one paper drachma was equal to one gold drachma which in turn was equal to one 
French franc. Furthermore, it should be stressed that contrary to Tuncer’s claims, there is a 
consensus in the literature that Greece was not a gold standard country between September 
1885 and 1910. It may be thought in fact that Tuncer’s approach lacks rigour, since on the one 
hand he argues that Greece was regarded as a gold standard country between 1885 and 1909 
but on the other that the drachma was inconvertible and indeed fluctuated severely, and this 
against a background of Greece having defaulted in December 1893.199  
 
4.1.2.2. What the ΓΧΒΜ Law provided and its evolution 
On 19 March 1910 (Julian calendar), two laws were enacted by the Greek government: the 
ΓΧΜΑ Law which dealt with the question of coins and the ΓΧΜΒ Law which primarily 
198 For example see Tuncer (2011, Table 2.7 on p. 136 and Table 2.10 on p. 155). 
199 Inconsistency in this thesis does not end with the claim that Greece was ‘conventionally 
characterised as a gold standard country’. For example on page 271, Tuncer (2011) makes an attempt to 
explain the first ‘break’ in the time series that is detected by the statistical analysis. He writes that the 
‘first break in 1884 is probably due to the suspension of gold convertibility by the National Bank of 
Greece. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 in the case of Greece, foreign creditors were especially 
apprehensive about the excessive amount of ‘forced banknotes’ in circulation. Greece’s lack of 
commitment to the LMU agreement and the adherence to the gold standard which lasted only six 
months, was reflected in a decrease in its credibility in the financial markets’. (See also Table 4.2, p. 
268). However, in December 1884 when a break is detected, the drachma was inconvertible thus no 
‘suspension of gold convertibility’ could take place. In fact it had been inconvertible since 1877 as it is 
demonstrated in table 4.3 above. It should be repeated again that Greece joined the gold standard 
countries on 1 January (Julian calendar) 1885 and remained on gold for nearly nine months until 19 
September (Julian calendar) of that same year, not for roughly six months as is claimed by Tuncer. 
Other areas of Tuncer’s thesis may not in the end survive scrutiny. For example in Table 3.10 (p. 
243) it is stated that Greece floated eight loans between 1898 and 1914. In fact, between the 
introduction of the Law of Control and the outbreak of the First World War five loans were issued if 
the 2.50 per cent Guaranteed Loan of 1898 is included, namely, the 1898 Guaranteed Loan, the 1902 
Railways Loan, the 1907 Loan, the 1910 Bonds Loan and the 1914 Loan. 
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authorised the government to issue a loan on the international financial markets.200 Article 
eight of the latter law, as has been explained above, gave the right to the National Bank to 
issue banknotes under the condition that these banknotes were used by the Bank to buy gold 
and foreign exchange at a price that was not above par. The National Bank could 
subsequently sell this gold at par plus initially 1 per thousand as a commission and the foreign 
exchange at the equivalent of the parity of the drachma with the French franc this time with 
half a per cent added as profit. It should be stressed again that the ΓΧΜΒ Law stated that 
foreign exchange in general could be bought and sold and did not restrict the buying or selling 
of foreign exchange to that of countries that were on the gold standard at the time. Stating that 
the Valaorites Law restricted the buying and selling of foreign exchange to foreign exchange 
based on gold then both the letter and the spirit of this law are lost. The only constraint that 
the ΓΧΜΒ Law imposed was that the National Bank could only use the banknotes issued 
under the terms of this law to purchase gold and foreign exchange at a price that was not 
above par. In addition, the gold and foreign exchange obtained under the terms of this Law 
could only be sold at par plus a small profit.201 Therefore, the banknotes in circulation under 
the principles of the 1910 Law had to be fully collateralised with gold and foreign exchange.  
 
The inclusion of article eight to the ΓΧΜΒ Law, which was the most important 
monetary development in Greece since the suspension of gold convertibility in September 
1885, has probably led contemporary economic historians and economists to claim that 
Greece adopted either the gold standard or the gold exchange standard in March 1910.  
 
 Contrary to claims in recent literature, however, Greece neither adopted the gold 
standard in March 1910, nor was one of the European countries that were on the gold standard 
on the eve of the outbreak of the First World War. Nor can it be said that the gold exchange 
standard was adopted in March 1910. If it is argued that Greece adopted the gold standard or 
even the gold exchange standard in March 1910 then aspects of the political economy at the 
time surrounding monetary issues are overlooked. In addition, both the spirit and letter of the 
Valaorites Law are completely ignored. At the time, the National Bank was in favour of a 
stable drachma at its LMU parity but was not yet ready for the introduction of the gold 
standard. The authorities at the National Bank were cautious not to repeat the 1885 experience 
when Greece remained on the gold standard for merely nine months, causing the National 
Bank to lose a considerable part of its reserves in trying to defend the parity of the drachma. 
As an alternative, the ΓΧΜΒ Law provided the bank of issue with a degree of flexibility and 
freedom that the gold standard did not permit, whilst at the same time paving the way for its 
200 National Bank of Greece (1913, pp. 233–240).  
201 See ibid., p. 238. 
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adoption when conditions allowed. Furthermore, the Law provided the National Bank with an 
inexpensive way to increase its gold and foreign exchange reserves.  
 
The ΓΧΜΒ Law proposed that the National Bank be able to print a quantity of 
banknotes limited by decree, and subsequently to use those banknotes to buy gold and foreign 
currency at a rate that was not above par. In fact, this term of the Law was against one of the 
main tenets of both the gold standard and the gold exchange standard, whereby the bank of 
issue firstly had to accumulate gold or gold related reserves and then on the strength of these 
reserves to print banknotes. In addition, the central bank of a country on the gold standard or 
the gold exchange standard was required to exchange unlimited quantities of banknotes in 
circulation with gold or gold based foreign exchange.  
 
The Valaorites Law obliged the National Bank to convert into gold and foreign 
exchange at par only the banknotes in circulation on account of this law. The remaining of the 
money supply, which included the banknotes in circulation under the privilege of the issuing 
banks as well as those of forced circulation, were not by law convertible at par into gold and 
foreign exchange. However, the share of the banknotes in circulation because of the ΓΧΜΒ 
Law gradually increased as Figures 4.2 and 4.3 demonstrate. In fact, after October 1912 the 
banknotes in circulation issued under the ΓΧΜΒ Law became the dominant component of the 
money supply. For example, by the end of December 1912 half of the banknotes in circulation 
were banknotes under the ΓΧΜΒ Law. 
 
With the ΓΧΜΒ Law the drachma was pegged at its LMU parity to the French franc. 
At the same time, the National Bank acquired the tools to intervene in the foreign exchange 
market by buying or selling gold and/or foreign exchange, and in this way to maintain the 
external value of the drachma around its LMU parity. This commitment mechanism 
resembled the gold exchange standard and thus it could, if questionably, be argued that article 
eight of the ΓΧΜΒ Law helped Greece gradually to ‘shadow’ the gold exchange standard. 
This claim, however, should not conceal the distinctive characteristics of the Valaorites Law, 
the advantages of which were praised so long as the drachma remained at par, whilst its 
shortcomings were comprehended only in retrospect after the drachma started depreciating in 
1919. 
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Amount of banknotes in circulation of each different category (’000 omitted) 
 
Percentage of each category in the total banknotes in circulation 
 
Figure 4.3: Categories of banknotes in circulation, 1910–1914 
Source: Author’s calculations using the Annual Reports of the National Bank, 1910–1914. 
 
In March 1910 there were in circulation banknotes from the two issuing banks, the National 
Bank and the Ionian Bank, and banknotes of forced circulation which were governed by the 
Law of Control of 1898. (See Figure 4.3 above and Table A3.1 in Appendix A3.) The 
Valaorites Law gave the right to the National Bank to issue banknotes up to a certain amount 
specified by a royal decree under the condition that these freshly printed banknotes would be 
used to buy gold and/or foreign exchange.  
 
As it has been noted before, in September 1910 for the first time, the National Bank 
was authorised to issue up to 10 million drachmae in banknotes. By the end of September 
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1910, nearly 6 per cent of the total banknotes in circulation were banknotes that had been 
issued in response to the Valaorites Law, whilst by the end of December of that same year this 
amount had risen to 17 per cent. (See Figure 4.2.) The National Bank resorted to this right 
repeatedly prior to the outbreak of the First World War as Table 4.2 demonstrates. As a result, 
the percentage share of the banknotes issued following the passage of the ΓΧΜΒ Law 
increased considerably. This was even more the case since the National Bank kept banknotes 
issued out of its own privilege as cash reserves. In addition, the withdrawal of banknotes 
according to the Law of Control was temporarily suspended until December 1914 as the 
ΓΧΜΑ Law provided. (See Figure 4.3 as well as Table A3.1 in Appendix A3.) For example, 
by the end of 1912, half of the banknotes in circulation were banknotes that had been issued 
under the ΓΧΜΒ Law. In January 1914, nearly 74 per cent of the value of the banknotes in 
circulation owned their origin to the Valaorites Law. This was the highest percentage share of 
banknotes in circulation under the principles of the 1910 Law in the total of the money supply 
before the outbreak of the Great War.  
 
Consequently, it may be seen that article eight of the ΓΧΜΒ Law laid the foundations 
for Greece gradually to ‘shadow’ the gold exchange standard as it provided the bank of issue 
with an inexpensive way to accumulate easily sufficient reserves of gold and foreign 
exchange. In this way, the National Bank was able to sustain the drachma at par until 1919.  
 
 The operation of the Valaorites Law led to a degree of freedom in the monetary 
system and this allowed for an increase in the money supply under certain conditions. As can 
be seen in Figure 4.4 below, the money supply in Greece increased after the introduction of 
the 1910 Law. In particular, the money supply started increasing rapidly after July 1912 and 
by the end of 1914 it had more than doubled, as Figures 4.3 and 4.4 indicate. In addition, it 
provided the bank of issue with an inexpensive way to accumulate easily sufficient reserves of 
gold and foreign exchange and in this way to be able to sustain the drachma at par until 1919.  
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Figure 4.4: Banknotes in circulation, 1910–1914 
(August 1910=100) 
Source: Author’s calculations using data in Table A3.1 in Appendix A3.  
 
4.1.2.3. Some thoughts on the 1910 monetary arrangement  
‘From 1885 until [the late 1920s] the Greek monetary system had been on forced circulation 
of the paper drachma. From 1910 until 1919 the Greek paper drachma was at par with the 
gold drachma (equal to 0.29034 grams of pure gold), whilst on the other hand forced 
circulation continued to operate under law. The operation of the ΓΧΜΒ Law contributed 
towards real parity.’202 Thus begins a document entitled ‘A treatise on the stabilisation of the 
drachma’, written possibly in late 1926 and kept in the archive of Emmanuel Tsouderos, the 
deputy governor of the National Bank at the time and one of the principal architects of de jure 
stabilisation in the late 1920s. The document goes on to say that since 1885 the Greek 
economy had been legally on forced circulation, a measure not lifted even during the period 
from 1910 until 1919 when the drachma remained at par.203 At the time ‘forced circulation’ 
was often used as a term meaning inconvertibility, as forced circulation was considered to be 
incompatible with the gold standard. This in a nutshell, is how the monetary conditions that 
prevailed in Greece between 1910 and 1919 are described in archival material on the period in 
question as well as in literature published before the 1980s.204  
202 HABOG_A3S1Y2F138T3, p. 2. 
203 Ibid., p. 3. 
204 See, for example: HABOG: A3S1Y2F134T2, pp. 2 and 27; A3S1Y2F135T1, p. 1; A3S1Y2F138T3, 
p. 2; A3S1Y2F138T8; A3S1Y2F138T16; A3S1Y1F36T7, p. 1; Annual Reports of the National Bank 
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Before the 1980s the stability of the exchange rate of the drachma between 1910 and 
1914 was admired. In addition, the fact that the drachma remained at par during the Great 
War was praised. The ΓΧΜΒ Law was credited with the stability of the Greek currency 
between 1910 and 1919. In fact, the chairman of the Ionian Bank, Falconer Larkworthy, an 
ardent advocate of the ΓΧΜΒ Law, repeatedly urged during the war ‘the adoption in Great 
Britain of the Valaorites currency reform scheme of 1910’.205 In 1917, at the annual general 
meeting of the Ionian Bank in London, Larkworthy noted the stability of the external value of 
the drachma despite the turmoil of war, the high level of reserves maintained in proportion to 
the banknotes in circulation in Greece and finally the significant return that the National Bank 
enjoyed from the foreign exchange reserves held as cover for the banknotes issued under the 
Valaorites Law and which were deposited at banks abroad. These outcomes he believed, 
made the ‘Greek system’ ‘extraordinarily suggestive’ to other countries.206  
 
 Valaorites, the father of the ΓΧΜΒ Law, as the governor of the National Bank 
acknowledged in the annual reports for 1910 and 1912 that the country was on forced 
circulation under law.207 Valaorites, however, repeatedly made clear in the same annual 
reports that since the gold parity of the drachma had been achieved, then in practice forced 
currency circulation did not exist.208 He added that the introduction of article eight of the 
ΓΧΜΒ Law protected the parity of the drachma because it encouraged the accumulation of 
considerable reserves in gold and foreign exchange. He also commented that because of the 
ΓΧΜΒ Law the suspension of forced circulation, that is to say the repayment of the 
government debt to the bank of issue in banknotes in circulation which might have meant 
considerable cost for the government, was no longer imperative. It is important, however, to 
note that Valaorites also recognised that with the ΓΧΜΒ Law in place the country only 
partially enjoyed the benefits of a system devoid of forced circulation. The monetary authority 
could not after all expand the number of banknotes in circulation to support the real 
economy.209 
 
Zolotas in the late 1920s, the heyday of the gold exchange standard, also made a 
distinction between forced circulation by law and in practice. Although he regarded the period 
from 1885 to 1928 as a period of inconvertibility, he argued that a new system had prevailed 
for 1910–1914; Financial Times, 14 April 1915, Company Meeting Reports, Ionian Bank; Zolotas 
(1928, 1929); Andreades (1939); Spiliotopoulos (1949, p. 87); Bank of Greece (1978, p. 25).  
205 Financial Times, Wednesday, 23 May 1917: Ionian Bank Meeting. See also Financial Times, 
Wednesday, 14 April 1915: Company Meeting Reports: Ionian Bank; Financial Times, Wednesday, 23 
May 1917: Company Meeting Reports: Ionian Bank. 
206 Financial Times, Wednesday, 23 May 1917: Company Meeting Reports: Ionian Bank.  
207 Annual Report of the National Bank for 1910 (1911, p. θ’, p. ιβ). 
208 Ibid., p. θ’; Annual Report of the National Bank for 1912 (1913, p. η’). 
209 Annual Report of the National Bank for 1910 (1911, p. ιβ΄). 
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in Greece between 1910 and 1919, that of the gold exchange standard.210 He resorted to a 
David Ricardo treatise to support his view.211 When, however, he examined the exchange rate 
policy between 1910 and 1927, he maintained that the ΓΧΜΒ Law had introduced in Greece 
a variation on the gold exchange standard.212 A further reference in the 1920s relating the 
ΓΧΜΒ Law with the gold exchange standard was made in the report prepared by the 
representatives of the League who visited Athens in the spring of 1927.213 
 
Preliminary research into the financial press for 1910 showed that no attention was 
paid to article eight of the ΓΧΜΒ Law, the clause that would become known as the Valaorites 
Law. This preliminary research shows that press interest was focused on the flotation of the 
new loan.214 The possibility of a restructuring of the public debt that was under the 
supervision of the IFC was also an issue that was broadly discussed in the press. More 
research, however, should be carried out into the foreign press, as well as into the reports of 
the IFC for the period in question in order to establish how market participants in general and 
foreign supervisors saw monetary developments in Greece between 1910 and 1914.  
 
 Writing in the early 1920s, Andreades showed great perception when he observed 
that the fact that the parity of the drachma had been sustained between 1910 and 1919 could 
lead to the conclusion that inconvertibility had been suspended during that period. He further 
added that the enactment of the ΓΧΜΑ Law also in 1910, which dealt with coinage, could 
reinforce this view.215 These observations from the 1920s pre-empted claims in recent 
economic history literature that focus on monetary changes in Greece in 1910. Nowadays, it is 
argued that Greece adopted either the gold standard or the gold exchange standard in 1910. At 
the time, the inclusion of article eight to the ΓΧΜΒ Law, a law that primarily aimed at 
authorising the government to float a loan on the international financial markets, aimed at 
solving two problems: firstly, the shortage of banknotes that was experienced in the country 
in particular during the second semester of the year, in other words during the period of the 
harvest, and secondly to sustain the drachma at par during a period that the drachma had 
reached its LMU parity and at the same time it was widely expected that the Greek currency 
would appreciate further because of the flotation of the new loan.  
210 Zolotas (1928, pp. 7 and 79–80). 
211 Ibid., pp. 79–80. Keynes (1913, p. 22) also referred to Ricardo in his book ‘Indian Currency and 
Finance’ to support theoretically his arguments. India was one of the countries that were on the gold 
exchange standard (British pound) between 1898 and 1914.  
212 Zolotas (1928, p. 180). 
213 HABOG_A3S1Y1F4T1, p. 10; 
214 See, for example, The Economist, 12 March 1910, ‘The New Development in Greece’, pp. 557–558. 
215 Andreades (1939, p. 526). 
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In February 1911, approximately a year after the enactment of the ΓΧΜΒ Law, the 
new governor of the National Bank, Valaorites, stated that the monetary changes introduced 
by this law had achieved their aims.216 In other words, the ΓΧΜΒ Law had helped to sustain 
the drachma at par and at the same time provided liquidity to the economy and a degree of 
flexibility to the system. In short, before the 1980s the monetary development in Greece in 
March 1910 was identified with the ΓΧΜΒ Law. Furthermore, article eight of the ΓΧΜΒ 
Law was regarded as a preliminary step that would pave the way for de jure introduction of 
convertibility and therefore adoption of the gold standard at some point in the future. It should 
be stressed that this monetary development was not a conscious act on the part of Greek 
monetary policy authorities to adopt for the country an exchange standard, let alone the gold 
exchange standard. In addition, although the IFC was based in Athens, the monetary change 
in 1910 was entirely a Greek initiative which was simply approved by the IFC. In other words 
the IFC did not oppose the inclusion of article eight into the ΓΧΜΒ Law, which was entirely 
an arrangement between the sub-governor of the bank of issue and the minister of finance. 
The sub-governor of the National Bank drafted it and the minister of finance agreed to add it 
to the ΓΧΜΒ Law which aimed at authorising the flotation of an international loan. It is, 
however, beyond the scope of this thesis to examine in detail the origins of article eight of the 
ΓΧΜΒ Law, or the schemes proposed before 1910 and the debate that took place in Athens 
between 1898 and 1910 regarding monetary issues.  
 
Tuncer in his thesis argues that the role of the IFC in Greece was instrumental in the 
successful transition to the gold exchange standard in 1910.217 Tuncer, however, provides no 
fresh evidence to challenge claims in the literature that the introduction of article eight to the 
ΓΧΜΒ Law was an initiative of the sub-governor of the National Bank which was endorsed 
by the minister of finance. The role of the IFC in the monetary advance in Greece in 1910 was 
simply to give their consent. It should be also repeated that in 1910 there was no deliberate 
intention on the part of either the government or the bank of issue to introduce the gold 
exchange standard as Tuncer claims. The addition of article eight to the ΓΧΜΒ Law was a 
measure that was aimed on the one hand at helping the National Bank to increase the 
banknotes in circulation and on the other to keep the external value of the drachma stable until 
conditions would allow the adoption of the gold standard.  
 
Tuncer’s examination of the contribution of the IFC to monetary developments in 
Greece between 1898 and 1910, and at the same time their fiscal responsibility and duties, is 
partial and lacks balance. In 1898 the Greek government conceded a substantial part of its 
216 Annual Report of the National Bank for 1910 (1911, p. ιβ΄). 
217 For example, see Tuncer (2011, pp. 153, 271, 307 and 308). 
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total revenues to the IFC and the primary task of the IFC was to improve the interest rate paid 
on Greek loans issued on the international markets before 1893 and placed under its 
jurisdiction. The Law of Control defined the minimum interest rate to be paid to the 
bondholders of the loans that the IFC supervised. The IFC, however, aimed at increasing the 
coupon paid for the loans under its control to their full contractual level as well as the sinking 
fund, using the public revenues that the government had assigned to them. Consequently, the 
coupon rate paid to the bondholders of the Old Loans, as the loans issued before 1893 are 
known, fluctuated within a band. It fluctuated between the rate set by the Law of Control and 
the contractual level, depending on the surplus of the public revenues assigned to the IFC.218 
The IFC was in effect a debt management committee whose role had been extended to 
supervise monetary and fiscal policy as well. Tuncer emphasises monetary developments in 
Greece between 1898 and 1914 which were not necessarily a consequence of the activities of 
the IFC to claim that in the case of Greece there was ‘a complete loss of monetary 
sovereignty’. At the same time, however, he ignores its fiscal responsibilities in order to 
conclude that ‘the issue of fiscal sovereignty in the context of the Greek Commission should 
be revisited’.219 This completely neglects the role of the National Bank in establishing 
monetary policy as well as the political economy at the time, which was in favour of a stable 
drachma close to its par. 
 
 Other claims in Tuncer’s thesis relating to the 1910 monetary advance also invite 
further scrutiny. For example, when speaking of ‘the switch to the gold exchange standard’ in 
Greece in 1910, it is repeatedly stated that ‘the banknotes in circulation came down to a 
desirable level’.220 It is also stated that the ‘withdrawal of over-issued paper currency’ ended 
in 1910 with the introduction of the gold exchange standard.221 Tuncer does not, however, 
elaborate on what he means by ‘desirable level’ of banknotes in circulation. Two comments 
should be made here. Firstly, it should be reminded that under the Law of Control the 
government was required to cancel banknotes to a value of at least 2 million drachmae every 
year until the debt in banknotes from forced circulation was reduced to 40 million drachmae. 
This target was achieved in 1925, as Table A3.1 in Appendix A3 shows. Secondly, between 
1898 and 1909, no significant reduction in the money supply took place as Figures 2.24, p. 
150, 2.25, p. 152 and 3.5, p. 210 in Tuncer’s thesis show. Then, after September 1910 the 
money supply increased as fresh banknotes were issued again and again under the principles 
stated in article eight of the ΓΧΜΒ Law, as Figures 4.3 and 4.4 above demonstrate.  
218 See Figure 6.4 in Chapter 6 and A4.1 in Appendix A4 of this thesis; See also Christodoulaki and 
Penzer (2004, pp. 15 and 60). 
219 Tuncer (2011, pp. 218–219). 
220 Ibid., pp. 209, 218 and 242. 
221 Ibid., pp. 218 and 242. 
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The importance of the share of forced circulation in the total banknotes in circulation 
diminished after the ΓΧΜΒ Law was implemented. In January 1910, nearly 51 per cent of the 
banknotes in circulation were forced banknotes. By January 1914, banknotes from forced 
circulation had dropped to only 27 per cent of the total. (See Figure 4.3 above.) Furthermore, 
government debt in forced banknotes as a percentage of the total assets of the National Bank 
dropped from 16.35 per cent in 1910 to only 8.40 per cent in 1914. Whilst significant, 
however, the decrease was due not so much to a decrease of the government debt in forced 
circulation to the bank of issue as to an impressive increase in the total assets of the National 
Bank. Debt in terms of forced circulation remained a significant obligation of the government 
to the bank of issue throughout the period 1910 to 1914. Furthermore, the appreciation of the 
drachma had increased its real value.  
 
At the end of 1912, Greece was embroiled in the First Balkan War and by then, policy 
makers had been complacent with the monetary arrangement in Greece. There was no talk of 
de jure stabilisation of the drachma which would most probably have entailed the repayment 
of forced circulation to the bank of issue.222 In spite of the fact that the external value of the 
drachma had remained stable since the end of 1909, policy makers were still cautious not to 
repeat the 1885 experience when Greece remained on the gold standard for merely nine 
months, causing the National Bank to lose a considerable part of its reserves. For its part, the 
bank of issue enjoyed the benefits of the ΓΧΜΒ Law without having the ‘golden fetters’. 
Moreover, the reserves, mainly foreign exchange reserves that the National Bank accumulated 
because of the ΓΧΜΒ Law, proved to be an important source of profit. It should be noted at 
this point that in the 1920s the governor of the National Bank, Alexandros Diomides, 
proposed to the Bank of England that Greece could enact another law, similar to the ΓΧΜΒ 
Law, to stabilise the drachma at the time, rather than adopting the gold exchange standard. 
Needless to say that Montagu Norman, the governor of the Bank of England, did not approve 
this proposal. Instead, he suggested that the gold exchange standard should be introduced de 
jure.  
 
4.1.2.4. Concluding remarks  
The discrepancy between the way that monetary change, in other words the ratification of 
both the ΓΧΜΑ and ΓΧΜΒ Laws in Greece in March 1910, is seen in recent economic 
history literature and by policy makers and scholars at the time raises the important question 
222 Valaorites even hinted in one of his reports as the governor of the National Bank that they could 
endorse convertibility by law without the government having repaid its debt in forced circulation to the 
bank of issue. See Annual Report of the National Bank for 1910 (1911, p. ιβ΄). 
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‘what is [economic] history’.223 What is it that matters in economic history: the interpretative 
choices of contemporary economic historians or the standards and perceptions that dominated 
at the time? Such questions have an important bearing on research that examines the 
creditworthiness of the Greek government during the period in question. 
 
Before the 1980s, the monetary developments in Greece in 1910 were not thought to 
be linked either to the gold standard or to the gold exchange standard. On the other hand, 
before the Great War the gold exchange standard had been embraced both in some continental 
countries and outside Europe. It was by no means invented at Genoa in 1922.224 
 
 At the time, certain characteristics defined the gold standard and the gold exchange 
standard and were prerequisites for a country to adopt either of these monetary systems. The 
idiosyncratic nature of examples like the monetary arrangement in Greece in 1910 will be lost 
to history if research does not take them into account. Acknowledging such discrepancies and 
examining them will increase our understanding of how the international financial system 
functioned at the time and how certain countries, in this case Greece, were incorporated into 
that system.  
 
4.1.3. Between the outbreak of the war and stabilisation 
As Table 4.4 below demonstrates, banknotes in circulation on the eve of the central banking 
reform fell into four categories. Three of the four categories existed before the war: those 
issued as a privilege of the National Bank, those issued because of the ΓΧΜΒ Law and those 
for the account of the government. A new category of banknotes was added in 1923 when the 
National Bank was given the right to issue banknotes to buy foreign exchange on behalf of the 
government. Finally, in 1926 the Bank was authorised by law to issue banknotes to refund 
those National Defence Bonds (NDBs) that still remained in circulation when they fell due. 
The National Bank, however, never availed itself of this privilege.  
 
Table 4.4 below summarises the different categories of banknotes that were in 
circulation on the eve of the banking reforms. At the same time, it shows the way that the 
money supply evolved after the outbreak of the First World War. The issuing privilege of the 
National Bank was extended three times and the printing press was repeatedly used to create 
banknotes for the account of the government whilst the ΓΧΜΒ Law was used as a vehicle by 
which to finance the participation of Greece in the Great War.  
223 Carr (1990). 
224 Nurkse (1997, pp. 264–265). 
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Table 4.4: Summary of banknotes in issue 
at the time of the establishment of a central bank in Greece (in drachmae) 
 
A) Banknotes issued because of the privilege of note issue of the National Bank 
1) Note issue right of the National Bank under Law ΑΣΟΓ/1885    60,000,000 
2) Transfer of the issue right of the Bank of Epirus-Thessaly  
  to the National Bank, Law BXMA/1899                       6,000,000 
3) Transfer of the issue right of the Ionian Bank, Law ΒΩΞ/1903                                7,000,000 
4) Expansion of the note issue privilege of the National Bank  
                                to the New Countries, Law 656/1915                   80,000,000  
5) Transfer of the issue right of the Bank of Crete, Law 656/1915                  10,405,000 
6) Expansion of the note privilege of the National Bank  
                                                   under Law 2547/1920                                        300,000,000 
7) Note issue for the needs of trade, L.D. of 3 March 1923                            300,000,000
                        
 
                                                                          TOTAL:                 763,405,000 
 
 
B) Banknotes issued for the account of the government (Forced Circulation) 
                       Initial Amount            Balance on 14 May, 19281 
1) Law ΒΦΙΘ/1898           94,000,000       40,000,000 
2) Law 2547/1920         400,000,000     376,000,000 
3) Law 2577/1921         500,000,000     470,000,000  
4) Law 2855/1922         550,000,000      517,000,000   
5) L.D. of 10 December 1922        600,000,000     582,000,000  
6) L.D. of 3 March 1923         750,000,000     643,000,000 
 
  TOTAL:    2,894,000,000                      2,628,000,000  
 
 
C) Banknotes issued under the ΓΧΜΒ Law of 19 March 1910                    1,139,784,175 
 
 
 
D) Notes issued for the account of the government under the L.D. of 23 April 1923  
  and of 28 October 19262                          1,657,767,3353 
 
 
                                                 GRAND TOTAL:                                                      6,188,956,5104 
 
Notes:  
1 Balance of banknotes in circulation under these laws that was passed to the Bank of Greece. 
By 14 May 1928, the government had cleared debt to the National Bank under the laws of 1920 
to 1923 equal to 212,000 drachmae.  
2 Under the decree law of 23 January 1926, the National Bank was authorised to issue banknotes 
with which to refund the remaining NDBs in circulation when they fell due. The National Bank 
never availed itself of this privilege.  
3 Balance of this note issue on 14 May 1928.  
4 The legal maximum note issue laid down by the above laws and conventions was 
6,188,956,510 drachmae on 14 May 1928. Against this legal maximum the total banknotes in 
circulation on that date were 4,363,352,807.61 drachmae.  
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HABOG_A3S1Y1F4T1, pp. 6–15. 
 
4.1.3.1. Issuing Privilege  
In 1914 the National Bank was negotiating the extension of its issuing privilege to the areas 
annexed after the end of the Balkan Wars with the exception of Crete where the Bank of Crete 
enjoyed the note privilege.225 Talks between the two sides were tough and concluded in an 
agreement that became law in February 1915.226 Under this law the issuing privilege of the 
National Bank was increased by 80 million drachmae. For the first time in its history as an 
issuing bank the National Bank was legally obliged to maintain a cover: one-eighth of this 
increase was backed with gold and a further one-eighth with Greek government bonds 
denominated in gold.227 In other words, the National Bank had to hold one-quarter of this 
authorised extension of its issuing privilege in gold and government bonds denominated in 
gold in equal parts. It was said that this reserve arrangement had been recommended by the 
IFC.228  
 
 In 1920, the issuing privilege of the Bank was extended by 300 million drachmae, this 
being justified by the expansion of Greek territory as a consequence of the First World War. 
Two-thirds of this extension, however, was passed on to the government as a loan. Following 
the precedent set in 1915, the issuing bank had to retain a legal cover for this part of its 
issuing right. One-eighth of the banknotes issued because of the extension of the note 
privilege of the National Bank in 1920 was covered by gold and a further one-eighth by Greek 
government bonds denominated in gold.229 
 
 In 1923, the issuing privilege of the National Bank was extended again by 300 
million drachmae for the last time in its history as a note issuing bank.230 This extension of the 
issuing privilege was aimed at the ‘strengthening of industry and shipping’. However, unlike 
the two previous extensions of the note issuing privilege, this time the National Bank was not 
obliged to retain any reserves for this extension of its issuing privilege. 
 
 
225 For the negotiations between the National Bank and the government, see for example Kostis (2003, 
pp. 96–120); See also The Government Coup against the National Bank as it was Seen by the Press 
(1914). 
226 See Annual Report of the National Bank for 1915 (1916, pp. xiii–xvii); Kostis (2003, pp. 118–120). 
227 See Article 3 of the Agreement, Annual Report of the National Bank for 1915 (1916, p. xiv).  
228 Spiliotopoulos (1949, p. 117). 
229 Annual Report of the National Bank for 1920 (1921, p. θ’). 
230 See Annual Report of the National Bank for 1923 (1924).  
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4.1.3.2. ΓΧΜΒ Law between 1915 and 1919  
Table 4.5 shows the number of banknotes that the National Bank was authorised to print as a 
result of the ΓΧΜΒ Law between 1915 and 1919 when this law was used for the last time. 
During this period, however, the principle of the law was violated as these banknotes were not 
covered by gold and/or foreign exchange but by Book Credits, which carried no certainty of 
being paid off. In fact, the ΓΧΜΒ Law became the main instrument by which to finance the 
active participation of Greece in the First World War, and in the end it was one of the main 
sources of the high inflation that the country experienced in the 1920s. These Book Credits 
are examined in detail in Chapter 5.  
 
Table 4.5: Evolution of the ΓΧΜΒ Law, 1915–1919 
 1 2 3 4 
1916     
28 January 1916 50,000,000      250,000,000 200,000,000 51.46 % 
13 June 1916 50,000,000      300,000,000 260,000,000 58.13 % 
30 September 1916 50,000,000      350,000,000 300,000,000 59.83 % 
25 November 1916 50,000,000 400,000,000 350,000,000 64.28 % 
1917     
14 March 1917 50,000,000 450,000,000 385,000,000 66.03 % 
8 June 1917 50,000,000 500,000,000 445,000,000 69.77 % 
11 August 1917 100,000,000 600,000,000 490,848,000 71.61 % 
7 October 1917 100,000,000 700,000,000 609,448,000 78.16 % 
1918     
18 January 1918 100,000,000 800,000,000 692,859,000 77.66 % 
13 March 1918 200,000,000 1,000,000,000 800,068,000 81.70 % 
21 September 1918 200,000,000 1,200,000,000 975,194,000 83.13 % 
1919     
19 January 1919 200,000,000    1,400,000,000 1,160,572,000 91.55 % 
Notes: 
(1) The first column of the table above gives the dates on which an agreement between the 
National Bank and the government authorised an increase in banknotes issued under the 
ΓΧΜΒ Law.  
(2) The second column (headed 1) shows the number of banknotes that could be issued 
according to the agreement between the government and the National Bank. 
(3) The third column (headed 2) indicates the maximum number of banknotes that the 
National Bank was permitted to circulate under the ΓΧΜΒ Law. 
(4) The fourth column (headed 3) shows the number of banknotes issued under the ΓΧΜΒ 
Law that were in circulation at the end of the month given in the first column. 
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(5) The fifth column (headed 4) shows the banknotes issued under the ΓΧΜΒ Law as a 
percentage of the total number of banknotes that were in circulation at the end of the month 
given in the first column. 
(6) In 1915, there was no increase in the money supply emanating from the ΓΧΜΒ Law.  
(7) Pantelakis (1988) stated that the National Bank was authorised to issue up to 100 million 
drachmae on 18 January 1918, yet Eulambio (1924) mentioned that this same agreement gave 
the bank of issue the right to circulate up to 200 million drachmae.  
Sources: NBGHA: Α1Σ18Υ1Φ34Ε17; Α1Σ18Υ1Φ34Ε18; Α1Σ18Υ1Φ34Ε19; 
Α1Σ18Υ1Φ34Ε21; Α1Σ18Υ1Φ34Ε22; Α1Σ19Υ1Φ34Ε4; Eulambio (1924, p. 100); Pantelakis 
(1988, p. 341, n. 36); Author’s calculations. 
 
Table 4.5 states the dates when a royal decree authorised an increase in the banknotes in 
circulation under the ΓΧΜΒ Law between 1915 and 1919. It also shows the number of 
banknotes that could be issued according to the agreement between the government and the 
National Bank. In addition, it indicates the number of banknotes that were in circulation 
because of the ΓΧΜΒ Law at the end of the month when a new agreement was signed as well 
as the banknotes in circulation because of the ΓΧΜΒ Law as a percentage of the money 
supply. By the end of January 1916, approximately 52 per cent of the total banknotes in 
circulation were because of the 1910 Law whilst by the end of January 1919 this amount had 
risen to nearly 92 per cent. It should be noted that the banknotes printed because of the 
ΓΧΜΒ Law after 1915 were inflationary as they were collateralised with Book Credits, 
although contemporaneous policy makers and National Bank authorities fervently argued the 
opposite at the time.231  
 
4.1.3.3. Banknotes issued for the account of the government 
As the financial markets abroad were closed, the Greek government resorted to the National 
Bank to finance public expenditure five times during the Asia Minor campaign. The printing 
press was used once in 1920, once in 1921, twice during 1922 and then once more in early 
1923.232 Table 4.4 above lists all the issues of banknotes for the account of the government 
and states the amount that the National Bank was authorised by law to issue each time. It also 
shows the remaining banknotes in circulation on the eve of the banking reforms. 
 
 These issues of banknotes were government loans. In all cases, the government was 
charged commission of 0.50 per cent but no interest was levied and the amortisation period 
was not specified. All the laws, however, that authorised the use of the printing press for the 
account of the government, stated that convertibility could be restored only if the government 
had repaid these loans to the bank of issue. At the time when discussions over the stabilisation 
of the drachma were taking place, the government had paid back to the National Bank only 
231 See, for example, Diomides (1922). 
232 See NBGHA_Α1Σ18Υ1Φ165Ε1. 
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212 million drachmae. One-third of the proceeds of the 1928 Stabilisation Loan was used 
therefore for the repayment of part of the remaining 2,588 million drachmae government debt 
to the new bank of issue.233 The aim was to strengthen the reserve position of the Bank of 
Greece for de jure stabilisation of the drachma.  
 
4.1.3.4. April 1923 Law 
In April 1923 a decree was passed that echoed the principles of the ΓΧΜΒ Law. This decree 
gave the National Bank the right to issue banknotes in order to buy foreign exchange to 
accommodate the needs of the government.234 The prerequisite set was that when the Bank 
sold foreign exchange bought for the account of the government then it had to withdraw from 
circulation banknotes of an equivalent value. The average price of the entirety of the foreign 
exchange reserves bought for the account of the government was used each time that the 
number of banknotes to be removed from circulation was calculated, as the legal provision 
required. In practice, the government gave instructions to the National Bank to buy foreign 
exchange on its behalf. Then the Bank printed banknotes to buy foreign exchange on behalf of 
the government as it was instructed. Foreign exchange purchased on these terms could be 
used for the requirements of the government without special authorisation. In addition, the 
government benefitted from any profits whilst at the same time being responsible for any 
losses resulting from these transactions.  
 
4.1.3.5. Closing Remarks 
On the eve of the central banking reform in Greece, total currency in circulation consisted of 
several note-issues added together. The terms of each of these issues were determined by 
different legal provisions.  
 
 Table 4.4 above indicates the legal maximum for banknotes in circulation, though the 
total circulation was usually below this level. At the time of central banking reforms the 
number of banknotes in circulation as a result of the 1898 Law of Control and the ΓΧΜΒ Law 
did not vary but the remainder did. The banknotes in circulation as a result of the April 1923 
decree fluctuated in line with the amount of foreign exchange bought and sold for the account 
of the government whilst the banknotes issued because of the note issuing privilege of the 
National Bank would change according to the cash transactions of the National Bank. In the 
1920s, banknotes issued for the account of the government were reported on the balance sheet 
of the National Bank together with banknotes in circulation under its issuing privilege. (See 
233 Ibid., p. 7. 
234 See Annual Report of the National Bank for 1926 (1927); Zolotas (1928). 
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Table A3.1 in Appendix A3.) These banknotes for the account of the government in fact 
represented debt to the bank of issue and decreased as the government cleared it. 
 
Finally, a portion of the banknotes in circulation was collateralised using gold, 
foreign exchange and Greek government bonds denominated in gold. For example, the total 
number of banknotes in circulation under the decree of April 1923 was covered by foreign 
exchange. In addition, one-eighth of the increase in the banknotes issued under the issuing 
privilege of the National Bank in 1915 and again in 1920 was covered by gold and a further 
one-eighth by bonds of Greek government loans denominated in gold. The remaining notes in 
circulation were not covered by any legal reserves.  
 
 
4.2. National Bank as the Bank of the Government 
4.2.1. Introduction 
Governments invariably turn to their central banks for financial assistance, in particular 
during wars or other crises. The National Bank was no exception. It lent to the government 
generously although only reluctantly, not only during periods of war or national disasters but 
also during periods that the Greek government had no access to the international financial 
markets. Under such circumstances the nationalist argument was usually too strong for the 
Bank to refuse its help to the government. As a consequence its financial position weakened 
during those periods. When, however, attempts at reconstruction were made, the National 
Bank’s aim was to achieve a reduction or a reconstruction of the illiquid public debt that it 
owned. This ebb and flow acted as a form of self-regulation that helped the National Bank to 
protect its financial strength and credibility during its entire history as a bank of issue. A 
financially sound National Bank in turn created the systemic stability that characterised the 
Greek banking system.  
 
 The National Bank acted as a financial ambassador for the Greek government abroad 
when foreign loans were contracted, and usually underwrote any portion issued in Athens. 
Furthermore, governors of the National Bank moved to the Ministry of Finance during 
turbulent periods or had been members of the parliament. The most prominent case was that 
of Stefanos Streit, who served as governor of the National Bank between 1896 and 1910. In 
1897, Streit became minister of finance, a post that he held for two years until the enactment 
of the Law of Control and the flotation of the 1898 Loan under the aegis of the Great Powers. 
For its part, the government deposited all available credit and funds within the National Bank; 
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a precedent that was to be followed by the IFC. In this way, a complex relationship developed 
between the government and the issuing bank in the country. 
 
 Christina Agriantoni (1986), having focused her research on the nineteenth century, 
calls the National Bank the bank of the government because, as she argues, public debt held 
by the National Bank after 1877 was a significant item on its balance sheet.235 She compares 
credit granted by the National Bank to the private sector of the economy with the public debt 
that it held between 1861 and 1900. This comparison shows that from 1885 until 1900 public 
debt held by the Bank consistently surpassed credits that had been granted to the private 
sectors of the economy. In addition, George Alogoskoufis and Sofia Lazaretou (1997, pp. 
136–137) present the percentage share of public debt in the total assets of the National Bank 
between 1848 and 1936.236 Their data demonstrate that in the 1860s public debt started 
becoming an important item on the balance sheet of the Bank. The percentage share of public 
debt held by the National Bank during the period that they examine fluctuated between a 
minimum 3.20 per cent experienced in 1861 and a maximum of 55.90 per cent which was 
reached in 1898.  
 
 These estimates of public debt owned by the National Bank, however, overemphasise 
its role as a lender to the government and obscure its conservative and risk-averse character as 
a lender. The literature does not distinguish between public debt that the National Bank had 
granted to the government because of its role as the central bank in Greece and government 
debt denominated either in gold or in drachmae which was traded on stock exchanges. 
Government debt that was traded on stock exchanges was a liquid asset on the balance sheet 
of the National Bank, an asset that it had, by and large, voluntarily invested in. It also 
constituted a source of significant profit. On the other hand, government debt in forced 
banknotes, temporary loans and treasury bills held by the National Bank was regarded as a 
burden, a portion of its assets that curbed its liquidity and weakened its financial position. 
That having said, when the National Bank granted loans to the government, in particular loans 
in forced circulation of banknotes it sought to secure special privileges such as an extension 
of its issuing right, tax exemptions or the management of public revenues.  
 
235 The source of the data on public debt and credits to the private sectors of the economy used by 
Agriantoni was Stavros Thomadakis (1981). Nonetheless, Thomadakis’ data on public debt held by the 
National Bank overstated the Bank’s role as a lender to the government as credit to legal entities was 
included in public debt. It should also be noted that it is not clear what items Thomadakis included in 
his estimation of credits to the economy granted by the National Bank.  
236 Estimates of the National Bank and public debt also appear in Dertilis (2005, vol. II, pp. 1042–
1050). 
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 Notwithstanding the volume of public debt owned by the National Bank, it anyway 
played the role of the bank of the government during its entire history as a dual-purpose bank. 
The Greek government resorted to it to borrow in particular whenever it could not borrow 
either from the domestic market or abroad, and at the same time the National Bank was 
responsible for all the business of its own government. Furthermore, the National Bank stood 
by the government when it borrowed from abroad. More research, however, should be carried 
out to establish the relationship between the government and the bank of issue in Greece in 
the nineteenth century. 
 
 This part of Chapter 4 examines public debt held by the National Bank between 1898 
and 1930. For the first time ever, and for the purpose of this thesis, public debt as it appeared 
on the balance sheet of the National Bank is divided into public debt traded on stock 
exchanges and government debt that was not traded on secondary markets, and time series 
were constructed accordingly. Sovereign debt held by the Bank that was not traded on stock 
exchanges includes debt primarily resulting from agreements between the bank of issue and 
the government and consisting mainly of forced circulation, temporary or long-term loans, 
advances and treasury bills. This debt held by the National Bank is referred to in this thesis as 
bilateral or illiquid public debt in contrast to public debt that was traded on secondary markets 
and thus was liquid.  
 
The time series of illiquid public debt owned by the bank of issue and constructed for 
the purpose of this thesis are compared with the time series of credits granted by the National 
Bank to the private sectors of the economy and presented in the previous chapter. This 
comparison demonstrates the importance of commercial activities to the National Bank on the 
eve of the outbreak of the Balkan Wars. It also shows how significant this aspect of their 
business remained when the League of Nations was being approached in 1927. Finally, this 
exercise illustrates changes that a long period of war and its aftermath brought to the 
commercial character of the National Bank and to its role as a bank of the government. 
Highlighting these changes will later help in understanding what the governors of the 
National Bank sought to achieve through stabilisation in 1927.  
 
The period in question is divided into two sub-periods. The first sub-period starts with 
the enactment of the Law of Control and finishes with the outbreak of the Balkan Wars. This 
is a period of relative peace, economic growth and expansion for the National Bank. The 
second sub-period covers the period from the outbreak of the Balkan Wars until after the 
implementation of a League sponsored stabilisation scheme. This is a long period of wars, 
monetary upheaval and finally reconstruction. The main objective here is to examine the role 
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of the bank of issue as a lender to the government during two very distinct and contrasting 
eras and thus to shed light on the way that the National Bank combined central banking 
functions with commercial activities. In addition, the analysis of the two very different 
periods will help to demonstrate the changes that a long period of war and its aftermath 
brought to the National Bank.  
 
4.2.2. Public Debt and the National Bank during a period of stability, 1898–1911 
4.2.2.1. The 1893 default, domestic public debt and the banks of issue 
The enactment of the Law of Control and the concomitant debt restructuring changed the 
relationship between the National Bank and the government. The Law of Control introduced a 
legal framework that strictly defined the relationship of the National Bank with the 
government; forced currency in circulation had gradually to be reduced and a limit was set to 
the number of treasury bills that the government could issue. No further borrowing of the 
government was allowed from the bank of issue without the consent of the IFC.  
 
 In December 1893, the Greek government suspended sinking fund payments of all 
external public debt whilst coupon payments were restricted to 30 per cent of their original 
interest rate. On the other hand, the service of the domestic public debt denominated both in 
gold and nominal drachmae continued to be paid in full.237 Valaorites ([1902] 1988, pp. 137–
141) in his book on the National Bank defended this preferential treatment that domestic 
public debt had received by arguing that this decision to exempt domestic government debt 
from default was based on public interest. The three privileged banks, as Valaorites called the 
issuing banks in Greece at the time, i.e. the National Bank, the Ionian Bank and the Bank of 
Epirus-Thessaly, held most of the domestic public debt. In case of a suspension of the service of 
domestic public debt, he argued, the financial position of the issuing banks would have been 
seriously damaged. 
 
 In 1898, the Law of Control provided for a restructuring of all domestic debt. Several 
loans denominated in drachmae were consolidated into one loan without any reduction in 
their capital.238 The capital of this Unified Loan as it is known, was 76,354,000 drachmae 
divided into 763,540 bonds, its interest rate 5 per cent and its amortisation period 80 years.239 
In addition, the floating debt denominated in gold which consisted entirely of loans and 
advances from the banks of issue, was converted into bonds of the 2.50 per cent Loan of 
1898. This conversion left interest charge virtually unchanged. In this way, the banks of issue 
237 Andreades (1939, pp. 441–442); Valaorites ([1902] 1988, pp. 136–137). 
238 Valaorites ([1902] 1988, p. 197). 
239 Andreades (1939, pp. 493). 
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acquired an asset that could be easily converted into gold, in particular when they would 
attempt to resume specie payments.240  
 
 The main arguments in favour of the preferential handling of the domestic 
government debt were as follows. Firstly, all bondholders of the domestic public debt already 
had experienced a reduction of interest rate as early as 1888, when the Tricoupis government 
had reduced the interest rate charged on these loans and simultaneously abolished sinking 
fund payments. Secondly, domestic debt was mainly denominated in drachmae which meant 
in a currency which had severely depreciated since these loans were issued. Finally, the 
conversion involved a small reduction in interest rate.241  
 
 It is unfortunate that not much is known about the negotiations for a debt compromise 
which eventually led to the enactment of the Law of Control in 1898. Andreades (1939, n. 5, 
p. 478) remarked that no minutes were taken during the negotiations.242 Thus, the positions or 
the recommendations of the different participants are not known. In particular, it would have 
been worthwhile knowing the role that Stefanos Streit, the governor of the National Bank 
played in his capacity as minister of finance and chief representative of Greece in the 
negotiations. Details of the negotiations that resulted in the reconstruction of the domestic 
public debt which was mainly held by the National Bank would have been particularly helpful 
in further understanding the methods that the National Bank employed to protect its own 
financial strength whilst at the same time looking after the financial needs of the government.  
 
 It was, however, evident that both in 1893 and in 1898 special attention was paid to 
the banks of issue. Valaorites, in his book on the history of the National Bank, first published 
in 1902, commended that the 1898 debt consolidation was one of the most important events in 
its history up to then. He then added that it was perhaps the most important event in terms of 
establishing a sound base for the bank, because it signified the end of a period where the Bank 
depended entirely on the financial adventures of the government.243  
 
4.2.2.2. Presentation of public debt held by the National Bank, 1898–1911  
Table 4.6 presents the public debt that the National Bank held between 1898 and 1911. It is 
divided into debt in government bonds that were traded on stock exchanges and other public 
debt, primarily illiquid debt that the National Bank owned. In addition, the percentage share 
240 United Kingdom House of Commons (1898, p. 67); Wynne (1951, p. 333). 
241 Wynne (1951, pp. 333–334). 
242 Andreades (1939) stated that no minutes existed for the negotiations between Greece and the Great 
Powers that led to the introduction of the Law of Control in 1898. See Andreades (1939, n. 5, p. 478).  
243 Valaorites ([1902] 1988, p. 199). 
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of each category of public debt in total assets is presented. A general point that can be made is 
that both types of government debt on the balance sheet of the National Bank decreased as a 
percentage of its total assets during the period in question.  
 
Table 4.6: Government debt and the National Bank, 1898–1911 
 
 Total bilateral 
public debt 
% 
of Assets 
Public debt 
traded on stock 
exchanges 
% 
of Assets 
1898 82,359,389 28.88 68,450,360 24.00 
1899 87,012,467 27.99 57,198,850 18.40 
1900 85,430,981 27.09 57,865,000 18.35 
1901 84,403,682 25.58 58,381,440 17.69 
1902 83,278,575 23.81 57,596,587 16.46 
1903 81,528,575 24.45 53,263,537 15.98 
1904 80,028,575 22.04 52,894,037 14.57 
1905 78,783,575 21.85 52,675,108 14.61 
1906 78,318,575 20.31 53,261,122 13.81 
1907 78,557,319 19.84 52,699,375 13.31 
1908 77,641,679 19.01 59,267,043 14.51 
1909 77,668,840 19.13 60,193,139 14.82 
1910 72,358,757 17.09 62,684,098 14.81 
1911 61,778,575 12.51 66,091,270 13.38 
Source: Author’s calculations using the Balance Sheet of the National Bank of Greece, 1898–
1911.  
 
Government debt traded on stock exchanges fell from 24 per cent in 1898 to approximately 
13 per cent of its assets in 1911. This decrease was mainly due to a remarkable expansion of 
the balance sheet of the National Bank and not to a notable reduction in the value of public 
debt traded on secondary markets that the Bank held. In addition, the outstanding capital of 
the total illiquid public debt held by the National Bank had been reduced by approximately 25 
per cent by 1911. Its share, however, in the total assets of the Bank experienced a more 
remarkable reduction again because of the expansion of the National Bank during this period; 
it fell from nearly 30 per cent in 1898 to roughly 12 per cent in 1911.  
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Table 4.7: Bilateral government debt that the National Bank held, 1898–1911 
 
 Forced 
Circulation 
Treasury 
Bills  
Temporary 
Loans in 
Drachmae 
 
Total 
1898 81,450,283  909,106 82,359,389 
1899 86,985,155  27,312 87,012,467 
1900 85,403,669  27,312 85,430,981 
1901 84,403,682   84,403,682 
1902 83,278,575   83,278,575 
1903 81,528,575   81,528,575 
1904 80,028,575   80,028,575 
1905 78,278,575 505,000  78,783,575 
1906 76,278,575 2,040,000  78,318,575 
1907 74,278,575 2,858,773 1,419,970 78,557,319 
1908 72,278,575 5,363,104  77,641,679 
1909 70,778,575 5,202,413 1,687,851 77,668,840 
1910 69,216,657 3,142,100  72,358,757 
1911 61,778,575   61,778,575 
Source: Author’s calculations using the Balance Sheet of the National Bank of Greece, 1898–
1911. 
 
Table 4.7 demonstrates that the illiquid public debt held by the National Bank consisted of 
banknotes issued as forced circulation, treasury bills and temporary loans in gold and 
drachmae. The domestic debt consolidation that the Law of Control introduced limited the 
illiquid public debt that the National Bank owned mainly to that derived from forced 
circulation. Moreover, as is explained above in section 4.1.1 of this chapter the Law of 
Control set a strict timetable for the reduction of forced banknotes in circulation; from 1900 
onwards at least 2 million drachmae of forced circulation had to be repaid each year until the 
government’s indebtedness to the bank of issue in banknotes of forced circulation was 
reduced to 40 million drachmae. Finally, according to the Law of Control the government 
could issue treasury bills up to 10 million drachmae.  
 
 Consequently, from the enactment of the Law of Control up to the Balkan Wars 
illiquid public debt held by the National Bank was mainly confined to forced banknotes in 
circulation. Treasury bills and temporary loans to the government remained insignificant as 
Table 4.7 above demonstrates. 
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Table 4.8: Government debt traded on stock exchanges held by 
the National Bank, 1898–1911 
 Bonds in Gold  Bonds in 
Drachmae 
Total Public Debt 
in Bonds 
1898 23,020,450 45,429,910 68,450,360 
1899 24,195,950 33,002,900 57,198,850 
1900 24,195,950 33,669,050 57,865,000 
1901 24,195,950 34,185,490 58,381,440 
1902 25,878,287 31,718,300 57,596,587 
1903 23,767,037 29,496,500 53,263,537 
1904 23,767,037 29,127,000 52,894,037 
1905 23,768,608 28,906,500 52,675,108 
1906 24,648,322 28,612,800 53,261,122 
1907 24,709,175 27,990,200 52,699,375 
1908 25,659,943 33,607,100 59,267,043 
1909 28,120,539 32,072,600 60,193,139 
1910 29,905,932 32,778,167 62,684,098 
1911 32,633,371 33,457,899 66,091,270 
Source: Author’s calculations using the Balance Sheet of the National Bank of Greece, 1898–
1911. 
 
Table 4.8 shows the liquid debt held by the National Bank, that is to say government debt 
held by the bank of issue which was traded on secondary markets. Public debt traded on stock 
exchanges was an investment for the Bank and consisted of bonds of loans that were 
denominated either in gold or in paper drachmae. 
 
 The National Bank, possibly on the eve of the announcement of default in 1893 
embarked on a massive sale of bonds of government debt denominated in gold that were kept 
in its portfolio.244 They only maintained bonds of the Piraeus-Larissa Railway Loan of 1890 
and the Funding Loan of 1893. Presumably a sale of bonds of the Funding Loan would have 
accrued excessive loss to the National Bank.245 
 
 As Table 4.9 shows, at the end of 1898 the portfolio of the National Bank consisted of 
bonds denominated in gold of the Railway Loan of 1890, the Funding Loan of 1893 and of 
the 1898 Guaranteed Loan. The National Bank obtained 8,042 bonds of the 2.50 per cent 
Guaranteed Loan, as Table 4.9 shows, from the conversion of the floating debt in gold that it 
244 Ibid., p. 143. Valaorites did not state when precisely the National Bank liquidated the government 
debt denominated in gold that it owned. In his usual manner he tried to justify this act of the bank of 
issue. 
245 Ibid. 
163 
 
                                                     
owned. Initially, it was proposed that all these bonds would be deposited at the Bank of 
France and the National Bank would not be able either to withdraw or sell them without the 
consent of the IFC. At the end, however, the 2,658 bonds of the 1898 Loan, which the 
National Bank obtained because of the conversion of the temporary loans and advances were 
left at the free disposal of the Bank and were deposited at the Bank of England as the terms 
offered where better. The remaining 5,384 bonds of the 2.50 per cent Guaranteed Loan of 
1898, which the National Bank took for the conversion of the floating debt in metallic, were 
also deposited at the Bank of England with the consent of both the IFC and the Bank of 
France. This latter set of bonds, however, was not at the free disposal of the National Bank of 
Greece.  
 
 As Table 4.9 shows, after the restructuring of the Greek government debt in 1898 the 
portfolio of the National Bank consisted of bonds denominated in gold of the Railway Loan 
of 1890, the Funding Loan of 1893 and the 1898 Guaranteed Loan. On the other hand, its 
portfolio of bonds denominated in drachmae was confined to bonds of the Unified Loan of 
1898.  
 
Table 4.9: The number of bonds traded on stock exchanges that 
the National Bank held in 1898 
 
Name of Loan Number of Bonds 
Denominated in Gold 
Piraeus-Larissa Railway Loan of 1890 3,600 
Funding Loan of 1893 2,750 
Guaranteed Loan of 1898 8,042 
Denominated in Drachmae 
Unified Loan of 1898 454,299 
Source: Annual Report of the National Bank for 1898 (1899, pp. 25–28). 
 
Table 4.8 indicates that the National Bank restructured its portfolio in government bonds 
during the period in question. Government bonds in paper drachmae were reduced in favour 
of bonds denominated in gold. By contrast, in 1898 the bulk of debt in government bonds in 
the National Bank’s portfolio was in bonds denominated in paper drachmae.  
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4.2.3. Public Debt and the National Bank: from the Balkan Wars until Stabilisation  
4.2.3.1. Introduction 
The Balkan Wars signalled a change in the relationship between the bank of issue and the 
government that lasted until stabilisation. The Law of Control was repeatedly violated during 
this period and the transparent and uncomplicated relationship between the Greek government 
and the National Bank that had prevailed during the first decade of the twentieth century, gave 
way to a complex financial relationship shaped by the historical conjuncture. During this 
period which included a long period of war, the Asia Minor debacle and a consequent 
increase in the population of the country swelled by more than a million refugees, the bank of 
issue proved to be an unfailing source of financial support for the Greek government.  
 
 The complexity in the relationship that developed between the bank of issue and the 
government is illustrated very vividly in the balance sheet of the National Bank during the 
period in question. This complexity coupled with a lack of transparency in the way that 
government debt was reported on the balance sheet of the National Bank makes the 
compilation and estimation of government debt granted to the government by the National 
Bank, in particular after 1915, a challenging and at the same time very strenuous task. 
 
 There follows an attempt to disentangle the complex financial relationship that was 
developed between the government and the National Bank during this turbulent period. 
Hence, the ways by which the National Bank financially supported the government will be 
presented in detail below. Briefly, the National Bank used the printing press several times to 
lend to the government up to early 1923, as has been already explained in section 4.1.3 of this 
chapter. The ΓΧΜΒ Law was employed by the government to finance Greek participation in 
the Great War and in this way the so-called Book Credit agreements with the Allies were 
utilised. (See Chapter 5 on the Book Credits opened by the Allies during the active 
participation of Greece in the First World War.) At the end, however, banknotes issued on 
account of the Book Credits turned into government debt to the bank of issue in the form of 
forced banknotes. Moreover, the Bank provided loans both in gold and in drachmae as well as 
advances to the government. In the 1920s, the National Bank further supported the 
government by guaranteeing, discounting and repaying the NDBs that had been issued. In 
addition to these conventional forms of government borrowing from the central bank, the 
National Bank on behalf of the Greek government financed the importation of food supplies, 
mainly cereals, during the First World War and the Asia Minor campaign. Finally, in 1926 the 
National Bank undertook the management and liquidation of Moslem properties in Greece 
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and at the same time the indemnification of urban refugees for their holdings abandoned in 
Asia Minor – a task, however, close to the responsibilities of a mortgage bank. 
 
 To understand developments in the way that the National Bank financed public 
expenditure, the period in question here is divided into three sub-periods: 1912–1923, 1924–
1927 and 1928–1930. The first sub-period refers to the long period of war; it covers the 
period from the outbreak of the First Balkan War until the signing of the peace Treaty of 
Lausanne with Turkey in 1923. The following sub-period starts in 1924 and finishes in 1927; 
this is a prolonged period towards stabilisation. Finally, the third sub-period deals with the 
banking reform and shows how the relationship of the National Bank with the government 
was transformed after the reform.  
 
It should be noted that this is the first time that the relationship of the National Bank 
with the government has been approached in such a thorough and detailed way. Previous 
studies that have tackled the question present either aggregate data of public debt held by the 
National Bank or data of public debt as a percentage of its total assets.246 Since the 1930s, it 
has been repeatedly stressed in the literature that the National Bank was overburdened with 
government debt during the 1920s. For the first time, however, here the methods followed by 
the National Bank to lend to the government are described in detail. In this way, the changes 
that happened to the balance sheet of the Bank during the period in question are exposed. 
These changes restrained the liquidity of the National Bank, but by no means was its solvency 
jeopardised. 
 
4.2.3.2. Government debt traded on stock exchanges, 1912–1930  
Here again, as in the period between 1898 and 1911 examined above, government debt held 
by the National Bank that was traded on stock exchanges is regarded as belonging to the 
portfolio of the Bank and is treated as a liquid investment. Hence, a distinction is made 
between government debt traded on stock exchanges and government debt held by the 
National Bank that was illiquid and was based on bilateral agreements between the Bank and 
the government. It should be stressed that this is a departure from previous research on the 
issue in question, where no such distinction is made and both categories of public debt are 
treated in the same way. 
 
246 See, for example, Alogoskoufis and Lazaretou (1997, pp. 136–137); Dertilis (2005, vol. II, pp. 
1042–1050). 
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 As in the period examined in the previous section, there is again here an entry on the 
balance sheet of the National Bank entitled ‘Bonds of Public Loans’ where Greek sovereign 
debt denominated in gold and traded on secondary markets that the Bank owned was reported. 
However, from 1924 to 1927 this asset item does not report only public debt denominated in 
gold and traded on stock exchanges. Liquid public debt was amalgamated with illiquid debt 
based on bilateral agreements between the bank of issue and the government and was reported 
as one on the balance sheet of the National Bank. Nevertheless, it is not possible at this stage 
of the research, using the evidence to hand, to distinguish between liquid and illiquid 
sovereign debt reported together on the balance sheet of the Bank as ‘Bonds of Public Debt’ 
in the 1920s. 
 
 Between 1915 and 1927, public debt owned by the National Bank that was traded on 
stock exchanges should be divided into two categories. Firstly, the Bank held government 
bonds denominated in gold and traded on stock exchanges that by law belonged to its gold 
and foreign exchange cover as it was the bank of issue in Greece. Government bonds 
denominated in gold that were kept as reserves was a prerequisite for the increase in the 
banknotes in circulation under the issuing privilege of the National Bank in 1915 and then 
again in 1920. As has been explained above in section 4.1.3, one-eighth of the increase in the 
banknotes in circulation, because of the extension of the note privilege of the National Bank 
both in 1915 and in 1920, had to be covered by gold and a further one-eighth by bonds of 
Greek government loans denominated in gold and traded on secondary markets. Secondly, in 
a separate category can be included public debt owned by the National Bank that was 
comprised of bonds of loans denominated either in gold or in drachmae, but on this occasion 
they were at its free disposal.  
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Table 4.10:  
Government debt traded on secondary markets held by the National Bank, 1912–1930 
 Bonds in gold  
Bonds in 
drachmae 
Bonds in gold 
and in drachmae 
Bonds in gold 
kept as cover 
1912 33,241,115.00 31,418,579.00   
1913 30,110,235.00 30,084,126.00   
1914 38,522,133.75 21,018,121.40   
1915 92,913,763.35 20,362,768.80  10,000,000.00 
1916 103,253,133.85 19,479,743.15  10,000,000.00 
1917 96,058,406.85 19,163,375.90  10,000,000.00 
1918 79,650,977.40 60,304,014.50  10,000,000.00 
1919 63,807,141.80 54,992,247.15  10,000,000.00 
1920 22,450,343.45 83,412,135.00  47,500,000.00 
1921 56,995,430.72 75,600,200.70  47,500,000.00 
1922 47,452,400.00 74,357,182.14  67,500,000.00 
1923 7,668,356.80 217,324,184.25  62,500,000.00 
1924 25,008,824.80 812,547,367.85  47,500,000.00 
1925 71,751,513.40 768,709,171.65  47,500,000.00 
1926 68,844,900.00 738,601,400.60  47,500,000.00 
1927 115,934,300.00 724,039,971.50   
1928   738,450,822.19  
1929   865,283,090.57  
1930   1,470,139,687.34  
Source: Author’s calculations using the Balance Sheet of the National Bank of Greece, 1912–
1930. 
 
Table 4.10 above presents public debt traded on secondary markets that the Bank owned 
between 1912 and 1930. Firstly, sovereign debt denominated in gold that the National Bank 
was required by law to keep as reserves is presented separately in the last column of Table 
4.10. In 1927, the way that assets and liabilities were reported on the balance sheet of the 
National Bank changed. During that year, Greek government debt denominated in gold that 
was maintained as cover was added to the rest of the public debt in gold that the Bank owned. 
Secondly, Table 4.10 shows public debt denominated in gold and in drachmae held by 
National Bank. As has been explained above, between 1924 and 1927 public debt 
denominated in drachmae and traded on secondary markets was amalgamated with bilateral 
government debt in drachmae. It is not possible, however, using available evidence to 
distinguish between public debt owned by the Bank that was denominated in drachmae and 
traded on secondary markets and bilateral, illiquid public debt reported together on the 
balance sheet of the National Bank and presented in Table 4.10 above. The latter stemmed 
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from bilateral agreements between the National Bank and the government. Thirdly, Table 
4.10 indicates the stock of sovereign debt traded on secondary markets that the National Bank 
retained after the banking reform.  
 
Sovereign debt owned by the National Bank that was denominated in gold and traded 
on stock exchanges was undervalued by the way that it was reported on its balance sheet in 
the 1920s. Furthermore, it would be incorrect to add together gold drachmae and paper 
drachmae. In other words, it will be misleading to follow the accountancy practice adopted by 
the Bank itself during the monetary upheaval of the 1920s. The real value of the public debt 
denominated in gold and traded on stock exchanges that the National Bank owned was higher 
than that reported on its balance sheet during the 1920s when it remained a central bank.  
 
4.2.3.3. Illiquid public debt held by the National Bank, 1912–1930  
Table 4.11 shows illiquid government debt held by the National Bank between the outbreak 
of the Balkan Wars and stabilisation as accurately as is possible. It presents loans to the 
government in forced circulation and loans in gold and drachmae granted by the National 
Bank using its own reserves as well as advances. The balance sheet of the National Bank is 
the main source of the information displayed in this table. Adjustments have been made 
where necessary, and of course possible, using information provided by the governor of the 
Bank in his annual report, as well as evidence from a variety of other sources.  
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Table 4.11: Bilateral government debt held by the National Bank, 1912–1930 
(in drachmae) 
 Forced Circulation Temporary Loans  Advances 
TOTAL 
 A B C in Gold in Drachmae in Gold in Drachmae 
1912 61,778,575.42       61,778,575.42 
1913 61,778,575.42   73,814,400.00    135,592,975.42 
1914 60,951,915.42   77,320,876.60 11,295,260.00   149,568,052.02 
1915 58,951,915.42  x 68,933,773.33    127,885,688.75 
1916 56,951,915.42  x 53,933,772.33 4,945,183.55   115,830,871.30 
1917 54,951,915.42  x 69,086,297.33 8,297,821.90   132,336,034.65 
1918 52,951,915.42  850,000,000.00 55,000,000.00    957,951,915.42 
1919 50,951,915.42  1,193,941,070.00 320,084,875.00    1,564,977,860.42 
1920 48,951,915.42 300,000,000.00 1,139,784,174.70 55,000,000.00 611,985,350.00   2,155,721,440.12 
1921 46,951,915.42    950,000,000.00 1,139,784,174.70 28,770,000.00 1,111,985,350.00   3,277,491,440.12 
1922 44,951,915.42 2,100,000,000.00 1,139,784,174.70 74,370,000.00 811,985,350.00  129,910,516.48 4,301,001,956.60 
1923 42,951,915.42 2,809,000,000.00 1,139,784,174.70 64,090,000.00 811,985,350.00 3,986,946.80 176,630,692.59 5,048,429,079.51 
1924 40,951,915.42 2,631,500,000.00 1,139,784,174.70 97,935,142.50 251,000,000.00 46,884,717.70  4,208,055,950.32 
1925 40,000,000.00 2,588,000,000.00 1,139,784,174.70 44,140,000.00 190,000,000.00 4,322,113.25 44,110,052.40 4,050,356,340.35 
1926 40,000,000.00 2,588,000,000.00 1,139,784,174.70  190,000,000.00 3,921,368.95 155,186,217.75 4,116,891,761.40 
1927 40,000,000.00 2,776,000,000.00 1,139,784,174.70 7,462,441.15 372,119,455.26   4,335,366,071.11 
1928     313,872,183.29   313,872,183.29 
1929     180,957,348.80   180,957,348.80 
1930     185,185,433.74   185,185,433.74 
 
 
 
Notes: 
(1) The column headed A in the section of Table 4.11 entitled Forced Circulation presents 
government debt in forced banknotes issued in the nineteenth century and governed by the 
Law of Control. 
(2) The column headed B contains government debt to the National Bank as a result of the use 
of the printing press in the 1920s. 
(3) The column headed C presents government debt to the National Bank arising out of the 
Allied Book Credits. 
(4) An x denotes missing data. 
(5) The accountancy practice followed by the National Bank in the 1920s was used in Table 
4.11 so that temporary loans and advances denominated in gold were added together with 
bilateral government debt in nominal drachmae.  
Sources: Author’s calculations using the Balance Sheet of the National Bank of Greece, 
1912–1930; Annual Reports of the National Bank, 1912–1930 (1913–1931). 
 
During the Balkan Wars the National Bank granted temporary loans in gold to the 
government. It is noteworthy that although the drachma had remained stable since 1910 these 
temporary loans were contracted in gold. These temporary loans, however, did not place any 
strain on the National Bank. In fact, in 1914 the Greek government entered into its largest 
borrowing agreement prior to the outbreak of the Great War. Of the total amount issued under 
the 1914 Loan, 25.95 per cent was given by the government to the bank of issue to clear its 
debt that had arisen out of the conflict.247  
 
Illiquid public debt because of the issuing privilege 
Government debt held by the National Bank in forced circulation presented in Table 4.11 is 
divided into three categories. The first category, headed A, shows debt in banknotes that had 
been issued in the nineteenth century and regulated by the Law of Control. As has been 
explained above, the Law of Control introduced in 1898 stipulated that from 1900 onwards 
the government had the obligation to cancel banknotes to the value of at least 2 million 
drachmae every year until the debt in banknotes fell to 40 million drachmae. As Table 4.11 
shows, this provision of the Law of Control was observed even in the 1920s when the Law of 
Control no longer operated and the printing press was used liberally, as the adjacent column B 
of this table shows. The 40 million drachmae target stipulated by the Law of Control was 
achieved in 1925 and subsequently it remained unchanged until the establishment of the Bank 
of Greece. Public debt to the National Bank regulated by the Law of Control is the only part 
of illiquid government debt in Table 4.11 that was precisely and consistently presented on the 
balance sheet of the National Bank during the entire period in question. As it will become 
evident below, the remainder of the bilateral public debt held by the National Bank cannot be 
estimated as accurately and presented as easily as has been the government debt in forced 
247 For more, see Christodoulaki and Penzer (2004, p. 17). 
 
 
                                                     
circulation regulated by the Law of Control. This again points to the complexities in the 
relationship between the government and the National Bank that developed gradually after the 
outbreak of the First Balkan War.  
 
  As Table 4.4 above shows, the printing press was employed for the first time by the 
National Bank to lend to the government in 1920 and by March 1923 it had been used in total 
five times. Government debt to the bank of issue because of the use of the printing press in 
the early 1920s is presented in column B of Table 4.11. On the 1924 balance sheet all 
government debt from banknotes issued as forced circulation was for the first time gathered 
together in a single entry. Previously, the forced circulation resulting from the 2547 law of 
1920 had been included with temporary loans in drachmae. An attempt has been made in 
Table 4.11, using evidence from the annual report of the National Bank to present together all 
government debt arising out of banknotes having been issued for the account of the 
government since 1920. It should be noted that the law of 19 April 1921 provided not only for 
the 500 million drachmae loan of forced banknotes but a further 50 million drachmae loan at 
5.50 per cent from the reserves of the National Bank. On the balance sheet of the National 
Bank, this 50 million drachmae loan was added together with debt to the government because 
of forced circulation. No evidence has been found which specifies the remaining balance of 
this loan at the end of each year so as to integrate it with the other temporary loans. It should 
also be stated that there is a noticeable discrepancy between the balance of all loans of forced 
circulation at the end of 1927 shown in Table 4.11 and their balance on 14 May 1928, 
indicated in Table 4.4 above. This discrepancy can be explained partly by the fact that the 50 
million drachmae loan referred to above is included with forced circulation on the balance 
sheet of the National Bank.  
 
Column C of Table 4.11 reports debt of the government to the National Bank from 
Allied Book Credits. The Book Credits of the Allies are examined in detail in Chapter 5, 
which deals with public finance during the period in question. It should, however, be repeated 
briefly here that the ΓΧΜΒ Law was used by the government to finance active participation 
in the Great War. Under an agreement signed in Paris in early 1918 Britain, France and the 
USA opened Book Credits in equal shares to the Greek government to a total value of 750 
million French francs. In addition, this Paris Agreement between the Allies stipulated that the 
National Bank would grant credits to the British and French armies stationed in Macedonia. 
In May 1919, a supplementary agreement was signed and a further 100 million French francs 
of Book Credits were granted to Greece by the Allies under the same terms and conditions as 
those of the 1918 agreement. On the strength of these Book Credits, the National Bank printed 
banknotes that were passed on to the government to meet the expenses of the armed forces. 
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Banknotes were also printed by the Bank to grant credit to the Allied army in Macedonia. Here, 
Book Credits is used as a generic term which refers to the 1918 and 1919 agreements between 
the Greek government and the Allies and to the agreement between the National Bank on the 
one hand, and on the other France and Britain that authorised the former to grant credit to the 
French and British army stationed in Macedonia. According to their agreement, these Book 
Credits could be drawn upon by the Greek government six months after the conclusion of peace.  
 
The Allies repudiated the Book Credits in December 1920. (For more on this see 
Chapter 5.) Consequently, the banknotes in circulation because of the Book Credits were no 
longer covered by the credits in foreign exchange promised by the Allies. Hence, the Book 
Credits were turned into banknotes in forced circulation. In other words, the banknotes in 
circulation that had been issued on the strength of the Book Credits were in effect turned into 
government debt in forced circulation to the bank of issue. In spite of the fact, however, that the 
Allies had repudiated the Book Credits, the National Bank continued to report them on its 
balance sheet as ‘reserves abroad because of the ΓΧΜΒ Law’. This ‘reserves abroad because of 
the ΓΧΜΒ Law’ in the assets of the balance sheet of the National Bank has been very 
misleading for researchers who are not familiar with the historical period in question. 
Nevertheless, the persistent inclusion of this entry on the balance sheet of the National Bank 
until the banking reform encapsulates vividly the expectations of successive Greek 
governments, as well as of the governors of the National Bank, that eventually the Book 
Credits would be realised.  
 
 In 1922, the Book Credits that had not been granted by the Allies, but on the strength 
of which the National Bank had printed banknotes, were consolidated. Subsequently, this 
consolidated figure of Book Credits appeared on the balance sheet of the National Bank until 
the banking reform as ‘reserves abroad because of the ΓΧΜΒ Law’. It should be repeated that 
in this thesis the Book Credits that had not been granted by the Allies, but on the strength of 
which the Greek government had printed banknotes, are treated as government debt in forced 
circulation and appear in column headed C of Table 4.11. In this table, the consolidated figure 
of Book Credits that was reported on the balance sheet in 1922 has been included as 
government debt in forced circulation to the bank of issue retrospectively for 1920 and 1921. 
This is justified by the fact that the Book Credits were cancelled in December 1920.  
 
In the annual report of the National Bank for 1919 its governor stated the amount of 
foreign exchange reserves abroad because of the ΓΧΜΒ Law that indeed represented Book 
173 
 
Credits both in 1918 and 1919.248 In retrospect, however, what the governor of the National 
Bank reported in his annual report for 1919 as foreign exchange reserves abroad on the 
strength of the Book Credits was in reality, government debt in forced circulation. For this 
reason, the amount that the governor stated as foreign exchange reserves abroad covered by 
the Allied Book Credits in 1918 as well as in 1919 has been included in column C of Table 
4.11 as government debt in forced circulation to the bank of issue.249 These two figures are 
presented in italics.  
 
It should be noted that this is the first time that Allied Book Credits have been 
regarded as government debt in forced circulation to the National Bank. Previous studies of 
the period in question view the Allied Book Credits as foreign exchange reserves abroad 
which, as it has been demonstrated here, is incorrect. 
 
 The principles of the ΓΧΜΒ Law were not violated for the first time in 1918. 
Previously, in 1915 the ΓΧΜΒ Law was used to open to the Greek government Book Credits 
by France, Great Britain and Russia. On the strength of these Book Credits, the National Bank 
issued banknotes that were passed over to the government. (These Book Credits are examined 
in detail in Chapter 5.) This experiment was repeated again in 1917 and possibly in 1916. No 
evidence, however, has been located which indicates the amount of government debt in forced 
circulation because of the Book Credits issued during the period of the Great War that Greece 
remained neutral. Therefore, between 1915 and 1917 government debt in forced circulation 
that is presented in Table 4.11 is understated. 
 
Temporary loans and advances to the government 
The rest of Table 4.11 shows temporary loans and advances granted by the National Bank to 
the government. The accountancy practice that the National Bank adopted in the 1920s has 
been reluctantly followed here so that debt in gold drachmae is added up together with debt of 
the government in paper drachmae.  
 
 During this turbulent period, on the one hand the government borrowed from the bank 
of issue and on the other, used proceeds of these loans to pay back to the National Bank part 
of its older obligations. For example, in 1922 the printing press was employed twice and in 
total 1,150 million drachmae were issued. A substantial part of the proceeds of these two 
248 See Annual Report of the National Bank for 1919 (1920, p. ε’ and p. στ’); Annual Report of the 
National Bank for 1919: To the general board of the National Bank of Greece, The course of the Greek 
foreign exchange during 1919 (1920, pp. vii–viii).  
249 Minus the exchange rate difference. 
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loans in forced circulation, to be precise 441 million drachmae, was used by the government 
to repay temporary loans and advances that the National Bank had granted to it during the 
previous year.250 Furthermore, in 1924 four loans that had been granted by the National Bank 
to the government after 1918 were consolidated in a loan of total value of 648 million 
drachmae redeemable over a period of 20 years.251 This was a 6 per cent interest rate loan 
between the National Bank and the government guaranteed both by special taxation and the 
government’s share in the profits of the National Bank. After 1924, this consolidated illiquid 
loan in drachmae was reported on the balance sheet of the National Bank, together with other 
loans also denominated in drachmae but traded on the Athens Stock Exchange. This change 
explains the sharp reduction in temporary loans in drachmae in 1924 that can be detected in 
Table 4.11. 
 
 Government debt called advances and presented in Table 4.11 was similar to treasury 
bills. It was an arrangement that allowed the Ministry of Finance to receive day-to-day credit 
from the National Bank. Advances were regulated by conventions made between the 
government and the Bank every three months. When the League representatives visited 
Athens in April 1927, the maximum amount of credit that the Bank was allowed to advance to 
the Treasury was 250 million drachmae, having been increased from 150 million drachmae 
that was allowed in December 1926.252 The proceeds of a surtax of 10 per cent on all taxes 
and the surplus revenue of the IFC that belonged to the government were earmarked for the 
repayment of these advances. 
 
National Defence Bonds and the National Bank 
As is explained in Chapter 5 on public finance, the Greek government started issuing treasury 
bills known as NDBs in 1918. The cornerstone of the success of these NDBs was the National 
Bank. Briefly to repeat that the NDBs were issued by the government but the National Bank 
guaranteed their full and prompt repayment. In addition, when they fell due the Bank repaid 
them and subsequently the government reimbursed the Bank. Finally, the Bank discounted the 
NDBs under certain conditions before their maturity. The National Bank had the right by law 
to issue banknotes on its behalf in case the government was unable to settle the balance. 
Needless to say, the National Bank never availed itself of this right. (For more on NDBs see 
Chapter 5.)  
 
 
250 Annual Report of the National Bank for 1922 (1923, p. xi). 
251 Annual Report of the National Bank for 1924 (1925, p. xvii); Dertilis (1957, p. 65). 
252 HABOG_A3S1Y1F4T1, p. 26. 
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Table 4.12: National Defence Bonds and the Balance Sheet of the National Bank  
(in drachmae) 
 As Assets As Liabilities Outstanding Balance 
1918  50,000,000  
1919 153,200,000 153,200,000  
1920 200,000,000 200,000,000  
1921 300,000,000 309,330,800  
1922 315,000,000 331,135,500  
1923 925,000,000 934,751,800  
1924 1,900,000,000 1,613,379,900 300,048,000 
1925 1,900,000,000 1,493,550,900 611,964,907 
1926 230,000,000 229,805,000 40,990,942 
1927 105,500,000 104,633,700  
1928 96,630,000 96,627,600 92,793,029 
1929 61,000,000 60,728,600  
1930 14,000,000 13,585,100  
Sources: Balance Sheet of the National Bank, 1918–1930; Annual Report of the National 
Bank for 1924 (1925, p. xvii); for 1925 (1926, p. xxiii); for 1926 (1927, p. xviii); Annual 
Report of the Bank of Greece for 1928 (1929, p. 63). 
 
In 1918, NDBs appeared for the first time on the balance sheet of the National Bank as a 
liability. Subsequently, ‘National Defence Bonds’ is found as an entry on both sides of the 
balance sheet of the National Bank, as Table 4.12 above demonstrates. That same table, 
however, indicates that there was a discrepancy between the value of NDBs that was quoted 
as an asset and that quoted as a liability. A comparison between Table 4.12 and Tables 5.7 
and 5.8 in the chapter that deals with public finance suggests that the entire value of the NDBs 
that had been issued was stated as a liability on the balance sheet of the National Bank. This 
may have been a way of expressing the responsibilities assumed by the National Bank where 
NDBs were concerned. It is also uncertain what the corresponding asset value of NDBs 
represented. Probably the entire amount of NDBs that the government could issue was 
reported on the asset side of the balance sheet of the National Bank rather than the quantum of 
outstanding government debt to the bank of issue stemming from NDBs. 
 
Previous research that tackles the issue of public debt held by the National Bank 
during the period in question regards the entire amount of the NDBs that is reported on the 
balance sheet of the National Bank as an obligation of the government. This same tradition 
was followed by the governor of the National Bank in his annual report for 1920, where he 
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stated the total public debt held by the National Bank during that year.253 The governor of the 
Bank included in the figure that he stated as total public debt to the National Bank the entire 
amount of the NDBs that appeared as an asset on the balance sheet. The view here, however, 
is that if the entire amount of the NDBs found on the assets of the National Bank is treated as 
government debt, then public debt to the bank of issue is overstated.  
 
 The National Bank had been authorised to repay the NDBs as they matured, as well 
as to discount them under certain conditions. It is not, however, known what the outstanding 
balance of this account was at the end of each year. This outstanding balance was in fact the 
debt of the government to the National Bank because of the NDBs. The rest of the NDBs that 
had been issued represented a potential threat to the National Bank as they could be easily 
discounted and their maturity period was very short. It is possible that the balance due by the 
government to the National Bank because of the NDBs that had either been discounted or 
repaid, formed part of the figure stated as discounts amongst the assets of the National Bank. 
The governor of the Bank announced in his annual report that this balance was 300 million 
drachmae in 1924.254 By the end of 1925, a year that the National Bank experienced a heavy 
strain because of the NDBs, this balance had been doubled.255 By contrast, when the League 
representatives were in Athens in April 1927 the balance due by the government to the 
National Bank because of the NDBs was a mere 2 million drachmae.256 By then, however, the 
Second Forced Loan had been issued which settled the question of the NDBs. (For more on 
the issue of the settlement of the NDBs, see Chapter 5.)  
 
 It would have been good if the outstanding balance of the NDBs due by the 
government to the Bank at the end of each year was known. Then, this figure could be added 
to the total public debt held by the Bank. Nevertheless, in this thesis the outstanding balance 
of the NDBs due by the government to the National Bank reported by the governor in his 
annual report for 1924 and 1925 is included in the total public debt held by the Bank during 
the period in question. (See Table 4.15 below.)  
 
Financing food importation during the war 
So far, conventional measures that are used by a central bank to financially support the 
government have been discussed here. The National Bank lent to the government using the 
253 Annual Report of the National Bank for 1920 (1921, p. ε). 
254 Annual Report of the National Bank for 1924 (1925, p. xvii). 
255 Annual Report of the National Bank for 1925 (1926, pp. xxiii and xxv); Annual Report of the 
National Bank for 1927 (1928, p. xxii). The exact amount for December 1924 was 300,048,000, whilst 
for 1925 was 611,964,907. 
256 HABOG_A3S1Y1F4T1, pp. 27–28. 
177 
 
                                                     
printing press and provided loans and advances as well. It also played an instrumental role in 
the issue of the NDBs, which resembled treasury bills. The contribution, however, of the bank 
of issue to government finance during the period in question did not end there. The National 
Bank was further involved in financing food importation during the First World War and the 
Asia Minor campaign. Finally, after 1926 the Bank was engaged itself in the indemnification 
of urban refugees for their property left behind in Asia Minor, which in the end involved 
government lending. 
 
Soon after the outbreak of the First World War the National Bank was involved in the 
importation of food supplies such as cereals in addition to sulphur and copper sulphate.257 
Initially, the National Bank was authorised not only to purchase wheat, flour and other cereals 
for the account of the government but it was also made responsible for their sale and 
distribution within the country. However, the government was accountable for any loss that 
could accrue to the Bank from the operation. In 1915, a government committee undertook the 
importation and distribution of food supplies whilst the role of the National Bank still 
remained imperative. The National Bank continued financing the entire operation. Finally, a 
Ministry of Food Provisions was established in 1917. The National Bank, however, still 
remained responsible for the finance of the importation of cereals until the Ministry was 
dissolved in the autumn of 1923. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
257 For a detailed account of these operations and their evolution see Eulambio (1924, pp. 179–235).  
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Table 4.13: Provisions and the National Bank  
(in drachmae) 
 
Food Supplies 
Sulphur & 
Copper Sulphate  
TOTAL 
1915 57,572,363.46  57,572,363.46 
1916 28,893,160.52 3,393,118.06 32,286,278.58 
1917 27,035,765.78 10,971,785.48 37,756,551.26 
1918 45,974,595.64 7,078,454.26 53,053,049.90 
1919 48,807,998.62 9,716,308.29 58,524,306.91 
1920 157,692,464.27  157,692,464.27 
1921 137,184,314.59  137,184,314.59 
1922 241,641,401.97  241,641,401.97 
1923 570,952,211.34 41,969,643.44 612,921,854.78 
1924 396,055,202.23 20,636,617.73 416,691,819.96 
1925 421,510,200.83 8,335,971.98 429,846,172.81 
1926 447,394,954.31  447,394,954.31 
Sources: Balance Sheet of the National Bank, 1918–1926; Annual Report of the Bank of 
Greece for 1928 (1929, p. xviii). 
 
The balance due by the government to the National Bank at the end of each year because of 
the importation of cereals and other materials is presented in Table 4.13 above. This 
outstanding balance constituted part of the floating debt of the government. Government debt 
to the National Bank because of the importation of food supplies to Greece stopped appearing 
on the balance sheet of the latter after 1926. Nevertheless, this is misleading since the floating 
debt of the government due to the National Bank because of the importation of cereals was 
not settled in 1926. Instead, it is probable that it was integrated with other government debt 
held by the National Bank. It is known that in March 1932 the remaining balance of this 
account was still 61.90 million drachmae. 258  
 
Indemnification of urban refugees 
A 1923 Lausanne Convention for the exchange of Greek and Turkish population provided for 
the liquidation of the refugee properties both in Greece and Turkey and the subsequent 
indemnification of the owners. In the literature on the issue in question, these properties are 
called in brief ‘exchangeable properties’, meaning in this case the property left in Greece by 
Moslem emigrants who were transferred to Turkey, and occasionally the refugees are referred 
to as ‘exchanged populations’. These terms have also been adopted here. 
 
258 Aggelopoulos (1937, p. 260). 
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The exchangeable properties consisted of rural estates and houses, which were 
granted to the RSC for the agricultural settlement, and of urban property.259 In 1926, the urban 
property of Moslem populations abandoned in Greece was transferred by the government to 
the National Bank, authorising the latter to manage and gradually sell it at auction. Initially, 
the value of these properties was estimated at approximately 4,500 million drachmae.260 New 
property was added later and their total value came up to nearly 5,125 million drachmae.261 
Liquidation of these properties, however, could easily extend over a period of years. For this 
reason, on the strength of these urban exchangeable properties, the National Bank was 
authorised to issue a series of bonds that were handed over to urban refugees as indemnity for 
their property abandoned in Asia Minor. Special committees were established which received 
the claims of the urban refugees, verified them and in return gave them a number of bonds 
representing a certain percentage of the value of their property in Asia Minor. These bonds 
were guaranteed by the government, carried an 8 per cent interest rate and were redeemable at 
par in proportion as the Moslem exchangeable urban properties were sold by the National 
Bank.262 In addition, the urban refugees could obtain in cash from the National Bank the 
equivalent of one-fifth of the value of the bonds they were entitled to. In return, the National 
Bank received from the refugees a corresponding amount of bonds. 
 
At first, against the pledged Moslem urban properties, bonds guaranteed by the 
government were issued to the value of 3,125 million drachmae. At the same time, an 
agreement between the government and the National Bank authorised the latter to pay in cash 
to the refugees 20 per cent of the nominal value of the bonds that they were entitled to 
receive. In other words, the National Bank could make cash payments to urban refugees up to 
625 million drachmae and in return would accept a corresponding amount of bonds. 
 
On 31 December 1926, the cash payments by the National Bank to urban refugees in 
exchange of bonds amounted to approximately 172 million drachmae.263 (See Table 4.14.) A 
few months later, on 20 May 1927, the cash payments to urban refugees were 613 million 
drachmae, which means that they had nearly reached the maximum allowed by law.264 It was 
decided then firstly, that the 8 per cent bonds that the National Bank had received in exchange 
for cash could be distributed back to urban refugees. Secondly, the National Bank could 
increase the cash payments to them. Finally, a new agreement between the government and 
259 See Pentzopoulos (1962, pp. 68, 117 and 147). 
260 See Annual Report of the National Bank for 1927 (1928, pp. xii–xiv); Aggelopoulos (1928, p. 109, 
n. 1); Eddy (1931, p. 265); Aegides (1934, p. 78). 
261 Aegides (1934, pp. 78–80). 
262 Pentzopoulos (1962, p. 147). 
263 Balance sheet of the National Bank for 1926. 
264 HABOG_A3S1Y1F4T1, pp. 29–30. 
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the National Bank authorised the latter to issue a new series of bonds for the indemnification 
of urban refugees for their property abandoned in Asia Minor.  
 
 At the end, two loans were issued which are known as ‘Loans of the Exchangeable’. 
The total amount of bonds granted to urban refugees as indemnity for their property in Asia 
Minor came up to over 6 billion drachmae.265 In addition, the National Bank granted cash to 
urban refugees of nearly 900 million drachmae without having received in exchange any 
bonds as collateral from the refugees.266 Hence, by the end of 1932 the cost of the 
indemnification of urban refugees for their property abandoned in Asia Minor had come up to 
nearly 7 billion drachmae whilst the estimated value of the urban exchangeable property was 
approximately 5 billion drachmae, which suggests that public money was also employed.267  
 
Table 4.14: Indemnification of urban refugees and the National Bank  
 (in drachmae) 
 Credit to Refugees Other Total 
% of Total 
Assets 
1926 172,044,732 1,466,000 173,510,732  
1927 869,397,364 96,372,860 965,770,224  
1928 1,070,311,054 72,175,524 1,142,486,578 15.52 
1929 1,109,408,798 34,001,624 1,143,410,422 13.92 
1930 1,023,528,325 128,533,961 1,152,062,286 12.81 
Note: Other includes an account called account for the management of the property of the 
exchanged Moslems. 
Source: Balance Sheet of the National Bank, 1926–1930. 
 
Table 4.14 above indicates the outstanding balance at the end of each year of all the accounts 
on the balance sheet of the National Bank which were related to the indemnification of urban 
refugees and the urban exchangeable properties that the Bank had agreed to manage and 
liquidate gradually. The National Bank retained this business after the banking reform. The 
last column of Table 4.14 shows this business of the National Bank that is related to the 
indemnification of urban refugees as a percentage of its assets after the banking reform. It is 
265 See Aegides (1934, pp. 40–41). The total amount of bonds issued equalled 6,121,921,000 drachmae. 
It should be noted that when Venizelos returned to power in the summer of 1928 he pursued a 
reduction in the interest rate of all outstanding bonds from eight per cent to six per cent. However, as a 
change in the terms of the bonds that had been already issued was not possible, a compromise was 
reached: the outstanding bonds remained at eight per cent whilst all the bonds that were circulated 
subsequently were issued at six per cent.  
266 The exact figure of the cash that the National Bank granted without receiving any collateral was 
870,958,144 drachmae. See Aegides (1934, pp. 40–41). 
267 The total cost of the indemnification of urban refugees had come to 6,992,879,144 drachmae by 31 
December 1932. See Aegides (1934, pp. 40–41). 
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noticeable that it constituted a significant part of the business that the National Bank 
maintained after the reform.  
 
The credit granted by the National Bank to urban refugees in agreement with the 
government takes the lion’s share, as is shown in Table 4.14. Part of this credit was 
collateralised with bonds issued on the strength of Moslem urban exchangeable properties. 
These bonds did not represent government debt as they were to be paid by the proceeds of the 
liquidation of Moslem urban properties. In addition, the National Bank had the right to sell 
these bonds gradually in a span of four years on the Athens Stock Exchange after 1 July 
1931.268  
 
As has been explained above the National Bank also granted credit to urban refugees 
without receiving in return a corresponding amount of bonds. The credit that the National 
Bank distributed to urban refugees and was not collateralised with bonds was indeed an 
obligation of the government. This credit formed part of the floating debt of the government 
and should be added to the public debt held by the National Bank. So far, however, no 
evidence has been located indicating the amount of credit that the National Bank had granted 
year on year without collateral to urban refugees. 
 
It is known that the total cash that the National Bank granted to urban refugees 
without collateral was nearly 900 million drachmae.269 It is not known, however, the amount 
of cash at the end of each year that the National Bank had provided to urban refugees without 
any collateral so that it can be included in the total public debt that the National Bank held, as 
shown in Table 4.15.  
 
 
 
Summary of illiquid debt 
 
 
 
 
268 Annual Report of the National Bank for 1927 (1928, p. xiii). 
269 Aegides (1934, pp. 40–41). 
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Table 4.15: Summary of bilateral public debt held by the National Bank of Greece, 1912–1930 (nominal drachmae) 
 Forced 
Circulation 
Temporary 
Loans Advances 
Consolidated 
Loans 
National 
Defence Bonds Food Supplies 
Refugee 
Indemnity Total 
1912 61,778,575       61,778,575 
1913 61,778,575 73,814,400      135,592,975 
1914 60,951,915 88,616,137      149,568,052 
1915 58,951,915 68,933,773    57,572,363  185,458,052 
1916 56,951,915 58,878,956    32,286,279  148,117,150 
1917 54,951,915 77,384,119    37,756,551  170,092,586 
1918 902,951,915 55,000,000   x 53,053,050  1,011,004,965 
1919 1,244,892,985 320,084,875   x 58,524,307  1,623,502,167 
1920 1,488,736,090 666,985,350   x 157,692,464  2,313,413,904 
1921 2,136,736,090 1,140,755,350   x 137,184,315  3,414,675,755 
1922 3,284,736,090 886,355,350 129,910,516  x 241,641,402  4,542,643,359 
1923 3,991,736,090 876,075,350 180,617,639  x 612,921,855  5,661,350,934 
1924 3,812,236,090 348,935,143 46,884,718 x 300,048,000 416,691,820  4,924,795,770 
1925 3,767,784,175 234,140,000 48,432,166 x 611,964,907 429,846,173  5,092,167,420 
1926 3,767,784,175 190,000,000 159,107,587 x 40,990,942 447,394,954 x 4,605,277,658 
1927 3,955,784,175 379,581,896  x x x x 4,335,366,071 
1928  313,872,183  ? 92,793,029 x x 406,665,212 
1929  180,957,349  ? x x x 180,957,349 
1930  185,185,434  ? x x x 185,185,434 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  
(1) An x denotes missing data.  
(2) A ? denotes where the available evidence does not clarify whether or not the National 
Bank retained any government debt of that category after the central banking reform. 
Sources: Tables 4.11 and 4.13; Annual Report of the National Bank for 1924 (1925, p. xvii); 
Annual Report of the National Bank for 1925 (1926, p. xxiii); Annual Report of the National 
Bank for 1926 (1927, p. xviii); Annual Report of the Bank of Greece for 1928 (1929, p. xviii). 
 
All public debt based on agreements between the government and the bank of issue from the 
outbreak of the Balkan Wars until the establishment of the Bank of Greece is gathered 
together in Table 4.15. In spite of the effort that has been made, it has not been possible to 
collect all the different amounts of government debt owed to the Bank. In Table 4.15, x 
denotes where data are missing. In spite of the fact that the data on bilateral public debt 
presented in Table 4.15 are nearly complete, the arguments made below about the changes 
that happened to the balance sheet of the National Bank are correct. If the data are located 
then all the comments and observations made will be strengthened as illiquid public debt held 
by the National Bank will be increased.  
 
Table 4.15 illustrates the complex relationship between the government and the 
National Bank that was created between the outbreak of the Balkan Wars and the banking 
reform. Furthermore, this table shows the methods that Greek governments used in order to 
finance public expenditure during such a turbulent period when they had no direct access to 
the financial markets. Indeed, if the total of the NDBs that had been issued as well as the 
proceeds of the two forced loans are added up together with the bilateral government debt 
held by the National Bank, then the outcome will show the stock of the domestic public debt 
that was created during the period in question. Therefore, the bank of issue proved to be the 
main source of financial support for the government. Participation in the First World War and 
the Asia Minor campaign were primarily financed by the National Bank. After the end of a 
long period of war, the National Bank continued its support to the government, although this 
time it was mainly confined to NDBs and advances. Achieving stabilisation of the drachma 
meant that they had to signal a change in their policy. Subsequently, the adoption of the gold 
exchange standard and the statutes of the new central bank led to the introduction of a legal 
framework which redefined the relationship of the central bank with the government. 
Government borrowing from the newly established Bank of Greece was strictly curtailed.  
 
Table 4.15 shows that the National Bank played an imperative role in channelling 
funds to the government during a period of turmoil when the Greek government had no access 
to financial markets. Between 1918 and 1923, the printing press was the main instrument used 
to finance public expenditure. Budget deficits were monetised during active participation in 
 
 
the Great War and the Asia Minor campaign, leading to a monetary instability that the country 
had never experienced before. Temporary loans were also contracted between the National 
Bank and the government. Table 4.15 also suggests that 1918, with the issue of banknotes 
because of the Allied Book Credits, signifies a turning point in the relation between the 
central bank and the government, although the ΓΧΜΒ Law had also been violated before. At 
the end, the National Bank was encumbered with government debt in forced circulation, in 
spite of the official belief that these issues of banknotes were fully covered by foreign 
exchange reserves.  
 
 Between 1920 and 1923, the printing press was rolled several times. When resort to 
the printing press was stopped, the government used treasury bills, the so-called National 
Defence Bonds to cover budget deficits. The settlement of the NDBs in 1926 was the first 
important step towards stabilisation. The governor of the National Bank pursued a 
stabilisation that was accompanied with the flotation of a foreign loan to clear public debt, in 
particular government debt in forced circulation, and in this way to strengthen the financial 
position of the National Bank. Public debt held by the National Bank in the 1920s created 
severe liquidity problems for it. As it is, however, apparent in this thesis, the solvency of the 
Bank was never jeopardised during this turbulent period. 
 
 After the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, the stipulations of the Law of Control that 
defined the relationship between the Greek government and the bank of issue were at first 
discretely, and then openly, violated. During the Balkan Wars temporary loans were granted 
by the National Bank to the government. Subsequently, the principles upon which the ΓΧΜΒ 
Law operated were infringed and in this way the printing press was rolled implicitly. In the 
early 1920s, banknotes in favour of the government were overtly issued. In addition, treasury 
bills were also being circulated in the form of NDBs.  
 
 The period in question here was an exceptionally turbulent period for Greece and it is 
not expected that the monetary discipline endorsed by the Law of Control and favoured by the 
National Bank would have been or could have been maintained. The legal framework that 
defined the relationship of the government with the bank of issue, in this case the Law of 
Control, was observed for as long as both the economic conditions and the political economy 
in Greece were in favour of it. During the Balkan Wars no attention was paid to it because of 
the euphoria that was created by victory and the prospects of the Greek economy with the 
annexation of the New Areas. Then, during the First World War the printing press was used 
under the Book Credit agreements with the Allies. A new committee, the Inter-Allied 
Financial Commission, was established in Athens that oversaw how the Book Credits were 
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spent. During the Asia Minor campaign the ‘nationalist argument’ was too strong for the 
Bank to refuse its help to the government.270 Thus, from the outbreak of the First Balkan War 
until stabilisation the National Bank became too close to the government. In the 1920s, the 
international environment had changed. The Financial Committee of the League of Nations 
ruled the waves, promoting the ideas of the Bank of England on monetary orthodoxy and 
consequently the relationship between a central bank and its government.  
 
4.2.4. Bilateral public debt held by the National Bank reconsidered, 1898–1930 
4.2.4.1. Evolution of illiquid public debt 
Table 4.16 demonstrates bilateral public debt held by the National Bank between the 
enactment of the Law of Control and the banking reforms of the late 1920s as a percentage of 
its total assets. In 1898, illiquid public debt to the National Bank – mainly government debt in 
forced circulation – accounted for nearly 29 per cent of its total assets. In 1912, when the First 
Balkan War broke out, bilateral public debt held by the National Bank still consisted solely of 
government debt in forced circulation which, however, had dropped to approximately 10 per 
cent of its total assets. This was the lowest percentage share of bilateral government debt in 
terms of the assets of the National Bank since the enactment of the Law of Control. Then 
illiquid government debt as a percentage of the assets of the National Bank started increasing, 
although by the end of 1917 it had fluctuated severely. It should be reminded that the data for 
the period after 1915 and until 1927 are not complete and therefore the total bilateral 
government debt presented in Table 4.15, as well as its percentage share in the total assets, is 
understated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
270 Dertilis and Kostis (1995, p. 462). 
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Table 4.16: Total bilateral public debt held by the National Bank of Greece  
as a percentage of its assets, 1898–1930 
 % of Assets 
1898 28.88 
1899 27.99 
1900 27.09 
1901 25.58 
1902 23.81 
1903 24.45 
1904 22.04 
1905 21.85 
1906 20.31 
1907 19.84 
1908 19.01 
1909 19.13 
1910 17.09 
1911 12.51 
1912 10.54 
1913 18.43 
1914 20.62 
1915 20.29 
1916 13.16 
1917 10.69 
1918 40.72 
1919 60.34 
1920 58.37 
  
1928 4.26 
1929 2.20 
1930 2.06 
Sources: Table 4.15 and Table A2.1 in Appendix A2. 
 
Table 4.16 demonstrates unequivocally that 1918 was a turning point in the relationship 
between the government and the National Bank. Bilateral public debt on the balance sheet of 
the National Bank corresponded to nearly 41 per cent of its assets in 1918, whilst the year 
before it had been only 10 per cent. The following year it increased to approximately 60 per 
cent. As it has been repeatedly explained, there is no point extending this exercise into the 
1920s because of the accountancy practices followed by the National Bank during the 
monetary upheaval. Bilateral government debt, however, held by the National Bank during 
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the 1920s remained a significant percentage of its assets, pointing out the liquidity problems 
that the Bank experienced during that period.  
 
It is unfortunate that there are no data on bilateral public debt held by the National 
Bank for the period before the enactment of the Law of Control that could be compared with 
the time series constructed in this thesis for the period 1898 to 1930. In this way, the 
experience of the National Bank as a lender to the government during its entire history as a 
bank of issue could be evaluated and general conclusions could be drawn. Nonetheless, it is 
possible that bilateral government borrowing from the National Bank between 1918 and 1927 
reached unprecedented high levels in its entire history as the bank of the government.  
 
 
Figure 4.5: Bilateral public debt held by the National Bank  
as a percentage of GDP, 1898–1930 
Source: Table A2.14 in Appendix A2. 
 
Both Figure 4.5 and Table A2.14 in Appendix A2 demonstrate bilateral government debt 
owned by the National Bank between the enactment of the Law of Control and the central 
banking reform as a percentage of GDP. They show that between 1898 and 1911 bilateral 
public debt held by the National Bank as a percentage of GDP fell steadily. This fall was due 
on the one hand to a slow but steady decrease in the illiquid public debt held by the National 
Bank and on the other to a significant increase in GDP. (See Table A2.15 where the time 
series of illiquid public debt in nominal drachmae for the entire period in question is 
presented and Table A1.2 in Appendix A1 for GDP data.) 
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 Between 1912 and 1917, bilateral public debt held by the National Bank as a 
percentage of GDP fluctuated from year to year. Figure 4.5, where illiquid public debt is 
presented as a percentage of GDP, shows that 1918 was a watershed. After 1918, the 
percentage share of bilateral public debt in GDP increased significantly, reaching 
exceptionally high levels. For example, in 1921 bilateral public debt held by the National 
Bank accounted for half of GPD of that year. Subsequently, the percentage share of illiquid 
public debt owned by the National Bank as a percentage of GDP shrank and by 1927 it 
represented merely 14 per cent of GDP. This is a moderate estimate since, as has been noted, 
the data are not complete. If the data had been complete then illiquid public debt held by the 
National Bank as a percentage of GDP in 1927 would have been shown to have been between 
17 per cent and 20 per cent. This significant decrease of bilateral government debt of the 
National Bank as a percentage of GDP was due, to a large extent, to high inflation in the 
1920s. Illiquid public debt had not decreased notably by 1927, as is demonstrated in Table 
4.15. On the other hand, Kostelenos et al. (2007) data on GDP in nominal drachmae show that 
it increased rapidly in the 1920s – an increase that was primarily inflationary. This suggests 
that high inflation wiped out a significant part of the burden of bilateral government debt 
which was denominated in drachmae.  
 
A last attempt will be made to appraise developments in the relationship of the 
National Bank with the government between the enactment of the Law of Control and the 
banking reform. This time the data of illiquid government debt owned by the National Bank is 
converted to constant 1911 values using Kostelenos et al. (2007) deflator. The result is 
presented in Table A2.15. Subsequently, as Table A2.15 shows, bilateral public debt at 
constant values was transformed into a ratio form where 1911 is again the base year. In this 
way, the proportionate change in the total stock of bilateral public debt at 1911 values that the 
National Bank held becomes evident. In addition, the evolution of bilateral government debt 
denominated in drachmae is also examined.  
 
 Figure 4.6, where illiquid government debt at 1911 values is graphically depicted, 
echoes Figure 4.5, which illustrates bilateral government debt as a percentage of GDP as well 
as Table 4.16 which shows bilateral public debt held by the National Bank as a percentage of 
its assets. Once again, the increase in the bilateral public debt that the National Bank held 
between the Balkan Wars and de jure stabilisation of the drachma is manifested in Figure 4.6. 
Between 1911 and 1917 bilateral government debt held by the National Bank at constant 
values fluctuated and its level in 1917 was close to that observed in 1911. This observation is 
consistent with previous comments made when bilateral public debt owned by the Bank was 
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examined as a percentage of its assets and of GDP. Furthermore, 1918 is again displayed as a 
turning point. 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Total bilateral public debt held by the National Bank  
at 1911 values as a ratio, 1898–1930 (1911=100) 
Source: See Table A2.15 in Appendix A2. 
 
Figure 4.6 shows that between 1918 and 1927 bilateral government debt at 1911 values held 
by the National Bank ballooned. After 1918 it increased remarkably reaching exceptionally 
high levels. As Figure 4.6 above shows, high inflation in the 1920s wiped out a significant 
part of the nominal value of bilateral public debt denominated in drachmae that the National 
Bank owned. High inflation, however, did not eliminate public debt denominated in 
drachmae. In 1927, bilateral government debt at 1911 values still remained approximately 
three and a half times higher than it had been before the outbreak of the Balkan Wars. This is 
a good proxy, given that the data on bilateral government debt compiled in Table 4.15 are not 
complete.  
 
 Most of the illiquid public debt held by the National Bank in 1928 was passed to the 
newly established Bank of Greece during the reform. The Old Bank, that is to say the 
National Bank, maintained some illiquid government debt mainly in temporary loans and the 
outstanding floated debt related to the NDBs as well as to the importation of food supplies on 
behalf of the government during the First World War and the Asia Minor campaign.  
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During the central banking reforms, one-third of the Stabilisation Loan of 1928, that 
is to say 3 million pounds sterling, was used by the government for the repayment of illiquid 
government debt to the bank of issue, by this time the Bank of Greece. In this way, the 
reserve position of the newly established central bank was strengthened and at the same time 
illiquid public debt created during the period of war and monetary upheaval was converted 
into government debt denominated in gold and traded on stock exchanges. At the end, 
however, the illiquid public debt that the Bank of Greece inherited from its predecessor 
represented 47.41 per cent of its total assets on the day that it opened its doors for operations. 
(See Table A5.1 in Appendix A5.)  
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4.2.4.2. Was the National Bank a ‘bank of the government’ or a commercial bank, 1898–
1930271  
Table 4.17: Bilateral public debt held by the National Bank 
compared to credits supplied to the economy, 1898–1930 
1898 0.91 
1899 0.77 
1900 0.68 
1901 0.62 
1902 0.57 
1903 0.55 
1904 0.51 
1905 0.50 
1906 0.47 
1907 0.42 
1908 0.40 
1909 0.41 
1910 0.39 
1911 0.30 
1912 0.28 
1913 0.70 
1914 0.64 
1915 0.72 
1916 0.57 
1917 0.64 
1918 3.45 
1919 4.82 
1920 4.30 
1921 5.89 
1922 4.28 
1923 4.94 
1924 2.20 
1925 1.80 
1926 1.64 
1927 1.99 
1928 0.10 
1929 0.04 
1930 0.04 
Sources: Tables A2.2 and A2.15 in Appendix A2. 
 
271 The term ‘bank of the government’ is used here to denote the importance of illiquid public debt on the 
balance sheet of the National Bank comparing it with credits granted to the economy borrowed from 
Agriantoni (1986). As has been stated above, the National Bank was in any event the bank of the 
government.  
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Figure 4.7: Bilateral public debt held by the National Bank  
compared to credits to the economy, 1898–1930 
Source: Table 4.17. 
 
In Table 4.17 and Figure 4.7, illiquid government debt held by the National Bank is compared 
with total credits granted to the economy during the entire period in question. After the 
enactment of the Law of Control the National Bank gradually increased credits to the 
economy, reinforcing in this way its commercial aspect. However, illiquid public debt held by 
the bank of issue, slowly but steadily, decreased until the Balkan Wars. As a result, in 1911 
bilateral public debt which was comprised of banknotes in forced circulation represented only 
30 per cent of credits to the economy. By contrast, at the end of 1898, when the floating debt 
of the government had been restructured following the introduction of the Law of Control, the 
illiquid public debt that the National Bank retained was approximately equal to total credits 
that it had granted to the economy. 
 
 Although illiquid public debt increased more rapidly than credits to the economy 
between the outbreak of the Balkan Wars and active participation of Greece in the First World 
War, it still remained a fraction of total credits to the economy supplied by the National Bank. 
Table 4.17 shows that the relationship between credits to the economy and bilateral public 
debt held by the National Bank changed fundamentally after 1918. In 1918, illiquid 
government debt was approximately three and a half times higher than credits to the 
economy. Indeed, from 1918 to the establishment of the Bank of Greece in 1928, bilateral 
public debt persistently exceeded credits to the economy: illiquid public debt on the balance 
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sheet of the National Bank was several times higher than credits to the economy, as Table 
4.17 and Figure 4.7 demonstrate. In 1924, credit granted to the economy in nominal terms 
increased by nearly twofold. This increase meant that the ratio of public debt to credits to the 
economy dropped abruptly; in 1924 illiquid public debt held by the National Bank was 
roughly 2.20 times higher than private credits to the economy or in other words, credits 
provided to the economy represented approximately 45 per cent of bilateral public debt held 
by the Bank. It should be reminded again that total illiquid government debt held by the 
National Bank in the 1920s, and presented in Table 4.15, is understated because the data are 
not complete. This means that the ratio between bilateral public debt and credits to the 
economy presented in Table 4.17 was to some extent higher in the 1920s. However, if the 
data in Table 4.15 were complete, the picture conveyed by Table 4.17 and Figure 4.7 would 
not have been very different. After 1928, as Table 4.17 demonstrates, illiquid government 
debt held by the National Bank was minute if it is compared with credits to the economy 
indicating the radical central banking reform that had taken place with the establishment of 
the Bank of Greece and the transformation of the National Bank into a purely commercial 
bank. 
 
 The National Bank restrained credits to the economy after the outbreak of the First 
World War, as Tables A2.3 and A2.4 in Appendix A2 show. In 1927, credits to the economy 
at constant prices were half of those provided in 1911. On the other hand, bilateral 
government debt held by the National Bank, as has been said before, was approximately 3.50 
times higher than that appearing on its balance sheet in 1911. This noticeable change in the 
balance sheet of the National Bank was not the result of a deliberate shift in the approach of 
the National Bank. Nor does it indicate that the bank of issue aimed at curbing its commercial 
activities and giving up lucrative private business to evolve itself into a fully fledged central 
bank. In 1927, on the eve of central banking reforms, the National Bank remained a dual-
purpose bank, that is to say a commercial bank which at the same time acted as the central 
bank in Greece. Both commercial activities and central banking responsibilities were 
important to the National Bank as late as 1927 when the League of Nations was approached 
for assistance. In fact, its governors pursued the stabilisation of the drachma expecting that a 
stable drachma would encourage capital flows, which in turn would enable them to expand 
the commercial aspect of the National Bank whilst retaining their public responsibilities.  
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CHAPTER 5: 
GREEK GOVERNMENTS: OPTIONS FOR FINANCE 
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction          
5.2. Governments in search of finance: the First World War     
5.3. Governments in despair         
5.3.1. Introduction          
5.3.2. Internal Borrowing         
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5.3.2.2. The two Forced Loans        
5.3.2.3. National Defence Bonds       
5.3.3. External Borrowing         
5.4. Developments in Greece: The Fleet Street Perspective     
5.5. The legacy of the period         
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
After the end of the Balkan Wars there was optimism in Greece. New fertile areas had been 
annexed, the drachma remained at par and the creditworthiness of the Greek government was 
high on capital markets abroad. (See Figures 6.3 and 6.5 in Chapter 6 of this thesis.) Hence, at 
the time it was difficult to imagine that the country would soon enter a long period of war, 
great financial and monetary instability in addition to financial isolation.  
 
 Although the Greek government borrowed heavily during the Balkan Wars its 
financial position remained fairly strong. The expenditure incurred during the period of 
mobilisation was covered by part of the proceeds of the 1910 Bonds Loan and loans from the 
National Bank of Greece.272 The loans granted by the bank of issue to the government were 
known as ‘credit operations’.273 The government intended to float an international loan after 
272 For a detailed presentation of the way that the Balkan Wars were financed, see for example 
Andreades (1939, pp. 580–589). 
273 Aggelopoulos (1937, p. 28, n. 2).  
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the end of the Balkan Wars with the aim of paying off the ‘credit operations’ and to develop 
the New Areas annexed. This resulted in the flotation of the 1914 Loan.274  
 
 At the end of 1913, public debt was 141.99 per cent of GDP. It was also the 
equivalent of 252.39 drachmae per capita. In 1913, the drachma remained stable at its LMU 
parity where one nominal drachma was equal to one gold drachma, which in turn equalled one 
French franc. Therefore, in 1913 per capita public debt was 252.39 gold drachmae or French 
francs or indeed 10.10 pounds sterling. These data from 1913 show an overall improvement in 
the burden of public debt since the enactment of the Law of Control, despite new external 
borrowing after 1900 and domestic loans during the Balkan Wars. By contrast, in 1898 total 
Greek public debt including the 2.50 per cent Guaranteed Loan was approximately 230 per 
cent of GDP. It was nearly 360 French francs per capita or approximately 14.50 pounds 
sterling per capita. (See Table A6.1 in Appendix A6 which presents some general information 
on public debt.) The improvement to be seen in the burden of public debt in 1913 was due to a 
large extent to the appreciation of the drachma, which by the end of 1909 had reached its 
LMU parity. In addition, an increase in GDP and of course in the population in the country 
had contributed to this improvement in the level of public debt. 
 
 Table A6.1 in Appendix A6 demonstrates that in 1898, after the reconstruction of 
Greek public debt, nearly 87 per cent of the country’s total debt was external debt 
denominated in gold and traded on secondary markets, whilst only 13 per cent was domestic 
debt. By 1913, the share of domestic public debt had increased mainly because of the way in 
which war expenditure during the Balkan Wars had been financed: by then 32 per cent of the 
total public debt was domestic debt, whilst the share of external debt had decreased to 
approximately 68 per cent.  
 
 This chapter examines firstly the methods employed by Greek governments to 
finance war and reconstruction between the outbreak of the Great War and stabilisation. More 
precisely, the methods used to mobilise internal resources are presented. In addition, the 
struggle of the Greek government to secure finance from its Allies during the Great War and 
then from the international capital markets is discussed. Secondly, this chapter establishes that 
market participants in London were well informed about developments in Greece and thus 
were able to evaluate country risk during a period when a system of formal rating had not 
been developed. Research into the newspaper cuttings that the Council of the Corporation of 
Foreign Bondholders systematically collected provides ample evidence that British investors 
274 For more on this loan, see Christodoulaki and Penzer (2004). 
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were able to be well informed about developments in Greece and promptly. Finally, this 
chapter closes with an appraisal of the period in question and its legacy.  
 
War, and to a large extent subsequent reconstruction, have a long-term impact on 
financial institutions. This long-term impact of war and its aftermath on financial institutions 
is a result of the need for direct and indirect funding of the conflict and its preparation as well 
as of the expenditure that occurs during reconstruction. Central banks tend to come very close 
to their governments and support them to pay for war and its aftermath. Deficit financing 
becomes an acceptable central bank duty. By contrast, during stabilisation the dangers 
inherent in political interference in central banking are widely acknowledged and establishing 
central bank independence becomes a major objective.  
 
In the Greek example, a long period of war and monetary upheaval in addition to the 
influx of over a million of refugees from Asia Minor put severe pressure on public finance. 
The Greek government adopted policies of deficit finance which had as a consequence a close 
relationship with the National Bank. During the attempt at stabilising the drachma under the 
aegis of the League of Nations in the late 1920s, the question of the relationship of the Greek 
government to the National Bank was scrutinised and was one of the reasons that led to the 
establishment of a new central bank which would be independent of any political interference. 
 
 
5.2. Governments in search of finance: the First World War 
The First World War created a deep national schism and intense domestic strife in Greece 
with the country divided between two sides. The Premier, Venizelos, aspired to a policy of 
intervention on the side of the Allies, whilst on the other hand the King was in favour of the 
country remaining neutral. The Premier believed in the final victory of the Entente which 
would bring territorial gains to Greece whilst the King had faith in the military supremacy of 
Germany. This crisis came to a head in 1916. Finally, in June 1917, King Constantine was 
forced to leave the country and subsequently the Venizelos government declared war on the 
Central Powers.  
 
 The Greek government borrowed heavily both before and during active participation 
in the First World War. As with most of the belligerent European governments at the time, it 
resorted to the printing press to finance expenditure. The increase in the money supply during 
the Great War is not usually thought to have been inflationary as these banknotes were issued 
under the ΓΧΜΒ Law. The principles upon which the ΓΧΜΒ Law operated were, however, 
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infringed. Short- and long-term loans were also issued.275 Furthermore, in 1918 the Greek 
government started issuing the treasury bills known as National Defence Bonds (NDBs). 
Finally, the government borrowed for importation of food, sulphur and copper sulphate. As is 
discussed in Chapter 4, the National Bank was responsible for financing the importation of 
these goods. Overall, Greece financed war expenditure by mobilising internal resources.  
 
During the Great War the National Bank resorted to the ΓΧΜΒ Law repeatedly to 
increase the money supply. As has been stated, however, the principles of the 1910 Law were 
violated. Between 1916 and 1919 the banknotes issued under the ΓΧΜΒ Law were printed on 
the strength of Book Credits opened by foreign governments. In the end, the banknotes issued 
under the ΓΧΜΒ Law during the Great War became government debt in forced circulation.  
 
 Table 5.1 below shows the Book Credits opened in favour of the Greek government 
by other European governments during the period of neutrality. See also Table 4.5 in Chapter 
4 which presents the evolution of the ΓΧΜΒ Law between 1916 and 1919 when this law was 
used to print banknotes for the last time. Evidence, although scant, located in the archives of 
the National Bank, indicates that the Bank was aware of the perils of increasing the money 
supply on the strength of Book Credits.276  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
275 For more, see Zolotas (1928, pp. 51–54). 
276 NBGHA_Α1Σ10Υ1Φ217: The third German Loan of 1916, p. 5. 
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Table 5.1: Book Credits opened during the period 1915–1917 
(in drachmae) 
France 
11 October 1915 10,000,000 
23 December 1915 10,000,000 
24 August 1915 10,000,000 
4 August 1917 50,000,000 
Total: 80,000,000 
Great Britain 
5 November 1915 10,000,000 
 5 September 1917  50,000,000 
Total: 60,000,000 
Russia 
16 November 1915 10,000,000 
                                       
 
10,000,000 
Germany 
1916 73,600,000 
Total: 73,600,000 
Grand Total:                                  223,600,000 
 
Note: The German Book Credit was opened by the S. Bleichroeder banking firm and 
amounted to 80 million marks. In 1916, the exchange rate between the drachma and the mark 
was 0.92 marks per drachma.      
Sources: NBGHA_Α1Σ19Υ1Φ34Ε18, pp. 1–2; NBGHA_Α1Σ10Υ1Φ217; Zolotas (1928, pp. 
54–56). 
 
Eleftherios Venizelos realised that the Allies would not make any real transfers to financially 
support the active participation of Greece in the Great War. For this reason he pursued a 
different kind of agreement with the Allies that would allow him to finance participation in 
the war. Under the February 1918 Paris Agreement, Britain, France and the USA made 
available Book Credits in equal shares to the Greek government totalling 750 million French 
francs, including a provisional Book Credit of 50 million drachmae opened in 1917.277 The 
ΓΧΜΒ Law was modified and on the strength of these Book Credits, the National Bank printed 
banknotes that enabled the government to meet the expenses of the armed forces during 1918.278 
The Allied Book Credits opened on behalf of Greece could be drawn upon by the Greek 
government six months after the conclusion of peace. It was, however, stipulated that the Greek 
government reserved the right to draw drafts in case their foreign reserves together with the 
National Bank’s deposits available abroad, fell below 100 million francs. The repayment of 
these advances placed an obligation on the Greek government and they were granted by the 
277 For the negotiations of the Greek government with the Western Allies and the difficulties 
encountered, see Leontaritis (1990, pp. 199–245).  
278 See Annual Report of the National Bank for 1918 (1919). 
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Allies in pounds sterling, French francs and US dollars. These Book Credits were aimed at 
helping the Greek government to procure internal resources, to liquidate arrears and pay for 
military arrangements. 
 
 This 1918 Paris Agreement between the Greek government and its Allies consisted of 
five articles and is presented in Appendix A6. It provided that the amortisation period of the 
loan could be up to 15 years. The interest rate of these advances was not specified and the Greek 
government was not required to assign any specific revenues as guarantees. Article four of the 
Paris Agreement, however, stipulated that until the repayment of these obligations by the Greek 
government, no new security could be ‘effected to an external loan without the consent of the 
Governments of the USA, France and Great Britain’.279 This clause complicated the relationship 
of the Greek government with its war Allies in the 1920s; each time that the Greek government 
attempted to float a foreign loan it was under the obligation to ask the permission of its former 
Allies.280 An Inter-Allied Financial Commission which was composed of representatives of the 
three Allies and of Greece was established in Athens. This Inter-Allied Financial Commission 
was made responsible for the authorisation of advances concerning the organisation and 
maintenance of the army and navy.  
 
In May 1919, a supplementary agreement was signed and a further 100 million 
French francs of Book Credits were granted to Greece; however, this time only by France and 
Great Britain but under the same terms and conditions as those of the 1918 agreement. 
 
 As Table 5.2 demonstrates, in total the 1918 and 1919 agreements provided for the 
opening of Book Credits of 850 million francs and the equivalent of banknotes were printed 
by the bank of issue. Zolotas (1928, p. 57) claimed that the National Bank did not always 
print fresh banknotes but sometimes used its own reserves to lend the government on the 
strength of the Book Credit agreements. Together these two agreements represented a huge 
borrowing operation for the Greek government; total Book Credits issued during these two 
years were 22.50 per cent of the 1919 GDP. 
 
 
 
 
 
279 See Appendix A6 for the text of the 1918 Book Credits Agreement between Greece and the Allies. 
280 This right was waived in 1927 and 1928 when Greece settled its war debt with Britain and the USA 
respectively.  
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Table 5.2: Book Credits issued, 1918–1919 
(French francs) 
France 
1918 
1919 
250,000,000 
   50,000,000 
Great Britain 
1918 
1919 
250,000,000 
   50,000,000 
U.S.A. 1918 250,000,000 
 
Table 5.3 shows the Book Credits opened by the three Allies. In addition, it indicates the total 
advances made to the government by the National Bank as well as the total of the banknotes 
issued each year on the strength of these Book Credits.  
 
Table 5.3: Book Credits opened and increase in the banknotes in circulation 
(in millions of drachmae) 
  
Britain 
 
France 
 
U.S.A. 
 
Total 
opened 
Advances to the 
government by the 
National Bank 
 
Total of 
banknotes  
issued 
1917 25.00 25.00  50.00   50.00   50.00 
1918 200.00 183.50 205.00 588.50 625.00 464.00 
1919 25.00 30.70 45.00 100.70 175.00 336.00 
1920  10.80  10.80   
 250.00 250.00 250.00       750.00 850.00 850.00 
Source: Pantenlakis (1988, pp. 88–89). 
 
In 1918 and 1919 the National Bank made separate agreements with Great Britain and France 
on the lines of the Paris Agreement for the financial support of their troops stationed in 
Macedonia. These additional agreements stipulated that the interest rate charged on the 
advances furnished to the Allied armies in Macedonia would be 5 per cent.  
 
Table 5.4 below shows the advances made by the National Bank to the Allied troops 
in Macedonia and the sums that each government reimbursed. The British Treasury 
reimbursed nearly all the advances made to the British troops by the National Bank. By 
contrast, France did not reimburse any of the advances made to its army in Macedonia.  
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Table 5.4: Advances made by the National Bank to the Allied troops in Macedonia 
(in millions of Drachmae) 
 
Britain France 
Advances 
made by the 
National 
Bank 
Reimbursed 
Advances 
made by the 
National 
Bank 
Reimbursed 
1918 98.866  
241,964,965.80 
 
0 1919 11.187 40.272 
1920  68.094 22,427,970.80 0 
Total 110.053 108.366 264,392,936.60 0 
Sources: NBGHA_Α1Σ19Υ1Φ34Ε18; Pantenlakis (1988, p. 111). 
 
Just a few months after the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres, in November 1920 Venizelos was 
overwhelmingly defeated in a general election.281 This general election that brought the 
Populist Party to power together with the unexpected death of the young King Alexander who 
had succeeded his father, paved the way for the return to Athens of the exiled King Constantine. 
Following a referendum held on 22 November (Julian)/5 December (Gregorian) 1920, King 
Constantine was officially returned to the Greek throne. Immediately, the Allied governments 
informed Athens that the repatriation of King Constantine meant that they were no longer bound 
by the Treaty of Sèvres. Greece would also encounter a financial embargo and cancellation of 
the Book Credits.282  
 
Political historiography and military sources correlate subsequent events in Asia Minor 
with the return of King Constantine to the Greek throne. Careful examination, however, of 
geopolitical developments in the area late in 1920 does not support the view that the outcome of 
the election had a catalytic effect on the course of history.283 Economic history literature on the 
period links the cancellation of the Book Credits with the depreciation of the drachma and the 
difficulties the country faced in raising capital from financial markets abroad in the 1920s.284 
With hindsight, the return of the exiled King to Athens, served as an excuse on the part of the 
Allies to cancel the Book Credits at a time when their domestic preoccupations prevailed over 
international agreements. 
 
 
281 For more see Bochotis (1999, pp. 98–100); Yanoulopoulos (1999b, p. 132). 
282 Yanoulopoulos (1999a, pp. 270–271). 
283 Ibid., pp. 273. 
284 See for example Diomides (1922); Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, pp. 54–57). 
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Table 5.5.: Book Credits realised 
(millions of French francs) 
 Book Credits Paid Total 
Opened 
Britain France U.S.A. Total 
1917     50.00 
1918     588.50 
1919   25.90 25.90 100.70 
1920 164.83  51.80 216.63 10.80 
 164.83  77.70 242.53 750.00 
Sources: NBGHA_Α1Σ19Υ1Φ34Ε18; NBGHA_Α1Σ19Υ1Φ35Ε6; Pantelakis (1988, pp. 88-
89); Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, p. 54). 
 
Table 5.5 shows the Book Credits that had been realised by the three war Allies 
before their cancellation in December 1920. The remaining Book Credits that had not been 
realised continued to appear on the balance sheet of the National Bank as ‘reserves abroad 
because of the ΓΧΜΒ Law’ until the central banking reform of 1928. These ‘reserves abroad 
because of the ΓΧΜΒ Law’ were in fact government debt in forced circulation. Nevertheless, 
as is explained in Chapter 4, the persistent inclusion of this entry on the balance sheet of the 
National Bank until the banking reform encapsulates vividly the expectations of successive 
Greek governments as well as the governors of the National Bank that eventually the Book 
Credits would be realised. In the end, one-third of the Stabilisation Loan of 1928, which was 
the equivalent of the government debt in forced circulation because of the Allied Book 
Credits, was used by the government to repay debt in forced circulation that the newly 
established Bank of Greece inherited from its predecessor. This was to strengthen the reserve 
position of the new central bank to enable it to support a drachma de jure stabilised.  
 
 It has been repeatedly argued that had the Allied Book Credits been realised in full 
then the monetary upheaval experienced in the 1920s would have been avoided. The main 
argument proposed in favour of this claim is that if the Book Credits had been realised in full, 
then the banknotes issued under the Paris Agreements would have been withdrawn from 
circulation. This belief was based on article eight of the ΓΧΜΒ Law, which stipulated that 
when the bank of issue sold gold or foreign exchange accumulated under this law then it had 
to withdraw from circulation the equivalent value in banknotes. The conjuncture, however, of 
the early 1920s was very different from that of the period between 1910 and 1914 when the 
ΓΧΜΒ Law operated in the way that it was designed to by its ‘father’ Ioannis Valaorites. In 
addition, it is believed that the Greek government would not have experienced financial 
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difficulties, in particular during the Asia Minor campaign. As a result the country would have 
escaped monetary upheaval in the 1920s.285  
 
During the Great War the drachma remained stable at its par value, whilst at the same 
time prices increased more than threefold. The size of Book Credits issued during the entire 
First World War was one of the main reasons of the high inflation experienced after the 
outbreak of the war and of the monetary upheaval in the 1920s; a fact that was persistently 
denied by contemporaneous policy makers and in particular by the governor of the National 
Bank, Alexandros Diomides.286 (See Table 6.1 in Chapter 6 for the inflation rates experienced 
and Table 5.13 in this chapter for the seigniorage collected by the government during the 
period in question.)  
 
 
5.3. Governments in despair  
5.3.1. Introduction 
After the cancellation of the Book Credits in December 1920, the Greek government 
struggled to finance the Asia Minor campaign, the rehabilitation of over a million of refugees 
and reconstruction. In the 1920s, the creditworthiness of the Greek government on the 
London market was low and the risk premium rocketed to nearly 19 per cent, reflecting the 
political, economic and financial distress that prevailed in Athens. In addition, clause four of 
the Paris Agreement and war debts together created a complex financial relationship between 
Greece and its former Allies.  
 
 The creditworthiness of the Greek government on the London market between 1896 
and 1929 is illustrated in Figure 6.3 in Chapter 6. Greek sovereign risk is measured by a 
Greek government loan’s spread in London relative to the British consols. The time series of 
sovereign risk constructed and presented in Figure 6.3 demonstrate that sovereign risk 
remained low during the First World War. The risk premium increased rapidly after 1919 
reflecting the decreased credibility of the Greek government as a borrower on the London 
market. The Asia Minor campaign, acting perhaps as a proxy of fiscal performance, prompted 
a continuous increase in the risk premium of Greek government debt. Military defeat and its 
aftermath exerted a strongly negative impact on the value of Greek sovereign debt traded on 
the London market and consequently the Greek default risk soared. By the end of the period 
in question, Greek country risk had decreased considerably but still remained higher than it 
285 For example, see Diomides (1922); Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, pp. 55–56). 
286 See Diomides (1922).  
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had been at the beginning of 1914. Stabilisation and the concomitant institutional reforms 
were gradually factored into the market price of Greek sovereign debt traded in London and 
as a result the risk premium demanded by investors fell steadily.287 
 
In the 1920s, the Greek government borrowed from the domestic market to an 
unprecedented extent: it heavily borrowed from the National Bank, resorted to forced loans 
and issued treasury bills, the so-called National Defence Bonds. In addition and despite the 
low creditworthiness of the Greek government on the financial markets abroad, foreign loans 
were contracted for productive purposes, the settlement of refugees and the stabilisation of the 
drachma. It has to be said, however, that borrowing for the settlement of over a million of 
refugees and the stabilisation of the drachma was under the auspices of the Financial 
Committee of the League of Nations.  
 
5.3.2. Internal borrowing 
In April 1920, a public loan denominated in drachmae, the 5 per cent Lottery Loan, was floated 
in Athens with great difficulty, in spite of concessions from the government to encourage 
subscription.288 This was the last attempt by the Greek government to issue a public loan on the 
Athens market before the stabilisation of the drachma. Subsequently, it heavily borrowed from 
the bank of issue, implemented forced loans and issued NDBs. 
 
5.3.2.1. Borrowing from the bank of issue 
As is discussed extensively in Chapter 4, the government borrowed widely from the National 
Bank in the 1920s. The bank of issue proved to be the main source of financial support for the 
government and a complex relationship was created between them. It is unfortunate that there 
are no data systematically presented on bilateral government debt held by the bank of issue 
before the enactment of the Law of Control that could be compared with the time series 
constructed in this thesis. Nevertheless, it is possible that it was the first time in its entire 
history as a bank of issue that the National Bank lent to the government to such a great extent. 
This, however, remains to be verified by future research.  
 
The money supply was increased again and again for the account of the government 
until 1923. As it has been extensively discussed in the previous chapter the printing press was 
used once in 1920 and once in 1921, twice during 1922 and then once more in early 1923. In 
287 For a detailed quantitative analysis of Greek government sovereign risk between 1914 and 1929, see 
Christodoulaki et al. (2011, 2012). 
288 Annual Report of the National Bank for 1920 (1921, p. 84); Zolotas (1928, p. 102); Dertilis (1957, 
p. 84). 
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all cases, the government was charged commission of 0.50 per cent but no interest was levied 
and the amortisation period was not specified. All the laws, however, that authorised the use 
of the printing press for the account of the government, stated that convertibility could be 
restored only if the government had repaid these loans to the bank of issue. In addition, the 
National Bank supplied loans to the government using its own reserves and granted advances 
that allowed the Ministry of Finance to receive day-to-day credit from the bank of issue.  
 
Between 1918 and 1925, NDBs became an important source of finance for the 
government. In particular, after 1923, once the printing press stopped being used as a 
financial tool, the government heavily depended on NDBs to finance public expenditure. The 
central bank played an instrumental role in the success of these treasury bills. (NDBs are 
examined in detail in part 5.3.2.3 of this section of Chapter 5.)  
 
The use of the printing press, bilateral loans and advances from the central bank are 
all conventional measures that governments take to finance their budget deficits. During the 
period in question the National Bank was further involved in supporting the government 
financially; for example it was on behalf of the government that it financed the importation of 
food during the Great War and the Asia Minor campaign. In addition, the government 
borrowed from the National Bank for the indemnification of urban refugees for their property 
left behind in Asia Minor.  
 
5.3.2.2. The two Forced Loans  
On Monday 21 March 1922 (Julian calendar), the minister of finance, Petros Protopapadakis, 
delivered the budget to the parliament for the fiscal year that was nearing its end. (At the time 
the fiscal year ran from 1 April to 31 March.) In his speech, he painted a bleak picture of the 
financial position of the government. The estimated total budget deficit amounted to 1,679 
million drachmae. For military expenditure alone the government needed 1,710 million 
drachmae at a time that the Greek army was marching into the interior of Asia Minor. 
Subsequently, he spoke about the unsuccessful attempts of the Greek government to secure 
capital from abroad and warned of the perils of monetising the budget deficit using as an 
example the monetary situation which prevailed in Austria and Germany at the time. Then, 
the minister of finance, in his budget speech, made an appeal for a domestic loan of 
approximately 1.5 billion drachmae to cover the budget deficit as it then stood, stressing as he 
did so that it was a matter of urgency.289 
289 Parliamentary Papers of the Hellenic Government from the 73rd sitting, 21 March 1922, pp. 1175–
1198. See also Parliamentary Papers of the Hellenic Government from the 74th, 75th, 76th, and 77th 
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Petros Protopapadakis suggested increasing the money supply by 550 million 
drachmae adding that subsequently the total banknotes in circulation would be approximately 
3 billion drachmae.290 Then, he proposed a controversial plan to fund government expenditure 
by literally forcing the Greek people to lend the government half of their cash holdings.291 This 
proposal for an internal loan by the minister of finance became the 2749 law on 25 March 1922 
(Julian calendar) and is known as the First Forced Loan. In short, this law stipulated that all 
banknotes of 5, 10, 25, 500, and 1 thousand drachmae were required to be presented at the 
nearest bank where they were to be cut into two parts. The part of each banknote that had the 
effigy of Georgios Stavros, the first governor of the National Bank and one of its founders, 
constituted legal tender for half its original value. The other half that bore the picture of a crown 
or ‘Στέμμα’ was exchanged for a twenty-year bond at 6.50 per cent. In this way temporarily the 
government’s cash requirements were met. 
 
The expected revenue from this forced loan was 1,570 million drachmae. In the end 
the final proceeds were 1,288,470,545. The First Forced Loan was extended beyond the Greek 
borders and banknotes of Greek drachmae held abroad were subject to the cutting process. On 
the other hand, foreigners in Greece were exempted from having their cash holdings cut into 
two parts with the part of ‘Georgios Stavros’ remaining legal tender and the other half a twenty-
year government bond.  
 
 There is a consensus in the literature that the impact of the Forced Loan of 1922 was 
deflationary. The only exception is Kostis (2003, p. 156), who rejects the idea that the 
unexpected and sharp reduction in the banknotes in circulation in March 1922 had a 
deflationary impact. To support his claim, he resorts to the increase in the price level during 
that year: inflation may have been as high as 55 per cent in 1922 when the previous year it 
had fluctuated between 17 and 25 per cent, depending on the price index used to estimate 
inflation. However, a counterfactual question should be asked to understand the impact of the 
First Forced Loan. What would have happened had the government employed the printing 
press to monetise the entire budget deficit in March 1922?  
 
sittings, March 1922, pp. 1198–1288, where the debate that took place in the parliament regarding the 
First Forced Loan is recorded. 
290 More precisely, the upper limit of the banknotes that could be in circulation according to all legal 
arrangements amounted to 3,100,140,000, including a 550 billion increase in the money supply that the 
minister of finance proposed. (See Table 4.4 in Chapter 4 and Table A3.1 in Appendix 3.) 
291 A similar forced loan was introduced in Finland at the end of 1945, although its objective was 
different from the Greek Forced Loan of 1922. Its aim was to ‘stop rampant inflation … by decreasing 
the note circulation’. For more, see Bank of Finland (1947, p. 19).  
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The impact of the First Forced Loan was deflationary as the money supply was 
abruptly and without advanced warning decreased, if only temporarily, in 1922. Figure 5.1 
illustrates this sharp decrease in the value of banknotes in circulation in March 1922. At the 
end of February 1922, the value of banknotes in circulation was of approximately 2,218 
million drachmae. By the end of the following month, the banknotes that were in circulation 
amounted to 1,198 million drachmae, as Table A3.1 in Appendix A3 shows. The currency 
that had been withdrawn soon returned, however, back into circulation as the government 
spent it to meet its own requirements. In addition, the Forced Loan had as a consequence a 
decrease in purchasing power and an increase in demand for bank credit. ‘Στέμμα’, that is to 
say the part of a banknote that constituted a 6.50 per cent government bond could be used as 
collateral for advances from the National Bank.292 Consequently, the banknotes in circulation 
rapidly increased and as Figure 5.1 indicates, by the end of September 1922 their value was 
similar to that when the Forced Loan was instigated. By the end of that year the money supply 
had increased by 40 per cent.  
 
Figure 5.1: The Forced Loan of 1922 and the money supply 
(February 1922=100) 
Source: Author’s calculations using the data of Table A3.1 in Appendix A3. 
 
 
292 Edwards (1922, p. 9). 
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Illustration 5.1: A bond of the Forced Loan of 1922 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Illustration of a bond of the Forced Loan of 1922 
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In January 1926, the experiment of the First Forced Loan was repeated as another forced loan 
was imposed by the government of General Theodore Pangalos. This time, however, it was 
more limited in its application. The 1926 law demanded the redemption of one quarter part of 
those banknotes in circulation that were of a 50 drachmae denomination or upwards. The 
interest rate of the Second Forced Loan was 6 per cent and the revenue from it amounted to 
1,250 million drachmae. Its amortisation period was 20 years and this time it was contained 
within the geographical limits of the country. 
 
Figure 5.2: Second Forced Loan of 1926 
(December 1925=100) 
Source: Author’s calculations using the data of Table A3.1 in Appendix A3. 
 
The Second Forced Loan was aimed at providing a definite settlement of the outstanding 
NDBs. Half of the proceeds of this forced loan were used by the government to repay its debt 
to the National Bank resulting from NDBs. The remainder of the proceeds of this loan were 
used to pay off half of the outstanding NDBs in cash. The other half of the NDBs were 
converted into 8 per cent bonds with a ten-year amortisation period.  
 
 Figure 5.2 demonstrates the impact of the Second Forced Loan on the money supply. 
In January 1926, the banknotes in circulation decreased unexpectedly by approximately 21 
per cent. By the end of the year, the currency that had been withdrawn had not yet returned 
back into circulation. Figure 5.2 further demonstrates that by the end of December 1926 the 
total amount of the banknotes in circulation still remained at a lower level than before the 
implementation of the Second Forced Loan. The Second Forced Loan, together with the 
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settlement of the NDBs in early 1926, was the first major step and perhaps one of the most 
important towards de facto stabilisation of the drachma in 1927.  
 
5.3.2.3. National Defence Bonds 
The Law of Control restricted the number of treasury bills that the Greek government could 
issue to 10 million drachmae which was approximately one-tenth of their ordinary revenue 
between 1892 and 1896.293 This limit was reached in November 1912 and as the ordinary 
revenue of the Greek government had increased by then, the amount of treasury bills that 
could be issued was also raised to 25 million drachmae with the consent of the IFC.294 
 
 In 1918, the government introduced by law a new series of treasury bills (National 
Defence Bonds) in maturities of three, six and ten months up to the value of 200 million 
drachmae.295 The issuing of this series of NDBs echoed the so called Bons de la Défence 
Nationale issued in France at the time. The National Bank was made responsible for discounting 
the NDBs. According to this initial law, NDBs could be discounted at the National Bank after 
the passage of half of the period of their maturity.296 
 
After 1920, the limit of the number of NDBs that could be issued was increased 
repeatedly becoming 600 million drachmae in June 1923. In December 1923, 1,250 million 
drachmae of NDBs could be issued and by the end of August 1924 the value of the NDBs that 
could potentially be issued stood at 2,250 million drachmae.297 This amount of 2,250 million 
drachmae of NDBs, a short-dated investment, corresponded to approximately 45 per cent of 
ordinary revenue for the fiscal year 1924–25.  
 
The issuance of these treasury bills also directly involved the National Bank, which 
not only marketed the bills for the treasury but guaranteed their repayment, as well as 
standing by to discount them if the holder desired cash before maturity. Under a law passed in 
December 1922, the National Bank was given the right to issue banknotes on its own behalf 
beyond the legal limit, in case the government was unable to pay its debt to the Bank because 
of NDBs. This law provided that as soon as the government paid back outstanding debt 
related to NDBs, the Bank had to withdraw from circulation the equivalent amount in 
293 United Kingdom House of Commons (1898, article 29, p. 14). 
294 NBGHA_Α1Σ10Υ1Φ180: Report of experts on the improvement of public finance, 1927; Zolotas 
(1928, p. 47). 
295 See Annual Report of the National Bank of Greece for 1918 (1919, pp. 19–23). 
296 See Law 1240/1918. 
297 HABOG_A3S1Y2F147T1, pp. 1–19; HABOG_A3S1Y2F147T2, pp. 1–34; Annual Reports of the 
National Bank for the period 1918 to 1925. 
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banknotes that had been issued for this particular purpose. In any event, the Greek 
government had to pay 3 per cent of its debt to the Bank because of NDBs at the end of each 
year.298 As it has already been mentioned by the end of the institution of NDBs the National 
Bank had never availed itself of this right. 
 
Table 5.6: Interest rates charged, National Defence Bonds 
 Three-Month Six-Month One-Year Three-Year Five-Year Ten-Year 
April 1918 4.5  5     
December 1919 5 5.5 6    
March 1923 5.5 6 7    
April 1924 4 5 6  7.5  
April 1925   7 7.5 8 9 
Sources: HABOG_A3S1Y2F147T1, pp. 1–19; HABOG_A3S1Y2F147T2, pp. 1–34; 
HABOG_A3S1Y2F147T12, pp. 1–21. 
 
Table 5.6 shows the interest rate that the NDBs of various maturities bore. In addition, it 
indicates changes in the interest rate and the evolution of the institution. Initially, NDBs of 
three-month, six-month and one-year maturity were issued. In April 1924, NDBs of five-year 
maturity were introduced for the first time and a year later NDBs of three- and ten-year 
maturity were added, whilst issue of the three-month NDBs was stopped. The response from 
the public, however, to NDBs with a medium- and long-term maturity was limited. By the end 
of 1924, only 0.60 per cent of the total bonds issued had a five-year maturity.299 By then, the 
popularity of the whole institution had begun to ebb away. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
298 HABOG_A3S1Y2F147T1, p. 5. 
299 HABOG_A3S1Y2F147T2, p. 13. 
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Table 5.7: National Defence Bonds, 1918–1922 and 1926–1928 
(Balance at the end of the month) 
  Drachmae 
1918 June 25,000,000 
 December 50,000,000 
1919 June 50,000,000 
 December 153,200,000 
1920 June 168,200,000 
 December 200,000,000 
1921 June 200,000,000 
 December 309,330,800 
1922 June 354,276,100 
 December 331,135,500 
   
1926 June 708,496,100 
 December 229,805,000 
1927 June 114,020,300 
 December 104,633,700 
1928 14th May1 102,011,000 
Note: 1 This balance of NDBs on the eve of the reform was retained by the National Bank of 
Greece. 
Source: HABOG_A3S1Y2F147T2. 
 
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 trace the evolution of NDBs. Data in Table 5.7 cover the period between 
1918 and 1922 and from 1926 to 1928. They are biannual data. By contrast, the data in Table 
5.8 show the outstanding balance at the end of each month between 1923 and 1925. Figure 
5.3 illustrates vividly the way that the institution evolved between 1918 and 1928. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
215 
 
Table 5.8: National Defence Bonds, 1923–1925 
(Balance at the end of the month, in drachmae) 
 1923 1924 1925 
January 332,513,800 1,095,198,700 1,576,303,600 
February 332,727,600 1,194,965,600 1,591,098,300 
March 325,787,900 1,252,982,200 1,529,557,500 
April 335,520,000 1,647,529,800 1,371,626,400 
May 364,854,800 1,897,812,500 1,403,976,300 
June 433,773,400 1,911,739,500 1,421,977,900 
July 547,211,300 1,745,253,300 1,437,338,500 
August 592,777,700 1,669,491,600 1,461,601,900 
September 616,334,500 1,690,111,000 1,470,601,000 
October 616,748,200 1,741,141,800 1,461,054,500 
November 757,111,700 1,584,267,900 1,474,875,500 
December 934,751,800 1,613,379,900 1,493,550,900 
Sources: HABOG_A3S1Y2F147T2, pp. 33–34; HABOG_A3S1Y2F147T12, p. 3; Kostis 
(2003, p. 222). 
 
Both Table 5.8 and Figure 5.3 demonstrate that by the end of 1923 the value of the 
outstanding NDBs had increased significantly. The peak was reached on 23 June 1924 when 
there were outstanding NDBs of 1,933.207 million drachmae.300 This was the equivalent of 
nearly 40 per cent of the ordinary revenue of the government for the fiscal year 1924–25. 
Subsequently, a decrease is seen. 
 
NDBs were a short-term, profitable and highly liquid investment. In particular after 
December 1923, NDBs of three-, six- and twelve-month maturity could be discounted at the 
National Bank one day after their issuance.301 This stipulation increased their popularity as it 
made them relatively easy to sell. It was also a favourite investment medium for banks.302 For 
reference, on 31 December 1924 approximately 27 per cent of the outstanding NDBs were 
held by banks.303  
 
300 Ibid., pp. 2, 11 and 33; HABOG_A3S1Y2F147T12, p. 1. 
301 HABOG_A3S1Y2F147T2, p. 8. 
302 BoE Archive, 0V80/1/33. 
303 HABOG_A3S1Y2F147T2, p. 26. 
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 Figure 5.3: National Defence Bonds, 1919–1928  
(June 1919 = 100) 
Sources: Author’s calculations using the data in Tables 5.7 and 5.8.  
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The institution of NDBs reached its peak in June 1924. Subsequently, there was a decrease in 
the outstanding balance of NDBs as Table 5.8 and Figure 5.3 demonstrate. By the end of July 
1924, NDBs started not to be renewed and instead the National Bank had to pay them off. By 
the end of December 1924 the government owed to the National Bank approximately 300 
million drachmae because of NDBs that had not been rolled over.304  
 
 The smooth functioning of the institution came close to ending in the first five months 
of 1925 when a large number of NDBs were brought to the National Bank for discounting. 
This culminated on 30 April 1925 when on a single day, NDBs of nearly 111 million 
drachmae were discounted by the National Bank. To cope with this situation the government 
introduced restrictive measures which limited the discounting of NDBs by the National Bank 
in the second half of 1925.305  
 
 In 1925, the policy of the banks changed; they invested only a very limited proportion 
of their liquid assets in NDBs.306 Money became tight. The discount rate increased twice during 
that year; once in February and then again in August when it increased from 8.50 to 10 per cent. 
(See Table 3.12 in Chapter 3.)  
 
 At the end of December 1925, the government owed the National Bank 612 million 
drachmae because of NDBs that had been redeemed by then. (See Table 4.15 in Chapter 4.) 
This item of government debt to the National Bank can be compared with credits to the 
agricultural sector: in December 1925, agricultural credit represented 92 per cent of the 
government’s outstanding debt to the National Bank because of NDBs. The government 
needed 12 per cent of its ordinary revenue in the fiscal year that had ended in March 1925 
simply to repay this item of its floating debt to the National Bank. Furthermore, on 31 
December 1925, 93.85 per cent of the outstanding NDBs were short-term bills with an 
amortisation period up to a year. 
 
 After the middle of 1924, the National Bank was under severe strain because of 
NDBs that it had either to discount or to redeem. In February 1925, the governor of the 
National Bank proposed increasing the banknotes in circulation by 600 million drachmae for 
‘the needs of trade’.307 It is probable that Diomides was eager to print banknotes in 1925 to 
cope with the increasing pressure that the Bank was experiencing because of the NDBs. The 
British representative on the IFC, L. G. Roussin, objected to this proposed new increase in the 
304 Annual Report of the National Bank for 1924 (1925, p. xvii). 
305 HABOG_A3S1Y2F147T12, pp. 5–6.  
306 Ibid., p. 6.  
307 For more on this see Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, pp. 126–127).  
 
 
                                                     
number of banknotes in circulation and effectively blocked it. Ultimately, the printing press 
was not used and instead the governors of the National Bank suggested to the government the 
implementation of the Second Forced Loan to deal directly with the floating debt caused by 
NDBs. 
 
The Second Forced Loan, introduced in January 1926, aimed at settling the question 
of the NDBs. Half of its yield, which amounted to 1,250 million drachmae, was used for the 
repayment of the government debt to the National Bank caused by NDBs. 
 
 By April 1926, the NDBs due for repayment amounted to approximately 1,272 
million drachmae, as roughly 93 per cent of the outstanding NDBs had a period of maturity of 
less than a year. As is explained above, half of the outstanding short-term NDBs were repaid 
in cash by the government when they reached maturity using the remaining proceeds of the 
Second Forced Loan whilst the other half was converted into a loan repayable in ten years and 
bearing interest at 8 per cent. This loan is known as the Third Forced Loan.  
 
Thus, with the nip of scissors a significant source of the monetary instability of the 
1920s was removed. The NDBs were a major cause of inflation and at the same time an 
important source of revenue for the government. In particular after 1923, when the printing 
press stopped rolling, NDBs became the main instrument by which to finance budget deficits. 
The NDBs were rarely used as means of payment, however, as has been explained before it was 
easy to discount them at the National Bank.308 
 
 The question which is raised here is whether the funding crisis of 1925 was caused by a 
sudden crisis of confidence in the public finance practices of the government or simply that 
bondholders of NDBs, and in particular banks had found more lucrative means of investment.309 
The latter view was supported by the governor of the National Bank in his annual report for 
1925. Diomides argued that the redemptions came primarily from commercial banks who 
wished to make loans to the then booming Greek economy.310 The National Bank changed its 
discount rate twice in 1925. The money market was becoming tighter and an increase in the 
discount rate of the National Bank further stepped up interest rates in the economy. Banks 
preferred, since the profit was higher, to lend rather than to invest in short-term treasury bills. It 
is difficult, however, to single out one of the reasons mentioned above to explain why it 
308 Zolotas (1928, p. 98).  
309 Makinen and Woodward (1990, p. 176). 
310 Annual Report of the National Bank for 1925 (1926, pp. xxiv–xxix); Makinen and Woodward (1990, 
p. 181). 
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became increasingly difficult for the government to refinance its floating debt of NDBs after 
the middle of 1924.  
 
5.3.3. External borrowing 
All Greek governments faced great difficulties in borrowing from the international capital 
markets in the 1920s. The literature relates these difficulties to the embargo imposed by the 
war Allies. In the 1920s, however, the London market ‘was not the free market of the pre-war 
days’.311 More importantly, at the time the creditworthiness of the Greek government on the 
London market was very low, as Figure 6.3 in Chapter 6 demonstrates. In fact, in the early 
1920s, Greek government bonds plummeted and as a consequence market rates rocketed, 
reflecting the political, economic and financial distress that prevailed in Athens during that 
period. This occurred at a time when the country was having to absorb over a million of 
refugees that had crossed the Aegean Sea from Asia Minor.  
 
In February 1923, Greece approached the Council of the League of Nations hoping to 
float an international loan under its aegis for the settlement of refugees. The negotiations with 
the League were protracted and the Geneva Protocol was only signed in September 1923.312 
For this purpose, an autonomous organisation was established, namely the Refugee 
Settlement Commission. This Commission handled the proceeds of the First Refugee Loan 
and was made responsible for the settlement of refugees primarily in rural areas.313 
 
The 7 per cent Refugee Loan of 1924 was the only loan to be floated on the 
international financial markets before the stabilisation of the drachma. This was made possible 
because it was issued under the auspices of the League of Nations and its yield was used for the 
rehabilitation of refugees. The total sum issued was £12,300,000. The price at issue was 88 per 
cent in London and New York and 86 per cent in Athens.314 A substantial part of the loan, in 
other words £7,500,000, was issued in London. The rest was floated in almost equal parts in 
Athens and New York. The Refugee Loan was placed under the direct control of the IFC. 
 
 
 
311 Atkin (1970, p. 326). For the way that the London market was regulated in the 1920s, see for 
example Atkins (1970, 1977); Moggridge (1971). 
312 For further information see Minoglou Pepelasis (1989, pp. 331–366; 1993, pp. 64–99). 
313 For more information on the First Refugee Loan see Stefanides (1930, pp. 234–235); League of 
Nations (1945, pp. 74–76); Wynne (1951, pp. 349–350); Minoglou Pepelasis (1989, pp. 331–366); 
Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, pp. 64–99). 
314 League of Nations (1945, p. 167). 
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Table 5.9: Foreign loans contracted between 1920 and 1927 
 Nominal Actual 
6% Loan of 1921 
(in check on Paris) 
40 million French francs  
5% Loan of 1923 from 
the Canadian Government 
40 million French francs 40 million French francs 
7% Refugee Loan of 1924 12.30 million pounds sterling 9.963 million pounds sterling 
8% Greek Railways 
Loan of 1925 
2.2 million pounds sterling 2 million pounds sterling 
8% Water-Supply 
Loan of 1925 
11 million dollars 9.3 million dollars 
8.5% Swedish Loan of 1926 1 million pound sterling 0.94 million pound sterling 
Note: The 1923 Canadian Loan was not a new loan but the rescheduling of an agreement 
between the Greek government and the Canadian government which took place in 1919. This 
loan from the Canadian government provided for the payment of wheat imports. 
 
Contrary to conventional belief and in spite of the war debt embargo on foreign 
financial markets, there was some capital influx into Greece after 1924. This influx was possible 
because the embargo was applied against the central government and excluded public entities. 
The Greek government could and did raise capital from smaller capital markets and for 
infrastructure programmes that were being undertaken at the time. However, raising money 
from the small capital markets of Europe, such as with the Swedish Loan of 1926, proved to be 
very expensive and the sums that could be raised were very limited. Table 5.9 lists all the 
external loans that were contracted before the implementation of the stabilisation programme 
in 1928.  
 
The so-called Swedish Loan, a private loan, was obtained from the match trust Svenska 
Tandsticksaktielboget, which had raised loans for other European and Latin American countries 
in the 1920s. The nominal value of this loan was 1 million pounds sterling; its issue price was 
94 per cent, the nominal interest rate was 8.5 per cent and the redemption period 28 years. The 
real interest rate was a fraction above 9 per cent. This was at a time when the market yield of 
pre-1914 Greek loans on the London market was between 8.30 and 8.80 whilst that of the 
Refugee Loan of 1924 was around 7.60 per cent. The government also conceded to the Alsing 
Trading Company the exclusive right to sell matches in Greece for 28 years. This was a high 
price indeed to pay for such limited capital, which was used by the government of General 
Pangalos to cover just one-third of the budget deficit for that financial year.  
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5.4. Developments in Greece: The Fleet Street Perspective315 
A considerable part of this thesis is devoted to Athens’ foreign borrowing and the complicated 
relationship that arose between Greek political and monetary authorities on the one hand and 
foreign supervisors and financial markets on the other. During the entire period in question 
the creditworthiness of the Greek government on the London market fluctuated markedly 
depending on a variety of historical events including political and institutional changes.  
 
Research into the press of the period will ascertain how well informed market 
participants in London were about developments in Greece, so as to be able to evaluate 
country risk at a time that sovereign credit rating was not common practice. Having said that, 
Moody’s Manual of Investments, which at the time furnished investors with ‘a key to the 
relative security and stability of particular investment bonds’, valued the Refugee Loan as a 
safer investment than other Greek loans traded on the London Stock Exchange. Under their 
system of ratings, the Refugee Loan carried a ‘Baa’ rating whilst, for example, the Monopoly 
Loan one of the Old Loans placed under the jurisdiction of the IFC, the 1910 Bonds Loan and 
the 1914 Loan all carried a ‘Ba’ rating.316 
 
The Council of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, besides publishing an annual 
report, systematically collected invaluable information from the British press on countries at 
the centre of their interest. This published material, sourced from a wide range of mainly daily 
press, was neatly organised in a continuous format in the form of cutting books.317 The 
material on Greece [hereafter Greek Extracts] consists of nine volumes, covering the period 
from 1867 until January 1971. Volumes six and seven, loaded with information that appeared 
in the British press during the period in question, have been used in this thesis.318  
 
The Greek Extracts provide ample evidence that British investors were able to be 
well informed about developments in Greece, and promptly. They also indicate the kind of 
qualitative information that an investors’ organisation, whose principal objective was ‘the 
315 This section also appears in Christodoulaki and Penzer (2004, pp. 19–29). 
316 Moody’s rating system (from highest to lowest) was: Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, Caa, Ca, C. Moody 
(1926).  
317 These volumes, adding up to a total of 503 volumes, are kept at the Guildhall Library, London. The 
cuttings are almost entirely in English, taken primarily from British daily newspapers, the weeklies and 
the financial press.  
318 Council of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, Greek Extracts [hereafter Greek Extracts], vol. 
6 (27 October 1904–25 September 1916); Greek Extracts, vol. 7 (25 September 1916–31 October 
1931). The cuttings that appear in these two volumes come from The Times, Financial News, Financial 
Times, Morning Post, Daily Telegraph, Board of Trade Journal, Stock Exchange Journal, Stock 
Exchange Gazette and Evening Standard. There is also a small number of cuttings from the Message 
d’Athenes. 
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protection of the interests of the holders of foreign securities’,319 observed to evaluate the 
creditworthiness of a country, in this case Greece. The information that is collected in the 
Greek Extracts covering the period between the outbreak of the Great War and stabilisation is 
presented in Tables 5.10 and 5.11 below.  
 
 
 
 
319 Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (various years).  
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Table 5.10: Press cuttings on Greece collected for the Council of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders 
Notes: (1) This table shows the absolute number of press cuttings on Greece, per month and per year, that were gathered in the Greek Extracts. (2) The 
number of press cuttings gathered for the first six months of the year is generally higher than that of the second half. (3) The total number of cuttings for the 
first half of 1914 is considerably higher than the average number observed during the first six months of each subsequent year during the period in question. 
This, to a large extent, is explained by the flotation of the 1914 Loan which attracted a lot of publicity in the press. In addition, the number of press cuttings 
clustered as ‘National Issues’ in Table 5.11 during the first semester of 1914 is substantial both in comparison with other years and the second part of 1914. 
(4) 1922 is the year of the Asia Minor debacle.  
Sources: Council of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, Greek Extracts, Volumes 6 and 7; See the text. 
 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 
January 20 9 8 2 8 7 8 17 10 9 11 8 10 9 12 5 
February 8 7 4 3 3 5 4 7 10 7 8 7 9 12 5 5 
March 20 11 9 10 8 9 17 10 20 14 11 7 13 14 7 9 
April 17 9 10 2 7 8 4 9 14 9 6 15 14 14 5 5 
May 10 5 23 5 7 5 5 11 12 3 11 11 1 7 4 9 
June 17 4 20 7 9 6 7 12 10 17 5 9 10 11 10 5 
July 5 5 6 10 7 8 9 13 7 9 7 9 8 6 10 2 
August 1 6 3 7 3 3 1 4 6 10 4 5 10 8 5 6 
September 7 4 10 8 6 6 3 15 7 9 11 12 8 11 10 5 
October 6 6 12 7 8 7 4 7 11 8 13 18 5 8 10 8 
November 9 4 3 2 5 4 9 5 6 11 10 6 6 6 9 6 
December 4 4 3 5 6 7 17 6 10 8 8 10 6 10 5 5 
                 
Total: 124 74 111 68 77 75 88 116 123 114 105 117 100 116 92 70 
 
 
Table 5.10 shows the absolute number of press cuttings per month and per year that the Greek 
Extracts include during the period under examination. Table 5.11 illustrates the wide range of 
issues covered by the press cuttings in the Greek Extracts. At the same time, however, Table 
5.11 indicates the kind of news that the Council considered important in evaluating the 
creditworthiness of the Greek government.  
 
The system employed to compose this table was to read the Greek Extracts and then 
divide the issues tackled in the cuttings into categories. Often, one press cutting refers to more 
than one topic related to Greece. For this reason, the total of Table 5.11 is different from the 
total of Table 5.10, which is simply the number of press cuttings per year that the volumes 
include.  
   
 
 
 
Table 5.11: Greek issues tackled in the press cuttings on Greece collected by the Council of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders 
 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 
  %  %  %  %  %  % 
Public Debt 60 37.04 42 39.25 68 40.00 40 45.45 53 49.07          50 45.87 
Public Finance 23 14.20 20 18.69 39 22.94 16 18.18 31 28.70 27 24.77 
Domestic Politics 8 4.94 11 10.28          14 8.24 5 5.68 4 3.70 0 0 
National Issues 24 14.81 2 1.87 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1.83 
War 2 1.23 6 5.61 7 4.12 5 5.68 2 1.85 0 0 
Refugees 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Economic Conditions 8 4.94 1 0.93 1 0.59 0 0 2 1.85 2 1.83 
Primary Sector 4 2.47 0 0 2 1.18 5 5.68 1 0.93 0 0 
Industry 5 3.09 0 0 0 0 1 1.14 0 0 0 0 
Trade 7 4.32 4 3.74 0 0 1 1.14 3 2.78 4 3.67 
Shipping 1 0.62 1 0.93 5 2.94 0 0 0 0 1 0.92 
Infrastructure 8 4.94 0 0 3 1.76 0 0 1 0.93 3 2.75 
Stabilisation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The Exchange Rate 0 0 3 2.80 1 0.59 0 0 0 0 2 1.83 
The Money Supply 1 0.62 3 2.80 9       5.29 0 0 0 0 2 1.83 
The National Bank 2 1.23 2 1.87 7 4.12 5 5.68 0 0 3 2.75 
The Banks 1 0.62 1 0.93 1 0.59 0 0 0 0 2 1.83 
Miscellaneous 8 4.94 11 10.28 13 7.65 10 11.36 11 10.19 11 10.09 
             
Total: 162 100 107 100 170 100 88 100 108 100 109 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 
  %  %  %  %  %  % 
Public Debt 49 31.82 66 43.42 73 42.20 76 41.08 62 40.79 68 31.43 
Public Finance 28 18.18 23 15.13 30 17.34 36 19.46 31 20.39 36 16.67 
Domestic Politics 9 5.84 6 3.95 15 8.67 7 3.78 19 12.50 6 2.78 
National Issues 10 6.49 4 2.63 8 4.62 4 2.16 7 4.61 16 7.41 
War 0 0 0 0 1 0.58 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Refugees 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2.16 3 1.97 12 5.56 
Economic Conditions 1 0.65 2 1.32 3 1.73 1 0.54 1 0.66 2 0.93 
Primary Sector 3 1.95 1 0.66 2 1.16 0 0 1 0.66 1 0.46 
Industry 3 1.95 1 0.66 0 0 1 0.54 0 0 0 0 
Trade 8 5.19 9 5.92 4 2.31 2 1.08 1 0.66 6 2.78 
Shipping 2 1.30 1 0.66 0 0 1 0.54 0 0 1 0.46 
Infrastructure 3 1.95 0 0 2 1.16 4 2.16 1 0.66 8 3.70 
Stabilisation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.93 
The Exchange Rate 8 5.19 12 7.89 16 9.25 14 7.57 8 5.26 20 9.26 
The Money Supply 8 5.19 3 1.97 6 3.47 14 7.57 2 1.32 17 7.87 
The National Bank 0 0 4 2.63 1 0.58 6 3.24 3 1.97 10 4.63 
The Banks 8 5.19 3 1.97 0 0 2 1.08 1 0.66 2 0.93 
Miscellaneous 14 9.09 17 11.18 12 6.94 13 7.03 12 7.89 9 4.17 
             
Total: 154 100 152 100 173 100 185 100 152 100 216 100 
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  1926 1927 1928 1929 
  %  %  %  % 
Public Debt 59 37.58 77 36.32 71 47.97 54 52.43 
Public Finance 32 20.38 30 14.15 24 16.22 21 20.39 
Domestic Politics 13 8.28 6 2.83 4 2.70 2 1.94 
National Issues 13 8.28 18 8.49 5 3.38 6 5.83 
War 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Refugees 4 2.55 3 1.42 2 1.35 1 0.97 
Economic Conditions 2 1.27 1 0.47 1 0.68 1 0.97 
Primary Sector 1 0.64 0 0 1 0.68 0 0 
Industry 1 0.64 0 0 1 0.68 0 0 
Trade 0 0 1 0.47 2 1.35 1 0.97 
Shipping 1 0.64 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Infrastructure 2 1.27 5 2.36 9 6.08 3 2.91 
Stabilisation 5 3.18 24 11.32 10 6.76 2 1.94 
The Exchange Rate 7 4.46 6 2.83 2 1.35 0 0 
The Money Supply  5 3.18 4 1.89 2 1.35 2 1.94 
The National Bank 3 1.91 16 7.55 3 2.03 2 1.94 
The Banks 2 1.27 6 2.83 3 2.03 1 0.97 
Miscellaneous 7 4.46 15 7.08 8 5.41 7 6.80 
         
Total: 157 100 212 100 148 100 103 100 
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Notes:  
(1) The system employed to compose this table was to read the Greek Extracts and then 
divide the issues tackled in the cuttings into categories. One piece of press cutting may refer 
to more than one issue related to Greece. For this reason, the total of observations in Table 
5.11 is different from the total of Table 5.10 which shows the absolute number of press 
cuttings per year that the Greek Extracts include.  
(2) ‘National Issues’ is a generic term that contains news on foreign diplomacy, reports on 
Greek minorities in the Near East and the Balkans, Greek War debts as well as the issue of 
Book Credits and rearmament.  
(3) Cuttings grouped as ‘National Issues’ in 1914 mainly refer to minority issues of Greek 
populations in surrounding areas not belonging to Greece and to a strained relationship 
between Greece and Turkey. In 1925, 1926 and 1927 ‘National Issues’ includes news on the 
negotiations for the settlement of war debts with Great Britain, France and the USA.  
(4) News in the Greek Extracts on the macroeconomic situation in Greece are divided into the 
following categories: Economic Conditions where general references on economic progress 
and development have been classified; information on agriculture and minerals is included in 
the Primary Sector; Industry, Trade, Shipping as well as Infrastructure, which contains news 
on infrastructure projects proposed or underway and on railways; Stabilisation, the Exchange 
Rate, the Money Supply and the National Bank which was the central bank in Greece until 12 
May 1928; and finally, the Banks, where references to banks other than the National Bank are 
included. 
(5) Information on macroeconomic conditions could be separated into two groups: news on 
the real economy (Economic Conditions, Primary Sector, Industry, Trade, Shipping and 
Infrastructure) and monetary and financial information (Stabilisation, the Exchange Rate, the 
Money Supply, the National Bank and the Banks).  
(6) The Greek Extracts include press cuttings with information for British investors on 
entrepreneurial opportunities in Greece.  
(7) Miscellaneous primarily contains information on foreign direct investment in Greece.   
Source: Council of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, Greek Extracts, Volumes 6 and 
7; See the text. 
 
It is apparent that the Council pedantically collected information on Greek government debt 
as it appeared in the British press. References to public debt account for between one-third 
and over half of the total references to Greece in a year. If information on public debt in the 
Greek Extracts is thematically disaggregated, news on the service of the debt predominates.320 
Special consideration was also paid to gathering announcements in the press that described 
efforts of the Greek government to raise fresh capital both on the international financial 
markets and in Athens. In retrospect, reports in the press on fresh borrowing and its terms 
might have been instigated frequently by Greek officials in an attempt to influence market 
expectations. Ex post, having the benefit of archival research, reports on new loans during 
periods that the Greek government faced difficulties in borrowing or a financial embargo, as 
the London market was not ‘the free market of the pre-war days’,321 illustrate the method and 
the terms on which Greek officials wished to borrow.322  
 
320 See Christodoulaki and Penzer (2004), Table A12 in Appendix II, pp. 61–62. 
321 Atkin (1970, p. 326). 
322 See, for example, Greek Extracts for 1921 and Greek Extracts, F. News, 8 April 1927. 
 
 
                                                     
The information presented in Table 5.11 demonstrates that public finance comes after 
government debt in terms of importance. References to the finance of the Greek government 
vary from 14 per cent to nearly 29 per cent of the total theme references of a year. In the 
1920s, it was customary to report the budget presentations of the Greek Minister of Finance in 
the British press. In these reports, the tenor was positive and expenditure typically met 
revenues. Public borrowing was added up with ordinary revenues to present a budget in 
equilibrium, a practice that was not overlooked by newspaper correspondents.323  
 
Citations on politics vary from no reference at all in 1919, a year of political stability, 
to 12.50 per cent of total citations in 1924 which was a year of constitutional change as the 
country became a republic, and had only short-lived governments. The collection of press 
cuttings in the Greek Extracts on the political situation is eclectic and hardly paints the picture 
of political crisis and bitter polarisation that characterised these times. Having said this, 
however, one can find press cuttings on all major political changes and general elections of 
the period.  
 
War and refugee problems have serious implications for government indebtedness. It 
is therefore surprising that both these issues, as Table 5.11 demonstrates, are hardly covered 
by the press cuttings collected in the Extracts. Cuttings on the Greek presence in Smyrna or 
on the advance of the Greek army in Asia Minor and ultimate defeat are scarce in the Greek 
Extracts. By contrast, events in Asia Minor and the debacle were more than adequately 
reported in the British press.324 In addition, despite the refugee problem in Greece being 
‘more acute … than in any other country’325 and at the time attracting widespread attention, 
press cuttings on refugees included in the Greek Extracts are limited and mainly related to the 
Refugee Loan of 1924.326  
 
 News on macroeconomic conditions in the country can be divided into two parts: 
news on the three sectors of the economy and monetary and financial information. In the 
1920s, a period of high inflation in Greece, news on monetary conditions dominates. 
Information on fluctuations of the drachma is provided and also there are articles that discuss 
the root of that problem. Economic and policy changes are reported and there is plenty of 
information on the central banking reforms that led to the establishment of a fully fledged 
central bank. In total, news on the three sectors of the economy together with monetary and 
financial news fluctuates between 6.50 per cent of the total observations in 1918 and over 30 
323 See The Economist, 2 September 1922. 
324 See Palmer’s Index to The Times (1922). 
325 Cited in Pentzopoulos (1962, pp. 77–78). 
326 By contrast The Economist reported regularly on the refugee question in Greece. 
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per cent in 1925.327 Both in qualitative and quantitative terms, news on macroeconomic 
developments gathered in the Greek Extracts plays a more central role than information on 
the political situation, supporting the assertion that ‘economics, not politics, were a key factor 
in allocating […] exports of capital’.328 
 
 A secondary objective of the Council of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders was 
to provide information on ‘the economic and financial condition’ of states that were at the 
centre of their interest.329 They never attempted to develop a system of formal rating.330 
However, they collected ample information to enable investors to assess sovereign risk. The 
cuttings from the British press collected in the Greek Extracts indicate that news on public 
debt took precedence over any other issue and public finance followed. News on 
macroeconomic conditions was also a vital component of the information gathered in the 
Greek Extracts.  
 
 This qualitative research on cutting books of mainly daily press organised by an 
investors’ organisation supports findings of quantitative statistical analysis of Greek sovereign 
risk between 1914 and 1929. This statistical analysis of daily time series of country risk 
between the outbreak of the Great War and stabilisation shows that investors acted upon news 
of fiscal performance and public debt developments. Unforeseen political changes also 
influenced market participants’ expectations. By contrast, institutional innovations, such as 
the adoption of the gold exchange standard and the establishment of a central bank de novo, 
did not result in any quantitative market response. Stabilisation and the concomitant 
institutional reforms, however, were gradually factored into the market price of Greek 
sovereign debt traded in London and as a result the creditworthiness of the Greek government 
steadily improved.331 
327 In 1918, all references are on the economy and trade opportunities in Greece for British merchants. 
In 1925, the emphasis is shifted to the exchange rate and to news on the money supply; nearly 24 per 
cent of the total references are on monetary and financial issues, whilst only eight per cent refer to the 
economy.  
328 Flandreau (1998, p. 31). 
329 Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, Annual Report. 
330 See Flandreau (1998) for a nineteenth century attempt to provide formal ratings to monitor 
sovereign risk and Moody, Moody's Manual for creation of sovereign ratings in the 1920s. 
331 See Christodoulaki et al. (2011, 2012). 
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5.5. The legacy of the period 
Figure 5.4 shows the budget surplus, the primary surplus and the exchange rate parity of the 
drachma with the pound sterling in historical perspective. The time series cover the period 
between 1833 and 1930. This figure demonstrates that budget deficits were a chronic 
characteristic of public finances. It should be noted that it also indicates that there was an 
attempt to improve the position of the budget after the enactment of the Law of Control. This 
attempt, however, was short-lived. After 1907, budget deficits persisted once again and when 
the First Balkan War broke out primary deficits also came into the picture.  
 
It has been argued that deficit financing was an instrument of policy and a result of 
the adoption of a system of Western parliamentarianism. The main characteristics of the 
taxation system in Greece were firstly that the bulk of public revenue came from indirect 
taxes, and secondly the way that the fiscal burden was distributed amongst different classes or 
interest groups. The peasantry and the higher classes were under-taxed. By contrast, the 
middle classes carried the main fiscal burden by not being able to avoid indirect or income 
taxation. Thus, both the structure and the evolution of the taxation system in Greece were 
based on grounds of political expediency. It was when parliamentary democracy and 
universal male suffrage were adopted in 1864 that the under-taxation of the peasantry started. 
The peasantry constituted the largest voting group whilst the higher classes were involved in 
governance.332 These arguments may not, however, survive if analysis on a micro level is 
carried out. The peasantry composed a substantial part of the electorate but at the same time the 
majority of them lived close to subsistence levels, in particular during the nineteenth century. 
 
In addition, it has been argued that foreign capital was acquired to serve a political and 
not an economic function.333 Foreign capital was not seen by the state as a tool for promoting 
economic growth, but rather as a means of enabling the central government to enhance its 
position in Greek society.334 The cost of national unification also absorbed a substantial part of 
foreign loans.335 This policy of deficit financing, coupled with a concomitant dependence on 
foreign borrowing, resulted in Greece experiencing recurring default and/or difficulty in 
borrowing independently from the international capital markets. Both default and difficulties 
with independent borrowing invited international financial intervention and control which in 
332 See Dertilis (1993, pp. 23–70). Kammas and Sarantides (2017) test econometrically Dertilis (1993) 
hypothesis that is to say that the agrarian sector was undertaxed and that this trend began in the 1860s 
when fundamental political reforms were implemented.  
333 Pepelasis Minoglou (1995, p. 261) 
334 Ibid., p. 263; for the effect of foreign borrowing on the economy, see Stefanides (1930); 
Aggelopoulos (1937, pp. 92–138). 
335 Aggelopoulos (1937, pp. 26 and 32). 
 
 
                                                     
turn resulted in partial loss of fiscal and monetary sovereignty. Conditionality attached to 
supervised foreign borrowing by governments experiencing difficulties in accessing capital 
markets independently promoted institutions that had previously been adopted by creditor 
countries whilst at the same time guaranteeing the continuity of debt service.  
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Figure 5.4: Budget surplus and the drachma in historical perspective, 1833–1930 
Sources: Greek government budget (1907–1930); Dertilis (1993, p. 128); Lazaretou (1993, pp. 305–306); Kostelenos et al. (2007). 
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Although the heavy budget deficits experienced in the 1920s were not extraordinary in the 
history of public finance from Independence to stabilisation in 1928, the depreciation of the 
drachma after 1919 was unique. By 1928, when the drachma was stabilised de jure it had lost 
approximately 95 per cent of its value. This scale of monetary instability, as Figure 5.4 
demonstrates, had not been experienced before, in spite of long periods of floating exchange 
rates. 
  
 The depreciation of the drachma in the 1920s was the result of monetisation of budget 
deficits. The participation of Greece in the First World War was financed by the Allied Book 
Credits and subsequently the printing press was rolled to cover public expenditure during the 
Asia Minor campaign. In addition, NDBs became a major financial tool for the government in 
particular after the debacle. 
 
 Table 5.12 shows seigniorage collected by the government between the outbreak of 
the Great War and the establishment of the Bank of Greece. Seigniorage was calculated in a 
simple way: as the difference in the average banknotes in circulation between two consecutive 
years. This difference is presented in the first column of Table 5.12. The rest of this table 
indicates seigniorage as a percentage of public revenue, expenditure and GDP. Table 5.12 
demonstrates that seigniorage, in other words loans to the government by the central bank in 
forced banknotes, constituted a significant source of revenue for the government during the 
period that this table covers. During certain periods it was practically the only source of 
extraordinary revenue for the government. In this way, the bank of issue operated at barely 
arm’s length from the government.  
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Table 5.12: Seigniorage, 1914–1928 
 A 
(’000 omitted) 
As percentage 
of revenue 
As percentage 
of expenditure 
As percentage 
of GDP 
1914 21,136.83 9.69 4.35 1.71 
1915 54,817.17 24.14 14.21 3.86 
1916 172,661.58 72.18 72.56 9.17 
1917 206,146.08 89.28 65.03 7.67 
1918 414,163.75 91.19 28.64 9.87 
1919 249,092.33 44.41 18.40 6.57 
1920 92,060.25 12.59 5.47 1.72 
1921 406,808.42 41.02 16.45 5.96 
1922 262,244.92 13.64 7.58 2.43 
1923 2,058,416.08 55.04 41.35 12.43 
1924 493,883.25 9.67 8.98 2.38 
1925 619,340.17 10.47 9.05 2.58 
1926 -747,006.75 -10.33 -8.60 -2.65 
1927 433,840.50 4.86 5.58 1.41 
1928 -78,251.58 -0.84 -0.83 -0.23 
Notes:  
(1) The annual average amount of banknotes in circulation was used to estimate seigniorage 
between 1914 and 12 May 1928 when the National Bank lost its issuing privilege.  
(2) Column A shows the difference in the average banknotes in circulation from year to year.  
Sources: Annual Reports of the National Bank for 1914–1928; Greek government budget 
(1914–1930); Kostelenos et al. (2007). 
 
The burden of public debt in 1928 after de jure stabilisation is shown in Table A6.1 in 
Appendix A6. Public debt as a percentage of GDP was approximately 133 per cent in 1928. 
This is an improvement if public debt as a percentage of GDP after stabilisation is compared 
with that of 1913. Public debt as a percentage of GDP in 1913 was 142 per cent. The picture, 
however, changes if public debt per capita is estimated. Table A6.1 indicates that per capita 
public debt both in gold drachmae and in pounds sterling nearly doubled between 1913 and 
1928, in spite of a considerable increase in the population because of the influx of one and a 
quarter million refugees. In 1913, public debt per capita was 252 gold drachmae or 10 pounds 
sterling, whilst by 1928 it had increased to 484 gold drachmae or 19 pounds sterling. These 
data imply that the burden of public debt per capita in 1928 was even higher than in 1898, 
although data of public debt as a percentage of GDP create a different picture.  
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Table A6.1 also demonstrates that the structure of public debt changed between 1898 
and 1928. After the enactment of the Law of Control and the consolidation of domestic 
government debt in 1898, domestic public debt represented only 13 per cent of the total public 
debt. At the end of the Balkan Wars as well as after stabilisation, the percentage share of 
domestic government debt had increased to one-third of the total public debt. In 1928, 40 per 
cent of the government debt denominated in drachmae was held by the newly established 
central bank together with its predecessor.  
 
The way that a long period of war and subsequent reconstruction was financed had a 
long-term impact on the banking structure in Greece. The implementation of a stabilisation 
plan sponsored by the Financial Committee of the League of Nations urged institutional 
reforms which focused on the country’s central banking system. The League insisted on 
reform of the National Bank, the issuing bank in Greece at the time, to confine its activities to 
central banking and to become independent from the government. This suggestion led to the 
establishment of a fully fledged central bank in Greece in 1928. At the same time, the 
National Bank chose to retain its commercial activities and maintain its strength as a banking 
institution.  
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CHAPTER 6: 
THE STABILISATION OF THE DRACHMA 
 
 
 
6.1. Introduction          
6.2. Ending Monetary Instability        
6.3. Historical Background          
6.4. Recourse to the League of Nations         
6.5. Comparison of the League stabilisation plans      
6.6. The making of the loan         
6.7. Greek government borrowing under foreign supervision in 1898 and 1928:  
       parallels and contrasts         
 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
With the drachma exhibiting notable stability during the second half of 1924, the First 
Refugee Loan was floated under the auspices of the League of Nations in December of that 
year. It was then widely believed that Greece was on the threshold of stabilising its 
currency.336 The governor of the National Bank of Greece, Alexandros Diomides, assumed 
that after the flotation of the 1924 Refugee Loan, the drachma would stabilise at a rate of no 
more than 250 drachmae to the pound sterling through the interplay of market forces.337 In 
fact, it would take nearly four years and would involve the implementation of a stabilisation 
plan sponsored by the Financial Committee of the League of Nations and the flotation of a 
second loan on the international markets under the auspices of the League, for Greece to 
stabilise de jure its currency.  
 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2, as well as Figure 6.1, illustrate in brief the monetary upheaval in Greece in 
the 1920s. Table 6.1 shows the inflation rates experienced in Greece between the outbreak of 
the Great War and stabilisation. Two price indices were used: the price index that appears in 
the Statistical Yearbooks and that produced by Kostelenos et al. (2007). Both indices indicate 
336 Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, p. 101). 
337 Ibid., p. 125. 
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that by the mid-1920s inflation had stabilised although its rate remained high. The significant 
fluctuations in prices from year to year demonstrated in Table 6.1 came to an end in 1924. 
Nevertheless, inflation remained high until 1927, by which time the drachma was heading 
towards stabilisation. 
 
Table 6.1: Inflation rates, 1915–1929 
 Statistical Yearbooks Price Index Kostelenos et al. Price Index 
 (pt-pt-1)/pt-1 lnpt - lnpt-1 (pt-pt-1)/pt-1 lnpt - lnpt-1 
1915 19.00 17.40 22.00 19.89 
1916 33.61 28.98 31.15 27.12 
1917 66.04 50.70 48.75 39.71 
1918 36.36 31.02 28.57 25.13 
1919 -10.00 -10.54 9.48 9.05 
1920 6.79 6.57 13.43 12.60 
1921 19.08 17.46 24.74 22.10 
1922 46.12 37.92 54.64 43.59 
1923 111.13 74.73 72.58 54.57 
1924 2.52 2.49 10.36 9.85 
1925 15.58 14.48 8.02 7.72 
1926 11.75 11.11 14.46 13.50 
1927 12.06 11.39 12.75 12.00 
1928 2.97 2.93 -0.15 -0.15 
1929 3.96 3.89 -7.98 -8.31 
Source: Author’s calculations using data in Table A1.1 in Appendix A1. 
 
Figure 6.1 demonstrates the way that the value of the drachma fluctuated from May 1919 
when it began depreciating to the end of 1928. The data used are weekly data, hand-collected 
from The Economist which are available upon request. Table 6.2 provides summary statistics 
of the exchange rate during the entire period that the drachma was depreciating. The period in 
question was divided into sub-periods taking into account historical and political events.  
 
It is evident that the external value of the drachma fluctuated severely and by the time 
convertibility was introduced it had lost approximately 95 per cent of its pre-war value. On 12 
May 1928, when the gold exchange standard was adopted, one sterling pound equalled 375 
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drachmae whilst according to the LMU parity one pound sterling was equal to 25.207 
drachmae. 
 
 De facto stabilisation in Greece was achieved in the spring of 1927 and the 
implementation of a stabilisation programme prepared by the Financial Committee of the 
League of Nations led to the adoption of the gold exchange standard on 12 May 1928. The 
National Bank of Greece, the Greek Treasury, the IFC, the Bank of England and later the 
Financial Committee of the League of Nations were all involved in the attempts at stabilisation 
of the drachma in the late 1920s. 
 
 In this chapter firstly, the measures taken that curbed the depreciation of the drachma 
are examined. Secondly, the stabilisation plans proposed by the British member of the IFC and 
the sub-governor of the National Bank are presented. Subsequently, the negotiations with the 
Financial Committee of the League and the stabilisation programme they prepared are studied. 
A comparison of the League stabilisation programmes follows and the flotation of the 
Stabilisation Loan is discussed. This chapter closes with an examination of the parallels and 
contrasts between the Law of Control of 1898 and the 1928 Geneva Stabilisation Plan. At the 
time, the establishment of the Bank of Greece was regarded as a symbol of foreign intervention 
in the country’s affairs and its creation was often compared with of the Law of Control. 
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Figure 6.1: Evolution of the exchange rate of the drachma, May 1919–December 1928 
(Weekly rates in London) 
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Notes:  
(1) These are weekly rates of drachmae to the pound sterling, hand-collected by the author from The Economist.  
(2) The period covered begins on 9 May 1919 when The Economist commenced reporting quotations of the drachma against the pound sterling and finishes 
on 27 December 1928. 
Source: Hand-collected weekly data from The Economist (9 May 1919–27 December 1928). Data available upon request. 
 
 
Table 6.2: Summary statistics of the drachma exchange rate, 1919–1928 
(drachmae per pound sterling) 
 
Number of Observations Mean 
 
Median 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
The Slide of the Drachma:1 
(9 May 1919–17 May 1928) 470 224 253 22.60 440 139 
May 1919–November 19202 81 29.11 30 22.60 40.50 5 
December 1920–September 19223 96 90 92.50 42.50 190 36 
October 1922–November 19264 216 305 295 140 440 73 
December 1926–May 19285 77 367 367 275 390 14 
Bank Consortium: 6 
(June 1921–September 1922) 69 105 98 60 190 33 
Notes:  
1 ‘The Slide of the Drachma’ covers the period from 9 May 1919 up to 17 May 1928. In May 1919, the drachma began fluctuating after having been stable 
around its LMU parity since the end of 1909 and on 12 May 1928 the gold exchange standard was de jure adopted. This entire period of monetary upheaval in 
Greece in the 1920s, entitled here as ‘The Slide of the Drachma’, is divided below into four sub-periods. 
2 This first sub-period begins in May 1919, when Greek troops disembarked in Smyrna and ends in November 1920 when the Allies renounced payment of 
the Book Credits. 
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3 This second sub-period begins in December 1920, when the exiled King Constantine returns to the Greek throne and finishes with the Asia Minor debacle. 
4 This third sub-period is a period of severe political upheaval in Athens. 
5 This fourth sub-period begins when a coalition government is formed after a general election whose priority was the stabilisation of the Greek currency and 
finishes with de jure adoption of the gold exchange standard.  
6 Late in May 1921 a syndicate of leading banks was formed by the Greek government which was known as the Bank Consortium. The objective of the 
government in setting up this Consortium was to curb the depreciation of the drachma. Theoretically, all the foreign exchange which entered or left the 
country, regardless of the reason or the mechanism, was to be controlled and managed by this banking syndicate. Its capital came mainly from contributions 
made by the participating banks; the size of each contribution at the same time determining the responsibility of the investing bank and its share in the 
expenses as well as in the profits and losses of the Consortium. The Bank Consortium operated from 1 June/14 July 1921 up to 28 September/11 October 
1922. By the end, almost all Greek banks were members of this banking syndicate. During its operation, however, a large proportion of the country’s foreign 
exchange earnings eluded its control; there are references to a 25 and indeed 35 per cent difference between the price set by the Consortium and that 
prevailing on the shadow foreign exchange market. For more on the Bank Consortium, see NBGHA_Α1Σ19Υ1Φ2Ε1; NBGHA_Α1Σ19Υ1Φ2Ε21; 
NBGHA_Α1Σ19Υ1Φ2Ε22; NBGHA_Α1Σ19Υ1Φ2Ε37; Zolotas (1928, p. 192); Tsalikis (1929, pp. 19-20). 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using hand-collected data on the exchange rate of the drachma to the pound sterling quoted in The Economist (1919–1928). 
Data available upon request. 
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6.2. Ending Monetary Instability 
In the Greek literature, the timing of the stabilisation of the drachma is seen as a consequence of 
political change and institutional advances that occurred in 1927: a coalition government was 
formed in December 1926, the war debt with Great Britain was settled,338 subsequently the 
financial embargo which had been imposed on the country was lifted,339 and recourse was made 
to the League of Nations.340 Fiscal developments are also regarded as having played a role in 
bringing about stabilisation.341 Foreign capital is treated as a prerequisite for stabilisation. The 
possibility of achieving stabilisation from domestic resources through an expenditure 
retrenchment or increase in taxation or both is not considered in the literature as it was 
completely ignored as an option by policy makers in the late 1920s. In short, stabilisation is 
explained as a natural outcome of the steps that the government took: to settle its war debts and 
to resort to an outside agent in order to raise capital from the international financial markets.  
 
 Changes in the fiscal policy of the Greek government in order to stabilise the drachma 
were neither abrupt nor fundamental. On the contrary, it is argued here that fiscal policy did not 
change and that budget deficits persisted. What changed was the way in which the government 
borrowed. They stopped monetising their budget deficits and turned to the international 
financial markets.  
 
 In the example of Greece, fiscal consolidation was not achieved in the way that the 
Financial Committee of the League intended it and indeed as orthodox economic policy at the 
time required. Then again, achieving a balanced budget before the implementation of a League 
sponsored reconstruction scheme was not seen as a prerequisite by the Financial Committee. 
Ordinarily, a de facto currency stabilisation was thought to be a requirement before the League 
was approached. In Article V of the 1927 Geneva Protocol which refers to the budget it is stated 
that ‘the Hellenic Government undertakes to make, and to persist in making, every effort to 
keep the budget within the limit of about 9,000 million drachmae, until the end of the financial 
year 1929–30, and to maintain thereafter a complete equilibrium between the current revenue 
and current expenses of the State’.342 
 
338 For more about the war debt issue, see Veremis (1982, pp. 91–116); Pandelakis (1988, pp. 175–325); 
Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, pp. 109–114). 
339 Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, p. 114) argues that ‘the British Treasury through the embargo prevented 
Greece from reaching stabilisation at an earlier date’.  
340 Zolotas (1929, pp. 67–130); Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, pp. 142–150). 
341 Zolotas (1929, pp. 67–111). 
342 League of Nations (1945, p. 19). 
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 The finance minister, before leaving Athens for Geneva in June 1927, presented the 
budget for the fiscal year 1927–28 and proposed to the parliament increases in taxation.343 The 
aim was to balance the budget. At the end, for the first time since the early nineteenth century, 
the budget of the fiscal year 1927–28 closed in surplus.344 Subsequently, budget deficits 
persisted, which is hardly surprising given the advent of the Great Depression. 
 
 By contrast, there was a significant change in policy in respect of the banknotes in 
circulation and the NDBs. The last time that the government resorted to the National Bank to 
borrow in forced circulation was in early March 1923. (See Table 4.4 in Chapter 4.) 
Subsequently any increase in the banknotes in circulation was based on the Law of 23 April 
1923, an arrangement which echoed the principles of the ΓΧΜΒ Law. Hence, any new issues of 
banknotes in circulation in response to the April 1923 Law were fully covered by foreign 
exchange reserves.   
 
 After the middle of 1923, one of the main causes of monetary instability and an 
important source by which the government increased its revenue was the NDBs. The number of 
the NDBs issued tripled in 1923. (See data in Chapter 5 where the evolution of the NDBs is 
examined.) This is very vividly depicted in Figure 6.2 below where the outstanding amount of 
NDBs is added together with the banknotes in circulation. As has been explained in Chapter 5, 
the NDBs were a very liquid investment as their maturity was short. Furthermore, and perhaps 
more importantly, the National Bank discounted them under certain conditions.  
 
 In January 1926, with no advance warning, the Second Forced Loan was imposed by 
General Pagalos to deal with the issue of the NDBs. In short, all banknotes over 50 drachmae 
were torn in two pieces: one part representing three-quarters of the original face value of the 
banknote continued circulating as money. The remaining one-quarter of the original face value 
of the banknote was converted into a 6 per cent bond of a 20-year period of maturity. The 
proceeds of this forced loan which approximately amounted to one quarter of the banknotes that 
were in circulation late in January 1926, were applied by the government firstly to repay its debt 
to the National Bank because of the NDBs, thereby improving its liquidity, and secondly to 
redeem half of the NDBs when they matured. The remaining half of the NDBs was converted 
into an 8 per cent loan with an amortisation period of ten years.  
 
343 Agrafiotis (1983, pp. 185–186); Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, p. 146). 
344 The data to hand show that the fiscal year of 1916 ended in surplus, although marginally so. 
However, 1916 was a year of political turmoil so the data available may not survive scrutiny. 
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 On 23 January 1926, there were approximately 1.3 billion drachmae of short-term 
NDBs in circulation and 96 million drachmae of a maturity of three, five and ten years.345 On 31 
December 1927, only 134 million of the short-term NDBs remained unredeemed, of which only 
half were to be repaid in cash, the other half would be converted into an 8 per cent bond. By 31 
March 1927, when all short-term NDBs had matured only, a tiny number (about 30 million) 
remained unsettled.346 The three-, five- and ten-year NDBs of value of 96 million drachmae 
would be repaid in cash in full upon their maturity.  
 
 Figure 6.2 demonstrates the impact of the Second Forced Loan on the money supply 
and the NDBs. The number of banknotes in circulation had abruptly dropped by the end of 
January 1926. (See Figure 5.2 in Chapter 5 and Table A3.1 in Appendix A3.) In addition, by the 
end of June 1926, the outstanding amount of the NDBs had also considerably decreased. (See 
also Figure 5.3 and Table 5.7 in Chapter 5.) The money supply vigorously contracted because of 
the introduction of the Second Forced Loan. Subsequently, however, slowly but steadily the 
banknotes in circulation increased. By May 1928, when the National Bank lost its issuing 
privilege, the money supply had not reached the level that it enjoyed before the implementation 
of the Second Forced Loan. Therefore, the Second Force Loan and the concomitant retirement 
of the NDBs was the first major milestone towards stabilisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
345 Annual Report of the National Bank for 1926 (1927, p. xviii). 
346 Ibid. 
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Figure 6.2: Total banknotes in circulation added together with the National Defence Bonds, January 1910–May 1928  
(January 1910=100) 
Sources: Tables 5.7 and 5.8 in Chapter 5; Table A3.1 in Appendix A3. 
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Contrary to the conventional belief and in spite of the Allies’ embargo, there was some capital 
influx into Greece in particular after 1924. (See Table 5.9 in Chapter 5.) This influx was 
possible because the ally embargo was applied against the central government and excluded 
public entities. In addition, the Greek government could and did raise capital from smaller 
capital markets and for infrastructure programmes that were being undertaken at the time. 
However, raising money from small capital markets of Europe, such as with the 8.50 per cent 
Swedish Loan of 1926, proved to be very expensive and the sums that could be raised were very 
limited indeed. 
 
 During the period 1923–1926, the balance of payments in Greece was passive. Imports 
remained high and although exports increased, this increase was limited. Invisible earnings from 
remittances remained low before the stabilisation of the drachma and shipping profits improved 
only after 1925.347 Overall the position of the balance of payments was improving after 1926.  
 
 The important issues in any stabilisation are the price level, the exchange rate, the 
budget and the money supply. All these issues were examined above and it was shown that the 
achievement of stabilisation in Greece in the 1920s was a slow procedure. To bring to a halt 
hyperinflation like that experienced in Germany or Austria after the end of the Great War was 
probably more spectacular than bringing about price and exchange rate stability after a long 
period of high inflation. It has been argued here that a change in monetary policy played an 
important role in delivering stabilisation to Greece. Fiscal policy, defined as the government’s 
choice of levels of spending and taxation did not change much either before or after 
stabilisation. The Stabilisation or Tripartite Loan, as it is otherwise known, reduced the 
adjustment effort and served as a substitution for fiscal reforms. In addition, it provided foreign 
reserves, which worked as a cushion and made possible the adoption of the gold exchange 
standard. The role of the external agent, in this case the Financial Committee of the League, was 
to make the stabilisation attempt credible and to guarantee the flotation of a loan on favourable 
terms on the international financial markets. Institutional reforms that were introduced created a 
commitment mechanism which enhanced credibility during the stabilisation attempt. In Greece, 
the stabilisation plan provided for central banking reforms, which led to the establishment of a 
new central bank. The statutes of the Bank of Greece incorporated rules which prevented policy 
makers from altering monetary policy.  
 
 Political authorities in Greece expected that institutional developments that ended 
with the establishment of a new central bank and the adoption of the gold exchange standard 
347 Zolotas (1928, p. 155). 
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would facilitate an influx of foreign capital essential for economic growth. The impact, 
however, that these institutional reforms have, at least in the short-run, on the cost and of 
course the volume of borrowing ‘reflect external circumstances as well’.348 By May 1928, the 
international economy was about to enter the most severe depression that has ever been 
experienced. 
 
 
6.3. Historical Background  
The first stabilisation programme that was suggested to the National Bank was prepared by L. 
G. Roussin, the British member of the IFC in Athens, in July 1925.349 In this stabilisation 
programme he explicitly described how he envisaged the operation of a stable monetary system 
and explained the causes of the monetary upheaval in Greece. He was clearly an advocate of the 
quantity theory of money in contrast to the prevailing idea in the country amongst 
representatives of the government and the National Bank, who blamed the position of the 
balance of payments for the depreciation of the drachma. He stated that  
new issues of paper money not covered by gold or foreign currency must be abstained 
from, even to satisfy the needs of commerce or for productive purposes. The demand for 
capital in the short or long term can only be satisfied by the growing resources of the 
country and the multiplication of means of payment can in a way replace actual wealth.350  
This was a statement clearly in contrast to the policy of the National Bank as an issuing bank at 
the time, which reflected the principles of the banking school.351 L. G. Roussin also examined 
the reasons that led to the monetary instability and claimed that  
[t]he release of large of notes from the till of the National Bank, in order to increase its 
advances and to repay national war bonds, in swelling the circulation resulted in causing a 
demand for exchange which greatly diminished the reserve of funds abroad. Moreover, this 
reserve, instead of having been kept in a liquid state, had been partly tied up in bonds and 
advances.352  
He believed that it would have been possible to establish convertibility of the drachma at around 
300 drachmae to the pound if the part of the reserves of the National Bank which were 
immobile were liquidated.353  
 
348 Drazen and Masson (1994). 
349 L. G. Roussin was appointed in January 1925 and was French. Prior to 1925 the Counsellor of the 
Legation in Athens served as the British Member of the IFC. This arrangement had been made at the 
beginning of the century when Greek public finance seemed to be sound and resources allocated to the 
IFC were plentiful for the service of the debt under their jurisdiction. 
350 Bank of England Archive, OV80/1, 9, p. 3. 
351 For the open conflict between Alexandros Diomides, the governor of the National Bank and L. G. 
Roussin, which took place in September and October of 1925, see Psalidopoulos (1989, pp. 320–325); 
Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, pp. 125–130). 
352 BoE Archive, OV80/1/9, p. 11. 
353 Ibid., pp. 13–15. 
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 Ioanna Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, p. 128) argues that L. G. Roussin promoted the 
implementation of a stabilisation programme under the supervision of the IFC. His stabilisation 
proposal, however, did not receive much attention either from the Bank of England or from the 
National Bank of Greece. In 1925, the governor of the National Bank believed that thoughts of 
stabilisation were still premature in view of ‘the unsettled state of public finances, the large 
floating debt, the new situation created by the inflation itself, and the need for elasticity’.354  
 
 L. G. Roussin proposed a new more comprehensive stabilisation plan in March 1926. 
The most innovative point of this plan was the proposition of ‘the creation of an issuing office 
quite independent of the National Bank’s other departments and safeguarded by legal provisions 
excluding any outside interference in its management’.355 He further suggested the unification 
of the various existing issues of banknotes. In addition to these, he pointed out that 
‘[s]tabilisation measures must of course be preceded or accompanied by measures for balancing 
the budget and settling the floating debt, so as to exclude strictly all possibility of recourse to 
arbitrary issues’.356 Roussin proposed that it would be possible to make the drachma freely 
convertible at a rate of 275 drachmae to the pound sterling. This was an optimistic estimation 
considering that the going market rate was approximately between 340 drachmae and 370 
drachmae to the sterling in March 1926. He based this calculation on the twin presumption that 
a foreign long-term credit of £2,000,000 would be made available and that the National Bank 
would be reorganised and would liquidate its gold securities held as cover.357 
 
 The National Bank rejected the proposal to establish a special department of issue 
because ‘the statutes of the National Bank similar to those of Banking institutions of Continental 
Europe, provide for the unity of the departments of issue and the banking department. 
Otherwise, the unhampered functioning of the branch offices, especially, would be rendered 
impossible’.358 Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, pp. 130–132) describes the reasons that led to the 
disapproval of this stabilisation scheme by both the National Bank and the Bank of England. 
The governor of the National Bank, Alexandros Diomides maintained that complete freedom in 
the buying and selling of foreign exchange would be impracticable, given the high tendency for 
speculation in Greece and that there was not sufficient foreign credit available to stabilise. 
Furthermore, he reacted strongly to Roussin’s proposal that a special issuing department be set 
up at the National Bank entirely independent of the other services of the Bank and under the 
354 Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, p. 128). 
355 BoE Archive, OV80/1/90, p. 9. 
356 Ibid., p. 10. 
357 Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, p. 130).  
358 BoE Archive, OV80/1/13, p. 1; HABOG_A3S1Y1F36T3, p. 1. 
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control of the IFC. At the same time the Bank of England effectively blocked this proposal by 
the British member of the IFC by refusing to extend the necessary credit.359  
 
 How the representatives of the National Bank of Greece envisaged achieving 
stabilisation is revealed in a scheme for the stabilisation of the drachma proposed by Emmanuel 
Tsouderos, the sub-governor of the National Bank, to the Bank of England in 1926. In this 
scheme, he recommended the unification of all different kinds of banknote issue (examined in 
detail in Chapter 4) and suggested ways by which the National Bank could increase its reserves. 
As a prerequisite for stabilisation he suggested that the Bank of England would concede credits 
and that in return the National Bank would accept the appointment of a ‘Special Commissioner’ 
proposed by the Bank of England, who would be independent from the IFC. The office of the 
‘Special Commissioner’ as stated in the scheme, would last until the credit had been repaid.360  
 
 Prior to December 1926, none of the stabilisation programmes proposed could actually 
lead to stabilisation. They were not stabilisation schemes accepted by all parties and none of 
them guaranteed external financial assistance. They highlighted, however, differences in the 
way that Greeks on the one hand, and their counterparts on the other, approached the question of 
stabilisation. The Greek delegation saw as imperative the raising of a big external loan without 
envisaging any institutional changes. By contrast, both the Bank of England and the IFC urged 
institutional reforms, although not as sweeping as the ones that the Financial Committee of the 
League of Nations required. 
 
 Stabilisation also proved to be difficult because there was not sufficient political 
stability in the country and the problem of war debts with the Allies had not been settled. Clause 
four of the 1918 Paris Agreement blocked the Greek government’s access to the international 
capital markets, since every time that the Greek government wanted to float a foreign loan it 
was required to ask permission of Britain, France and the USA. In addition to this difficulty, 
Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, p. 110) says that in the late autumn of 1925 or early winter of 1926 
the British Treasury imposed an embargo in the City after Greco-British negotiations for the 
determination of the net war debt and the mode of payment reached deadlock. 
 
 Some fiscal measures were taken in 1926. The government of General Pangalos 
implemented unpopular austerity measures and decreased the number of public servants; 
nevertheless, overall public expenditure rose by 27 per cent in 1926 due to an increase in 
359 Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, pp. 131–132).  
360 BoE Archive, OV80/1/18. 
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military expenditure. However, as has been noted above, a turning point towards stabilisation 
was the retirement of the NDBs in early 1926.  
 
 
6.4. Recourse to the League of Nations 
By the time that the coalition government was formed, on 4 December 1926, it was universally 
recognised in the country that stabilisation should be achieved as soon as possible. A few days 
later, on 10 December 1926, a Committee of Greek Experts was appointed to examine the 
public finances of the country and to suggest measures for their improvement. The Committee 
announced its results to the Greek government at the end of February 1927. They suggested the 
unification of the budget and economies in military and naval expenditure, in pensions and in 
civil administration. They encouraged an increase in revenues by means other than taxation in 
order that budget deficits be avoided in the future. In addition, they suggested stabilisation of the 
drachma at the prevailing market rate.361 The Committee of Greek Experts perceived 
stabilisation as a matter of technicality, but at the same time as a prerequisite together with the 
settlement of the war debt in order for foreign capital to flow into the country again.  
  
 The general view in the country was that monetary stability could only be achieved 
with a large loan from abroad, which would provide the capital needed for the completion of the 
refugee settlement and the stabilisation of the drachma. It is significant that the Greek 
Committee of Experts did not envisage any institutional changes. They recommended cuts in 
public expenditure and a return to capital markets as preconditions to achieving monetary 
stability, but on the other hand they dismissed the issue of public revenue. By contrast, in 
France, at roughly the same time, political truce and broad consensus led to monetary 
stabilisation by means of increased revenues through taxation, which assured persistent 
balanced or surplus government budgets in the future. 
 
 Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, p. 134) argues that Diomides was against the involvement of 
the League of Nations because of theoretical differences over the nature of stabilisation and the 
operation of central banking. It is not clear from the evidence she provides that the governor of 
the National Bank et al. were aware of the central banking reform that the involvement of the 
Financial Committee of the League of Nations in the stabilisation process in Greece would 
entail. The help and involvement of the Bank of England was welcomed, in spite of the fact that 
Greek bankers held different views on monetary issues from those of the Bank of England 
361 BoE Archive, OV80/1/33; BoE Archive, OV80/1/39; Psalidopoulos (1989, pp. 317–319); Pepelasis 
Minoglou (1993, p. 145). 
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whose after all theoretical position dominated the Financial Committee of the League. From the 
end of 1925 the practice developed was of turning, not to the League of Nations, but to one or 
more of the major national central banks for assistance. In this way four countries – Belgium, 
Italy, Poland and Rumania – stabilised their currencies in the years 1926–28.362  
 
 Recourse to the League of Nations involved stringent controls and, as archival material 
reveals, the Greek government was anxious to avoid any kind of control or any sort of foreign 
intervention into Greek public affairs because of the political cost that such intervention 
entailed. Nor were they prepared to extend the rights of the IFC.363 Furthermore, during the 
negotiations for the settlement of the war debts with Britain, the Greek government suggested 
surrendering its claim to the remainder of the Book Credits granted under the agreement of 
February 1918, provided that the British Treasury would support them in their efforts to obtain 
credits from the London market of an equivalent amount, that is to say 5.5 million sterling, to 
stabilise the drachma.364 Needless to say, this proposition was not accepted by the Treasury, and 
the Bank of England’s advice was recourse to the League of Nations. 
 
 As late as 30 March 1927, the Greek minister of finance, George Kaphandaris, 
maintained that a League of Nations plan would be disadvantageous for the country.365 A few 
days later the British war debt settlement was signed and a few weeks after that the League 
Secretariat was ‘invited’ to examine financial conditions in Greece. A mission was sent to 
Greece in April 1927. This committee was headed by Joseph Avenol and its members were E. 
Felkin, Jacques Rueff and J. Von Walre de Bordes, all members of the Financial Committee of 
the League of Nations. At the end of May, they submitted to the Secretariat a long report which 
dealt with the accounts of the Treasury, the budget, the National Bank and the general economic 
situation in the country.366 In this report, as has been noted before, a lot of attention was paid to 
the National Bank and its dual-purpose character. 
 
 In the proceedings of the 27th session of the Financial Committee which was held 
between 8 and 14 June, the implementation of a Greek reconstruction plan was discussed in 
detail.367 The Greek delegation, which was headed by the minister of finance Georgios 
Kaphandaris, and a member of which was the sub-governor of the National Bank Emmanuel 
362 Meyer (1970, p. 3). 
363 BoE Archive, OV80/1/38; BoE Archive, OV80/1/39; BoE Archive, OV80/2/1; BoE Archive, 
OV80/2/17; BoE Archive, OV80/2/20; BoE Archive, OV80/2/24. 
364 BoE Archive, OV80/1/38. 
365 Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, p. 143). 
366 See HABOG_A3S1Y1F1; HABOG_A3S1Y1F2; HABOG_A3S1Y1F3; HABOG_A3S1Y1F4; 
HABOG_A3S1Y1F5. 
367 For a detailed description of the events in Geneva in June 1927, see Pyrsos (c1935, pp. 45–49); 
Bank of Greece (1978, pp. 60–64); Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, pp. 146–147). 
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Tsouderos, was asked privately to answer questions which dealt with the reforms that the 
Financial Committee requested.368 These questions referred to the budget, to the way the 
proceeds of the loan would be used, to changes of the National Bank ‘to bring [it] closer to 
conformity with modern central banking’, and to the appointment of a foreign advisor to the 
central bank. These questions constituted the main points of what later became a stabilisation 
programme for Greece. They were all accepted in principle, but with the appointment of an 
advisor with extended powers.369 On the last day of the proceedings in Geneva, the Greek 
minister of finance made an official request to the League to raise under its aegis a loan of 9 
million pounds sterling and the Financial Committee asked the Council to approve the 
reconstruction scheme for Greece. The Council accepted the plan in principle but reserved the 
right to approve it in its September session.  
 
 The original idea of the Financial Committee was that the existing bank of issue, the 
National Bank of Greece – which, as has been discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, pursued public 
responsibilities and at the same time was the most powerful commercial bank in Greece – 
should be reformed by winding up or transferring to other institutions all those parts of its 
activities which would not normally fall within the scope of a central bank. This idea was 
embodied in the Committee’s June report. The Protocol, however, that was signed in September 
spoke about the establishment of a new, independent, fully fledged central bank. The 
establishment of a new fully fledged central bank, the Bank of Greece, is examined in detail in 
Chapter 7. 
 
 The Geneva Protocol also stated that fiscal consolidation and de jure stabilisation of the 
Greek currency could be achieved with a loan of 9 million sterling, of which 3 million would be 
available for the settlement of refugees, 3 million for budget arrears and 3 million for 
strengthening the newly established central bank. Article V of the Geneva Protocol referred to 
the budget, saying that the Hellenic government had to undertake to make, and to persist in 
making, every effort to keep the budget within the limit of about 9 billion drachmae, until the 
end of the financial year 1929–1930, and to ‘maintain thereafter a complete equilibrium 
between the current revenue and current expenses of the government’.370 In addition, they had 
to send every three months a report on the situation of the budget for a period of three years 
following stabilisation. Advances and treasury bills or other similar short-term obligations were 
368 BoE Archive, 0V80/2/23; Pyrsos (c1935, pp. 47–49); Bank of Greece (1978, pp. 61, n. 1); Pepelasis 
Minoglou (1993, p. 152, n. 21). 
369 BoE Archive, 0V80/2/23. 
370 League of Nations (1945, p. 19). 
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limited to 800 million drachmae. Finally, Greece undertook to create a new system of public 
accounting in conformity with the principle of the unity of the budget.371  
 
 
6.5. Comparison of the League stabilisation plans 
In this section, a comparison between the Greek stabilisation plan and the other plans that were 
prepared by the Financial Committee will be attempted. The Financial Committee had 
implemented six reconstruction schemes (Austria, Hungary, Greece, Bulgaria, Danzig and 
Estonia) and had prepared another three for Albania, Portugal and Rumania which were never 
executed. In Greece and Bulgaria the League of Nations stepped in twice, at first to assist with 
the settlement of refugees and then to involve itself in currency stabilisation.372  
 
 The League reconstruction programmes can be broadly divided into two parts: the 
making of a loan and the conditions attached to the scheme in order for the League to supervise 
the making of the loan. In each case, a big foreign loan was issued under the aegis of the 
Financial Committee of the League. It was generally speaking difficult for those countries 
which resorted to the League of Nations to borrow independently from the international capital 
markets. Their creditworthiness was low reflecting their internal economic and monetary 
conditions. The money loaned to the government was to 
afford a breathing-space during which inflation could be arrested and the state could settle 
down to living within its means, and at the same time the actual foreign exchange proceeds 
of the loan would strengthen the position of the central bank, and pave the way for 
exchange stability on the basis of free convertibility.373  
 
 Institutional reforms, changes in fiscal and monetary policy and a mechanism of 
stringent control were introduced as conditions by the League. This conditionality bound 
governments to follow planned policy in the future. The most important institutional change in 
all reconstruction schemes was central banking reforms ‘on the lines recommended at 
Brussels’.374 Accounting or auditing offices were also reorganised. The objective was to achieve 
better control and monitoring of public finances by a central authority.375  
 
 In all the cases a plan was drawn up in order for the country to balance its budget. In 
most of the cases a balanced budget was not regarded by the League of Nations as a prerequisite 
371 League of Nations (1927, pp. 16–20). 
372 In Greece, the League intervened for the first time in 1923 and then in 1927; in Bulgaria in 1926 and 
then again in 1928. 
373 League of Nations (1945, p. 19). 
374 Ibid., p. 20. 
375 Santaella (1993, p. 11). 
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to a country adopting convertibility. All the stabilisation programmes, however, spoke about 
fiscal consolidation and asked for guarantees that this would be achieved in the future.  
 
 Some sort of supervision was imposed in all cases. In Austria and Hungary and later in 
Bulgaria a foreign Commissioner-General was sent to control the proceeds of the loan.376 A 
foreign advisor was appointed in the central bank of the countries which resorted to the League 
of Nations. Both the foreign advisor to the bank and the Commissioner-General reported to the 
Council regularly according to the rules set out in the League Protocol. In Greece, the presence 
of the IFC made the question of supervision a more complicated one.377 The IFC was 
responsible for servicing the government’s foreign debt under their aegis. It should be noted 
here that the idea of introducing an international commission similar in structure to the IFC in 
Greece was incorporated in the first drafts of the scheme for Austria but it was subsequently 
dropped from the final Protocol.378 Nevertheless, a foreign advisor was appointed to the newly 
established central bank in Greece and the servicing of both League loans that Greece had raised 
in the 1920s was assumed by the IFC.  
  
 It is widely recognised that the League reconstruction schemes were comprehensive 
and effective, since inflation was immediately curbed in all cases. Institutional changes mainly 
focused on monetary policy and fiscal reforms were introduced that made the stabilisation 
programmes credible. Ending inflation was promoted as a fiscal phenomenon in the schemes. In 
addition, all these plans made provision for the flotation of a big international loan which was 
regarded as a pre-condition for currency stabilisation in the countries where the League 
intervened.  
 
 
6.6. The making of the loan 
The making of the Stabilisation Loan is briefly examined here. The Stabilisation Loan is also 
known as the Tripartite Loan because it served three purposes: one-third of the loan went 
towards budget arrears, one-third to the central bank and one-third to the refugees.  
 
The settlement of the war debts with the USA was tied up to this loan. The Americans 
indicated that they would block any issue of the loan on the American market unless the war 
debts with Greece were settled.379 Aware of this possibility, negotiations were entered into and 
376 The Commissioner-General remained in those countries until 30 June 1926. 
377 League of Nations (1945, p. 89). 
378 Ibid., p. 18. 
379 BoE Archive, OV80/2/25; BoE Archive, OV80/2/34A. 
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an agreement was reached on 6 December 1927. As part of the settlement the Greek 
government renounced its claim to the remaining Book Credits, and in return the American 
government promised to release credit amounting to 2.5 million pounds sterling or 12.167 
million American dollars on account of the American share of the 1918 Book Credits. Since this 
American credit would be employed directly by the RSC for the rehabilitation of refugees, it 
was then arranged that a 6.5 million pounds sterling Stabilisation Loan would be floated on the 
capital markets instead of a loan of 9 million pounds as the Geneva Protocol had indicated. The 
proceeds of this 6.5 million pound loan were then allocated as follows: 3 million pounds was 
earmarked for the budget, 3 million pounds for the central bank and only 500 thousand pounds 
for the refugees.  
 
The 2.5 million pounds loan from the American government, which became known as 
the Second Refugee Loan was issued at par, had a 4 per cent interest rate and a 20 year 
redemption period. This was a very favourable agreement for the Greek government. It was not 
certain, however, until the spring of 1929 that the credit would in fact be transferred, as the 
American Congress delayed giving its approval. It was expected to pass a resolution in March 
1928 but only did so finally on 10 May 1929. 
 
Archival Material shows great cooperation between the Bank of England (Montagu 
Norman and Otto Niemeyer) and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Benjamin Strong and 
George Harrison) to overcome difficulties and arrange for part of the Stabilisation Loan to be 
issued on the New York market. The Bank of England wanted the loan to be an international 
loan and for as many markets to participate as possible. This was either because Montagu 
Norman genuinely believed that ‘it is not reasonable, even if it were possible, that London 
should issue any part of the proposed Loan without the co-operation of America’380 or that he 
doubted that Greece would be able to raise this amount of money in Europe alone.381 On the 
other hand, the relationship, as it appears in the archival material between the Bank of England 
and the Bank of France, was not as strong as that between the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York and the Bank of England. In the end France did not participate and no part of the loan was 
floated in France. 
 
 Two banks competed to underwrite the Stabilisation Loan: the Hambros Bank, which 
was considered to be ‘the Bankers of the Greeks’,382 and the American house of Blair & Co. 
380 BoE Archive, OV80/2/34A; Pepelasis Minogou (1993, p. 156). 
381 BoE Archive, OV80/2/30.  
382 BoE Archive, OV9/197/49. 
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Table 6.3 shows the various offers made by each house.383 At the end, Hambros obtained the 
loan with an offer that was regarded as being extremely ‘favourable to Greeks’.384 It is possible 
that Hambros made this offer under some pressure from the British Treasury and Foreign Office 
to secure the business.385  
 
Table 6.3: Bids made for the Stabilisation Loan, January 1928 
 Nominal Interest Rate Issue Price Real Interest Rate 
Hambros 
First Offer 7.00% 93 7.50% 
Second Offer 6.50% 88 7.40% 
Third Offer 6.00% 85.50 7.00% 
Blair 
First Offer 7.00% 89 7.80% 
Second Offer 6.50% 88.50 7.40% 
Source: Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, p. 164). 
 
The Stabilisation Loan had a coupon rate of 6 per cent, the price of issue was 91 and net 86. In 
addition, its amortisation period was 40 years. The Geneva Protocol of September 1927 placed 
the new League of Nations loan under the jurisdiction of the IFC without the Greek government 
having to assign to it additional revenues. As has been noted above, these terms were very 
favourable to the Greek government and this was recognised in the literature by 
contemporaneous scholars.386 Table 6.4 presents all the loans that were issued under the 
auspices of the League and their terms are compared. It is noticeable that the terms and 
conditions of the Greek Stabilisation Loan were more advantageous than the others. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
383 See also BoE Archive, OV9/197/54-55. 
384 BoE Archive, OV80/3/8A; BoE Archive, OV9/197/218–224. 
385 BoE Archive, OV80/3/8A; BoE Archive, OV9/197/225–227. 
386 Zolotas (1929, p. 129); Stefanidis (1930, p. 245). 
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Table 6.4: Loans issued under the auspices of the League of Nations 
 
Date 
of 
Issue 
Nominal 
Amount 
in £ 
Coupon Rate Maturity 
(years) 
Price of 
Issue 
Price 
Received 
Austria 1923 33,782,558 6, 6.50, 7.00 20 75–93 75–91.50 
Hungary 1924 14,386,583 7.50 20 88–92 80–86.80 
Greek 
Refugee Loan 
 
1924 
 
12,300,000 
 
7.00 
 
40 
 
86–88 
 
80–81 
Municipality 
of Danzig 
 
1925 
 
1,500,000 
 
7.00 
 
20 
 
90 
 
84 
Bulgaria 
Settlement 
Loan 
 
1926 
 
3,327,596 
 
7.00 
 
40 
 
92–93 
 
87–88.50 
Estonia 1927 1,523,708 7.00 40 94.50 89.50 
Free City 
of Danzig 
 
1927 
 
1,900,000 
 
6.50 
 
20 
 
91 
 
85.50 
Greek 
Stabilisation 
Loan 
 
1928 
 
7,557,903 
 
6.00 
 
40 
 
91 
 
86 
Bulgarian 
Stabilisation 
Loan 
 
1928 
 
4,480,412 
 
7.50 
 
40 
 
96–97 
 
90–91.80 
Source: League of Nations (1945, pp. 164–171); Flores and Decorzant (2012, p. 31). 
 
The flotation of the loan was launched simultaneously in London and in New York on 31 
January 1928. On 20 January 1928, nearly ten days before issue, when agreement had been 
already reached, The Times wrote: ‘it would be interesting to know why it is expected that the 
public will subscribe to the new loan, which gives a yield smaller by nearly 0.50 per cent, the 
security being in no way better than that of the existing [Refugee Loan]’.387 It is true that the 
terms by which the Stabilisation Loan was issued surprised all the participants involved in its 
flotation. In London, however, it was six times oversubscribed by the public,388 and there was 
similar success in the other capital markets. Table 6.5 compares the two Greek League of 
Nations loans by market percentage. Note that the flotation of the loan in Italy and Sweden was 
in sterling whilst in Switzerland it was in American dollars.389 The Hambros and Erlangers were 
387 BoE Archive, OV80/3/6. 
388 BoE Archive, OV9/197/293a. 
389 BoE Archive, OV80/3/21. 
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responsible for the part of the loan issued in pounds sterling and Speyer, the National City Co 
and the National City Bank of New York led the dollar tranche.  
 
Table 6.5: Geographical breakdown of the two Greek League of Nations loans 
 First Refugee Loan (1924) Stabilisation Loan (1928) 
Britain 61% 44.50% 
USA 19% 41% 
Greece 20% – 
Italy – 5% 
Sweden – 4% 
Switzerland – 5.50% 
Source: Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, p. 168). 
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6.7. Greek government borrowing under foreign supervision in 1898 and 1928: 
parallels and contrasts390  
According to George Leontaritis (1990, p. 195) ‘Greece has always lived beyond her 
resources’. Not only has she borrowed heavily, but by 1932 she had defaulted on her sovereign 
debt four times.391 As a consequence the country experienced financial embargoes, foreign 
intervention into its monetary policy and control of its fiscal revenues. A byzantine relationship 
arose between the Greek government and its foreign creditors, making an historical analysis of 
Greek public debt and the conditionality that often accompanied it even more compelling.  
 
 In the late 1920s, three foreign institutions were based in Athens as a consequence of 
the 1893 default and government borrowing under the aegis of the League of Nations in the 
1920s: the IFC, the RSC and the financial advisor to the Bank of Greece. The IFC, established 
in 1898, was mainly a debt management committee responsible for the service of the 
government debt placed under its jurisdiction. A special body, the RSC, was established in 
1923 to administer the proceeds of the First Refugee Loan and to carry out the settlement of 
refugees mainly in rural areas. The RSC was an autonomous body, its statutes having been 
developed by the Financial Committee of the League of Nations, and it was under the strict 
supervision of the League Council. In 1928, H. O. Finlayson was appointed as advisor to the 
Bank of Greece, a clause in the Geneva Protocol that Greek representatives went to great 
lengths to avoid. In the end, there was a compromise and the financial advisor to the newly 
established central bank did not have the power of veto. Its role was to oversee the activities 
and policies pursued by the Bank of Greece and to report regularly to the Council of the 
League.  
  
 This thesis examines in depth the Geneva Protocol of 1927 prepared by the Financial 
Committee of the League and refers extensively to the 1898 Law of Control. The two 
historical periods covered, that is to say the 1890s which led to the introduction of the Law of 
Control and the 1920s, were very different. Whereas in 1893 the Greek government defaulted 
on its external debt obligations, in the 1920s none of the Greek governments, despite the 
difficulties they encountered in financing public expenditure, considered default an option. 
The humiliation of the military defeat of 1922, combined with the transaction costs and the 
390 Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, pp. 202–204) in her thesis makes a ‘temporal comparison’ between the 
1898 Law of Control and the League of Nations Stabilisation scheme of 1928. She sees the similarities as 
factual and in the nature of the interests that both organisations represent. In her analysis, the differences 
are also of this nature. 
391 The first episode of default is broadly regarded as having occurred even before Greece became a 
sovereign state; this rather ‘excusable default’ occurred in 1827 during the War of Independence. See, 
for example, Reinhart and Trebesch (2015); Dertilis (2016). The other three default episodes took place 
in 1844, 1893 and 1932. 
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embarrassment of the 1893 default which still loomed large in politicians’ minds in Athens, as 
well as the belief that foreign capital would be forthcoming, led governments to opt for 
controversial measures to cover expenditure rather than ceasing to honour their foreign 
obligations.392  
 
Military defeat is a common characteristic of both historical periods. In 1898, Greece 
had to pay a war indemnity in exchange for Turkish troops evacuating Thessaly. In the 1920s, 
Greek governments had to settle more than a million refugees who reached Greece after the 
Asia Minor debacle.  
 
 In both the late 1890s and the 1920s, the creditworthiness of the Greek government as 
demonstrated by Figure 6.3 below was very low. In the 1890s, the Greek government did not 
have access to the international financial markets as a consequence of default. Furthermore, 
the negotiations with foreign bondholders proved to be difficult and protracted. It took five 
years and a Greco-Turkish war before a compromise was reached in 1898. This compromise 
resulted in the stipulation of the Law of Control which provided detailed instructions for the 
restructuring of Greek public debt and outlined the organisation and responsibilities of the 
IFC. Furthermore, the Law of Control suggested some monetary changes. 
 
The literature argues that in the 1920s the Greek government was unable to borrow 
from the international financial markets because of embargoes imposed by the Allies either 
for ‘political and strategic considerations’ or to force Greece to settle its war debt.393 It is 
further argued that in this way stabilisation was delayed.394 In the 1920s, the London market 
‘was not the free market of the pre-war days’.395 After 1918, an embargo on overseas loans was 
introduced, though with some reluctance on the part of the London authorities, as a new 
instrument of monetary policy.396 Later, it was also used as a ‘useful political lever to force a 
prompt settlement’ of war debts to Britain.397 Governments that had not settled their war debts 
to Britain were not permitted to raise capital on the London market.  
 
Figure 6.3 provides a graphic demonstration of why Greek governments faced 
considerable difficulties in raising capital on the financial markets in the 1920s, beyond the 
international politics and embargoes referred to in the literature. In the early 1920s, Greek 
392 The most controversial measure adopted was the Forced Loan of April 1922. The experiment was 
repeated in 1926. For more, see Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
393 For example, see Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, pp. 17, 30, n. 39 and 42). 
394 Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, p. 114). 
395 Atkin (1970, p. 326). See also Moggridge (1971). 
396 Atkin (1970, p. 334); See also Atkin (1977). 
397 Atkin (1977, pp. 95–96). 
262 
 
                                                     
government bonds plummeted and as a consequence market rates rocketed, reflecting the 
political, economic and financial distress that prevailed in Athens during that period. For 
example, the market value of the Bonds Loan amounted to a country risk of nearly 19 per cent 
in November 1922. Subsequently, the market price of Greek government debt drifted gradually 
upwards and consequently, the spread between the yield of Greek government bonds and the 
British consol steadily declined. The extended period of restoration of the institutions in 
Greece, both political and economic, is delineated by the sovereign risk of the Greek 
government on the London market which slowly but steadily improved, as Figure 6.3 below 
demonstrates. Stabilisation and the concomitant institutional reforms were gradually factored 
into the market price of Greek sovereign debt traded in London and as a result the 
creditworthiness of the Greek government steadily improved.398 
 
 In the 1920s an international committee, the Financial Committee of the League, 
prepared stabilisation programmes for several countries that borrowed capital under its aegis. 
By contrast, in the late nineteenth century, bondholders organised themselves into committees 
which negotiated with the government in question for a debt settlement. In the Greek 
example, however, because of the 1897 war with Turkey, the Great Powers of the time 
intervened and eventually a debt restructuring and resumption of the debt service was agreed 
under their jurisdiction in January 1898.399 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
398 For an extended analysis of the sovereign risk of the Greek government on the London market 
between 1914 and 1929, see Christodoulaki et al. (2011, 2012). 
399 The mediating powers were the following: Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary 
and Russia. 
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Figure 6.3: Greek sovereign risk between 1896 and 1930
Notes: (1) Country risk is measured by a loan’s spread in London relative to the British consols.  
(2) Author’s calculations using hand-collected monthly data from the Investor’s Monthly Manual (1896–1930).  
Source: Investor’s Monthly Manual (1896–1930). Data available upon request. 
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Prior to the Second World War, foreign financial advice and assistance coupled with capital 
usually raised from the markets was accompanied by conditionality. Table 6.6 below compares 
the conditionality introduced by the Law of Control in 1898 with that of the stabilisation plan 
prepared by the Financial Committee of the League of Nations in 1928. 
 
Table 6.6: A summary of the conditionality introduced by 
the Law of Control and the League Stabilisation Plan 
1898 Law of Control 1928 League Stabilisation Plan 
Foreign Supervision 
• International Financial Committee 
• Advisor to the Bank of Greece 
• The government had to report to the 
Council of the League on the budget 
situation every three months for three 
years  
Fiscal Measures 
• No reference to balanced budgets 
• Certain revenues were assigned 
exclusively to the IFC for the service of 
the Old Gold Loans  
• The number of treasury bills that could 
be issued was limited to 10 million 
drachmae 
• The Greek government had to keep the 
budget within 9 billion drachmae until 
the end of the financial year 1929–30 and 
thereafter to maintain balanced budgets 
• The number of treasury bills that could 
be issued was limited to 400 million 
drachmae 
• The new central bank could grant credits 
to the government to a maximum of 400 
million drachmae 
• A new system of public accounting was 
introduced 
Public Debt Settlement 
• Restructuring of the Old Gold Loans 
• Retirement of floating debt and 
consolidation of debt in drachmae, both 
held by the banks of issue 
• Introduction of a precise timetable for the 
retirement of government debt in forced 
circulation 
• Retirement of the NDBs preceded 
recourse to the League 
• One-third of the Stabilisation Loan 
employed to clear illiquid public debt 
transferred to the Bank of Greece and 
thus its reserve position was strengthened 
Monetary Reform 
• Greek government not obliged to assume 
the Gold Standard  
• Article 30 of the Law of Control1 
• De jure adoption of the gold exchange 
standard 
• Establishment of the Bank of Greece 
Note: 1Article 30 of the Law of Control is examined extensively in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
 
Both plans incorporated extensive control and supervision over monetary and public finance. 
In 1898, the IFC, primarily a debt management committee, was established. In the 1920s, 
both League of Nations loans that is to say the 1924 Refugee Loan and the Stabilisation Loan, 
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were placed under the aegis of the IFC and were guaranteed by revenues that the Greek 
government had already assigned to the Commission. The RSC administered the proceeds of 
the First Refugee Loan, to carry out the settlement of refugees in rural areas.  
 
In 1928, the stabilisation plan incorporated foreign supervision over monetary policy 
with the appointment of a financial advisor to the Bank of Greece. His main task was to 
oversee the policies and activities of the newly established central bank and to report regularly 
to the Council of the League. In addition, the Greek government was obliged to report to the 
Council on the state of public finances every three months for a period of three years.  
 
In the late 1890s, the central issue at the negotiations was the resumption of the debt 
service of the external public debt. The Law of Control introduced a rescheduling of the public 
debt denominated in gold and contracted before 1897. The debt readjustment plan that was 
developed defined the minimum interest rate to be paid to the bondholders of the Old Gold 
Loans, as the external loans floated before 1893 and placed under the jurisdiction of the IFC are 
known. The aim, however, was to increase both the interest rate paid and the sinking fund for 
the loans placed under the jurisdiction of the IFC to their full contractual level, using public 
revenues earmarked for this purpose. Thus, the yield of the Old Gold Loans fluctuated within 
limits from year to year depending on the volume of the surplus revenues of the IFC.  
 
 For example, the minimum rate of the Monopoly Loan was set at 43 per cent of its 
original interest rate which was 4 per cent. In other words, the minimum interest rate that the 
IFC had to pay the holders of the Monopoly Loan was 1.72 per cent. The interest rate paid to 
Monopoly Loan bondholders during the period in question is presented in Figure 6.4 and in 
Table A4.1 in Appendix A4. Figure 6.4 and Table A4.1 show that the interest rate paid in 1920 
and 1921 was at the full contractual level for the first time since the introduction of the Law of 
Control. Subsequently, it retained either its original level or remained close to that level. 
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Figure 6.4: Monopoly Loan interest rate paid by the IFC, 1898–1930 
Source: Table A4.1 in Appendix A4. 
 
Amongst the priorities of the coalition government that was formed in December 1926 was 
the stabilisation of the drachma and the continuation of the settlement of refugees. By May 
1928, the Greek currency had lost approximately 95 per cent of its pre-war value, with the 
origin of this monetary upheaval being the monetisation of budget deficits. The Financial 
Committee of the League insisted on reform of the National Bank, a dual-purpose bank, to 
confine its activities to central banking responsibilities and to become independent from the 
government. This proposal led to the establishment of a new central bank in Greece in 1928 
with a clear mandate: to ensure the stability of the external value of the drachma. Through 
conditionality, therefore, creditors promoted institutions akin to those prevailed in their 
countries.  
 
The Law of Control also introduced a degree of monetary discipline in Greece and 
independence for the National Bank. Article 30 strictly prohibited the National Bank from 
using the printing press to lend to the government without the consent of the IFC until the 
debt in banknotes from forced circulation had been fully paid off.  
 
In 1898, Great Britain, France and Russia guaranteed jointly and severally the 
flotation of the loan.400 As a result the terms under which the Guaranteed Loan was issued 
were very favourable; its interest rate for example was only 2.50 per cent and the amortisation 
400 Wynne (1951, p. 319). 
1.50 
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period 60 years. The proceeds of this loan were used for the payment of the war indemnity to 
Turkey, to cover the budget deficit for 1897, to retire the floating debt denominated in gold 
and for the service of the Old Gold Loans for 1898.401  
 
Figure 6.5 demonstrates the market performance of the 2.50 per cent Guaranteed 
Loan between 1898 and 1930. In addition, the market rate of this 1898 Loan is compared with 
that of the British consols and other Greek loans traded on the London Stock Exchange during 
this period. It is evident that the yield of the 1898 Guaranteed Loan remained close to that of 
consols and its movement did not resemble that of the other Greek loans traded on the London 
market.  
 
 By 1927, the creditworthiness of the Greek government on the London market had 
improved significantly. The drachma had also exhibited considerable stability. The 
government, however, was unable to secure by itself the entire amount of capital needed for 
reconstruction and further settlement of refugees at a reasonable cost. The role that the 
League played here was twofold. Firstly, the Financial Committee defined the amount of 
capital and the terms under which a loan could be raised and secondly a stabilisation 
programme that incorporated reforms was prepared. The way that the proceeds of the loan 
could be used was also specified. In this way, the League facilitated access to capital markets 
by signalling that a country would follow prudent fiscal and monetary policies in the future.  
 
 By contrast to loans issued in the late nineteenth century under the aegis of the Great 
Powers, the coupon rate of the League loans was close to the market yield of the country that 
floated the loan. In this way the creditworthiness of the country in question was denoted. 
 
For example, the coupon rate of both Greek League loans was set close to the market 
rate of the other Greek government loans traded on the London market at the time. 
Subsequently, the market rate of both loans fluctuated on the capital markets in the same way 
as the other Greek loans denominated in gold. This is illustrated in Figure 6.5 below, where 
the market yield of the two Greek League of Nations loans, that is to say the Refugee Loan of 
1924 and the Stabilisation Loan, is compared with that of the 1910 Bonds Loan.  
 
 
 
 
401 Ibid., p. 318. 
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 Figure 6.5: Market yield of Greek government loans and the British consol, 1898–1930 
Note: Author’s calculations using hand-collected monthly data from the Investor’s Monthly Manual (1896–1930).  
Source: Investor’s Monthly Manual (1898–1930). Data available upon request. 
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PART IV:  
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BANK OF GREECE 
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CHAPTER 7: 
A DOMESTIC VARIATION ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS’ NORMS402 
 
 
 
7.1. Introduction          
7.2. Path towards inevitable reform       
7.2.1. Background to change        
7.2.2. June 1927, Geneva         
7.2.3. Preparing for central banking reforms       
7.2.4. Opposition to the League's proposals       
7.2.5. Tsouderos' proposition: the 'deus ex machina'      
7.3. Bank of Greece: objectives and functions      
7.4. Endowment of the Bank of Greece   
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
The cornerstone of the reconstruction scheme that the Financial Committee of the League 
prepared for Greece was the establishment of a fully fledged central bank de novo, that is the 
Bank of Greece, which started operations on 14 May 1928, two days after the gold exchange 
standard was officially adopted. On that same date, the old National Bank, the central bank in 
Greece since 1842, opened its doors for business for the first time in its history as a pure 
commercial banking institution. Prior to this, on 31 January 1928 the Stabilisation Loan was 
successfully floated in London and New York.    
 Section two of this chapter explores the negotiations between the Financial Committee 
of the League and Greek officials that led to the establishment of a central bank in Greece and 
the different positions of the participants in the negotiations are described. The reasons that 
impeded the metamorphosis of the National Bank, the precursor of the central bank in the 
country, from a dual-purpose bank into a fully fledged central banking institution are also 
402 Part of this chapter appears in Christodoulaki (2002). An earlier version of this chapter was 
presented at the pre-conference to session No. 39, XIII Economic History Congress, Buenos Aires 
2002, Kassel-Hofgeismar, April 2001; at the summer school of the European Historical Economics 
Society, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland, August 2001 and at the Warwick Summer Research 
Workshop, Department of Economics, Warwick University, July 2002. Thanks are due to the 
participants on these occasions for helpful comments and advice. 
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discussed. Sections three and four focus on the institutional arrangements surrounding the 
establishment of the Bank of Greece. The objectives and functions of the new central bank are 
illustrated in section three whilst section four looks at its financial position upon 
commencement of operations.  
 
 
7.2. Path towards inevitable reform 
7.2.1. Background to change 
Despite a cardinal point in all League of Nations reconstruction schemes being the issue of 
central banking reforms, neither the National Bank nor the Greek government seemed to 
consider it a possibility that the involvement of the Financial Committee of the League in the 
stabilisation process would entail such developments. They were anxious to avoid any kind of 
control or any sort of foreign intervention in Greek public affairs that recourse to the League 
might involve.403 However, Joseph Avenol, the deputy Secretary-General of the League, who 
headed a committee that visited Greece in April 1927 to investigate economic conditions in the 
country, informed the National Bank unofficially that it should be reformed in line with the 
principles of modern central banking.404 A considerable part of the report that this committee 
prepared for the Financial Committee of the League was devoted to the National Bank, to the 
way it functioned, its multifaceted character and its role as the central bank in the country.405 
 
 In the Spring of 1927, when the League representatives visited Athens to investigate 
economic conditions in the country, a new specialist institution, the National Mortgage Bank 
was about to open for business. In spite of this imminent change in the status of the National 
Bank at the time when the League committee was in Athens, the dual-purpose character of the 
National Bank still attracted severe criticism on the part of the committee. Its activities as a 
commercial bank were in stark contrast to those of an orthodox central bank. In addition, the 
National Bank, as the bank of issue in the country, was thought by the League representatives to 
be too close to the government. The commercial activities of the National Bank as well as its 
responsibilities and privileges as the central bank in Greece, are examined in Chapters 3 and 4 
of this thesis respectively. Furthermore, the relationship of the Old Bank with the government 
is scrutinised in section 4.2 of Chapter 4, where changes that a long period of war and its 
aftermath brought to its role as a bank of the government are also highlighted.  
 
403 BoE Archive, OV80/1/38; BoE Archive, OV80/1/39; BoE Archive, OV80/2/1; BoE Archive, 
OV80/2/17; BoE Archive, OV80/2/20; BoE Archive, OV80/2/24.  
404 Spiliotopoulos (1949, p. 111). 
405 See HABOG_A3S1Y1F4T1, pp. 1–100; 
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7.2.2. June 1927, Geneva 
A Greek delegation headed by the Minister of Finance Georgios Kaphandaris, arrived in 
Geneva early in June 1927 to officially request the assistance of the League of Nations in order 
for Greece to obtain an international loan. The views of the Financial Committee on a 
stabilisation scheme in Greece were outlined in a set of seven questions that the Greek 
delegation was asked to answer.406 One of the questions dealt with the reform of the National 
Bank, to bring it into closer conformity with modern central banking practice. The Greek 
delegation deemed that the reform of the National Bank be entrusted to the bank itself and that it 
should be implemented gradually. They also strongly objected to the appointment of a foreign 
expert at the National Bank with excessive powers including the right of veto. By contrast, the 
Financial Committee insisted that central banking reform should precede de jure stabilisation. In 
the end, the Financial Committee gave way on the issue of foreign control, accepting that any 
potential appointee should only have supervisory responsibilities whilst the Greek delegation 
accepted in principle the recommendations for banking reform.407  
 
 The Financial Committee, in its report to the Council dated 14 June 1927, spelt out the 
main principles that the National Bank was expected to conform to, in order to operate as a pure 
central bank. These principles were: (a) the independence of the Bank, (b) the sole right of note 
issue, (c) the limitation of the Bank’s operations to loan and discount transactions of a short-
term and self-liquidating character, (d) the reduction of the government debt to the Bank and the 
well-defined limitation of new advances to the government, (e) the centralisation of the money 
transactions of the government and of government enterprises in the National Bank and (f) the 
provision of adequate and appropriate cover for a unified note issue.408 These recommendations 
echoed Montagu Norman’s ‘Epitome’ of central banking where he sketched out the main tenets 
of the institution as it had developed by the early 1920s. (See Table 1.2 in Chapter 1.) In 
addition, the Financial Committee suggested that a provision of 3 million sterling of the 
prospective League sponsored loan be devoted to the reduction of the government debt to the 
Bank, in order to strengthen it sufficiently for its enhanced responsibilities as a central bank. 
 
 
 
 
406 BoE Archive, OV80/2/23; Pyrsos (c1935, pp. 47–49); Bank of Greece (1978, p. 61); Pepelasis 
Minoglou (1993, pp. 146–147). 
407 Pyrsos (c1935, pp. 47–56); Bank of Greece (1978, pp. 61–62). 
408 League of Nations (1927, p. 15); Pyrsos (c1935, pp. 57–58); Venezis (1955, pp. 24–25); Bank of 
Greece (1978, pp. 61–63); Kostis (1987, p. 260); Kostis (1999, pp. 706-707). 
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7.2.3. Preparing for central banking reforms 
A sub-committee was formed to examine central banking reform in Greece. The members of 
this sub-committee were Sir Henry Strakosch (Britain),409 M. Janssen (Belgium), M. Dubois 
(Switzerland), L. Osborne (representative of the Bank of England) and J. de Bordes of the 
Financial Section of the League. Emmanuel Tsouderos, the deputy governor of the National 
Bank, represented Greece in the talks.  
  
 The position of the representatives of the League was that the reorganisation of the 
National Bank should take place within two or three months. In that time the National Bank 
should be reformed by winding up or transferring to other institutions or to a new commercial 
bank all those activities which did not normally fall within the scope of a central bank. These 
activities included the operation of interest bearing accounts, mortgage loans, loans to the 
agricultural sector and to legal entities, in short all medium- and long-term lending of the bank. 
Tsouderos tried to convince the Financial Committee that in such a limited time-span a radical 
reorganisation of an institution with the importance and the history of the National Bank carried 
great risks for the country. Instead, he argued that reform should be implemented gradually, 
spread over two or three years. He argued that the transfer of certain commercial type operations 
of the Bank, such as deposits, to other institutions would seriously affect the operation of 
important economic functions such as savings in the country. Although the League accepted the 
argument that more time was necessary for reforms to take place, they refused to grant any 
concessions in relation to the metamorphosis of the National Bank into a pure central bank.410 
They declined to accept its retaining part of its commercial functions by acting as a bank for 
interest bearing deposits and insisted that the Bank conform strictly to what were then 
recognised as the principles of an orthodox central bank. A counter suggestion came from the 
deputy governor of the National Bank: the bank could be separated into two autonomous 
departments in terms of accounting and management, the issue department and the commercial 
department, but both would continue to operate under the same governance. The League 
rejected the proposition, arguing that the co-existence under the same direction of central 
banking functions and profit-maximising commercial operations would inhibit the smooth 
operation of central banking in the country.411 It should be mentioned here that the National 
Bank of Greece had never previously been divided into two departments, namely the Issue 
409 He was responsible for the founding of the South African Reserve Bank. Montagu Norman 
considered him ‘the best authority on the subject [of] the principles which should govern the policy of 
central banks in any country’. For more, see Cottrell (1997, p. 29). 
410 Venezis (1955, p. 38). 
411 Bank of Greece (1978, p. 65). 
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Department and the Banking Department following the paradigm of the Bank of England, as 
has been argued in the literature.412 
 
7.2.4. Opposition to the League’s proposals  
Strong opposition to the proposals of the League sub-committee was expressed by the governor 
of the National Bank, Alexandros Diomides, who was prepared to espouse only marginal 
reforms of the business that the National Bank pursued, in spite of the fact that such a stance 
might lead to the collapse of the whole stabilisation plan.413 His views on the League’s 
proposals are clearly expressed in a letter written on 22 June 1927 and sent to Tsouderos.414 The 
arguments that he put forward to support his position were a mixture of political rhetoric and 
commercial banking rationale. The public responsibilities of the National Bank were mixed up 
with the welfare of the Bank as a private, profit maximising banking institution. Diomides was 
very clear as to what business he could accept the National Bank losing and did not want to 
deprive the National Bank of its commercial functions. He consented to the National Bank 
passing on immediately to the newly established Mortgage Bank long-term agricultural 
advances of at least a three-year duration and felt that later on, this bank could also take over 
responsibility for credit to the refugees.415 On the other hand, he was determined that the 
National Bank should maintain the right to accept interest bearing deposits. He called the Bank 
a pure ‘Banque de Depots’ and argued that the National Bank should not under any 
circumstances shed this aspect of their work.416 This view of the governor of the National Bank 
echoed what M. S. Eulambio, a managing director of the Bank had argued a few years before 
the negotiations with the Financial Committee took place. Eulambio (1924, p. 178) had ended 
his monograph on the history of the Bank by referring to its deposit character and asserting that 
the National Bank’s power as an institution rested with its deposits. In his words the deposits of 
the National Bank represented ‘real wealth – the wealth of the whole nation’. 
 
 The governor held that documentary credit should be allowed, and that loans or 
advances on securities as well as mortgage loans should be possible on condition that they were 
granted on a short-term basis. The Bank should also be allowed to grant loans and have the 
freedom to invest in companies or in long-term bond loans. Finally, he argued that the National 
Bank should retain its property and its investment in companies. The changes to the status of the 
412 Lazaretou (1993, p. 290); Alogoskoufis and Lazaretou (1997, p. 47). 
413 HABOG_A3S1Y1F40T13, pp. 1–16; Pyrsos (c1935, pp. 61–65); Venezis (1955, pp. 27–35); Bank of 
Greece (1978, pp. 64–65). 
414 The entire letter was printed in Venezis (1955, pp. 27–35).  
415 HABOG_A3S1Y1F40T13, p. 13; Venezis (1955, p. 33). 
416 HABOG_A3S1Y1F40T13, p. 3; Venezis (1955, pp. 28–29); 
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National Bank that its governor would not permit to take place indicate that Diomides was 
ardent about preserving the commercial freedom that the Bank enjoyed.  
 
 By the 1920s, the idea of central banking had been consolidated and applied albeit to a 
limited number of countries. Central banks were regarded as being non-competitive with other 
commercial banks and non-profit-maximising in nature, as has been discussed in Chapter 1. 
Chapter 3 of the thesis demonstrates that by 1927 these were principles that the National Bank 
as the bank of issue in the country had not adopted naturally. Adoption of these attributes in 
1927 would have marked the true emergence of the National Bank as a central banking 
institution. The governor of the National Bank was, however, reluctant to permit this 
metamorphosis of the Bank from a dual-purpose bank that pursued both central banking and 
commercial functions into a fully fledged central bank in accordance with the basic tenets of the 
institution as they had evolved by then. Such a transformation would have removed profitable 
commercial activities from the National Bank and would have induced it to confine its activities 
merely to public responsibilities as the bank of issue in Greece. Furthermore, the introduction of 
the gold exchange standard was expected to generate capital inflows to the country and to create 
new entrepreneurial opportunities. A National Bank bound by the constraints that govern a fully 
fledged central bank would not have been able to take up any of the new opportunities that 
stabilisation would offer. Its role would have been to guarantee the external value of the 
drachma and to be the bank of the government. All the business of the National Bank would 
have been focused on these two objectives and its portfolio would have been limited to short-
term, self-liquidating assets. In addition, a substantial part of its assets would have continued to 
consist of illiquid government debt, further weakening the National Bank. 
 
 Tables 3.9 and 3.10 in Chapter 3 demonstrate why the governor of the National Bank 
was opposed to the Bank losing its interest bearing deposits. Table 3.9 shows government 
deposits and deposits of other agencies as a percentage of the total deposits of the National Bank 
between 1898 and 1930. Table 3.10 demonstrates deposits at the National Bank as a percentage 
of its total liabilities between 1898 and 1920 and during a short period following stabilisation. 
As it has been mentioned several times, accountancy practices that were employed during the 
monetary upheaval of the 1920s obscure the real financial position of the Bank during that 
period. The difficulty stems from the way that assets and liabilities denominated in gold and 
foreign exchange were reported in the balance sheet of the Bank. Therefore, it may not be an 
accurate exercise to extend the estimates presented in Table 3.10 into the 1920s.  
 
 Deposits of a fully fledged central bank consist of government deposits and deposits of 
the banking sector. Tables 3.9 and 3.10 show that deposits of the government, both as a 
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percentage of total deposits and as a percentage of total liabilities, constituted only a small part 
of total deposits of the National Bank. In addition, their volumes fluctuated considerably not 
only from year to year but also throughout the year according to the service of public debt and 
other obligations of the government. A portion of the liabilities of the National Bank was held 
by other commercial banks which received an interest rate of 1 per cent for their deposits at the 
National Bank when the League representatives visited Athens in April 1927.417 Deposits of 
other banks at the National Bank were, however, very volatile as they rose and fell according to 
seasonal patterns in the country. For example in 1926, deposits of banks at the Athens and 
Piraeus offices of the Old Bank fluctuated from about 18 per cent of its total sight deposits to 
less than 6 per cent.418 Commercial banks used to deposit with the National Bank, but they did 
not resort to it for re-discounting facilities. They preferred to acquire short-term credits from 
abroad where they could obtain more favourable interest rates.419  
 
 Restricting the deposits of the National Bank to non-interest bearing deposits, i.e. 
deposits from the government and the commercial banks, such as a central bank can accept, 
would have caused both the size and the importance of the Bank as a commercial institution 
to contract severely. In fact, its commercial aspect would have been eclipsed as the Financial 
Committee of the League of Nations suggested. If the National Bank had agreed to lose its 
interest bearing deposits then it would have been left without the means to expand its size and 
its activities in the future. In short, it would have lost one of the main sources of its lending 
power, namely interest bearing deposits; the others being its capital including its lottery loans 
and the issuing privilege. The National Bank had been the issuing bank in the country but ‘to 
a large extent’ it had obtained its means to grant credits from its deposits.420 In the past, new 
issues of banknotes had been used to finance the expenditure of the government of the day 
and represented government debt in the assets of the National Bank. In 1927, the country was 
about to adopt the gold exchange standard. This implied that the central bank would have to 
abide by a monetary rule which did not allow the use of the issuing privilege liberally.  
 
 The inflationary period of the 1920s had exerted a negative influence on the balance 
sheet of the National Bank as it was a lender in nominal drachmae both to the private sector of 
the economy and to the government. As it is extensively discussed in Chapter 4, a 
considerable part of its assets was tied to illiquid government debt, as lending to the 
417 BoE Archive, OV9/190/100; HABOG_A3S1Y1F4T1, pp. 96–100. 
418 BoE Archive, OV9/190/100. Author’s calculations using data appearing in HABOG_A3S1Y1F4T1, 
p. 90. 
419 HABOG_A3S1Y1F4T1, p. 96. 
420 HABOG_A3S1Y1F4T1, p. 2; HABOG_A3S1Y1F40T13, pp. 5–6; Venezis (1955, pp. 29–30); 
Kostis (1987, p. 213).  
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government increased considerably during this period and the terms of this lending were very 
favourable for the government. Furthermore, as Table 3.5 in Chapter 3 of this thesis and Table 
2 in ‘Banking Reform and the Establishment of the Bank of Greece’421 both demonstrate, total 
credits to the economy as well as deposits of other agencies as a percentage of GDP shrank 
substantially after the outbreak of the First World War, indicating ‘a loosing of the links’422 
between the National Bank and the economy.  
 
 The National Bank had always pursued commercial activities in a conservative and 
risk-averse fashion, and loans were granted cautiously as it has been repeatedly maintained in 
this thesis. Furthermore, its commercial aspect had always been very important for its 
financial strength. By 1927, the National Bank remained a private dual-purpose institution. As 
a joint stock bank, its governors had a ‘duty to the proprietors’ which was to produce 
dividends by maintaining its commercial strength. 
 
 The National Bank pursued the implementation of a stabilisation plan, accompanied by 
the issue of an international loan in order to liquidate part of the government debt that was tied 
to its assets. This would improve the liquidity of the National Bank and put it in a position to 
expand its commercial business and take advantage of the new opportunities that convertibility 
and capital inflows would create, so as to regain ground lost because of war and monetary 
upheaval. At the same time, however, the Financial Committee of the League was promoting 
the metamorphosis of the National Bank into a fully fledged central bank, a course which would 
restrict its business mainly to discounting and confine its duties to public responsibilities. 
Clearly, the way in which the governors of the National Bank had envisaged stabilisation 
affecting the status of the National Bank showed a marked difference in thinking from that of 
the Financial Committee of the League. 
 
7.2.5. Tsouderos’ proposition: the ‘deus ex machina’ 
The negotiations between the Greek side and the representatives of the League were about to 
reach a stalemate in late June 1927, since there was a fundamental disagreement over the way 
that each side envisaged the stabilisation of the drachma as affecting the status of the National 
Bank. 
  
 At this point, Emmanuel Tsouderos suggested to the sub-committee of the League 
responsible for central banking reform in Greece an alternative solution which at the time 
421 See Christodoulaki (2002). 
422 Bouvier (1984, p. 36). 
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appeared to be innovative: the National Bank would continue its commercial functions and 
instead it would transfer to a new bank its privilege of note issue and those of its other activities 
which were usually carried on by a central bank. Tsouderos, without consulting the governor of 
the National Bank, presented this solution to members of the League committee, who promptly 
accepted it. Only one member of the sub-committee of the League, M. Dubois, voiced doubts 
about Tsouderos’ proposal to create a New Bank of Issue and for the National Bank to be 
transformed into a purely commercial bank. Dubois argued that according to this plan ‘the new 
bank would not have sufficient standing and would not be strong enough to control the financial 
market’.423 In Athens, neither the National Bank nor the minister of finance objected to this 
scheme when they were informed. Greek officials involved in the negotiations with the 
Financial Committee of the League saw this option as the best solution that, on the one hand, 
would not undermine the National Bank, and on the other would allow the flotation of an 
international loan under the auspices of the League to go ahead. In fact, they believed that this 
alternative option would work in favour of the National Bank. The New Bank of Issue would 
develop close links with the National Bank and business that would officially belong to the new 
central bank would continue to be carried out in branches of the National Bank.424 This 
proposition from the deputy governor of the National Bank led to the establishment of a fully 
fledged central bank de novo in Greece, the Bank of Greece. 
  
 The statutes of the New Bank of Issue for Greece were fairly closely drafted in 
accordance with Estonian and Indian precedents.425 They were prepared by Osborne and de 
Bordes under the supervision of Strakosch at the Bank of England in early July 1927. Tsouderos 
took part in the discussions on a consultative basis, suggesting ‘only a few alterations’.426  
 
News about possible central banking reforms in Greece appeared in the British press 
on the same day that the Greek representatives in Geneva officially asked the Council to 
authorise a Stabilisation Loan for Greece. The Financial News of 15 June reported that the 
National Bank, under the League’s scheme, ‘would be transformed into an issue bank and 
would engage a foreign advisor’.427 Some central banking reforms would in any event, have 
been anticipated by the markets, as they were an integral part of all the League sponsored 
reconstruction schemes that had preceded the Greek stabilisation plan. Three weeks later, The 
Economist published a long article on the negotiations between Greek officials and the 
Financial Committee of the League. It was reported that a prerequisite for the flotation of a 
423 BoE Archive, OV9/190/93.  
424 Venezis (1955, p. 41). 
425 BoE Archive, OV9/190/1. 
426 Ibid. 
427 Greek Extracts, Financial News, 15 June 1927.  
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League sponsored loan was that the Greek parliament authorised ‘the gradual conversion of 
the National Bank of Greece into a central bank of issue of modern type’.428 By that time, 
however, not only the manner of central banking reform in Greece had been agreed upon, but 
the statutes of the New Bank had been drafted.429  
 
 The architects of the reform at first withheld and then influenced the release of news 
of the establishment of the Bank of Greece. On 17 July, the day that the ministers of finance 
and foreign affairs returned to Athens, the first reference to the creation of a new central bank 
appeared in the Greek press as an option under consideration.430 The first public 
announcements by the minister of finance to the press stated clearly that two plans were being 
considered: the government was thinking either of transforming ‘the National Bank into a 
pure bank of issue by transferring all its other functions to another bank’ or of forming ‘a new 
independent bank of issue’.431 When Tsouderos returned to Athens at the end of July, he 
brought with him the final draft of the statutes of the Bank of Greece and a convention between 
the National Bank and the government which settled the constitution of the New Bank including 
the early loss of the issuing privilege by the National Bank.432  
 
 By early August 1927, details of the sweeping reforms had been made known 
publicly, as had been the opposition of the leader of the Populist Party to the arrangements 
provided by the Geneva Protocol. The Populist Party led by Panayis Tsaldaris withdrew from 
the coalition government, protesting against the establishment of a new fully fledged central 
bank in the country. It was their view that the National Bank should not be deprived of its 
issuing privilege. The Populist Party’s disagreement with the Geneva Stabilisation Plan ignited 
considerable opposition to the New Bank of Issue which was to haunt the institution and 
threaten its existence for years to come. A reshuffled government brought the stabilisation plan 
to parliament, which ratified it the following December, the Populist Party being absent. 
Previously, the Council of the League had approved the scheme in its September session.  
 
It took less than two months from the day that the Greek delegation arrived in Geneva 
until Emmanuel Tsouderos returned to Greece armed with the Geneva Protocol which spelt 
out in detail central banking reforms in the country and formed the legal basis of the 
stabilisation scheme in Greece. By contrast, it took approximately ten months from the day 
428 The Economist, 9 July, 1927. The requirements set by the League for the re-organisation of the 
National Bank to operate as a central bank of issue and maintain the stable value of the drachma were 
also stated. 
429 See BoE Archive, OV9/190/1; BoE Archive, OV9/190/93.  
430 Venezis (1955, p. 44). 
431 Greek Extracts, Financial News, 22 July 1927; Venezis (1955, p. 44). 
432 League of Nations (1927, Annex III, pp. 24–27 and Annex IV, pp. 27–39). 
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that Tsouderos arrived in Athens until the Bank of Greece opened for business in May 1928. 
Prior to this, on 1 March 1928 in an extraordinary meeting, the shareholders of the National 
Bank unanimously ratified the reform of the Bank that its governors had decided. A 
prerequisite for the Bank of Greece to open its doors for business was that the Stabilisation 
Loan had already been floated. Delays in the launch of the Stabilisation Loan due to the fact 
that Greece had not reached an agreement regarding war debts with the USA delayed the start 
of operations of the Bank of Greece.  
 
The political authorities expected that institutional developments resulting in the 
establishment of a central bank and the adoption of the gold exchange standard would 
facilitate an influx of foreign capital essential for economic growth. However, by May 1928 
the Greek government had over-borrowed and the international economy was about to enter 
the most severe depression ever experienced. A few months after Greece adopted the gold 
exchange standard, in December 1928, a loan for public works with a nominal value of 4 
million pounds was issued on the London market, on similar terms to those of the 
Stabilisation Loan. Only one-third of this loan was covered. A month later, in January 1929, 
the Greek government signed an agreement with Seligman & Co for a loan with a nominal 
value of up to 54 million dollars.433 The agreement provided for the flotation of a loan on 
terms similar to the Stabilisation Loan on the condition that the IFC would assume 
responsibility for its service. Seligman would take responsibility for any part of the loan that 
remained uncovered. On 30 October 1929, the Evening Standard announced the cancellation 
of this loan.434 The official reason for the termination of this agreement was that the IFC had 
refused to assume responsibility for the service of this loan.435 The timing of the termination 
of the agreement, however, is more revealing than the official announcement.  
 
 
7.3. Bank of Greece: objectives and functions 
Autonomy was incorporated in the statutes of the Bank of Greece which at the time were 
regarded as the most modern of their kind.436 The macro function of a central bank, that is 
responsibility for monetary management, can be clearly traced to the statutes for the new central 
bank in Greece, together with the other main principles that the Financial Committee followed 
433 The nominal value of this loan in sterling was approximately 11 million, close to that of the Refugee 
Loan of 1924. This means that the Seligman Loan was potentially a bigger lending operation than the 
Stabilisation Loan. 
434 Greek Extracts, 30 October 1929.  
435 Greek Extracts: Morning Post, 2 November 1929; Financial News, 25 November 1929. On the 
refusal of the IFC, see Greek Extracts: The Times, 30 August 1929; The Economist, 19 October 1929. 
See also Stefanides (1930, pp. 257–258). 
436 League of Nations (1927, p. 7). 
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when they were involved in central banking reforms. The Bank of Greece, however, was not 
initially intended to be the bankers’ bank, as none of the characteristics of a central bank 
associated with its micro function were set out in its charters. 
 
 The prime objective that was assigned to the New Bank was to ensure the convertibility 
of the currency.437 To achieve this aim the Bank should ‘exercise control within the limits of its 
statutes over currency and credit in Greece’ and it was granted a monopoly over the right of 
issuing banknotes.438 It was, however, stipulated in the statutes that the issuing privilege could 
‘be revoked at any time’439 if the Bank of Greece failed to ensure that the gold value of its notes 
remained stable, a clause that put the New Bank in a precarious position, in particular after the 
collapse of the Gold Standard in 1931. The ultimate power to suspend the minimum reserve 
ratio that the Bank of Greece was obliged to hold was handed over to the government.440 
 
 The statutes of the New Bank laid down a minimum 40 per cent of reserve against its 
notes in circulation and other demand liabilities.441 The term reserve was defined in its statutes 
to include gold coin and bullion in the ownership of the New Bank and net foreign gold 
exchange. In the way that ‘net foreign gold exchange’ was described, it could also include bills 
of exchange payable in a foreign currency maturing within three months and bearing at least 
two good signatures, and treasury bills of a foreign government maturing within three months. 
A temporary provision was included which allowed the New Bank to hold in its reserves during 
the first five years of its existence, the bonds of the Greek government denominated in gold that 
the National Bank had passed on to the newly established central bank.442 
 
 Provision was made so that at the request of the Bank of Greece, the government could 
suspend the full reserve requirements for up to 30 days in the first instance and subsequently to 
renew this temporary suspension for further periods of not exceeding 15 days each. In such 
cases, the New Bank had to pay a tax to the government and to raise its discount rate by not less 
than 1 per cent per annum during the period of suspension.443 These provisions in the statutes of 
the Bank of Greece, which were related to the regulation of note issue and to the reserve 
requirements, were very close to the basic stipulations of the Federal Reserve Act of the USA in 
437 League of Nations (1927, Article 4, p. 27); Bank of Greece (1936, Article 4, p. 4). 
438 League of Nations (1927, Article 2, p. 27); Bank of Greece (1936, Article 2, p. 3). This exclusive 
privilege was conferred on the Bank of Greece until 31 December, 1960.  
439 League of Nations (1927, Article 2, p. 27); Bank of Greece (1936, Article 2, p. 3). 
440 League of Nations (1927, Article 63, pp. 37–38); Bank of Greece (1936, Article 63, pp. 33–34). 
441 League of Nations (1927, Article 61, p. 37); Bank of Greece (1936, Article 61, p. 32). 
442 League of Nations (1927, Article 62, p. 37); Bank of Greece (1936, Article 62, p. 32).  
443 League of Nations (1927, Articles 63 and 64, pp. 37–38). 
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its amended 1917 form.444 By then, the system of a partial fiduciary note issue associated with 
the Bank of England and dating back to the Bank Act of 1844 had been renounced; the major 
weakness of which was thought to be its lack of elasticity. This new means of regulating 
banknotes in circulation, first seen in the statutes of the Reichsbank when it was established in 
1875 and subsequently modified and improved in the USA, were adopted by most of the central 
banks established or reformed in the 1920s, as they provided a high degree of elasticity in note 
circulation without at the same time undermining its credibility. 
 
 The administration of the New Bank was entrusted to a Board of Directors. This Board 
consisted of the governor, the deputy governor and nine directors. At least three of the directors 
were to represent the industrial and commercial sectors of the country and three the agricultural 
sector. The first Board of Directors, including the governor and the deputy governor, was 
appointed by the government in agreement with the National Bank.445 Subsequently, it was 
entirely the responsibility of the shareholders to elect the Board of Directors but the government 
was to approve the election of the governor.446 The government had the power to appoint a 
commissioner who would have veto powers over decisions that were deemed to be contrary to 
the statutes of the New Bank or other laws of the state.447 Alexandros Diomides, the governor of 
the National Bank, was appointed as the first governor of the Bank of Greece and Emmanuel 
Tsouderos, the sub-governor of the National Bank, as the first deputy governor of the New 
Bank.  
 
 The Geneva Protocol explicitly directed the New Bank to act as the government’s 
bank.448 The government undertook to centralise at the Bank of Greece all the receipts and 
payments of the state and state enterprises. In addition, the Bank was made responsible for the 
‘issue and management of all internal state debt, upon such terms and conditions as may be 
agreed upon’.449 Lending to the government, however, was strictly limited. In accordance with 
its statutes, the New Bank was allowed to grant credits to the government up to a maximum of 
400 million drachmae and to discount treasury bills endorsed by a third party up to a similar 
limit.450 Consequently, neither treasury bills nor similar floating debt could total in excess of 
800 million drachmae, a sum which corresponded to 3 per cent of the GDP of 1927 or to less 
than one-tenth of the 1927 budget which was about 9 billion drachmae. The rate of interest that 
444 For more, see De Kock (1954, pp. 34–36). 
445 The first governor and deputy governor of the Bank were appointed irrevocably for five years. See 
League of Nations (1927, Article 29, p. 32).  
446 League of Nations (1927, Articles 20–25 and 29, pp. 30–32); Bank of Greece (1936, Articles 20–25, 
pp. 11–13).  
447 League of Nations (1927, Article 47, p. 34); Bank of Greece (1936, Article 47, pp. 22–23). 
448 League of Nations (1927, Articles 45 and 46, p. 34); Bank of Greece (1936, Articles 45 and 46, p. 22). 
449 League of Nations (1927, Article 45, p. 34); Bank of Greece (1936, Article 45, p. 22). 
450 League of Nations (1927, Article 55, pp. 35–36); Bank of Greece (1936, Article 55, pp. 25–29). 
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could be charged on temporary advances on drachmae was to be agreed between the Bank of 
Greece and the government.  
 
 Although the Bank of Greece immediately became the government’s bank it was not 
designed to be the bank of the banks. No provision was included in its original statutes to 
compel commercial banks to place their domestic or foreign reserves with the central bank. 
Initially, Henry Strakosch had proposed a clause which was included in the draft statutes that 
forced other banks to keep reserves at the central bank.451 According to this clause, every bank 
transacting business in Greece would be obliged to maintain a daily minimum balance with the 
central bank equal to 7 per cent of its liabilities.452 It is not clear from the material to hand why 
this clause was discarded from the final draft statutes of the New Bank. It is quite possible that 
in the end a tendency to let the Greeks fight this point out amongst themselves prevailed, since 
there was disagreement even amongst the members of the sub-committee about the exact nature 
and phrasing of a provision regulating the commercial banks in the country.453 The only bank 
that was required by law to ‘maintain daily a minimum balance with the Bank of Greece equal 
to 7 per cent of the aggregate sight deposits payable in drachmae’ was the National Bank.454 
This stipulation was incorporated in the agreement between the government and the National 
Bank of Greece that was drafted at the Bank of England in early July 1927. 
 
 The business of the New Bank was limited to discounting bills of three-month maturity 
and granting advances for fixed periods not exceeding six months. An exception was given to 
agricultural bills and advances which could have a maturity date of nine months.455  
 
 The Bank of Greece received statutory independence which was primarily instrument 
independence, granting as it did full discretion and power to pursue monetary policy to attain a 
goal which was precisely defined. This goal was to ensure the stability of the external value of 
the drachma. According to its creators, the strength of the New Bank was based both on its 
being statutorily independent and on an endowment of reserves upon commencement of 
operations. That having been said, very little concern was expressed if the composition of the 
451 BoE Archive, OV9/190/1; BoE Archive, OV9/190/96: Article 59a. 
452 BoE Archive, OV9/190/57: Article 59a. 
453 BoE Archive, OV9/190/96: Article 59a; Dubois opposed in principle ‘the system of all banks having 
to deposit a reserve of 7 per cent at the central bank’. In his opinion a reserve of 7 per cent should ‘be a 
blocked reserve which would not be available in case of crisis’ calculated as a percentage of the bank’s 
capital or of the total of its clearings during the preceding year. For a different view as to why this clause 
was excised from the statutes of the Bank of Greece, see Pepelasis Minoglou (1993, p. 149; 1996, p. 36; 
1998, p. 52). 
454 League of Nations (1927, Annex III, Article 7, p. 26).  
455 League of Nations (1927, Article 55, pp. 35–36); Bank of Greece (1936, Article 55, pp. 25–29). This 
exception must have been a concession to Tsouderos. See BoE Archive, OV9/190/95: Article 54. 
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assets that the New Bank inherited might not allow it to influence decisively monetary policy 
and to play the role of the lender of last resort in order to achieve systemic stability.  
 
 
7.4. Endowment of the Bank of Greece 
The Bank of Greece opened its doors for business on Monday 14 May 1928 as a joint stock 
company. Its share capital was 400 million drachmae divided into 80,000 shares of 5,000 
drachmae each. In order to safeguard its independence, the statutes of the New Bank stipulated 
that the state together with state institutions could not own more than one-tenth of its nominal 
issued capital.456 See Table A5.1 in Appendix A5 where the first balance sheet of the Bank of 
Greece is presented. This table shows the financial strength of the Bank of Greece upon 
commencement of operations. 
 
 The share capital of the New Bank was initially taken over by the National Bank, which 
was obliged to offer it for public subscription at par in three separate issues: the first within two 
months of the opening of the New Bank and the second and third issues each with a year’s 
interval between them. A pre-emption right to one-half of each issue was to be reserved for the 
shareholders of the National Bank in proportion to the number of shares that they held in the 
capital of this bank.457 In return, the National Bank transferred to the Bank of Greece bills and 
advances and other liquid assets that the latter was entitled to hold. The total discounts and 
advances that were passed on to the Bank of Greece amounted to nearly 50 million drachmae or 
0.16 per cent of the GDP of the country in 1927. (See Appendix A5, Table A5.1.) By contrast 
the discounts of the National Bank on 14 May 1928, the first day that it operated as a pure 
commercial bank, amounted to over a billion drachmae or 3.38 per cent of the 1927 GDP.  
  
 The New Bank’s deposits comprised deposits belonging to the government and to the 
banking sector. As has been mentioned above, the National Bank was obliged by law to keep 
deposits at the Bank of Greece equal to 7 per cent of its aggregate sight deposits payable in 
drachmae. Other banks could deposit with the new central bank if they wished.458 On the first 
day of the New Bank’s operations almost the entirety of its liabilities in favour of the banking 
sector, 95 per cent, belonged to the National Bank and only a small proportion, 5 per cent, 
comprised deposits of the other banks.459  
  
456 League of Nations (1927, Article 8, p. 28); Bank of Greece (1936, Article 8, p. 6).  
457 League of Nations (1927, Annex III, p. 24); Bank of Greece (1978, p. 77). 
458 League of Nations (1927, Annex III, Article 3, p. 25). 
459 Bank of Greece (1929, pp. 35–36). 
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 According to the Geneva Protocol, the government undertook to centralise at the Bank 
of Greece all the receipts and payments of the government and government enterprises.460 
However, in violation of the Geneva Protocol, the final agreement between the government and 
the National Bank gave the latter the right to retain deposits of the surplus funds of state 
enterprises until 1950.461 The literature has seen this arrangement as a gesture on the part of 
Greek officials involved in the central banking reform to preserve a strong National Bank.462 
 
 The Geneva Protocol stated that the New Bank should have reserves in gold and foreign 
exchange of not less than 50 per cent of the total of the note circulation and its other demand 
liabilities on the day that it commenced business.463 The balance sheet of 14 May 1928, the day 
that the Bank commenced operations, painted an optimistic picture: it showed a reserve ratio of 
53.67 per cent of all sight liabilities or 81.51 per cent of the notes in circulation alone.   
 
Table 7.1: Allocation of public debt previously belonging to  
the National Bank on 14 May 1928 
 
 Percentage of GDP1 Percentage of the 
former National Bank 
debt 
Bank of Greece (Article 62)2   0.75   3.64 
Bank of Greece 12.18 58.70 
National Bank of Greece   3.73 17.97 
Cleared by one-third of  
               the Stabilisation Loan 
 
  3.64 
 
17.57 
Cleared by residual items3   0.40   1.94 
Measurement error4   0.04   0.19 
                                           Total 20.74              100.00 
Notes:  
1 GDP for 1927 has been used for the estimates.  
2 This is government debt comprising bonds denominated in gold and traded on the Athens 
Stock Exchange and abroad that the Bank of Greece included in its reserves under Article 62 of 
its statutes.  
3 This refers to the public debt cleared by the part of the reserve funds of the National Bank 
which under the Law 2577/1921 belonged to the government and by exchange rate differences 
in favour of the government.  
4 There is some discrepancy amongst sources for the exact figures on 14 May 1928 but this is 
very marginal. 
460 League of Nations (1927, Annex VI, p. 40). 
461 NBGHA_Α1Σ22Υ6Φ8Ε2. For more on the issue of the deposits of the state enterprises and for the 
compromised solution that was reached in July 1929, see: Pyrsos (c1935, pp. 123–139); Kostis (1986, p. 
51); Pepelasis Minoglou (1996, p. 36; 1998, p. 52). 
462 Kostis (1986, p. 51); Pepelasis Minoglou (1996, p. 36; 1998, p. 52).  
463 League of Nations (1927, p. 7). 
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Sources: NBGHA_Α1Σ22Υ6Φ2Ε1; Balance Sheet of the Bank of Greece and the National 
Bank on 14 May 1928; Annual Report of the Bank of Greece for 1928; Annual Report of the 
National Bank for 1928; Kostelenos et al. (2007). 
 
Table 7.1 illustrates how the government debt that the National Bank possessed before central 
banking reform, was distributed between the two banks, the National Bank and the Bank of 
Greece. This table also shows what proportion of that debt was cleared by the proceeds of one-
third of the Stabilisation Loan. The National Bank transferred to the New Bank the Greek 
government bonds denominated in gold that it was obliged to keep as cover for banknotes 
issued in conformity with the Laws 656 of 1915 and 2547 of 1920, after deducting gold bonds 
forming part of this cover to the value of £700,000.464 According to the Geneva Protocol, the 
value of these bonds was to be based on the average price of Greek government bonds traded on 
the London Stock Exchange during the three months to 30 September 1927. Their value in 
sterling was converted into Greek currency at the stabilisation price.465 This arrangement 
transferred to the New Bank Greek government bonds denominated in gold of market value of 
£621,409 or 233,028,598.50 drachmae.466 As Table 7.1 shows, these bonds were 0.75 per cent 
of GDP in 1927 or 5.84 per cent of the total debt that was transferred to the Bank of Greece.467 
They formed part of the reserves of the Bank of Greece as defined by its statutes, representing 
7.30 per cent of the total reserves. In fact, it was the only part of the government debt that the 
Bank of Greece inherited from its predecessor that was liquid, traded on secondary markets and 
could be used for open market operations. 
 
 The rest of the government debt that the National Bank passed over to the New Bank 
and which appears on its balance sheet of 14 May 1928 under the heading ‘Government Debt’ 
was immobile, illiquid debt that had its origins in the inflationary period of the 1920s. It 
consisted of issues of banknotes for the account of the government, loans resulting from the 
ΓΧΜΒ Law and other direct loans of the National Bank to the government after the proceeds 
of one-third of the Stabilisation Loan had been deducted.468 (For a detailed presentation of 
this illiquid government debt held by the National Bank before the central banking reform, 
see Table 4.11 in Chapter 4.) As Table 7.1 illustrates, this debt was more than 12 per cent of 
the 1927 GDP of the country and comprised 94.16 per cent of the total government debt that 
the Bank of Greece held on the very first day of its operations or 47.41 per cent of its total 
assets. In practice, it limited the power of the bank to intervene in the financial market and to 
conduct effectively monetary policy. The 3 million sterling of the Stabilisation Loan that was 
464 BoE Archive, OV9/192/2, p. 121; NBGHA_Α1Σ22Υ6Φ2Ε1. 
465 League of Nations (1927, Annex III, p. 24). 
466 Bank of Greece (1929, p. 10). 
467 Balance Sheet of the Bank of Greece, 14 May 1928; Bank of Greece (1929, p. 10). 
468 NBGHA_Α1Σ22Υ6Φ2Ε1. 
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employed for repayment of government debt to the central bank formed part of the New 
Bank’s reserves. 
 
Table 7.2: Composition of public debt remaining at the National Bank  
on 14 May 1928 
  
Percentage of GDP1 
Percentage of the 
total debt 
at the National 
Bank 
Government bonds2 2.43 65.24 
Temporary loans to the  
                Greek government 
 
0.97 
 
25.89 
Government bonds against 
            National Defence Bonds 
 
0.33 
 
  8.87 
                             Total 3.73            100.00 
Notes:  
1 GDP for 1927 has been used for the estimates.  
2 This is government debt denominated in gold and in drachmae that was traded on the Athens 
Stock Exchange.  
Sources: Annual Report of the National Bank for 1928 (1929); Kostelenos et al. (2007). 
 
The Old Bank retained national debt amounting to nearly 4 per cent of the 1927 GDP or nearly 
18 per cent of the total public debt that it held before the reform. (See Table 7.1 above.) The 
composition of the public debt that remained at the National Bank is illustrated in Table 7.2. 
Government debt of nearly 2.50 per cent of GDP comprised Greek government bonds 
denominated in gold and in drachmae that were traded on the Athens Stock Exchange. This is a 
modest estimate based on the book value of the government bonds that the National Bank 
recorded in its annual report.469 Both the discount portfolio of the Old Bank and its portfolio of 
government bonds when compared with those of the New Bank gave the former an 
unchallenged pre-eminence on the credit market. By contrast, as has been pointed out above, the 
instruments that the Bank of Greece wielded were not effective in imposing its authority on the 
financial markets and exercising monetary policy. It possessed too few assets which could be 
used to inject or drain market liquidity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
469 Annual Report of the National Bank for 1928 (1929, p. 6). 
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 CONCLUSION 
 
 
This thesis examines the origins of central banking in Greece and thus contributes to the 
literature dealing with the evolution of central banking and its transfer to small open 
economies. It also adds to research related to foreign financial intervention and control, and 
sends the message that conditionality attached to financial assistance is successfully 
implemented if it is in line with the prevailing political economy in the recipient country. A 
long time-span is covered, allowing the thesis to demonstrate that conditionality is also 
successful as long as the historical and economic circumstances which prevailed when it was 
introduced remain unchanged.  
 
Prior to the establishment of a fully fledged central bank in Greece in 1928, the 
National Bank, a dual-purpose bank, carried out the public responsibilities of a central bank 
whilst at the same time being by far the most important commercial bank. The Old Bank of 
issue is considered in this thesis to be a central bank which, however, failed to develop into a 
fully fledged central bank as would be recognised today, owing either to market forces or 
government intervention, by following a route similar to that described in the natural 
evolution hypothesis. When under pressure from the League, the National Bank’s governors 
faced the challenge of transforming it into a fully fledged central bank by shedding all 
commercial and deposit banking business; they chose instead for the Old Bank to continue with 
its commercial activities and to lose all its public responsibilities. A fully fledged central bank, 
the Bank of Greece, was then established alongside it. As a result, the social cost of transferring 
the commercial activities and deposits of the National Bank to a newly established commercial 
bank, or to other banks that already operated in Greece as was initially suggested by the League, 
was minimised.   
 
Extensive use of the annual reports and the published balance sheets of the Old Bank of 
issue as well as material, both qualitative and quantitative, from a variety of archives enabled 
widespread analysis of the ‘dual position’ of the National Bank over a long and historically 
diverse period. Time series are constructed to demonstrate how its governors managed ‘the two 
conceptions of their business’,470 i.e. central banking responsibilities and commercial banking 
preserving and safeguarding the financial strength and consequently the reputation and 
credibility of the Bank. A strong, financially sound National Bank created the systemic 
470 Clapham (1944, p. 372). 
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stability that characterised the Greek banking system and made it a respectable ambassador 
for the Greek government abroad. It is unfortunate that no similar time series have been 
created exploring the central banking responsibilities and the commercial activities of the 
National Bank from 1842 up to 1897. Future research has the potential to fill this gap by 
constructing time series following the methodology adopted here; only then could the entire 
history of the Old Bank as a dual-purpose bank be evaluated. 
 
The time series constructed demonstrate the evolution of the dual-purpose Old Bank 
between the enactment of the Law of Control in 1898 and the establishment of the Bank of 
Greece in 1928. They refer to the commercial activities of the Bank, its financial position, its 
relationship with the government and the manner in which the printing press was used. For the 
first time ever, and for the purpose of this thesis, public debt as it appeared on the National 
Bank’s balance sheet is divided into public debt traded on stock exchanges and government 
debt that was not traded on secondary markets, and time series were created accordingly. The 
newly constructed time series indicate that the changes a long period of war and monetary 
upheaval brought to the structure and composition of the balance sheet of the Old Bank, to a 
great extent, determined the banking reforms that took place in the late 1920s. 
 
This thesis demonstrates that the commercial aspect of the National Bank was very 
strong on the eve of central banking reforms. The Old Bank was involved in a variety of 
commercial activities; most of which were not, however, compatible with central banking 
orthodoxy as promoted by the Bank of England. The Old Bank can be compared with other 
continental ‘public banks’, which in the past had combined unique public responsibilities with 
commercial activities. It differed, however, from those continental banks of issue in that it 
remained a dual-purpose bank until as late as the 1920s and never evolved into a fully fledged 
central bank. The structure of the assets and liabilities of the Greek bank of issue was close to 
the early North European central banking model, where ‘solidity of collateral’ was more 
important than the liquidity dictated by the classical model of central banking.471  
 
 The time series constructed demonstrate that at the beginning of the period in question 
the commercial activities of the National Bank were primarily focused on mortgage credit and 
time deposits. Illiquid public debt held by the Bank consisted mainly of forced banknotes in 
circulation between the enactment of the Law of Control and the outbreak of the Balkan Wars. 
The newly created time series indicate that during this period of relative peace and growth the 
Old Bank of issue expanded credits to the economy and its deposits increased. They also show 
471 Tarkka (2009).  
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that the Bank began restructuring its portfolio of credits to the economy in favour of more liquid 
forms, just after the outbreak of the First World War. It is important to note that the significance 
of mortgage credit as an asset item of the Old Bank had diminished by 1926 in favour of more 
liquid assets, following a long period of war and high inflation. In addition, time deposits 
decreased during that same period. This change on the Bank’s balance sheet explains in a way 
that goes beyond what is argued in the literature why, of its own volition, it conceded its 
mortgage credit privilege to the newly established Mortgage Bank in 1927.  
 
 The same newly constructed time series show that the commercial aspect of the 
National Bank subsided after the outbreak of the Great War and in addition graphically indicate 
that the relationship between credits supplied to the economy and bilateral public debt held by 
the National Bank changed fundamentally after 1918. As is evidenced, the Old Bank proved 
to be the main source of financial support to the government during a turbulent historical 
period when the latter had no access to international financial markets and a complex 
relationship developed between them. High inflation in the 1920s wiped out a significant part 
of the nominal value of bilateral public debt denominated in drachmae and owned by the 
National Bank without, however, entirely eliminating it. Hence, the National Bank promoted 
a stabilisation programme which would help to reduce it still further so as to increase its 
liquidity.  
 
The financial position of the dual-purpose Old Bank was also protected by the way in 
which it pursued its commercial activities. The National Bank’s financial strength was based 
on its ability to select high quality assets and liabilities, which resulted in its enduring 
profitability and solvency. In this thesis, the term profitability does not necessarily mean that 
the aim of its management was the maximisation of profits, despite the fact that the National 
Bank was a private institution. The quality of its assets and liabilities, given the constraints 
under which it operated, was more important for its conservative and risk-averse governors 
than maximisation of profits per se in the conventional sense of the term. A great number of 
the assets and liabilities of the Old Bank related to the monopolies and privileges that it 
enjoyed. Furthermore, as is shown, there was a considerable spread between the interest rate 
charged for credits to the economy and the rate paid for deposits, which also indicates that the 
banking system in Greece was not at all competitive.  
  
The policy of the National Bank as a commercial bank was to lend against a variety 
of good collateral, to low-risk, creditworthy customers from its establishment in 1842 to the 
end of the period in question. A conservative and risk-averse National Bank did not challenge 
the informal credit networks that operated but did business with them, as they could provide 
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high quality collateral and were the low-risk and creditworthy customers it sought. Research, 
however, on the relationship between the banking sector and the non-banking credit system is 
very limited. The literature has not so far tackled crucial questions related, for example, to the 
National Bank and the cost of capital in Greece.  
 
This thesis demonstrates that it was the way in which the governors of the National 
Bank combined central banking responsibilities with commercial banking that safeguarded 
and preserved the financial strength and consequently the reputation and authority of the 
Bank. As a bank of the government the Old Bank lent to the government, though reluctantly, 
during periods of national crisis. When attempts at reconstruction were made, the aim of the 
Old Bank was to achieve a reduction and/or a reconstruction of the illiquid public debt that it 
held. A financially sound National Bank in turn acted as an anchor in an unstable political, 
economic and monetary environment, such as that of the period in question. Although it 
protected its own interests at the same time, a financially sound National Bank provided the 
systemic stability that characterised the Greek banking system and made it a respectable and 
credible ambassador for the Greek government abroad. 
 
As is shown, restructuring of the domestic public debt in 1898 strengthened the 
financial position of the Old Bank of issue. In the late 1920s, the National Bank pursued a 
stabilisation programme that would improve its liquidity and its position as the bank of the 
government, whilst allowing it to expand its commercial aspect, as stabilisation was expected 
to encourage foreign direct investment in Greece. William Miller (1928, pp. 20–21), an 
experienced observer of Greek affairs, wrote that on the eve of the central banking reform  
the terrace of the Grande Bretagne in Athens [was] often full of business men in search of 
concessions. The drainage of the Vardar and Struma valleys, the Salonika harbour-works, 
the new port of Candia, the ‘Power and Traction’ convention for the traffic of Athens and 
suburbs, railways, telegraphic and aerial communications, water-works, and roads – all 
these have attracted foreigners.472 
 
The National Bank would not have implemented such radical reforms of its own 
volition. Neither were key market forces conducive to such sweeping central banking reforms 
in the late 1920s. The structure and the size of the banking sector as well as the payments 
system, in short, the stage of development of financial institutions in Greece at the time, 
would not have encouraged the Old Bank to confine its activities to central banking 
orthodoxy. By the time the Greek delegation arrived in Geneva in June 1927 to request 
officially the assistance of the League in stabilising de jure the drachma, the National Bank 
had already conceded its monopoly on mortgage credit, of its own accord, to a newly 
472 Quoted also in Mazower (1991, p. 107). 
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established National Mortgage Bank. This was the only monopoly that the bank of issue had 
enjoyed since its foundation in 1842 but which it willingly passed to another banking 
institution in the late 1920s. Then in 1928 the Old Bank conceded its issuing privilege to the 
Bank of Greece; and finally in 1930 it lost its monopoly on agricultural credit when a 
specialised institution, the Agricultural Bank of Greece, commenced operations. These wide-
ranging banking reforms led to the modernisation and rationalisation of the banking system in 
Greece and together constitute the most important transformation of the banking system in the 
country in its entire history. 
 
This thesis also examines the monetary arrangement introduced in March 1910, 
which is known as the ΓΧΜΒ Law or the Valaorites Law, and draws attention to the 
discrepancy between the way that this monetary change in Greece in 1910 is seen in recent 
economic history literature and the way it was considered by scholars and policy makers at 
the time. These days it is claimed that Greece adopted either the gold standard or the gold 
exchange standard during that month. By contrast, before the 1980s it was believed that the 
Greek currency had remained inconvertible throughout the period from September 1885, 
when the gold standard was suspended, until May 1928, when the gold exchange standard 
was de jure introduced. A close analysis, however, of the ΓΧΜΒ Law indicates that in 1910 
the National Bank, a privately owned bank of issue, aimed at avoiding the ‘golden fetters’. 
Thus, a mechanism was introduced that helped the Old Bank to maintain a stable drachma at 
its LMU parity, whilst at the same time increasing the money supply for the ‘needs of trade’. 
Simultaneously, the ΓΧΜΒ Law helped the Bank to increase its reserves in gold and foreign 
exchange, which, as is shown, became an important source of income for the bank of issue. 
The fact that the National Bank was reluctant to adopt the gold standard raises questions that 
are at the heart of the ‘rules versus discretion’ debate. Does the 1910 monetary arrangement in 
Greece reflect the inherent tension between a privately owned central bank’s duty to earn 
profits for its shareholders and its responsibility to provide the public with monetary and 
financial stability? To what extent did the ΓΧΜΒ Law enacted in March 1910 and its 
evolution reflect the political economy of the time and historical circumstances? Only future 
research can provide conclusive answers to these questions. 
 
 It has been argued that the emergence of early central banks stemmed from the needs of 
‘revenue seeking or power-hungry governments’473 to ‘finance [public expenditure] on 
beneficial, subsidised terms’474. Once again state finance was at the core of central banking 
reforms under the terms of the stabilisation programmes sponsored by the Financial Committee 
473 Bordo and Redish (1987, p. 405). 
474 Goodhart (1988, p. 19). 
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of the League of Nations. This time, however, central banking reforms were aimed at preventing 
governments from borrowing liberally from the central bank and making monetary policy 
subordinate to fiscal policy. Central banking reforms in the 1920s also aimed to re-establish the 
pre-war status quo and encourage cooperation among central bankers.  
 
The statutes of the Bank of Greece were at the heart of the stabilisation principles and 
were focused both on the macro function of a central bank and on its role as the bank of the 
government. The law of the New Bank set up a commitment mechanism for monetary policy 
and central bank independence. The law alone, however, is insufficient to guarantee 
independence for any central bank. Central banks also need to achieve a political consensus, or 
at least a sufficient degree of political support, to maintain their position of independence.475 In 
Greece, the establishment of a central bank was not welcomed either by politicians or by the 
commercial banks. Its independence, a keystone in its statutes, was limited from its earliest 
days. And in the final analysis the credibility of the Bank of Greece was contingent upon events 
that its creators were not able to predict even as late as 1928.  
 
Central banking reforms that took place under the supervision of the Financial 
Committee of the League of Nations in the 1920s were aimed at combating different economic 
and monetary conditions from those that emerged in the 1930s. In the 1930s, central banks had 
to operate in an environment dominated by the failure of the gold exchange standard, by 
collapsing financial structures, extensive state intervention and autarky. The actions of the Bank 
of Greece became effective under the distinctive conditions that were created by the financial 
crisis of 1931. These conditions, coupled with the fact that depreciation and flexible exchange 
rates enabled policy makers to pursue monetary policies independent of the exchange rate, 
strengthened the position of the newly established central bank in Greece. More research, 
however, must be carried out to delineate the monetary policy that the Bank of Greece exercised 
in the 1930s and the effect that this policy had on enabling the Bank of Greece to strengthen its 
position in the market place. 
 
This thesis also explores the complex relationship that arose between Greek 
governments and foreign supervisors and unravels the impact that foreign financial 
intervention had on the evolution of monetary institutions in Greece during the period in 
question. 
 
Sovereign risk time series were constructed to establish the background of the 
negotiating power of the Greek government between the introduction of the Law of Control in 
1898 and stabilisation in 1928. These sovereign risk time series illustrate in a graphic way 
475 Goodhart (1993, p. 6). 
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why Greek governments faced considerable difficulties in raising capital on the financial 
markets in the 1920s, beyond the international politics and embargoes referred to in the 
literature. Qualitative research into the British press supports the findings of quantitative 
analysis which indicates that creditors acted upon news of fiscal policy and public debt.476 
 
This thesis examines in depth the Geneva Protocol of 1927 prepared by the Financial 
Committee of the League and refers extensively to the 1898 Law of Control. The parallels and 
contrasts between them are explored as the international financial control of the late 
nineteenth century is echoed in the League reconstruction schemes. In the late 1890s, the 
central issue in the negotiations was the resumption of the debt service of the external public 
debt. The Law of Control detailed the restructuring of the Greek government debt and 
encouraged monetary discipline in Greece and independence for the National Bank. It should 
be noted that the Law of Control did not stipulate that Greece had to adopt the gold standard 
as is usually claimed by modern scholars. By contrast, a prerequisite of the 1927 League 
Reconstruction scheme was de jure adoption of the gold exchange standard.  
 
In both 1898 and 1928 conditionality was introduced that was pertinent to the 
operation of the National Bank; in fact, as is shown, conditionality protected its financial 
strength since on both occasions it improved the quality of its assets. In particular, the 
bilateral public debt that it held was restructured in 1898, whilst in 1928 the National Bank 
refused to confine its assets and liabilities to those of a central bank and passed over to the 
Bank of Greece nearly all the illiquid debt that it held. This thesis also demonstrates that 
reforms relating to monetary institutions encouraged by foreign creditors were adapted in 
such a way as to be in line with the objectives and the constraints under which the Old Bank 
of issue operated when still a privately owned central bank. For example, in 1898 
conditionality introduced by the Law of Control relating to monetary institutions had been 
endorsed, if not promoted, by the National Bank. Yet again, in 1928, the National Bank 
sponsored a stabilisation programme which safeguarded and preserved its own financial 
position and strength. 
 
 In the 1920s, the League facilitated access to capital markets by signalling that a 
country, in this case Greece, would follow prudent fiscal and monetary policies in the future. 
The coupon rate of the League loans was close to the market yield of the country that floated 
the loan. In this way the creditworthiness of the country in question was denoted. By contrast, 
in 1898 the Great Powers jointly and severally guaranteed the flotation of the 2.50 per cent 
476 See Christodoulaki et al. (2011, 2012). 
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Guaranteed Loan. As a result, the terms under which the Guaranteed Loan was issued were 
very favourable; in fact, its interest rate was only 2.50 per cent, that is to say the same as the 
British consols coupon rate.  
  
In the both late 1890s and late 1920s, lenders to Greece promoted the establishment 
of institutions there that were akin to those which prevailed in their own countries. By the 
time that the 1898 Law of Control and the 1928 League stabilisation programme were signed, 
conditionality had not only been accepted but, as discussed, also shaped by those that were 
most affected. Since 2009, when the current economic recession started, successive Greek 
governments have faced similar questions to those that are tackled extensively here in this 
thesis. An over-borrowed Greek government has had no access to capital markets and has 
been expected to implement widespread structural reforms demanded by its lenders, which, 
however, have mustered very little support. Resistance and delays in the implementation of 
structural reforms in a fairly unstable and polarised political environment are among the most 
important reasons for a deep and protracted economic recession. A ‘war of attrition’ with 
distributional implications among different socio-economic groups has taken place and the 
burden of a huge and rapid fiscal adjustment has been shifted onto those that can bear it least 
and to future generations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
297 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
298 
 
  
APPENDIX A1: General information  
 
 
Table A1.1: Available price indices, 1914–1929 
 A B C D E 
1914 100 100 100 100 100 
1915 119 117 123 121 122 
1916 159 159 181 161 160 
1917 264 156 231 268 238 
1918 360 366 292 350 306 
1919 324 323 333 328 335 
1920 346 351 362 358 380 
1921 412 398 465 402 474 
1922 602 636 751 648 733 
1923 1271 1181 1467 1239 1265 
1924 1303 1235 1353 1301 1396 
1925 1506 1414 1474 1508 1508 
1926 1683 1633 1711 1690 1726 
1927 1886 1790 1965 1816 1946 
1928 1942 1868 1860 1889 1943 
1929 2019 1923 1662 1925 1788 
Notes: 
(1) Column headed A shows a general price index which appears in the Statistical Yearbooks. 
(2) Column headed B indicates a cost of living index which is also provided by the Statistical 
Yearbooks. 
(3) Column headed C shows a price index constructed by Kostelenos (1995).  
(4) Column headed D shows a price index constructed by Mitrofanis (2002) and published in 
Dertilis (2005). 
(5) Column headed E presents a deflator based on a sample of ten items constructed by 
Kostelenos et al. (2007). 
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of Greece for 1939 (1940, pp. 471–472); Kostelenos (1995, pp. 
332–333); Dertilis (2005, pp. 1048–1050); Kostelenos et al. (2007, Table 7–II, column 
headed 3, p.38 of CD). 
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Table A1.2: GDP data at current prices, 1898–1930 
1898 568,609,039 
1899 542,817,095 
1900 585,318,900 
1901 663,880,009 
1902 638,047,417 
1903 623,984,536 
1904 572,452,526 
1905 579,591,946 
1906 604,516,897 
1907 646,723,396 
1908 638,396,799 
1909 689,464,639 
1910 660,869,107 
1911 847,536,747 
1912 823,862,626 
1913 856,722,066 
1914 1,235,786,566 
1915 1,420,876,565 
1916 1,882,928,700 
1917 2,689,025,077 
1918 4,196,152,017 
1919 3,789,749,966 
1920 5,361,536,871 
1921 6,821,748,101 
1922 10,780,134,536 
1923 16,558,597,496 
1924 20,718,344,368 
1925 23,992,285,292 
1926 28,217,011,578 
1927 30,874,784,578 
1928 33,618,998,228 
1929 32,387,828,463 
1930 31,089,932,899 
Source: Kostelenos et al. (2007, Table 6–III, Column H, pp. 138–141). 
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 APPENDIX A2: Financial position of the National Bank, 1898–1930 
 
Table A2.1: Total assets and liabilities of the National Bank, 1898–1930 
(in Drachmae) 
1898 285,206,415.00 
1899 310,906,883.87 
1900 315,345,530.51 
1901 329,988,672.21 
1902 349,835,505.87 
1903 333,401,636.79 
1904 363,023,704.55 
1905 360,514,674.84 
1906 385,574,311.39 
1907 395,912,553.59 
1908 408,335,218.99 
1909 406,085,817.95 
1910 423,366,869.95 
1911 493,774,990.66 
1912 586,362,493.07 
1913 735,632,510.32 
1914 725,446,800.83 
1915 913,928,534.01 
1916 1,125,648,628.22 
1917 1,590,753,339.45 
1918 2,483,020,605.15 
1919 2,690,469,188.26 
1920 3,963,521,338.29 
1921 5,107,005,324.22 
1922 8,095,503,082.78 
1923 10,104,224,035.06 
1924 11,080,903,898.31 
1925 11,621,735,863.81 
1926 11,111,440,888.04 
1927 10,142,406,900.33 
1928 7,362,310,823.58 
1929 8,212,332,107.93 
1930 8,994,604,459.10 
 
Source: Balance Sheet of the National Bank, 1898–1930. 
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Table A2.2: Credits to the economy by the National Bank, 1898–1930 
(in Drachmae) 
 
Discounts Loans against Securities 
Loans against 
Merchandise 
Agricultural 
Credit 
Mortgage 
Loans 
Loans to legal 
entities TOTAL 
1898 15,735,435.26 5,035,809.97  4,441,196.51 36,895,992.56 28,748,966.72 90,857,401.02 
1899 19,989,630.64 9,553,107.31  10,075,563.98 43,107,082.37 30,628,638.67 113,354,022.97 
1900 22,904,815.33 9,978,007.06 130,302.35 12,594,367.93 45,528,961.61 34,717,257.15 125,853,711.43 
1901 25,171,505.70 10,667,797.93 623,358.73 12,279,357.70 48,559,656.38 39,807,403.89 137,109,080.33 
1902 24,599,858.32 12,563,613.49 561,426.90 13,746,457.90 50,346,619.37 45,157,368.29 146,975,344.27 
1903 23,816,294.14 12,838,454.30 4,245,090.40 13,500,025.64 51,143,697.18 42,694,673.41 148,238,235.07 
1904 23,414,374.70 15,311,250.37 5,187,723.36 13,965,710.29 54,411,486.18 43,513,839.51 155,804,384.41 
1905 25,702,248.41 12,545,344.18 2,563,796.38 14,950,285.18 57,482,151.94 43,383,406.53 156,627,232.62 
1906 24,143,943.31 12,245,138.20 5,737,380.32 17,179,935.97 62,345,114.29 45,953,525.56 167,605,037.65 
1907 26,399,574.19 16,470,486.66 10,049,323.57 18,016,244.30 68,680,254.18 46,705,574.32 186,321,457.22 
1908 26,956,001.57 23,176,588.57 10,967,832.76 16,772,876.08 69,384,628.68 45,926,165.16 193,184,092.82 
1909 25,094,915.63 25,155,334.62 7,260,689.42 16,694,189.66 69,532,928.83 47,281,496.24 191,019,554.40 
1910 24,689,228.06 18,269,261.97 6,714,690.81 17,036,145.13 68,483,660.26 48,598,969.34 183,791,955.57 
1911 25,266,886.24 23,511,246.69 7,601,902.10 16,786,140.23 70,953,832.93 61,351,418.91 205,471,427.10 
1912 29,018,541.66 37,055,864.79 4,999,952.85 16,100,478.05 72,513,291.94 60,380,031.49 220,068,160.78 
1913 17,587,992.04 26,291,407.11 4,670,847.90 13,964,349.69 72,786,956.74 59,238,223.28 194,539,776.76 
1914 28,989,753.89 38,358,020.22 2,553,552.65 13,946,707.20 72,735,462.10 75,695,794.84 232,279,290.90 
1915 30,237,087.73 56,305,558.14 4,541,619.46 13,636,421.24 75,997,567.20 75,387,774.52 256,106,028.29 
1916 28,521,896.84 52,861,351.99 15,181,993.52 14,898,109.87 75,005,685.51 73,070,621.50 259,539,659.23 
1917 27,343,924.86 45,038,257.70 29,019,396.90 15,256,684.43 70,903,595.62 77,695,240.28 265,257,099.79 
1918 16,105,546.33 22,995,612.60 90,592,223.72 19,713,592.22 66,563,738.78 76,939,087.77 292,909,801.42 
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Discounts Loans against Securities 
Loans against 
Merchandise 
Agricultural 
Credit 
Mortgage 
Loans 
Loans to legal 
entities TOTAL 
1919 33,964,800.24 27,760,594.07 94,387,318.32 30,403,636.26 71,327,065.15 79,022,851.98 336,866,266.02 
1920 72,450,363.55 59,595,318.15 170,560,796.64 63,337,109.97 90,620,355.20 81,691,145.10 538,255,088.61 
1921 68,953,004.08 73,166,755.25 158,740,400.83 68,821,866.66 116,284,614.85 93,680,086.23 579,646,727.90 
1922 185,321,780.53 210,825,521.26 340,053,454.43 78,553,841.93 145,344,864.26 102,351,834.44 1,062,451,296.85 
1923 178,075,557.38 143,263,648.68 311,938,368.63 176,525,578.55 220,654,593.46 115,946,834.78 1,146,404,581.48 
1924 479,032,337.28 235,737,708.62 440,223,510.16 462,155,810.85 407,138,279.20 217,427,303.09 2,241,714,949.20 
1925 680,362,329.35 344,589,817.55 416,835,096.61 565,515,421.43 540,771,820.08 280,611,840.67 2,828,686,325.69 
1926 663,086,628.24 327,633,282.82 302,902,539.69 485,184,154.07 637,947,648.05 362,634,493.34 2,779,388,746.21 
1927 848,867,414.03 293,480,166.70 204,533,262.91 755,639,043.65 0.00 71,649,572.80 2,174,169,460.09 
1928 1,055,875,030.70 425,380,082.38 693,741,563.00 878,531,153.57 0.00 91,884,330.45 3,145,412,160.10 
1929 1,461,621,441.87 696,753,083.71 966,894,989.92 1,258,101,890.59 0.00 124,766,825.74 4,508,138,231.83 
1930 1,915,732,162.11 818,448,811.69 1,023,819,503.45 513,714,948.94 0.00 350,808,727.81 4,622,524,154.00 
Source: Author’s calculations using the Balance Sheet of the National Bank, 1898–1930. 
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Table A2.3: Credits to the economy by the National Bank at 1911 values, 1898–1930 
 
Discounts   Loans against Securities 
Loans against 
Merchandise 
Agricultural 
Credit 
Mortgage 
Loans 
Loans to legal 
entities TOTAL 
1898 14,463,884.94 4,628,875.83  4,082,311.94 33,914,498.21 26,425,817.89 83,515,388.82 
1899 19,772,352.05 9,449,269.19  9,966,046.98 42,638,527.13 30,295,718.68 112,121,914.02 
1900 18,777,821.58 8,180,167.95 106,824.45 10,325,112.45 37,325,545.10 28,461,895.50 103,177,367.03 
1901 17,620,053.99 7,467,458.55 436,351.11 8,595,550.39 33,991,759.47 27,865,182.72 95,976,356.23 
1902 23,078,217.60 11,786,482.76 526,699.46 12,896,161.54 47,232,395.49 42,364,129.01 137,884,085.86 
1903 22,575,862.15 12,169,784.81 4,023,991.94 12,796,899.30 48,479,962.95 40,470,992.50 140,517,493.66 
1904 25,671,181.90 16,787,033.54 5,687,744.89 15,311,802.85 59,655,966.78 47,707,944.52 170,821,674.47 
1905 28,875,365.50 14,094,152.10 2,880,314.45 16,795,999.40 64,578,713.91 48,739,382.64 175,963,928.01 
1906 25,848,221.66 13,109,500.90 6,142,371.87 18,392,637.33 66,745,945.89 49,197,303.83 179,435,981.48 
1907 26,992,823.05 16,840,609.96 10,275,151.07 18,421,103.72 70,223,630.68 47,755,137.79 190,508,456.26 
1908 27,874,956.17 23,966,699.54 11,341,736.15 17,344,678.67 71,750,013.75 47,491,829.88 199,769,914.17 
1909 24,555,240.03 24,614,359.68 7,104,545.56 16,335,174.83 68,037,597.03 46,264,689.87 186,911,606.99 
1910 25,244,042.17 18,679,807.18 6,865,582.74 17,418,979.85 70,022,618.92 49,691,081.01 187,922,111.87 
1911 25,266,886.24 23,511,246.69 7,601,902.10 16,786,140.23 70,953,832.93 61,351,418.91 205,471,427.10 
1912 29,340,969.90 37,467,596.62 5,055,507.88 16,279,372.25 73,318,995.18 61,050,920.73 222,513,362.57 
1913 18,187,582.68 27,187,705.08 4,830,081.35 14,440,407.07 75,268,330.27 61,257,708.16 201,171,814.60 
1914 26,380,676.04 34,905,798.40 2,323,732.91 12,691,503.55 66,189,270.51 68,883,173.30 211,374,154.72 
1915 22,553,893.31 41,998,408.12 3,387,601.40 10,171,428.96 56,686,709.96 56,231,864.60 191,029,906.35 
1916 16,221,828.83 30,064,893.94 8,634,758.81 8,473,299.99 42,659,483.63 41,558,915.98 147,613,181.19 
1917 10,455,030.09 17,220,510.30 11,095,651.76 5,833,438.16 27,110,198.33 29,707,003.64 101,421,832.27 
1918 4,789,557.90 6,838,564.53 26,940,824.70 5,862,538.86 19,795,098.79 22,880,578.39 87,107,163.17 
1919 9,226,259.17 7,540,937.49 25,639,540.20 8,258,898.21 19,375,411.73 21,465,909.05 91,506,955.84 
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Discounts   Loans against Securities 
Loans against 
Merchandise 
Agricultural 
Credit 
Mortgage 
Loans 
Loans to legal 
entities TOTAL 
1920 17,349,955.48 14,271,510.40 40,844,822.35 15,167,571.07 21,701,190.32 19,562,879.48 128,897,929.11 
1921 13,237,813.02 14,046,782.13 30,475,477.80 13,212,636.85 22,324,683.44 17,984,995.46 111,282,388.69 
1922 23,007,206.04 26,173,427.61 42,216,731.72 9,752,250.50 18,044,178.24 12,706,707.96 131,900,502.06 
1923 12,810,178.44 10,305,922.55 22,439,835.21 12,698,677.98 15,873,176.29 8,340,839.50 82,468,629.97 
1924 31,226,319.98 15,366,856.36 28,696,518.21 30,126,202.57 26,539,816.19 14,173,269.76 146,128,983.08 
1925 41,056,347.46 20,794,213.13 25,153,842.04 34,125,930.60 32,632,782.25 16,933,473.14 170,696,588.62 
1926 34,959,955.49 17,273,828.93 15,969,948.50 25,580,392.83 33,634,551.55 19,119,199.82 146,537,877.12 
1927 39,695,238.79 13,723,892.69 9,564,505.10 35,335,638.73 0.00 3,350,519.59 101,669,794.90 
1928 49,451,686.98 19,922,587.49 32,491,241.50 41,145,823.46 0.00 4,303,383.46 147,314,722.89 
1929 74,389,010.74 35,461,146.88 49,209,979.91 64,030,912.78 0.00 6,349,989.45 229,441,039.76 
1930 109,367,394.45 46,724,493.01 58,448,917.70 29,327,515.91 0.00 20,027,348.95 263,895,670.02 
Sources: Author’s calculations using the data in Table A2.2 in Appendix A2 and Table 2.1 in Chapter 2. 
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Table A2.4: Credits to the economy by the National Bank at constant values as a ratio series (1911=100) 
 
Short-Term Credit 
Agricultural 
Credit 
 
Mortgage Credit 
TOTAL 
Credits to 
the 
Economy 
 
Discounts 
Loans 
against 
Securities 
Loans 
against 
Merchandise 
Total  
Short-Term 
Credits to 
the economy 
Mortgage 
Loans 
 
Loans to 
Public 
Entities 
Total 
Mortgage 
Credit 
1898 57.24 19.69 0.00 33.86 24.32 47.80 43.07 45.61 40.65 
1899 78.25 40.19 0.00 51.83 59.37 60.09 49.38 55.13 54.57 
1900 74.32 34.79 1.41 48.00 61.51 52.61 46.39 49.72 50.21 
1901 69.74 31.76 5.74 45.27 51.21 47.91 45.42 46.75 46.71 
1902 91.34 50.13 6.93 62.77 76.83 66.57 69.05 67.72 67.11 
1903 89.35 51.76 52.93 68.76 76.23 68.33 65.97 67.23 68.39 
1904 101.60 71.40 74.82 85.40 91.22 84.08 77.76 81.15 83.14 
1905 114.28 59.95 37.89 81.32 100.06 91.02 79.44 85.65 85.64 
1906 102.30 55.76 80.80 79.99 109.57 94.07 80.19 87.63 87.33 
1907 106.83 71.63 135.17 95.97 109.74 98.97 77.84 89.17 92.72 
1908 110.32 101.94 149.20 112.07 103.33 101.12 77.41 90.13 97.23 
1909 97.18 104.69 93.46 99.81 97.31 95.89 75.41 86.39 90.97 
1910 99.91 79.45 90.31 90.08 103.77 98.69 80.99 90.48 91.46 
1911 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1912 116.12 159.36 66.50 127.46 96.98 103.33 99.51 101.56 108.29 
1913 71.98 115.64 63.54 89.05 86.03 106.08 99.85 103.19 97.91 
1914 104.41 148.46 30.57 112.82 75.61 93.28 112.28 102.09 102.87 
1915 89.26 178.63 44.56 120.50 60.59 79.89 91.66 85.35 92.97 
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 Short-Term Credit 
Agricultural 
Credit 
 
Mortgage Credit 
TOTAL 
Credits to 
the 
Economy 
 
Discounts 
Loans 
against 
Securities 
Loans 
against 
Merchandise 
Total  
Short-Term 
Credits to 
the economy 
Mortgage 
Loans 
 
Loans to 
Public 
Entities 
Total 
Mortgage 
Credit 
1916 64.20 127.87 113.59 97.41 50.48 60.12 67.74 63.65 71.84 
1917 41.38 73.24 145.96 68.77 34.75 38.21 48.42 42.94 49.36 
1918 18.96 29.09 354.40 68.41 34.92 27.90 37.29 32.26 42.39 
1919 36.52 32.07 337.28 75.22 49.20 27.31 34.99 30.87 44.54 
1920 68.67 60.70 537.30 128.53 90.36 30.58 31.89 31.19 62.73 
1921 52.39 59.74 400.89 102.45 78.71 31.46 29.31 30.47 54.16 
1922 91.06 111.32 555.34 162.11 58.10 25.43 20.71 23.24 64.19 
1923 50.70 43.83 295.19 80.80 75.65 22.37 13.60 18.30 40.14 
1924 123.59 65.36 377.49 133.54 179.47 37.40 23.10 30.77 71.12 
1925 162.49 88.44 330.89 154.32 203.30 45.99 27.60 37.46 83.08 
1926 138.36 73.47 210.08 120.97 152.39 47.40 31.16 39.87 71.32 
1927 157.10 58.37 125.82 111.71 210.50   5.46 2.53 49.48 
1928 195.72 84.74 427.41 180.68 245.12   7.01 3.25 71.70 
1929 294.41 150.83 647.34 282.12 381.45   10.35 4.80 111.67 
1930 432.85 198.73 768.87 380.53 174.71   32.64 15.14 128.43 
Source: Author’s calculations using the data in Table A2.3. 
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Table A2.5: Credit to the economy supplied by the Bank of Athens, 1898–1928 
(in Drachmae) 
 
Mortgage Credit 
Excluded1 Total Credit 
1898 10,798,448.75 10,798,448.75 
1899 18,802,937.35 18,802,937.35 
1900 31,804,229.00 31,804,229.00 
1901 29,708,598.61 33,322,847.16 
1902 29,975,681.78 34,238,957.68 
1903 33,494,063.01 39,238,247.06 
1904 45,542,587.48 50,394,649.48 
1905 76,497,989.88 83,324,511.48 
1906 99,388,058.29 109,115,920.94 
1907 96,453,262.69 106,703,919.26 
1908 99,944,265.43 109,934,477.78 
1909 113,013,475.93 122,386,471.63 
1910 158,916,138.01 169,616,460.21 
1911 173,575,280.57 184,223,790.55 
1912 151,792,934.68 161,476,762.67 
1913 100,126,230.28 109,396,673.24 
1914 72,160,732.38 80,984,710.11 
1915 55,411,301.74 63,402,751.25 
1916 52,160,535.47 57,869,092.51 
1917 71,757,144.49 77,050,551.37 
1918 120,799,067.00 126,591,840.15 
1919 173,229,403.72 178,170,517.46 
1920 188,111,717.53 193,187,878.07 
1921 255,702,754.49 259,568,413.13 
1922 218,784,318.96 223,383,664.96 
1923 508,486,426.29 513,376,912.64 
1924 613,888,834.78 622,084,321.13 
1925 802,597,769.60 814,010,790.98 
1926 728,862,672.53 746,320,509.53 
1927 972,048,890.27 995,530,612.69 
1928 1,848,106,899.84 1,892,583,491.30 
Note: 1 Mortgage credit supplied by the Bank of Athens after 1901 was subtracted from the 
total credit of the Bank of Athens.  
Source: Annual Reports of the Bank of Athens, 1898–1928. 
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Table A2.6: Credit to the economy by the Bank of Athens as a percentage of the credits 
provided by the National Bank  
 
As a % of National 
Bank short-term credit 
As a % of total 
National Bank credit 
1898 51.99 11.89 
1899 63.65 16.59 
1900 96.34 25.27 
1901 81.48 24.30 
1902 79.46 23.30 
1903 81.89 26.47 
1904 103.71 32.34 
1905 187.44 53.20 
1906 235.93 65.10 
1907 182.26 57.27 
1908 163.57 56.91 
1909 196.51 64.07 
1910 319.92 92.29 
1911 307.87 89.66 
1912 213.57 73.38 
1913 206.23 56.23 
1914 103.23 34.87 
1915 60.84 24.76 
1916 54.02 22.30 
1917 70.77 29.05 
1918 93.14 43.22 
1919 110.96 52.89 
1920 62.16 35.89 
1921 84.99 44.78 
1922 29.72 21.03 
1923 80.29 44.78 
1924 53.15 27.75 
1925 55.67 28.78 
1926 56.34 26.85 
1927 72.17 45.79 
1928 84.97 60.17 
Sources: Table A2.2 and Table A2.5. 
 
 
 
 
309 
 
 Table A2.7: Deposits at the National Bank, 1898–1930 
(in Drachmae) 
 Government Deposits Deposits of Other Agencies Total 
1898 15,949,148.25 52,807,689.61 68,756,837.86 
1899 32,324,185.62 53,680,769.18 86,004,954.80 
1900 20,940,878.11 62,065,714.36 83,006,592.47 
1901 23,246,176.61 72,194,218.31 95,440,394.92 
1902 38,217,635.01 73,663,165.94 111,880,800.95 
1903 21,294,936.06 83,107,236.81 104,402,172.87 
1904 30,458,962.39 91,523,198.48 121,982,160.87 
1905 26,185,607.26 101,836,287.48 128,021,894.74 
1906 25,521,669.62 125,082,004.64 150,603,674.26 
1907 19,257,941.03 134,838,416.96 154,096,357.99 
1908 8,394,880.56 166,297,447.98 174,692,328.54 
1909 8,007,277.92 160,532,632.23 168,539,910.15 
1910 17,547,342.32 165,242,959.32 182,790,301.64 
1911 33,096,125.36 189,245,401.45 222,341,526.81 
1912 6,948,288.85 221,345,008.21 228,293,297.06 
1913 8,873,227.10 266,046,251.79 274,919,478.89 
1914 12,109,404.57 300,704,665.84 312,814,070.41 
1915 14,350,300.50 351,792,775.15 366,143,075.65 
1916 10,010,067.06 403,099,352.77 413,109,419.83 
1917 18,357,623.50 490,425,664.37 508,783,287.87 
1918 179,247,679.38 611,064,986.76 790,312,666.14 
1919 45,424,564.01 788,162,105.56 833,586,669.57 
1920 81,164,871.41 1,242,381,455.42 1,323,546,326.83 
1921 79,077,041.86 1,763,152,987.76 1,842,230,029.62 
1922 113,736,230.64 2,143,598,870.02 2,257,335,100.66 
1923 130,049,619.85 2,583,782,825.14 2,713,832,444.99 
1924 472,087,928.60 2,937,818,940.46 3,409,906,869.06 
1925 449,727,152.45 2,690,207,209.13 3,139,934,361.58 
1926 492,367,340.05 3,479,103,992.79 3,971,471,332.84 
1927 1,366,090,883.08 3,072,444,606.44 4,438,535,489.52 
310 
 
 Government Deposits Deposits of Other Agencies Total 
1928  5,278,884,906.55 5,278,884,906.55 
1929  6,210,852,957.64 6,210,852,957.64 
1930  6,864,583,470.82 6,864,583,470.82 
Notes:  
(1) Deposits of the government are in gold and nominal drachmae. 
(2) In 1927 the way that data were presented on the balance sheet changed. Three categories 
of deposits appear: sight, time and savings deposits. Government deposits were most likely 
included in sight deposits. In the Annual Report of the National Bank for 1927, p. XIV the 
governor reported data on deposits of other agencies. Thus, using these data on deposits of 
other agencies it can be assumed that in 1927 government deposits were 1,366,090 and 
deposits of other agencies 3,072,444,606. Government deposits for 1927, however, seem to be 
an outlier. Note that in June 1927 the National Bank handed over to the Mortgage Bank a 
significant part of its time deposits. 
Sources: Balance Sheet of the National Bank, 1898–1930; Annual Report of the National 
Bank for 1927.  
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Table A2.8: Deposits of other agencies at 1911 prices 
 1911 prices 1911=100 
1898 48,540,401.56 25.65 
1899 53,097,282.56 28.06 
1900 50,882,702.76 26.89 
1901 50,535,952.82 26.70 
1902 69,106,681.45 36.52 
1903 78,778,734.89 41.63 
1904 100,344,711.59 53.02 
1905 114,408,668.65 60.46 
1906 133,911,322.61 70.76 
1907 137,868,493.75 72.85 
1908 171,966,679.16 90.87 
1909 157,080,317.56 83.00 
1910 168,956,284.25 89.28 
1911 189,245,401.45 100.00 
1912 223,804,397.19 118.26 
1913 275,116,010.37 145.38 
1914 273,641,245.91 144.60 
1915 262,402,807.69 138.66 
1916 229,262,756.89 121.15 
1917 187,515,695.20 99.09 
1918 181,721,940.51 96.02 
1919 214,097,765.99 113.13 
1920 297,517,664.32 157.21 
1921 338,495,615.79 178.87 
1922 266,122,097.10 140.62 
1923 185,868,962.12 98.22 
1924 191,505,389.39 101.19 
1925 162,340,090.21 85.78 
1926 183,429,005.41 96.93 
1927 143,675,467.21 75.92 
1928 247,235,474.26 130.64 
1929 316,100,458.13 167.03 
1930 391,892,782.84 207.08 
Sources: Table A2.7 and Table 2.1 in Chapter 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
312 
 
 
Table A2.9: Composition of deposits of other agencies at the National Bank  
(in Drachmae) 
 Sight Deposits Time Deposits Savings Total 
1898 16,076,109.10 34,675,983.39 2,055,597.12 52,807,689.61 
1899 8,757,041.07 42,637,582.57 2,286,145.54 53,680,769.18 
1900 12,378,855.54 47,160,661.90 2,526,196.92 62,065,714.36 
1901 19,288,488.20 50,200,951.51 2,704,778.60 72,194,218.31 
1902 13,845,828.84 56,751,602.83 3,065,734.27 73,663,165.94 
1903 14,662,042.63 64,965,223.60 3,479,970.58 83,107,236.81 
1904 17,580,008.17 70,183,964.41 3,759,225.90 91,523,198.48 
1905 15,429,567.32 81,158,900.63 5,247,819.53 101,836,287.48 
1906 27,341,460.52 90,402,148.38 7,338,395.74 125,082,004.64 
1907 18,816,895.20 106,220,530.15 9,800,991.61 134,838,416.96 
1908 26,857,222.87 127,288,792.93 12,151,432.18 166,297,447.98 
1909 29,086,625.65 117,585,023.88 13,860,982.70 160,532,632.23 
1910 28,786,983.46 119,156,671.39 17,299,304.47 165,242,959.32 
1911 39,776,247.89 126,470,989.58 22,998,163.98 189,245,401.45 
1912 54,371,744.61 139,479,166.57 27,494,097.03 221,345,008.21 
1913 70,922,642.84 153,872,794.96 41,250,813.99 266,046,251.79 
1914 88,945,327.48 169,774,490.01 41,984,848.35 300,704,665.84 
1915 115,588,771.69 184,047,024.36 52,156,979.10 351,792,775.15 
1916 149,636,073.22 194,923,227.44 58,540,052.11 403,099,352.77 
1917 218,588,307.52 200,895,654.27 70,941,702.58 490,425,664.37 
1918 280,007,019.73 232,533,095.20 98,524,871.83 611,064,986.76 
1919 342,797,327.12 325,998,567.11 119,366,211.33 788,162,105.56 
1920 526,115,636.92 578,240,656.47 138,025,162.03 1,242,381,455.42 
1921 666,787,276.34 910,090,916.21 186,274,795.21 1,763,152,987.76 
1922 957,820,710.88 988,105,872.62 197,672,286.52 2,143,598,870.02 
1923 1,373,177,391.79 988,867,454.98 221,737,978.37 2,583,782,825.14 
1924 1,668,488,930.68 1,054,848,798.78 214,481,211.00 2,937,818,940.46 
1925 1,423,378,497.85 1,009,870,113.04 256,958,598.24 2,690,207,209.13 
1926 2,031,215,214.93 892,712,227.28 555,176,550.58 3,479,103,992.79 
1927 2,022,000,000.00 302,876,161.94 747,568,444.50 3,072,444,606.44 
313 
 
 Sight Deposits Time Deposits Savings Total 
14 May 
1928 
      
3,437,210,305.53 473,121,364.44 899,064,373.82 4,809,396,043.79 
1928 3,522,022,574.73 762,829,978.17 994,032,353.65 5,278,884,906.55 
1929 4,009,231,220.95 872,610,201.90 1,329,011,534.79 6,210,852,957.64 
1930 3,691,602,207.83 1,460,734,074.32 1,712,247,188.67 6,864,583,470.82 
 
Note: Deposits in gold and in nominal drachmae were added together. 
Source: Balance Sheet of the National Bank, 1898–1930. 
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Table A2.10:  
Commercial deposits at the National Bank in gold and nominal drachmae, 1920–1927 
 
 Sight Deposits Time Deposits Savings 
 In Gold In Drachmae In Gold In Drachmae In Gold In Drachmae 
1920 80,508,989.04 445,606,647.88 196,391,514.96 381,849,141.51 1,104,931.01 136,920,231.02 
1921 73,667,559.08 593,119,717.26 186,665,793.82 723,425,122.39 1,250,804.90 185,023,990.31 
1922 63,308,017.47 894,512,693.41 173,884,278.75 814,221,593.87 985,722.21 196,686,564.31 
1923 48,716,142.16 1,324,461,249.63 116,930,204.88 871,937,250.10 744,347.02 220,993,631.35 
1924 79,850,623.75 1,588,638,306.93 98,120,227.18 956,728,571.60 1,545,592.40 212,935,618.60 
1925 99,272,124.46 1,324,106,373.39 89,719,994.68 920,150,118.36 3,596,112.64 253,362,485.60 
1926 92,829,994.47 1,938,385,220.46 43,079,678.71 849,632,548.57 4,953,181.67 550,223,368.91 
1927 117,142,605.22 3,270,948,277.86 35,819,705.04 267,056,456.90 7,217,395.56 740,351,048.94 
Notes: In 1927 all deposits were shown together. In this table sight deposits for 1927 include government deposits at the National Bank as well. 
Source: Balance Sheet of the National Bank, 1920–1927. 
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Table A2.11:  
Government deposits at the National Bank in gold and nominal drachmae, 1920–1926 
 
 In Gold In Drachmae Total 
1920 4,572,602.79 76,592,268.62 81,164,871.41 
1921 6,622,893.66 72,454,148.20 79,077,041.86 
1922 0.00 113,736,230.64 113,736,230.64 
1923 4,612,171.64 125,437,448.21 130,049,619.85 
1924 4,755,297.42 467,332,631.18 472,087,928.60 
1925 4,024,788.26 445,702,364.19 449,727,152.45 
1926 4,704,461.49 487,662,878.56 492,367,340.05 
Source: Balance Sheet of the National Bank, 1920–1926. 
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Table A2.12: Deposits at the Bank of Athens 
(in Drachmae) 
 Total Deposits 
1898 8,697,202.15 
1899 10,616,467.35 
1900 19,480,891.01 
1901 25,312,500.88 
1902 27,086,233.03 
1903 32,720,317.62 
1904 40,798,989.22 
1905 54,682,419.22 
1906 69,148,091.03 
1907 78,288,814.02 
1908 77,152,348.69 
1909 89,094,829.32 
1910 127,260,534.18 
1911 140,319,617.22 
1912 118,279,364.91 
1913 98,742,088.73 
1914 69,552,960.91 
1915 57,064,396.06 
1916 72,900,834.67 
1917 153,030,614.64 
1918 251,879,398.99 
1919 312,292,573.95 
1920 417,952,870.31 
1921 537,927,628.70 
1922 510,388,384.56 
1923 764,328,077.24 
1924 948,851,921.17 
1925 1,079,653,503.23 
1926 1,215,410,698.33 
1927 1,303,113,034.70 
1928 2,464,057,436.65 
Source: Annual Reports of the Bank of Athens, 1898–1928. 
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Table A2.13: Deposits at the Bank of Athens as a percentage of  
the National Bank’s deposits of other agencies 
 % 
1898 16.47 
1899 19.78 
1900 31.39 
1901 35.06 
1902 36.77 
1903 39.37 
1904 44.58 
1905 53.70 
1906 55.28 
1907 58.06 
1908 46.39 
1909 55.50 
1910 77.01 
1911 74.15 
1912 53.44 
1913 37.11 
1914 23.13 
1915 16.22 
1916 18.09 
1917 31.20 
1918 41.22 
1919 39.62 
1920 33.64 
1921 30.51 
1922 23.81 
1923 29.58 
1924 32.30 
1925 40.13 
1926 34.93 
1927 42.41 
1928 46.68 
Sources: Tables A2.12 and A2.9.  
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Table A2.14: Bilateral public debt held by the National Bank  
as a percentage of GDP, 1898–1930 
 % of GDP 
1898 14.48 
1899 16.03 
1900 14.60 
1901 12.71 
1902 13.05 
1903 13.07 
1904 13.98 
1905 13.59 
1906 12.96 
1907 12.15 
1908 12.16 
1909 11.27 
1910 10.95 
1911 7.29 
1912 7.50 
1913 15.83 
1914 12.10 
1915 13.05 
1916 7.87 
1917 6.33 
1918 24.09 
1919 42.84 
1920 43.15 
1921 50.06 
1922 42.14 
1923 34.19 
1924 23.77 
1925 21.22 
1926 16.18 
1927 14.04 
1928 0.93 
1929 0.56 
1930 0.60 
Sources: Table A2.15 in Appendix A2 and Table A1.2 in Appendix A1. 
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 Table Α2.15: Total bilateral public debt held by the National Bank, 1898–1930 
 Bilateral public debt  
in nominal drachmae 
Bilateral public debt  
at 1911 values 
 Bilateral public debt 
at constant values as 
a ratio, 1911=100   
1898 82,359,389 75,704,084.84 122.54 
1899 87,012,467 86,066,679.32 139.31 
1900 85,430,981 70,038,011.45 113.37 
1901 84,403,682 59,082,577.40 95.64 
1902 83,278,575 78,127,322.94 126.46 
1903 81,528,575 77,282,295.05 125.10 
1904 80,028,575 87,742,172.59 142.03 
1905 78,783,575 88,509,942.28 143.27 
1906 78,318,575 83,846,945.00 135.72 
1907 78,557,319 80,322,652.01 130.02 
1908 77,641,679 80,288,554.42 129.96 
1909 77,668,840 75,998,542.37 123.02 
1910 72,358,757 73,984,796.48 119.76 
1911 61,778,575 61,778,575.00 100.00 
1912 61,778,575 62,465,003.61 101.11 
1913 135,592,975 140,215,462.78 226.96 
1914 149,568,052 136,106,927.32 220.31 
1915 185,458,052 138,333,465.02 223.92 
1916 148,117,150 84,241,629.06 136.36 
1917 170,092,586 65,035,400.53 105.27 
1918 1,011,004,965 300,658,339.26 486.67 
1919 1,623,502,167 441,011,036.41 713.86 
1920 2,313,413,904 554,001,750.69 896.75 
1921 3,414,675,755 655,560,113.30 1061.14 
1922 4,542,643,359 563,957,088.23 912.87 
1923 5,661,350,934 407,259,237.15 659.22 
1924 4,924,795,770 321,028,950.62 519.64 
1925 5,092,167,420 307,285,965.00 497.40 
1926 4,564,286,716 240,643,158.26 389.53 
1927 4,335,366,071 202,732,945.77 328.16 
1928 313,872,183 14,700,138.27 23.79 
1929 180,957,349 9,209,797.96 14.91 
1930 185,185,434 10,572,066.81 17.11 
 
Sources: Author’s calculations using data on bilateral public debt reported on the Balance 
Sheet of the National Bank, 1898–1930 and Table 2.1 in Chapter 2. 
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 Table A2.16: Revenue of the National Bank, 1898–1930 
(in Drachmae) 
 1st Semester 2nd Semester Total 
1898 5,020,777.00 4,956,214.87 9,976,991.87 
1899 5,503,909.98 5,516,309.13 11,020,219.11 
1900 5,697,210.50 5,881,115.37 11,578,325.87 
1901 5,875,180.76 6,017,272.85 11,892,453.61 
1902 6,058,885.65 6,123,052.46 12,181,938.11 
1903 6,183,527.49 6,275,700.40 12,459,227.89 
1904 6,445,559.99 6,702,017.00 13,147,576.99 
1905 6,624,242.68 6,986,755.91 13,610,998.59 
1906 6,994,143.83 7,522,053.86 14,516,197.69 
1907 7,579,184.84 8,004,901.20 15,584,086.04 
1908 8,213,599.94 8,429,709.73 16,643,309.67 
1909 8,591,655.48 8,531,229.69 17,122,885.17 
1910 8,200,172.06 8,235,069.01 16,435,241.07 
1911 8,704,553.90 9,193,931.89 17,898,485.79 
1912 9,450,618.15 9,749,263.44 19,199,881.59 
1913 10,172,039.52 13,069,203.41 23,241,242.93 
1914 13,967,241.36 14,666,280.52 28,633,521.88 
1915 15,507,131.04 17,523,123.72 33,030,254.76 
1916 18,825,478.60 19,782,541.96 38,608,020.56 
1917 20,285,382.26 22,726,867.91 43,012,250.17 
1918 25,287,957.44 27,549,470.96 52,837,428.40 
1919 32,033,343.83 32,327,269.99 64,360,613.82 
1920 45,536,530.73 54,268,099.26 99,804,629.99 
1921 65,224,317.98 120,216,683.99 185,441,001.97 
1922 115,341,912.83 164,077,638.60 279,419,551.43 
1923 135,560,482.94 143,145,589.73 278,706,072.67 
1924 158,945,519.30 172,804,909.05 331,750,428.35 
1925 229,763,572.84 262,259,128.18 492,022,701.02 
1926 283,393,732.38 311,306,343.15 594,700,075.53 
1927 336,036,927.80 300,444,393.19 636,481,320.99 
1928  570,368,422.04 570,368,422.04 
1929  622,732,346.31 622,732,346.31 
1930  667,892,217.31 667,892,217.31 
Sources: Profit and Loss Statements of the National Bank, 1898–1930. 
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Table A2.17: Expenses of the National Bank, 1898–1930 
(in Drachmae) 
 1st Semester 2nd Semester Total 
1898 3,962,025.99 3,770,014.09 7,732,040.08 
1899 4,109,534.85 4,046,497.01 8,156,031.86 
1900 4,076,989.97 4,176,279.39 8,253,269.36 
1901 4,149,665.03 4,196,694.86 8,346,359.89 
1902 4,243,363.03 4,288,625.40 8,531,988.43 
1903 4,376,359.38 4,450,486.84 8,826,846.22 
1904 4,503,735.35 4,774,942.06 9,278,677.41 
1905 4,689,154.70 5,068,179.04 9,757,333.74 
1906 5,055,717.65 5,476,582.15 10,532,299.80 
1907 5,519,258.60 5,861,567.46 11,380,826.06 
1908 6,059,729.94 6,303,390.23 12,363,120.17 
1909 6,436,171.84 6,395,593.45 12,831,765.29 
1910 6,056,823.05 6,079,413.16 12,136,236.21 
1911 6,640,417.05 7,124,542.76 13,764,959.81 
1912 7,377,525.50 7,678,187.40 15,055,712.90 
1913 8,100,616.94 10,996,772.09 19,097,389.03 
1914 11,895,045.72 12,336,611.20 24,231,656.92 
1915 13,087,891.18 15,107,343.33 28,195,234.51 
1916 16,124,393.25 17,112,877.36 33,237,270.61 
1917 17,582,991.47 19,730,373.14 37,313,364.61 
1918 22,299,617.61 24,026,558.67 46,326,176.28 
1919 27,687,982.75 28,772,962.03 56,460,944.78 
1920 37,091,738.92 38,900,490.43 75,992,229.35 
1921 39,729,568.02 47,511,360.11 87,240,928.13 
1922 67,534,320.21 109,080,149.74 176,614,469.95 
1923 108,405,709.44 113,706,202.86 222,111,912.30 
1924 127,349,693.43 137,821,517.44 265,171,210.87 
1925 190,884,698.28 222,309,515.97 413,194,214.25 
1926 238,352,068.30 263,796,040.33 502,148,108.63 
1927 288,591,571.62 250,261,412.54 538,852,984.16 
1928  481,524,637.67 481,524,637.67 
1929  523,203,893.79 523,203,893.79 
1930  556,108,382.96 556,108,382.96 
Source: Profit and Loss Statements of the National Bank, 1898–1930.  
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 Table A2.18: Revenue and expenses of the National Bank  
at constant prices and as a ratio, 1911=100 
 
Revenue Expenses 
At 1911 prices As a ratio At 1911 prices As a ratio 
1898 9,170,770.30 51.24 7,107,228.76 51.63 
1899 10,900,434.12 60.90 8,067,379.34 58.61 
1900 9,492,141.03 53.03 6,766,193.80 49.16 
1901 8,324,717.53 46.51 5,842,451.92 42.44 
1902 11,428,416.17 63.85 8,004,236.57 58.15 
1903 11,810,309.77 65.98 8,367,114.65 60.79 
1904 14,414,813.33 80.54 10,173,007.76 73.91 
1905 15,291,368.79 85.43 10,961,942.84 79.64 
1906 15,540,870.47 86.83 11,275,756.26 81.92 
1907 15,934,290.22 89.03 11,636,574.96 84.54 
1908 17,210,695.23 96.16 12,784,590.18 92.88 
1909 16,754,651.08 93.61 12,555,813.35 91.22 
1910 16,804,572.33 93.89 12,408,960.62 90.15 
1911 17,898,485.79 100.00 13,764,959.81 100.00 
1912 19,413,213.61 108.46 15,222,998.60 110.59 
1913 24,033,558.03 134.28 19,748,436.38 143.47 
1914 26,056,504.91 145.58 22,050,807.80 160.20 
1915 24,637,321.17 137.65 21,030,871.64 152.79 
1916 21,958,311.69 122.68 18,903,697.66 137.33 
1917 16,445,860.36 91.88 14,266,874.70 103.65 
1918 15,713,091.45 87.79 13,776,738.70 100.09 
1919 17,483,032.41 97.68 15,337,152.16 111.42 
1920 23,900,582.44 133.53 18,198,139.13 132.21 
1921 35,601,542.57 198.91 16,748,785.78 121.68 
1922 34,689,193.97 193.81 21,926,216.60 159.29 
1923 20,049,211.55 112.02 15,978,011.08 116.08 
1924 21,625,565.17 120.82 17,285,515.89 125.58 
1925 29,691,025.06 165.89 24,934,133.62 181.14 
1926 31,354,407.23 175.18 26,474,784.41 192.33 
1927 29,763,515.01 166.29 25,198,161.13 183.06 
1928 26,713,086.16 149.25 22,552,106.04 163.84 
1929 31,693,872.21 177.08 26,628,386.09 193.45 
1930 38,129,354.94 213.03 31,747,718.22 230.64 
Sources: Tables A2.16 and A2.18 in Appendix A2; Table 2.1. 
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Table A2.19: Expenses as a percentage of revenue, 1898–1930 
1898 77.50 
1899 74.01 
1900 71.28 
1901 70.18 
1902 70.04 
1903 70.85 
1904 70.57 
1905 71.69 
1906 72.56 
1907 73.03 
1908 74.28 
1909 74.94 
1910 73.84 
1911 76.91 
1912 78.42 
1913 82.17 
1914 84.63 
1915 85.36 
1916 86.09 
1917 86.75 
1918 87.68 
1919 87.73 
1920 76.14 
1921 47.05 
1922 63.21 
1923 79.69 
1924 79.93 
1925 83.98 
1926 84.44 
1927 84.66 
1928 84.42 
1929 84.02 
1930 83.26 
 
Sources: Author’s calculations using the data in Tables A2.16 and A2.17 in Appendix A2. 
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Table A2.20: Net profits of the National Bank, 1898–1930 
(in Drachmae) 
 1st Semester 2nd Semester Total 
1898 1,129,239.89 1,245,394.67 2,374,634.56 
1899 1,472,052.80 1,546,259.92 3,018,312.72 
1900 1,673,209.45 1,765,403.42 3,438,612.87 
1901 1,780,611.15 1,880,027.99 3,660,639.14 
1902 1,876,722.62 1,881,469.83 3,758,192.45 
1903 1,869,809.95 1,865,343.66 3,735,153.61 
1904 1,988,340.31 1,977,216.65 3,965,556.96 
1905 1,984,957.98 1,965,336.25 3,950,294.23 
1906 1,976,415.78 2,083,688.89 4,060,104.67 
1907 2,107,749.72 2,204,366.18 4,312,115.90 
1908 2,213,852.06 2,184,935.54 4,398,787.60 
1909 2,196,035.06 2,176,435.28 4,372,470.34 
1910 2,175,400.17 2,106,424.57 4,362,072.04 
1911 2,106,424.57 2,103,648.75 4,210,073.32 
1912 2,104,576.45 2,103,487.54 4,208,063.99 
1913 2,102,745.17 2,103,011.54 4,205,756.71 
1914 2,103,042.23 2,360,546.60 4,463,588.83 
1915 2,449,889.56 2,448,913.80 4,898,803.36 
1916 2,733,243.00 2,717,623.00 5,450,866.00 
1917 2,734,729.19 3,045,939.36 5,780,668.55 
1918 3,026,760.39 3,542,153.88 6,568,914.27 
1919 4,409,254.10 3,585,301.20 7,994,555.30 
1920 8,551,832.15 15,419,440.98 23,971,273.13 
1921 25,580,857.59 72,760,426.02 98,341,283.61 
1922 47,901,351.99 55,079,428.55 102,980,780.54 
1923 27,234,202.05 29,524,634.77 56,758,836.82 
1924 31,646,016.19 35,064,152.60 66,710,168.79 
1925 38,943,026.96 40,037,286.22 78,980,313.18 
1926 45,078,950.30 47,589,253.12 92,668,203.42 
1927 47,534,609.30 50,217,589.95 97,752,199.25 
1928  88,926,239.17 88,926,239.17 
1929  100,184,421.39 100,184,421.39 
1930  112,942,020.19 112,942,020.19 
Source: Profit and Loss Statements of the National Bank, 1898–1930.  
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 Table A2.21: Net profits at 1911 prices, 1898–1930 
 At 1911 prices As a ratio 
1898 2,182,744.90 51.85 
1899 2,985,504.97 70.91 
1900 2,819,042.98 66.96 
1901 2,562,447.40 60.86 
1902 3,525,726.94 83.75 
1903 3,540,614.36 84.10 
1904 4,347,779.32 103.27 
1905 4,437,984.88 105.41 
1906 4,346,700.29 103.25 
1907 4,409,017.38 104.73 
1908 4,548,746.27 108.04 
1909 4,278,438.72 101.62 
1910 4,460,096.13 105.94 
1911 4,210,073.32 100.00 
1912 4,254,820.26 101.06 
1913 4,349,134.78 103.30 
1914 4,061,865.84 96.48 
1915 3,654,025.46 86.79 
1916 3,100,180.04 73.64 
1917 2,210,255.62 52.50 
1918 1,953,500.65 46.40 
1919 2,171,655.32 51.58 
1920 5,740,489.09 136.35 
1921 18,879,866.68 448.45 
1922 12,784,789.94 303.67 
1923 4,083,046.76 96.98 
1924 4,348,585.50 103.29 
1925 4,766,053.38 113.21 
1926 4,885,751.17 116.05 
1927 4,571,146.01 108.58 
1928 4,164,841.88 98.93 
1929 5,098,871.56 121.11 
1930 6,447,756.49 153.15 
Source: Author’s calculations using the data in Table A2.20 and Table 2.1.  
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Table A2.22: Net Profit Margin, 1898–1930 
1898 23.50 
1899 27.01 
1900 29.41 
1901 30.49 
1902 30.58 
1903 29.73 
1904 29.94 
1905 28.82 
1906 27.82 
1907 27.48 
1908 26.24 
1909 25.42 
1910 26.44 
1911 23.42 
1912 21.84 
1913 18.05 
1914 15.56 
1915 14.80 
1916 14.09 
1917 13.41 
1918 12.42 
1919 12.40 
1920 23.98 
1921 52.99 
1922 36.83 
1923 20.35 
1924 20.10 
1925 16.05 
1926 15.58 
1927 15.36 
1928 15.59 
1929 16.07 
1930 16.88 
Sources: Tables A2.16 and A2.20 in Appendix A2. 
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Table A2.23: Dividend paid per share by the National Bank, 1898–1930 
(in Drachmae) 
 1st Semester 2nd Semester Total 
1898 50 55 105 
1899 65 70 135 
1900 75 80 155 
1901 80 85 165 
1902 85 85 170 
1903 85 85 170 
1904 90 90 180 
1905 90 90 180 
1906 90 95 185 
1907 95 100 195 
1908 100 100 200 
1909 100 100 200 
1910 100 100 200 
1911 100 100 200 
1912 100 100 200 
1913 100 100 200 
1914 100 112.5 212.5 
1915 112.5 112.5 225 
1916 125 125 250 
1917 125 140 265 
1918 140 160 300 
1919 160 160 320 
1920 180 240 420 
1921 250 300 550 
1922 350 450 800 
1923 550 650 1,200 
1924 750 900 1,650 
1925 1,100 1,100 2,200 
1926 1,200 1,300 2,500 
1927 1,300 1,300 2,600 
1928  2,600 2,600 
1929  3,000 3,000 
1930  3,400 3,400 
Source: Profit and Loss Statements of the National Bank, 1898–1930.  
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Table A2.24:  
Percentage of net profits of the National Bank paid as dividend, 1898–1930 
1898 88.43 
1899 89.45 
1900 90.15 
1901 90.15 
1902 90.47 
1903 91.03 
1904 90.78 
1905 91.13 
1906 91.13 
1907 90.44 
1908 90.93 
1909 91.48 
1910 91.70 
1911 95.01 
1912 95.06 
1913 95.11 
1914 95.21 
1915 91.86 
1916 91.73 
1917 91.68 
1918 91.34 
1919 80.05 
1920 35.04 
1921 11.19 
1922 15.54 
1923 42.28 
1924 49.47 
1925 55.71 
1926 53.96 
1927 53.20 
1928 58.48 
1929 59.89 
1930 60.21 
Sources: Tables A2.20 and A2.23 in Appendix A2. 
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 Table A2.25:  
Dividend paid per share by the National Bank at constant prices, 1898–1930 
(1911=100) 
 At 1911 prices 1911=100 
1898 96.52 48.26 
1899 133.53 66.77 
1900 127.07 63.54 
1901 115.50 57.75 
1902 159.48 79.74 
1903 161.15 80.57 
1904 197.35 98.67 
1905 202.22 101.11 
1906 198.06 99.03 
1907 199.38 99.69 
1908 206.82 103.41 
1909 195.70 97.85 
1910 204.49 102.25 
1911 200.00 100.00 
1912 202.22 101.11 
1913 206.82 103.41 
1914 193.38 96.69 
1915 167.83 83.91 
1916 142.19 71.09 
1917 101.32 50.66 
1918 89.22 44.61 
1919 86.93 43.46 
1920 100.58 50.29 
1921 105.59 52.80 
1922 99.32 49.66 
1923 86.32 43.16 
1924 107.56 53.78 
1925 132.76 66.38 
1926 131.81 65.90 
1927 121.58 60.79 
1928 121.77 60.89 
1929 152.68 76.34 
1930 194.10 97.05 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using the data in Table A2.23 and Table 2.1 in Chapter 2.  
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APPENDIX A3: Money supply, 1910–1928 
 
Table A3.1: Banknotes in circulation, January 1910–May 1928 
(end of month data, ’000.00 omitted) 
  A B C D Total 
1910 January 61,778 60,419   122,198 
 February 61,778 57,868   119,647 
 March 61,778 57,517   119,295 
 April 61,778 50,990   112,769 
 May 61,778 49,864   111,643 
 June 61,778 49,792   111,571 
 July 61,778 48,191   109,970 
 August 61,778 58,236   120,015 
 September 61,778 58,801 7,500  128,080 
 October 61,778 50,190 14,209  126,177 
 November 61,778 48,255 14,984  125,018 
 December 61,778 42,601 21,476  125,856 
1911 January 61,778 37,891 22,490  122,160 
 February 61,778 33,442 25,000  120,221 
 March 61,778 28,986 25,000  115,764 
 April 61,778 25,381 25,000  112,159 
 May 61,778 23,935 25,000  110,713 
 June 61,778 24,975 25,000  111,753 
 July 61,778 22,327 25,000  109,106 
 August 61,778 37,438 25,000  124,217 
 September 61,778 49,342 25,000  136,120 
 October 61,778 41,589 31,000  134,367 
 November 61,778 40,598 29,850  132,226 
 December 61,778 42,718 30,850  135,347 
1912 January 61,778 36,062 33,000  130,841 
 February 61,778 35,597 33,000  130,376 
 March 61,778 36,473 34,000  132,252 
 April 61,778 32,204 35,000  128,983 
 May 61,778 30,678 35,000  127,457 
 June 61,778 29,593 35,000  126,372 
 July 61,778 30,328 35,000  127,107 
 August 61,778 39,201 40,000  140,979 
 September 61,778 56,269 56,500  174,547 
 October 61,778 48,074 75,000  184,853 
 November 61,778 39,325 90,000  191,103 
 December 61,778 34,967 100,000  196,746 
1913 January 61,778 25,720 110,000  197,498 
 February 61,778 26,428 108,766  196,972 
 March 61,778 23,973 114,000  199,751 
 April 61,778 18,319 122,730  202,827 
 May 61,778 13,029 128,234  203,041 
 June 61,778 9,165 135,681  206,624 
 July 61,778 8,545 140,802  211,125 
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  A B C D Total 
 August 61,778 19,820 142,486  224,084 
 September 61,778 23,604 149,804  235,186 
 October 61,778 17,551 156,319  235,648 
 November 61,778 13,434 160,595  235,807 
 December 61,778 6,870 165,825  234,473 
1914 January 61,778 0 168,540  230,318 
 February 61,778 0 166,533  228,311 
 March 61,778 0 157,698  219,476 
 April 61,778 0 157,368  219,146 
 May 61,778 0 152,470  214,248 
 June 61,778 0 150,564  212,342 
 July 61,778 13,397 167,613  242,788 
 August 61,778 24,877 170,613  257,268 
 September 61,778 28,044 170,613  260,435 
 October 61,778 16,721 170,613  249,112 
 November 61,778 21,637 167,613  251,028 
 December 60,951 37,742 153,513  252,206 
1915 January 60,951 52,376 133,513  246,840 
 February 60,951 58,829 133,513  253,293 
 March 60,951 64,583 133,513  259,047 
 April 60,951 70,470 133,513  264,934 
 May 58,951 71,737 133,513  264,201 
 June 58,951 75,164 133,513  267,628 
 July 58,951 75,211 133,513  267,675 
 August 58,951 77,548 133,513  270,012 
 September 58,951 125,507 133,513  317,971 
 October 58,951 133,960 153,513  346,424 
 November 58,951 125,084 173,513  357,548 
 December 58,951 136,447 183,513  378,911 
1916 January 58,952 129,704 200,000  388,656 
 February 58,952 143,372 205,000  407,324 
 March 58,952 141,572 215,000  415,524 
 April 58,952 143,453 225,000  427,405 
 May 57,952 137,367 245,000  440,319 
 June 57,952 129,356 260,000  447,308 
 July 57,952 132,997 260,000  450,949 
 August 57,952 142,219 270,000  470,171 
 September 57,952 143,494 300,000  501,446 
 October 57,952 135,450 325,000  518,402 
 November 57,952 136,578 350,000  544,530 
 December 56,952 137,437 360,000  554,389 
1917 January 56,951 142,017 365,000  563,968 
 February 56,951 140,894 375,000  572,845 
 March 56,951 141,142 385,000  583,093 
 April 56,951 134,781 390,000  581,732 
 May 56,951 138,211 410,000  605,162 
 June 56,951 135,865 445,000  637,816 
 July 56,951 122,887 475,848  655,686 
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  A B C D Total 
 August 56,951 137,638 490,848  685,437 
 September 56,951 126,903 540,848  724,702 
 October 56,951 113,324 609,448  779,723 
 November 56,951 116,127 628,806  801,884 
 December 54,951 114,371 678,806  848,128 
1918 January 54,951 144,323 692,859  892,133 
 February 54,951 112,907 768,109  935,967 
 March 54,951 124,263 800,068  979,282 
 April 54,951 107,112 832,368  994,431 
 May 54,951 115,024 859,595  1,029,570 
 June 54,951 137,666 880,714  1,073,331 
 July 54,951 128,973 924,966  1,108,890 
 August 54,951 140,075 927,005  1,122,031 
 September 54,951 142,913 975,194  1,173,058 
 October 54,951 139,829 1,021,654  1,216,434 
 November 54,951 105,542 1,066,698  1,227,191 
 December 52,951 44,539 1,160,333  1,257,823 
1919 January 52,951 54,149 1,160,572  1,267,672 
 February 52,951 98,020 1,121,394  1,272,365 
 March 52,951 108,560 1,121,394  1,282,905 
 April 52,951 87,801 1,172,371  1,313,123 
 May 52,951 72,092 1,206,121  1,331,164 
 June 52,951 74,369 1,206,361  1,333,681 
 July 52,951 83,513 1,196,897  1,333,361 
 August 52,951 101,969 1,197,058  1,351,978 
 September 52,951 137,823 1,200,000  1,390,774 
 October 52,951 99,299 1,227,300  1,379,550 
 November 52,951 120,538 1,193,941  1,367,430 
 December 50,951 130,354 1,193,941  1,375,246 
1920 January 50,951 147,706 1,163,089  1,361,746 
 February 50,951 150,774 1,159,883  1,361,608 
 March 50,951 153,159 1,188,883  1,392,993 
 April 50,951 142,861 1,195,317  1,389,129 
 May 50,951 156,359 1,182,061  1,389,371 
 June 50,951 161,607 1,181,991  1,394,549 
 July 50,951 176,289 1,167,378  1,394,618 
 August 50,951 234,341 1,167,378  1,452,670 
 September 50,951 270,714 1,167,378  1,489,043 
 October 50,951 338,045 1,090,268  1,479,264 
 November 50,951 347,849 1,091,816  1,490,616 
 December 48,951 362,133 1,097,281  1,508,365 
1921 January 48,951 358,929 1,097,281  1,505,161 
 February 48,951 413,046 1,097,281  1,559,278 
 March 48,951 456,620 1,097,281  1,602,852 
 April 48,951 541,845 1,097,281  1,688,077 
 May 48,951 588,968 1,097,281  1,735,200 
 June 48,951 612,208 1,097,281  1,758,440 
 July 48,951 669,989 1,097,281  1,816,221 
333 
 
  A B C D Total 
 August 48,951 730,948 1,097,281  1,877,180 
 September 48,951 904,588 1,097,281  2,050,820 
 October 48,951 963,853 1,097,281  2,110,085 
 November 48,951 974,945 1,097,281  2,121,177 
 December 46,951 1,016,950 1,097,281  2,161,182 
1922 January 46,951 929197 1,139,784  2,115,932 
 February 46,951 1,030,844 1,139,784  2,217,579 
 March 46,951 10,835 1,139,784  1,197,570 
 April 46,951 220,589 1,139,784  1,407,324 
 May 46,951 354,575 1,139,784  1,541,310 
 June 45,951 522,269 1,139,784  1,708,004 
 July 45,951 656,595 1,139,784  1,842,330 
 August 45,951 853,903 1,139,784  2,039,638 
 September 45,951 1,141,161 1,139,784  2,326,896 
 October 45,951 1,458,952 1,139,784  2,644,687 
 November 45,951 1,756,162 1,139,784  2,941,897 
 December 44,951 1,964,710 1,139,784  3,149,445 
1923 January 44,952 2,242,662 1,139,784  3,427,398 
 February 44,952 2,368,794 1,139,784  3,553,530 
 March 44,952 2,526,308 1,139,784  3,711,044 
 April 44,952 2,781,327 1,139,784  3,966,063 
 May 44,952 3,012,215 1,139,784 99,117 4,296,068 
 June 44,952 3,030,492 1,139,784 126,320 4,341,548 
 July 44,952 2,900,057 1,139,784 126,320 4,211,113 
 August 44,952 2,932,611 1,139,784 126,320 4,243,667 
 September 44,952 3,126,903 1,139,784 18,703 4,330,342 
 October 44,952 3,259,720 1,139,784 78,908 4,523,364 
 November 42,952 2,937,012 1,139,784 428,520 4,548,268 
 December 42,952 2,798,569 1,139,784 699,895 4,681,200 
1924 January 42,952 2,630,533 1,139,784 779,525 4,592,794 
 February 42,952 2,754,698 1,139,784 575,283 4,512,717 
 March 42,952 2,822,272 1,139,784 695,531 4,700,539 
 April 42,952 2,150,747 1,139,784 1,467,672 4,801,155 
 May 42,952 1,989,898 1,139,784 1,440,612 4,613,246 
 June 42,952 2,056,780 1,139,784 1,302,745 4,542,261 
 July 42,952 2,057,507 1,139,784 1,234,943 4,475,186 
 August 42,952 1,984,589 1,139,784 1,255,169 4,422,494 
 September 42,952 2,191,049 1,139,784 1,280,074 4,653,859 
 October 42,952 2,521,050 1,139,784 1,049,993 4,753,779 
 November 42,952 2,777,338 1,139,784 866,176 4,826,250 
 December 40,952 2,968,765 1,139,784 716,423 4,865,924 
1925 January 40,952 2,975,411 1,139,784 691,220 4,847,367 
 February 40,952 3,013,778 1,139,784 784,675 4,979,189 
 March 40,952 2,845,408 1,139,784 1,196,292 5,222,436 
 April 40,952 2,889,352 1,139,784 1,171,110 5,241,198 
 May 40,952 2,935,086 1,139,784 982,125 5,097,947 
 June 40,952 2,997,752 1,139,784 1,003,212 5,181,700 
 July 40,952 2,940,850 1,139,784 1,181,172 5,302,758 
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  A B C D Total 
 August 40,952 2,934,939 1,139,784 1,187,147 5,302,822 
 September 40,952 2,959,418 1,139,784 1,407,691 5,547,845 
 October 40,952 2,938,442 1,139,784 1,517,347 5,636,525 
 November 40,952 2,915,520 1,139,784 1,396,994 5,493,250 
 December 40,000 3,143,364 1,139,784 1,016,101 5,339,249 
1926 January 40,000 2,394,074 1,139,784 620,706 4,194,564 
 February 40,000 2,446,020 1,139,784 631,395 4,257,199 
 March 40,000 2,729,359 1,139,784 362,319 4,271,462 
 April 40,000 2,886,559 1,139,784 408,336 4,474,679 
 May 40,000 2,875,456 1,139,784 311,781 4,367,021 
 June 40,000 2,878,195 1,139,784 472,468 4,530,447 
 July 40,000 3,149,643 1,139,784 198,176 4,527,603 
 August 40,000 3,035,353 1,139,784 335,074 4,550,211 
 September 40,000 3,013,501 1,139,784 492,895 4,686,180 
 October 40,000 2,893,235 1,139,784 644,694 4,717,713 
 November 40,000 2,680,176 1,139,784 926,526 4,786,486 
 December 40,000 2,500,370 1,139,784 1,184,486 4,864,640 
1927 January 40,000 2,350,635 1,139,784 1,314,878 4,845,297 
 February 40,000 2,677,520 1,139,784 1,073,242 4,930,546 
 March 40,000 2,902,674 1,139,784 889,855 4,972,313 
 April 40,000 2,598,690 1,139,784 1,263,656 5,042,130 
 May 40,000 2,418,206 1,139,784 1,261,359 4,859,349 
 June 40,000 2,401,625 1,139,784 1,243,182 4,824,591 
 July 40,000 2,621,031 1,139,784 970,741 4,771,556 
 August 40,000 2,705,032 1,139,784 958,269 4,843,085 
 September 40,000 2,971,695 1,139,784 974,835 5,126,314 
 October 40,000 3,011,764 1,139,784 1,041,787 5,233,335 
 November 40,000 2,749,418 1,139,784 1,090,315 5,019,517 
 December 40,000 2,626,819 1,139,784 1,159,655 4,966,258 
1928 January 40,000 2,499,844 1,139,784 1,151,113 4,830,741 
 February 40,000 2,463,843 1,139,784 1,245,885 4,889,512 
 March 40,000 2,400,969 1,139,784 1,314,735 4,895,488 
 April 40,000 2,212,860 1,139,784 1,501,292 4,893,936 
 May 40,000 2,025802 1,139,784 1,657,767 4,863,353 
Notes: 
(1) The second column headed A of the table above shows the banknotes in circulation 
because of the ΒΦΙΘ Law of 1898. 
(2) The third column headed B indicates the banknotes in circulation for the account of the 
National Bank. In the 1920s banknotes issued for the account of the government were 
reported together with the banknotes in circulation because of the privilege of the National 
Bank. 
(3) Column headed C shows the banknotes in circulation under the ΓΧΜΒ Law. 
(4) Column headed D indicates the banknotes in circulation under the law of 23 April 1923.  
(5) Total is the sum of columns A, B, C and D.  
Sources: Annual Reports of the National Bank, 1910–1928. 
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APPENDIX A4: Interest rate paid on Old Gold Loans, 1898–1930 
 
 
Table A4.1: Interest rate paid on the Monopoly Loan, 1898–1930 
 % of Original 
Interest Rate 
Rate of 
Interest Paid 
 % of Original 
Interest Rate 
Rate of 
Interest Paid 
1898 43 1.72 1915 63 2.52 
1899 53.25 2.13 1916 67 2.68 
1900 50.75 2.03 1917 65 2.60 
1901 53 2.12 1918 65 2.60 
1902 51.25 2.05 1919 69 2.76 
1903 47 1.88 1920 100 4.00 
1904 47 1.88 1921 100 4.00 
1905 51 2.04 1922 85 3.40 
1906 51 2.04 1923 85 3.40 
1907 55 2.20 1924 85 3.40 
1908 55 2.20 1925 97 3.88 
1909 53 2.12 1926 100 4.00 
1910 57 2.28 1927 97 3.88 
1911 59 2.36 1928 97 3.88 
1912 59 2.36 1929 100 4.00 
1913 61 2.44 1930 100 4.00 
1914 55 2.20    
Note: The minimum interest rate fixed by the Law of Control was 1.72 per cent or 43 per cent 
of the original interest rate. 
Source: The Stock Exchange Year Book (1914–1930); Wynne (1951, p. 336). 
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 APPENDIX A5: Bank of Greece, 14 May 1928 
 
Table A5.1: Balance Sheet of the Bank of Greece, 14 May 1928 
(’000 omitted) 
  
Thousand 
Drachmae 
% of 
Total 
Assets 
 
% of GDP1 
ASSETS    
Gold Coin and Bullion 876,306 11.05 2.84 
Foreign Gold Exchange (Article 62 of 
Statutes) 
 
3,191,081 
 
40.24 
 
10.34 
Other Foreign Exchange 9,828 0.12 0.03 
Subsidiary Greek Coins 0 0 0 
Inland Bills and Notes 49,999 0.63 0.16 
Advances 0 0 0 
Government Debt 3,759,525 47.41 12.18 
Investments 0 0 0 
Bank Buildings and Equipment  0 0 0 
Other Assets 42,938 0.54 0.14 
    
LIABILITIES    
Capital Paid Up 400,000 5.04 1.30 
Reserve Funds 0 0 0 
Bank Notes in Circulation 4,863,353 61.33 15.75 
Other Sight Liabilities in Drachmae:    
   1) Current and Deposit Accounts:    
       a) Government Accounts 666,738 8.41 2.16 
       b) Banks’ Accounts 964,588 12.16 3.12 
       c) Other Accounts 891,430 11.24 2.89 
   2) Bank Post Bills and Demand Drafts 0 0 0 
Deposits in Drachmae at Notice:    
       a) Government Accounts 0 0 0 
       b) Banks’ Accounts 0 0 0 
       c) Other Accounts 0 0 0 
Foreign Exchange Liabilities:     
       a) Foreign Gold Exchange (Article 62) 103,383 1.30 0.33 
       b) Other Foreign Exchange 9,828 0.12 0.03 
Other Liabilities 30,357 0.38 0.10 
    
TOTAL: 7,929,677 100.00 25.68 
 
Note: 1The GDP of 1927 has been used for the estimates. 
Sources: Annual Report of the Bank of Greece for 1928 (1929), pp. 57–58; Kostelenos et al. 
(2007), Table 7–II, column headed 3, p.38 of CD. 
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APPENDIX A6: Greek public debt: some general information 
 
 
Table A6.1: Some general information on Greek public debt, 1898–1928 
 1898 1913 1928 
Total public debt (in drachmae) 1,305,841,866.69 1,216,479,596.00 44,720,268,534.00 
Public debt as % of GDP 229.66 141.99 133.02 
    
Public debt per capita in drachmae 528.96 252.39 7,207.50 
Public debt per capita in gold drachmae 358.84 252.39 483.72 
Public debt per capita in French francs 358.84 252.39 2,397.31 
Public debt per capita in pounds sterling 14.35 10.10 19.22 
    
External public debt in the total public debt (%) 86.69 67.98 66.77 
Domestic public debt in the total public debt (%) 13.31 32.02 33.23 
    
% of forced circulation in total public debt 7.18 5.08 8.47 
% of forced circulation in total domestic public debt 53.94 15.86 25.50 
Notes:  
(1) The 2.50 per cent Guaranteed Loan was included in public debt for 1898.   
(2) Data on public debt for 1928 are after the stabilisation of the drachma. 
Sources: Lekatsas (1919, pp. 36–41); Annual Report of the Bank of Greece for 1928 (1929, pp. 59–65); Commission Financiere Internationale (1929, p. 20); 
Andreades (1939, pp. 560–561); Dertiles (1993, pp 144–145); Lazaretou (2014, pp. 161–162).  
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APPENDIX A7: 
 
A7.1: Text of the 1918 Book Credits Agreement between Greece and the Allies 
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 Source: The Times, 10 March 1922.  
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